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ABSTRACT
During the 1980’s, governments in both Britain and the U.S. were increasingly 
inclined to shift costs and obligations onto developers. In the U.S., a variety of methods 
were experimented with, but the predominant technique which emerged was to impose 
mandatory, fixed exactions and “impact fees.” In Britain, local authorities negotiated legal 
agreements which frequently involved “contributions.” This thesis evaluates the 
negotiation of agreements in Britain in light of contrasting U.S. experience with developer 
finance.
The thesis begins by setting developer finance in historical context, describing how 
and why different methods of developer finance emerged in the two countries. Planning 
research and literature in Britain and the U.S. are analysed and compared to identify 
important research questions regarding the attitudes of planners and developers, the 
rationale for obtaining developer payments, the process for obtaining payments, factors 
affecting local government success in extracting payments, the incidence of developer 
payments, and the presumed effects of developer finance on planning and development 
control.
The core of the thesis describes empirical research conducted in England, analysing 
how local authorities in a high-growth region used agreements between 1985 and 1990.
An important feature of the research is that it examines local authority use of agreements in 
a specific geographic and planning context This research calls into question many widely 
held assumptions about how planning agreements have been used, and suggests that, in the 
British context, negotiated agreements have significant planning advantages. The thesis 
argues that an important criteria for evaluating developer finance is how it functions in 
relation to regional planning and growth management objectives, and that additional 
geographically-based research is needed in both countries to evaluate the effects of 
developer finance on patterns of development, and on the achievement of planning policies.
To Lynne, my wife of 25 years.
Your support and encouragement made this thesis possible.
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION
The TVend Toward Developer Finance
In the United States and Britain during the 1980’s, it became increasingly common 
for local governments to extract payments from, or impose other kinds of obligations on 
developers in exchange for the granting of planning permission. And yet, in neither 
country was the shift toward developer finance the consequence of a centrally directed and 
consciously adopted policy at the national level Rather, in both countries, developer 
finance emerged from the bottom up. Perhaps as a result, remarkably little empirical 
research has been conducted in Britain, or at the national level in the U.S., to evaluate the 
potential long term effects of developer finance on the practice of planning and development 
control, and on patterns of development What effect has developer finance had on the 
willingness of local planning authorities to grant planning permission, on where planning 
permission has been granted, and on the types of projects which have received planning 
permission? What types of communities have been most successful in utilising developer 
finance? And what factors have strengthened the ability of local planning authorities to 
obtain payments from developers? This thesis will attempt to provide answers to these and 
other previously unasked questions, and to test the conventional wisdom which has arisen 
on the subject of developer finance in the absence of sound empirical research.
In Britain there has been considerable disagreement and debate about whether the 
negotiation of agreements has been fair or overly burdensome to developers. The fact that 
this seemingly simple and fundamental question has provoked widely opposing views and 
interpretations is an indication of the fundamental confusion which has existed about the 
nature and effects of developer finance. This confusion is a reflection of the fact that the 
nature and effects of developer finance can vary significantly, depending on the methods 
used, and on how those methods are applied in specific contexts. The effects of developer 
finance can best be understood and judged by evaluating how it has been used in specific 
contexts. Indeed, the effects of developer finance may vary substantially, depending on 
exactly what developers have been required to pay for, and on how and when they have 
been made to pay.
Urban Development. Land Values and Developer Finance
The question of whether making developers pay has been onerous or fair to 
developers is difficult to confront without considering the relationship between developer 
finance and land values, and whether developer finance has had a positive or negative effect 
on land values. A number of British commentators (McAuslan,1984; Keogh,1985) have 
suggested that British local authorities* practice of encouraging (or possibly forcing) 
developers to agree to make “contributions” in exchange for obtaining planning permission
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has been nothing less than a local attempt at taxing gains in land value- i.e. betterment 
Thus, a consideration of the problem of developer finance raises important questions about 
the redistributive aspects of developer finance. It also raises broader questions about the 
effects of planning, development control, and infrastructure investment on land values and 
development gain.
In attempting to plan and manage growth and development, planning authorities 
make decisions, and take actions which have a profound impact on land and property 
values. Sometimes those actions have an extremely negative impact on land values on 
some areas, while enhancing values in other areas. In the U.S. considerable attention has 
been focused on the need to compensate owners of properties which have lost economic 
value as a result of public actions or imposed restrictions. However, the overall effect of 
actions taken by public planning authorities has almost always been generally positive. 
“Planning authorities have not only redistributed large amounts of income and wealth but 
have actually created income and wealth” (Balchin and Kieve,1986,125). Indeed, it might 
well be argued that one of the principle unstated objectives of planning and development 
control in both Britain and the United States has been to enhance property values.
Three kinds of activities undertaken by public authorities can have a distinctly 
positive impact on land values. The preparation o f plans for the future development of areas 
is often sufficient to create positive expectations, and will often have the effect of increasing 
property values. “Local authorities* plans of an area greatly influence land owners* 
expectations regarding price level. The more definite the plans for how a given area is to be 
used, the higher are the prices asked on sale of the land.. .** (Svensson,1974,73). In a 
very real sense, plans prepared by public authorities have represented “a speculator’s guide” 
(Hall,1973,434), encouraging development and increasing land values in selected areas, 
while discouraging development in others. A second way in which public authorities have 
enhanced land values, and the profitability of development, has been through the exercise 
of development control. The extent to which land values have been enhanced by restrictive 
development controls has been repeatedly emphasised in the literature on town planning 
produced in Britain (Hall, Thomas and Drewett,1973; Drewett,1973; Pearce, Cuny and 
Goodchild, 1978; Ravetz,1980; Walters,1983; Balchin and Kieve,1986). Making land 
more costly (and valuable) has been far from detrimental to major landowners and 
developers. As Rydin has pointed out,
... development control is vital to the land speculation activities of housebuilders, 
both in maintaining the attractiveness of certain development locations and in 
granting such development rights to a limited number of landowners... The grant 
of planning permission on a particular site, in these circumstances, gready increases 
the value of that site. Thus it is to the benefit of local landowners, including 
housebuilders with landbanks held for capital appreciation, if generally restrictive 
planning control coexists with the possibility of planning permission being granted 
on their land (Rydin,1986,29).
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Not only has development control had an important influence on land values, but it also has 
had an important effect on the profitability of development Barras (1985,94) argues that 
“the more restrictive is development control, the higher is the rate of development profit, 
even though the total volume of profit may be reduced.**
The third way in which public authorities can have a major positive impact on land 
values is by making investments in infrastructure to support development The term 
“infrastructure,** derived from the Latin “infra,** meaning “below,** has been used generally
to refer to a “wide range of structures... on or under the ground for which the public
sector has the main responsibility*’ (GLC,1985,2). Types of structures and improvements 
most commonly thought of as “infrastructure” are roads and transport facilities (including 
bridges and tunnels,) water supply and distribution facilities, sewers and surface drainage 
facilities, gas and power lines, and other basic structures and facilities which are essential 
for the development and economic functioning of modem communities. Over time, the 
term “infrastructure” has been used in an increasingly broad sense to include additional 
improvements, community facilities such as fire and police stations, schools, libraries and 
community centres, as well as open space, recreation improvements, and other amenities. 
As noted by Whitehead (1983) and Shoup (1983), extending infrastructure to previously 
unserviced land will have the effect of significantly increasing the value of that land.
Public investments in transportation improvements can have a particularly pronounced and 
positive effect on property values (Misczynski, 1978c, 105; Bajic,1983). As Neutze 
(1974,91) has observed, “... public investments in urban services (roads, railways, 
sewers, schools, parks, airports, etc.) are among the most important determinants of future 
[land] values.” Infrastructure provision can have such a major impact on the value of land 
that speculators will tend to anticipate extensions of urban services, so that the price paid 
for agricultural land is often “well above what it would fetch for agriculture”
(Neutze,1970,316). Moreover, “As the prospect of urban infrastructure improvements 
draws close the price of agricultural land on the fringe rises still further” (Ibid.). The 
provision of public sewer and water facilities will substantially increase land values in areas 
benefiting from these facilities, creating windfalls for landowners (Walters, 1983). There 
is really no way that public authorities can avoid taking actions which exert effects on land 
values. If infrastructure is not extended to facilitate development in new areas, land with 
such infrastructure already available will become all the more valuable, and the owners of 
that land will reap the windfall.
Of the three above-mentioned actions that public authorities can take to enhance the 
value of land, the provision of public infrastructure is probably the most essential and 
important in enabling new, wealth-creating development to occur. The preparation of plans, 
although often having a positive impact on property values, cannot in and of itself assure 
that development will occur. Moreover, although planning regulations may raise the value
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of land with planning permission by preventing inappropriate development from occurring, 
the exercise of regulation alone may not be sufficient to create the positive conditions 
necessary to stimulate development For productive development to occur on undeveloped 
land, it is often necessary that basic infrastructure and public facilities be provided. The 
finance of infrastructure and facilities in support of development has traditionally been an 
important responsibility of city and local governments, and a potentially important tool for 
the management and control of development As Healey (1988,14) has noted “the need to 
relate urban development to infrastructure investment in more efficient ways” has been an 
important goal of public sector urban planning.
The physical development which generally occurs in areas where infrastructure is 
provided is the most visible sign of the effects of public infrastructure expenditure. But 
there are other less visible effects, such as on the landscape of land values, and on levels of 
investment and earnings. As Doebele (1982,1) has pointed out, the process of urban 
development is “a wealth-producing process.” It should, therefore, somehow be possible 
to raise the revenue necessary to finance infrastructure improvements that are crucial for that 
wealth-creating process to proceed. The ironic fact, though, is that cities have been 
increasingly “impoverished,” (Ibid.) and therefore unable to finance public infrastructure 
improvements with revenues raised through traditional means of taxation. “The resources 
available [to public authorities] for maintaining existing infrastructure and investing in new 
structures has ... deteriorated” (Cars and Snickars,1991,7). And so in many parts of the 
world, including Britain and the U.S., there has been a worsening cycle of public 
disinvestment in infrastructure.
The ability of governments to finance new infrastructure has been doubly strained, 
because land values have risen as a result of public actions.
Local authorities who buy sites in developing areas for services as and when 
required normally have to pay a price which reflects the value of that land for some 
form of development, and the value will normally have been enhanced by the 
provision or the prospect of provision of those and other public services ... Thus 
local authorities may have to make a ‘double payment* for land required for 
statutory purposes in the sense that they are paying a price which reflects the benefit 
of services which they themselves or some other public authority are providing 
(Sheaf Committee, 1972, para 39).
How then can governments, which are increasingly short of money, afford to 
provide the infrastructure and facilities necessary for development and wealth creation?
One solution would be for local authorities to attempt to recoup some of the value which 
they have helped to create. “In some cases, land prices rise as a direct result of expenditure 
by public authorities, e.g. a new road. It seems reasonable that the authority concerned 
should, if it is feasible, be able to recoup some of the rise in land values** (Hallett and 
Williams,1988a, 10). The seriousness of the problem seems to underscore the need for 
new approaches to developer finance. As Doebele has argued (1982,2), “If the situation is
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ever to be remedied, new institutions must be established, instruments that will permit 
governments to recapture at least a part of the wealth created by urbanization... enough to 
permit them to install new services as rapidly as they are needed.”
The concept of recouping increases in land value as a means of financing the 
provision and improvement of public infrastructure and facilities is not a new idea. Some 
of the most historically significant and successful past examples of city planning and 
improvement were made possible by capturing the increased value created through planning 
and infrastructure investment: the planning and development of Washington D.C. in 1791 
(see Reps,1987); the building of Central Park in New York in the 1850’s (see 
Fogelsong,1986); the monumental replanning and rebuilding of Paris by Napoleon ID and 
Baron Von Haussman between 1854 and 1869 (See Pinckney,1958); and the development 
of Letchworth and Welwyn Garden Cities in the early Twentieth Century. Perhaps the most 
dramatic demonstration of the feasibility of financing public infrastructure by recouping the 
increased value was the ambitious New Town building programme carried out in Britain by 
the British Government after World War n. Twelve New Towns were initially designated 
in 1947, and between 1948 and 1970 another 16 New Towns were established. Between 
1947 and 1976, the government invested a total of £1,682,386,278 in building the New 
Towns (Osborn and Whittick,1977,66). The strategy of up-front public investment and 
subsequent recoupment of value was remarkably successful in financial terms. The first 12 
New Towns, “taken together, paid their way within 12 years from their start” (Ibid.). The 
16 towns designated after 1947 “took about 15 years to repay their capital investment and 
interest to the Treasury” (Ibid.). More recent research by Heim (1990) suggests that as the 
government-funded programme of developing new towns in England proceeded, the 
Treasury began to recognise the potential not simply of off-setting costs, but for making a 
competitive rate of return on its invested public funds.
Despite these successful past models, with the election of conservative 
administrations at the national level in Britain and the U.S. toward the end of the 1970*s, 
the notion that the government should take the lead in financing infrastructure 
improvements with public funds fell increasingly out of fashion. Quite to the contrary, 
national governments in both countries looked for ways to reduce levels of taxation and 
public expenditure. Funding provided by national governments to local governments was 
especially vulnerable to cutbacks. Confronted with these fiscal limitations, local 
governments in both countries searched for alternative means of finance, and in the process 
appeared to find it increasingly attractive to look to developers to pay for facilities and 
improvements which were formerly financed publicly through general taxation.
Differing Approaches to Developer Finance
In the U.S., payments from developers were extracted in the context of a largely
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prescriptive, zoning-based planning system, which afforded local planning authorities little 
discretion in reviewing applications for development, and relatively little opportunity to 
negotiate with developers regarding the content of their development or proposals, or 
additional benefits which might be provided to the community in return for approval. In the 
context of this prescriptive approach to development control, the most common approach to 
developer finance was for local governments to impose mandatory charges (exactions and 
impact fees), which were entirely non-negotiable, and which were the same for all similar 
developments within a given community. In Britain, there was much less willingness to 
impose mandatory obligations and exactions on applicants for planning permission. The 
one way in which local authorities could hope to impose obligations on developers was by 
negotiating consensual agreements, containing possible offers of “contributions.” The 
process of negotiating “contributions” from developers came to be known as the negotiation 
of “planning gain.” “Planning gain” came to refer to any desired public benefit secured by 
a local authority in the process of granting planning permission (Kayden,1988,163). 
Jowell, who conducted the first intensive study of negotiated contributions, defined 
planning gain as “... the achievement of a benefit to the community that was not part of the 
initial application (and was therefore negotiated) and that was not of itself normally 
commercially advantageous to the developer” (Jowell, 1977a, 418).
The most unique characteristic of the “planning gain” approach to developer finance 
was that the gains achieved by the community, (i.e. additional costs imposed on the 
developer) were obtained largely through a process of bargaining. The process of 
bargaining, in the context of urban planning and development control, has been described 
as “case-specific land use policy making that benefits both the public and private sectors,” 
as opposed to ‘“rule application,’ where the public sector applies some set of already- 
established policies, such as a zoning ordinance, to a proposed development” (Kirlin,1985, 
1). Put another way, the practice of obtaining planning gain was based on “negotiation and 
consensus, rather than unilateral dictate.” (Grant,1985,88)
The following scenario describes one way that planning gain might be achieved:
An applicant approaches a planning officer for informal advice about a proposed
development The applicant would be told that his proposal at present would
never meet with the approval of the elected members. On the other hand, if the 
applicant were prepared to incorporate a number of residential units within the 
development, and perhaps to dedicate some public open space, the members would 
be likely to be far more sympathetic. The applicant would then draft a formal 
submission incorporating these ‘gains* (Jowell,1977a, 73-74).
Under the above scenario, the developer entered into negotiations before actually 
submitting a formal application for planning permission, and then modified his application 
for planning permission to incorporate features desired by the local planning authority 
(LPA). Under this scenario, gains achieved by the LPA would be incorporated in the
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development proposal, and there would not necessarily be a need to enter into a formal 
planning agreement A second way in which planning gain could be secured would be by 
negotiating a legal agreement after a planning application has been submitted. The local 
authority would agree to grant planning permission subject to the applicant agreeing to 
assume certain specified obligations -- and possibly even to make a financial contribution to 
the local authority. In such cases, the gains “offered** up by the developer might be viewed 
as the “price** of obtaining planning permission (McAuslan, 1984,84).
Experience as an American Planner Which Motivated This Research
I initially became interested in the problem of developer finance in the course of my 
work as Planning Director for a small city in the U.S. (33,000 population, 35 square 
miles). I began work as Planning Director for Northampton, Massachusetts in 1980, just 
one month before a referendum (called “Proposition 2 1/2**) was passed which prevented 
municipalities in the state of Massachusetts from increasing their property tax collections by 
more than 2.5% per year. This statewide law effectively limited the ability of the City of 
Northampton, and other cities in the state, to finance and provide new infrastructure and 
facilities to serve new development. To make matters worse, from 1984 through 1988, 
there was a major development boom in Massachusetts (Case,1992), which was 
accompanied by surging property values. As a result of the constraints of Proposition 2 
1/2, the city was unable to raise sufficient revenue from local property tax collections to 
meet the needs and demands for new infrastructure and facilities occasioned by new 
development.
Local governments in the U.S., faced with increased financial demands for facilities 
and services, and with decreased revenues, could respond in any of three ways. They 
could try to slow down and discourage new development. They could reduce public 
infrastructure expenditure. Or, they could seek to raise additional money from sources 
other than the property tax, and to impose special fees on new developments.
As the boom intensified in Northampton, there was increased citizen and political 
pressure on the city’s Planning Department and Planning Board to implement measures to 
limit and stop development There were calls for increasing minimum lot size 
requirements, for lowering allowed densities of development, and even for imposing a 
fixed limit on the number of building permits which could be issued in a given year. 
Responding to this pressure, the city first reduced its public works budget by cutting back 
on plans to improve and widen roads. Then excess capacity in public schools, which could 
have assured the ability to absorb new school children from new developments, was 
eliminated by closing and selling surplus schools. Lastly, the city attempted to raise 
additional money through user fees, by raising fees charged for water and sewer services. 
(Much of the cost of water and sewer had previously been paid for out of property taxes.)
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However, the city was not able to impose development impact fees on new developments. 
In Massachusetts during the 1980's development boom, there was no enabling legislation at 
the state level authorising municipalities to impose impact fees to cover the cost of needed 
off-site improvements.
The experience of attempting to plan for and control growth, at a time when public 
funds were inadequate to meet the needs of new development and when public attitudes 
toward growth and new development had become increasingly antagonistic, led me to begin 
to consider the issues and questions which are explored in this thesis.
- How can and should local government finance the public infrastructure 
and facility costs of new development?
- To what extent should developers and landowners be expected to pay 
the public costs imposed by their developments, including off-site costs?
- What methods of developer finance make the most sense in terms of 
equity and efficiency, and in terms of achieving the objectives of 
planning and development control?
Reasons For Conducting Research in Britain
As an American-trained planner I welcomed the opportunity to study how local 
planning authorities and planners in Britain approached the problem of trying to secure 
contributions from developers. Although British planners have often looked to the U.S. for 
new ideas and approaches to planning and development control, I agree with Haar (1984, 
xii) that Americans have much to learn from the example and experience of British planning 
and development control. England offered a number of advantages as a context in which to 
carry out empirical research on developer finance. British planners have “pioneered” not 
only in the planned development of cities, but also in attempting to “capture for the public... 
planning-induced increases in property values”(Ibid.). The logic of conducting research on 
developer finance in Britain was further reinforced by the fact that the British planning 
system- by maintaining tight control over development, and by producing a compact 
settlement pattern which has been highly efficient in terms of public infrastructure 
investment— has had a much greater impact on land values and development gain than has 
the American planning system. As a result, it seemed reasonable to expect that the 
relationship between payments from developers and the value of development rights might 
be clearer in Britain than in the U.S., and that planning authorities in Britain might consider 
the value of permission to the applicant, as well as the cost of required improvements, 
when seeking contributions from developers.
The long history of debate in Britain over the concept of “betterment,” and the 
numerous attempts which have been made in Britain to publicly capture gains in land value, 
made Britain all the more appropriate as a context for research. Indeed, the ideas of
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American economist Henry George (1884)- that land values are publicly created and 
should therefore be taxed- appear to have struck a more responsive chord in Britain than in 
the U.S. George’s ideas were taken up in a modified form in the Uthwatt Committee 
Report on Compensation and Betterment, which was issued in 1942. The Uthwatt Report 
proposed that control over all development rights of land should be nationalised, and vested 
in the state. By nationalising development rights, the state would, in effect, be able to claim 
ownership of most future increases in land value. The report proposed that a periodic levy 
should be imposed, at a rate of 75%, against increases in annual site values, as a way of 
“securing for the community a share of community-created increase in annual site values of 
property.. .”(Ibid.,§342,152). Furthermore, it recommended that local authorities be given 
expanded authority to buy land compulsorily, so as to enable them to direcdy recoup 
increases in value produced by town planning schemes and public improvements.
Although the specific recommendations contained in the Uthwatt Committee Report 
were not immediately implemented, the Report did have a major influence in shaping the 
direction of post-war land use planning and tax policy in Britain. In the years that 
followed, three attempts were made by successive Labour governments to tax betterment 
Under the 1947 Town and Country Planning Act, development rights in Britain were 
nationalised. Increases in land value resulting from public improvements, from the 
approval of town planning schemes and from the granting of planning permissions were 
made subject to a development charge, which was set at 100% of the gain in value 
(Cullingworth, 1988,159). This approach to the taxation of property value increases was 
adhered to for six years. In 1953, the 100% levy on betterment was abolished for private 
land transactions, but public authorities continued to acquire land based compulsorily at 
below-market prices, imposing a 100% tax on betterment on the land that they purchased, 
and in effect creating a dual land market (McAuslan,1984). This unequal treatment of land 
gains was ended by the 1959 Town and Country Planning Act, which restored “‘fair market 
price' as the basis for compensation for compulsory acquisition” by public authorities 
(Cullingworth,1988,168).
The second attempt at the national level in Britain at taxing increases in land values 
came with the passage of the Land Commission Act of 1967. The intent of the Act was to 
assure that “the right land is available at the right time for the implementation of national, 
regional and local plans” and “to secure that a substantial part of the development value 
created by the community returns to the community and that the burden of the cost of land 
for essential purposes is reduced”(White Paper,1965, para. 7). Under the act, a Land 
Commission was established, which was intended to intervene in the private land market to 
publicly acquire land that would then be made available for development at a reasonable 
cost. A second feature of the 1967 Land Commission Act was that it also introduced a new 
betterment levy, set initially at 40 percent (Cullingworth, 1988,169). It was originally 
intended that the betterment levy would be increased at various intervals, to 45 per cent and
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then to SO per cent, but it never was. (Cullingworth, Ibid.) One problem with the Act was 
that, like the 1947 development tax, the betterment levy was only applied when increases in 
development value were realised through sale or permission to development (Drewett,1973, 
220). There was no tax on holding land, and therefore little reason not to continue holding 
it (Ibid.), especially given the pledge of the Conservative Party that it would, once elected, 
immediately abolish the tax. Thus if landowners were simply patient enough to withhold 
their land from sale or development until the Conservatives took office, they could expect to 
get full market value free of the tax (Roberts,1977,27). As a result, although the intention 
of the Land Commission Act was to lower land prices, the actual effect it had was to 
produce a shortage of developable land and, in turn, a sharp increase in land prices (Ibid., 
15). Under these conditions, the levy turned out not to be a tax on betterment at all, 
because it was not paid by landowners, but by purchasers of land in the form of higher land 
prices. The Conservatives won the next national election and the Land Commission Act 
was abolished in 1971. The provisions of the Land Commission Act lasted just under four 
years (McAuslan,1984).
A third attempt to impose a tax on increases in land value was made in 1976 with 
the adoption of the Development Land Tax (DLT). The DLT was adopted after a major 
development boom, during which immense profits had been made through speculative 
commercial development, particularly in Central London as a result of highly restrictive 
development control policies. As a result of the huge increases in building rents which 
occured during the period, a remarkable political consensus arose that “unearned” 
development gains should be taxed. The surge of property values and rents had "served to 
underline.... the possibilities for securing a share in development profits on behalf of the 
community" (Keogh,1985,203). Even among Conservatives, there was a recognition that 
some form of tax was needed to deal with “the irresponsible behavior and excessive 
profits” of certain developers (McAuslan,1984,82). When initially applied, the first 
£160,000 of realised development value was subject to relief, but further realisation of 
development value above that was charged at a rate of 80 per cent The tax was 
subsequently reduced to a top rate of 60 per cent, applicable after the first £50,000 of 
realised development value, which remained free of tax (McAuslan,1984, 83).
Although apparently similar to the 1947 and 1967 acts in its attempt to capture 
increases in land value, the Development Land Tax of 1976 was different in one very 
important respect Under the DLT, local authorities (rather than central government) 
recouped the tax on betterment (Ibid, 79). In designating local government as the vehicle 
for collecting gains in development value, the DLT thus appears to have provided an 
important transition leading toward the negotiation of planning gain by local authorities. In 
fact tax rules that accompanied the imposition of DLT encouraged the negotiation of 
planning gain in a specific way. If a local authority imposed an expensive planning gain 
agreement on a developer it simply meant that he would pay less development land tax than
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he would have done, because he was able to claim allowance for the cost of financing the 
planning gain (Ward, 1982,83). The tax provisions of DLT in effect underwrote planning 
gain contributions by developers, and established a pattern of reliance on developer 
contributions for infrastructure through planning gain (Grant, 1986,105).
The DLT never fulfilled its promise, either as an instrument of planning and land 
policy, or as a means of raising revenue for public facilities and improvements financed by 
local governments. It is estimated that a simple tax set at 60% of development values 
should have brought in an annual return to the National Treasury of approximately £600 
million (Grant,1986,11). In actual practice, the amount collected was only a small fraction 
of that sum, because DLT was an “event-based tax,** and landowners simply avoided the 
tax by not conducting land transactions. The most that was collected from DLT in any 
single year came in 1982, when £38.3 million was collected, and the average annual 
amount collected from DLT over the four year period 1979-1982 was only an approximate 
£26 million(Ibid.,12). The Development Land Tax was abolished in March 1985.
Given this history, it was probably inevitable that efforts by local government to 
extract “contributions** in exchange for granting planning permission would be perceived as 
yet another attempt to collect betterment According to McAuslan(1984,84), planning gain 
appeared to be, “in effect a decentralised local attempt to ensure that some of the financial 
gains from obtaining of planning permission accrue to the local community.** McAuslan*s 
assessment was echoed by Keogh(1985,222), who argued that “planning gain is an ad hoc 
local tax with an arbitrary impact on the process of development.’*
Convergence of British and American Development Control
A comparison of British and American approaches to developer finance appeared 
particularly appropriate and timely given signs that the British and American systems of 
development control were tending to converge in the 1980’s. (For a summary description 
and comparison of traditional zoning in the U.S., and the British approach to development 
control, see Appendix One.)
The traditional way in which development has been controlled in the U.S. in the 
past has been through highly prescriptive, but at the same time fairly permissive zoning 
ordinances. This approach to development control has provided developers with a high 
degree of certainty. It has also tended to minimise the degree of control that local planning 
authorities have been able to exert over development Under traditional zoning, a great deal 
of development has been allowed “by right** The only requirement has been that 
development must conform to the provisions set forth in the appropriate ordinance 
regarding allowed uses, maximum building height and density, required setbacks from the 
property line (front, side and rear,) required parking and landscaping, sign limitations, etc. 
Zoning as traditionally applied has essentially been a “cookbook** approach to development
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control. As long as proposed developments meet the preset requirements established in the 
ordinance, local planning authorities must approve them. Conversely, if the proposed 
developments do not meet the requirements of the ordinance, then local planning authorities 
are bound to deny them permission. Under this approach, there has been little or no basis 
for granting of exceptions, and little basis for negotiation.
However, by the 1980’s, U.S. development control had begun to undergo some 
significant changes. In the first place, “ zoning restrictions have become increasingly 
stringent over time and over the development of any given community.. .”(Fischel,1985, 
249). There has been a trend away from allowing development “as of right”, and an 
increased tendency toward the adoption of ordinances which require that developers apply 
for and receive “special permits” prior to undertaking development For example, in 
downtown Boston development controls have been tightened so much that it is now the 
case that “little can be built as of right”(King,1990,8). Indeed, in the U.S. the rules and 
procedures governing development have become increasingly complex, and developers 
have faced increased uncertainty as a result
Another factor which allowed local planning authorities in the U.S. to exercise 
greater discretion, and in turn to exert greater control over development has been the trend 
toward the use of “flexible zoning techniques,” such as Planned Unit Development (PUD) 
zoning, floating zones, overlay zones, conditional rezoning, and contract zoning. The 
trend toward more flexible zoning became noticeable at the national level in the 1970’s (see 
Meshenberg,1976), but increased and accelerated in the 1980’s. One of the most 
commonly used flexible techniques of development control has been PUD zoning, which 
provides an alternative to the fixed requirements of standard zoning. Under PUD zoning, 
all standard zoning limitations on building height and setbacks, project density, and allowed 
uses are waived, and “the city and the developer bargain over the scope and character of 
each project.. .’’(Susskind and McMahon,1988,203). What is unique about the PUD 
process is that “.. .the developer and community... negotiate every feature of the project...” 
and there is ample “opportunity for the developer to strike deals and compromises with the 
community”(Fischel,1985,35). Another form of flexible zoning which has become 
increasingly popular in the 1980’s has been “performance zoning”(see Kendig,1980). 
Rather than requiring that every new development conforms to preset physical dimensions, 
“performance zoning” focuses on controlling the by-products and impacts of development, 
and on assuring that new developments meet certain minimum performance standards. An 
important factor which led Kendig and others to advocate a performance-based approach to 
development control was the realisation that rigid and prescriptive zoning ordinances had 
“failed to protect the environment...’’(Ibid.,3), and that a more flexible site-by-site 
evaluation of the impacts of proposed developments was necessary to produce 
environmentally acceptable development.
A good example of the flexible approach to development control in the U.S. in the
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1980’s was the innovative “Land Development Guidance System/’ first developed and 
applied in Fort Collins, Colorado. This approach received considerable national acclaim 
and was subsequently copied, adapted and applied in communities elsewhere in the 
country. In an attempt to control the high rate of growth it was experiencing, and to 
improve the quality of development, Fort Collins adopted a system of development control 
which allowed very little development by right. To obtain approval to develop, a developer 
had to earn a specified minimum number of “points.” Unlike standard zoning, the Fort 
Collins approach did not tell developers exactly how they had to design their projects. Nor 
did the ordinance set a fixed limit on the density of development. Rather, developers could 
increase the density of their developments by earning more points, by including desired 
features and amenities specified in the ordinance, by assuring that adequate infrastructure 
was provided, and by mitigating development impacts. How much the density could be 
increased depended on “how far the developer [could] shape his proposals to score the 
necessary points on the city's guidance scale for greater density.. .”(Wakeford,1990, 208). 
One of the goals of the city was to minimise traffic impacts of proposed developments.
Thus the Fort Collins development guidance system offered developers density bonuses if 
they constructed developments which contained both housing and commercial uses. 
Commercial developers were also granted higher densities for projects located near 
residential areas (thus minimising the need for travel), near transit routes, or if they 
promised to institute vanpool programmes (Cervero,1988,199). Developers could also 
increase project densities by increasing the provision of open space and landscaping, which 
mitigated and neutralised the impacts of their projects on nearby areas (Wakeford,1990,
98).
As a result of the changes described above (the tightening of development controls, 
and the increased flexibility and discretion in reviewing applications on a case by case 
basis) development control in the U.S. appeared to be moving at least partially toward the 
British model. Meanwhile, an opposite trend appeared to be underway in Britain in the 
1980*s, as British development control appeared to be moving toward a more fixed and 
predictable system of development control, like that in the U.S. Under the Town and 
Country Planning Act of 1947, as amended in 1971, developers were faced with a high 
degree of uncertainty when submitting applications for planning permission. There were 
no fixed zoning plans to guide developers as to what types of development might be 
acceptable, or approvable on specific sites. Rather, local planning authorities could decide 
whether to approve or deny applications for planning permission on a case by case basis. 
However, in the 1980’s steps were taken by the government of Margaret Thatcher to 
provide developers with greater certainty and a more predictable framework of development 
control. Circular 22/80 represented an important shift in policy emphasis toward what 
became known as a “presumption in favour of development” The circular advised local 
planning authorities “always to grant planning permission, having regard to all material
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considerations, unless there are sound and clear cut reasons for refusal”(DoE,1980). 
Another step which loosened development control was the adoption of the Revised Use 
Classes Order in 1987, which cut the number of separate use classes, and increased the 
number of different uses within each use class- thereby increasing the ability of owners to 
change uses without having to obtain specific permission. At the same time, British 
development control was becoming more predictable. With the issuance of a consultation 
paper in September, 1986 on The Future o f Development Plans, and Planning Policy 
Guidance 12 in November 1988, the government set in motion a process which required 
for the first time that development plans should be prepared “covering the whole of each 
District'* Under this new approach to planning, a prospective developer could look at a 
local development plan, and find specific areas delineated on a map allocated for specific 
types of development— just as is done in American zoning plans.
As the above discussion has shown, approaches to development control in the U.S. 
and Britain became more similar in the 1980's. This apparent convergence of British and 
American development control in the 1980's made a comparison of British and American 
approaches to developer finance all the more relevant and timely.
Research Annroach
This thesis has three basic purposes. The first purpose is to describe and compare 
the different approaches to developer finance which were used in Britain and the U.S. in 
the 1980’s— how they evolved, their rationale and legal basis, and the issues and questions 
which these practices raise for planning and development control. The second purpose is to 
present and analyse data compiled through empirical research documenting how agreements 
were used in a specific region of Britain over a five to seven year period. The third purpose 
is to interpret the data collected in Britain in light of American experience.
During the first phase of my research, I carried out a thorough review of planning 
literature and research on the negotiation of planning gain in Britain, and on various 
methods of developer finance in the U.S. I also conducted an initial round of 28 interviews 
in Britain with planners and public officials in local government, planning consultants and 
chartered surveyors, solicitors, university-based researchers, officials at the Department of 
Environment and developers. The purpose of these interviews was to identify a range of 
local government approaches to developer finance, and to compile information on a cross- 
section of agreements signed in various localities in the South East of England. I also 
conducted an additional 8 interviews in the United States to provide contrasting American 
views and perspectives on approaches to developer finance. These initial phases of my 
research served to identify issues and questions which needed to be addressed in 
geographically focused research.
In the second and most important phase of the research, I conducted empirical
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research within an area located in the South East of England, comprehensively documenting 
how a number of local planning authorities in that region used agreements in practice. My 
initial intention was to document the extent to which British local authorities negotiated 
agreements to obtain funding from developers for infrastructure improvements. My interest 
in this question was heightened by the fact that the primary reason local governments in the 
U.S. have used developer finance has been to obtain financing for infrastructure 
improvements. However, in the course of conducting research in the field, as I began to 
compile data on local authority use of agreements, I decided to broaden the scope of the 
research to document aH uses of agreements, whether or not they involved contributions.
It should be noted that the empirical research which I conducted was limited to 
Britain. I made no attempt to compile original data on developer finance in the U.S. What 
I have done, instead, has been to bring my knowledge, gained from twenty years of 
planning experience in the U.S., to bear on an examination of how developer finance 
worked in Britain in the 1980*s.
The field research I conducted in Britain had the following specific purposes:
- To document the frequency with which local planning authorities signed 
agreements; the frequency with which agreements contained contributions; the 
nature and extent of developer contributions; and the extent to which developer 
contributions were directly related and beneficial to the developments making the 
contributions.
- To document the characteristics of projects which were subject to agreements.
- To discover local planning authority attitudes toward negotiating contributions 
from developers.
- To describe the process whereby agreements have been negotiated, and the extent 
to which offers of contributions affected local planning authority decisions 
regarding the granting or denial of planning permission.
- To analyse geographic variations in the practice of using agreements to impose 
obligations on developers, and factors which affected local authority success in 
obtaining contributions, the ability of local authorities to obtain contributions, 
and the ability or willingness of developers to make them.
- To analyse and describe how local authority use of agreements, and attitudes 
toward agreements evolved and changed over time.
- To analyse the use of agreements in relation to established planning policies, and 
to determine whether or not the content of agreements was consistent with those 
policies.
The Structure of the Thesis
The thesis contains nine chapters. Chapter One observes that local governments in 
both Britain and the U.S. in the 1980’s appeared to become more reliant on funding from
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developers, and that different approaches to developer finance were followed in the two 
countries. Because the negotiation of developer contributions in Britain has raised the 
question of whether local authorities have used agreements to capture betterment, much of 
this first chapter is devoted to a discussion of the effects of plan-making, development 
control and infrastructure finance on land values and development gain. This discussion 
establishes an important conceptual framework for evaluating British and American 
approaches to developer finance.
Chapter Two begins by describing the factors and forces which led American local 
governments to make increased use of developer finance in the 1980’s. The balance of the 
chapter is devoted to describing the many different tools of developer finance which have 
been used in the U.S.— their planning rationale and legal basis, and how and where they 
have been used. Chapter Three shifts back to Britain, describing the legal and institutional 
basis for negotiating agreements in the British system of development control, and how and 
why the negotiation of agreements led inevitably in the 1970’s and 1980*s to the negotiation 
of developer contributions. The chapter also reviews central government policy statements 
on agreements, and the growing tension between central government policies and local 
authority practices. Chapter Four synthesises what is currently known and believed about 
developer finance in Britain and the U.S., and puts forward a list of issues and questions 
which are important in understanding the effects and implications of various approaches to 
developer finance. The chapter reviews what is known about the negotiation of agreements 
and developer contributions in Britain from previous research and published accounts in 
books and journals, and contrasts British research findings and opinions with those in the 
U.S. This review makes it clear that many important research questions remain 
unanswered about how agreements have been used by local planning authorities.
The core of the thesis, Chapters Five through Eight, is devoted to a description of 
empirical research I conducted in England between October 1989 and April. 1992. This 
empirical research was conducted in an attempt to provide concrete answers to the research 
questions and issues which were raised and discussed in Chapter Four. Chapter Five 
describes the study area which was chosen for research, and the methodology and research 
design used in carrying out research within that study area. Chapter Six presents data 
compiled at the county level describing how agreements were used over a five year period 
1985-90, and trends in agreements during that period. Chapter Seven analyses geographic 
and locational variations in the use of agreements, and shows how the signing of 
agreements, and the contents of agreements varied from district to district This chapter 
also identifies and evaluates various factors (such as development pressure, rates of 
growth, degrees of planning constraint, and political affiliation) which might explain the 
varying degrees of success which local authorities had in securing contributions. Chapter 
Eight describes how local authority policies and practices on agreements evolved between 
April 1990 and March 1992, in the aftermath of the study period. This chapter also
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analyses the impact of the water infrastructure charge which was implemented as of 1 April 
1990, and compares what developers paid under negotiated agreements against what they 
paid once under mandatory fixed infrastructure charges were imposed. Chapter Nine, 
summarises the findings of the empirical research which was conducted in England, offers 
a number of explanations for the surprising findings of the research, and offers an 
American planner's assessment of the advantages and disadvantages of negotiated 
agreements as a means of infrastructure finance, and as a means for achieving planning and 
development control objectives.
-30-
CHAPTER TWO: EVOLUTION OF DEVELOPER FINANCE IN_THE U.S.
A sign of the times:
... 22 prisoners have literally punched and kicked their way out of the East County 
Jail in San Diego County, California in the past year. The County Board of 
Supervisors decided to economize by substituting plasterboard and styrofoam for 
the four inches (10 centimeters) or more of concrete that were supposed to go into 
the walls [of the county jail]. So far, the voters have refused to approve taxes for a 
new jail {International Herald Tribune, 11 June, 1990).
The Decline in Federal Funding and the “New Federalism”
The shift toward private finance in the U.S. was not driven by ideology, but was 
rather a pragmatic response to the increasingly untenable position in which local 
governments found themselves in the 1980’s. “In a favorable fiscal environment, it is 
unlikely that.... privatization — as a strategy for providing goods and services that 
conventionally were in the public sector... — would have been considered nearly as 
attractive”(Netzer,1988,36). The “New Federalism” enunciated under the administration of 
President Ronald Reagan was the initial catalyst which set in motion the trend toward a 
more localised system of development finance.
Throughout the post World War II period, and through the 1960’s, public 
expenditure was absorbing an expanding share of the U.S. national economy, and “a 
sizeable fraction of that expenditure was for infrastructure and other public capital” (Netzer, 
Ibid.). Most of the truly expensive infrastructure constructed in the United States in the 
Twentieth Century was in fact paid for by the federal government (Nicholas,1990, lect.). 
For example, the federal government financed 100% of the cost of the 41,000 mile U.S. 
Interstate Highway System. To finance this massive public works project, and to provide 
continued funding for highway improvements, the federal Highway Trust Fund was 
established in the 1950*s, funded through a four cent per gallon federal tax on gasoline.
The federal government also played the lead role in financing the construction of other 
major transportation facilities, such as tunnels, bridges, port facilities and airports. The 
federal government provided most of the capital funding grants for the establishment and 
expansion of subway and public transit systems in major cities, and this funding was 
substantially expanded in 1964 with passage of the Urban Mass Transportation Act The 
federal government played the lead role in financing the development and improvement of 
public airports. In 1972 the Congress amended the Federal Water Pollution Control Act 
and committed billions of dollars to a Wastewater Construction Grant programme which 
funded improvements to local sewerage systems (Joint Economic Committee, 1984,6). In 
older central cities, the federal government financed an ambitious programme of “urban
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renewal,” including the demolition of deteriorated and “obsolete” structures, and public 
investments in infrastructure and facilities to encourage new private development. From 
the 1960's until 1974, when it was terminated, the federal urban renewal programme 
pumped more than $13 billion into the rebuilding of American cities (Segalyn,1990,430). 
Throughout this period, prior to the 1980’s, “there was never a system of local finance for 
infrastructure”(Nicholas,19904ect.).
During the 1970*s, however, the first steps were taken toward shifting greater 
responsibility to units of local government, when President Richard Nixon signed 
legislation establishing the Federal Revenue Sharing programme and Community 
Development Block Grant (CDBG) programmes. Under these two programmes, grant 
funds formerly distributed to local governments in categorical grants were pooled together 
to form lump-sum "block grants." The stated purpose behind “block grants” was to give 
local governments much greater flexibility in deciding how to spend the federal revenues 
that they received.
The most significant steps toward expanding the responsibilities of states and local 
governments, however, came in the 1980's under what President Ronald Reagan called the 
“New Federalism.” The goal of the “New Federalism” was to redefine inter-govemmental 
responsibilities, and to shift responsibilities from the federal government to state and local 
governments. But there was a price to be paid for this increased state and local role: 
federal funding to state and local governments steadily decreased. In the late 1970*s, the 
federal government provided 25% of revenue contained in state and local budgets; by 1990 
it provided only 17% {New York Times, December 30,1990,1). Cuts in federal funding 
for infrastructure were particularly severe. Adjusting federal spending for inflation, federal 
infrastructure funding was actually cut 6% per year, every year, from 1974 through 1989 
(Nicholas,1990, lect.). One dramatic indication of the reduced federal funding for 
infrastructure was the decline over time, in real terms, in the amount of money raised for 
the Federal Highway Trust Fund through the federal gas tax. The federal gasoline tax, 
which was set at 4 cents per gallon in the 1950*s, remained at that level until 1983, when it 
was increased modesdy to 5 cents per gallon (ACIR,1984,28). However, this increase 
was trivial compared to the increase in the price of gasoline between the 1950*s and 1980*s. 
As a percentage of the cost of gasoline, the federal gasoline tax actually fell significantly 
during the period, while the cost of constructing highways and bridges rose substantially. 
Nicholas (1990, lect.) has estimated that to keep the federal gas tax in line with inflation, it 
should have been increased 96 cents per gallon in 1990.
By the 1980’s, the national decline in infrastructure investment was becoming 
increasingly a subject of national debate. A study carried out for the U.S. Congress by the 
University of Colorado Graduate School of Public Affairs found that, in all regions of the 
U.S., the need for future infrastructure was "greatly in excess of historical expenditure
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levels" (Joint Economic Committee, U.S. Congress, 1984, 81). The study found that 
public infrastructure expenditure was greatest for highways and bridges, transport, and 
water and sewer systems, but these were also the areas where infrastructure needs were 
greatest relative to available revenues (see Table 2.01). No region in the country was 
immune from this shortfall in infrastructure spending. On a regional basis, projected 
shortfalls in infrastructure spending were expected to range finom $74 per capita to $166 per 
capita (Ibid., 62).
Table 2.01: Projected U.S. Infrastructure Needs Versus Revenues. 1983 - 2000 (Billions 
O fil
Needs Revenues Shortfall
Highways and Bridges 720 455 265
Other Transport 178 90 88
Water 96 55 41
Sewer 163 114 49
Total 1,157 714 443
Source: Joint Economic Committee, U.S. Congress
The Taxpayers* Revolt and Changing Attitudes Toward Development
Another factor which undoubtedly hastened the shift to developer finance was the 
growing “taxpayers* revolt” When local governments sought to raise additional money by 
increasing local property taxes, they met with increased local taxpayer resistance. The first 
indication of this “taxpayers* revolt” came in 1978 in California, with the passage of 
Proposition 13, which cut local property taxes in half, (New York Times, December 30, 
1990,16), and limited property tax increases in the future.
For properties purchased after the passage of Proposition 13, the tax is limited to 
one per cent of the purchase price. Thereafter, as long as the property is not resold, 
the tax levy can increase by no more than two per cent per year, regardless of the 
rate of property appreciation. When the property is sold, its market value is 
adjusted to die purchase price, and the tax can again increase by two per cent per 
year. For properties purchased before 1975, the tax is based on the property’s 1975 
market value. This value is increased by two per cent per year (Dowall,1988,162).
As a result of Proposition 13, property taxes in California fell from 21.7 percent of cities* 
revenues in fiscal year 1977-78 to 13.4 percent in fiscal year 1985-86 (Chapman, 1991, 
15-16).
Two years later, in 1980, voters in Massachusetts approved Proposition 2 1/2,
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which limited property tax increases to 2.5% per year (a rate approximately one-half to one- 
third less than the rate of inflation). By 1985 some 30 states had adopted some form of 
explicit limitations on the amount of fiscal resources available to state and/or local 
government (Kirlin,1985,2). As a result, property taxes, which had risen on the national 
level to 5 percent of personal income in 1971-72, fell back to 3.4 percent of personal 
income by 1981-82 (Netzer,1988,36).
The tax revolt had its most serious impact on the ability of local governments to 
finance infrastructure improvements. “Because local governments can no longer increase 
tax rates... infrastructure costs cannot be financed through tax increases** (Dowall,1988, 
162). One way in which state and local governments tried to cope with this problem was 
by reducing and postponing infrastructure investments. During the 1960*s, 20 percent of 
total state and local government spending was devoted to infrastructure, whereas it fell to 
less than 10 percent in the 1980*s (Ibid., 37).
Toward the end of the 1980*s there was increasing empirical evidence that growth 
and new development was financially undesirable, and that local communities would be 
financially better off if less development occurred. Studies of the fiscal impact of new 
development conducted in California after Proposition 13 was enacted found that “In all 
cases, new development was a net fiscal loser** (Misczynski,1987). Recent empirical 
research has confirmed that growth has placed increased fiscal burdens on local 
governments. Analysis of data from 248 large counties throughout the U.S. for the period 
1978-1985 revealed that growth contributed to higher per capita spending levels 
(Ladd,1990a). “The finding that population growth was associated with rising per capita 
spending lends empirical legitimacy to the fiscal concerns of established residents in fast 
growing areas” (Ibid., 15). Not surprisingly, citizen attitudes toward accepting new 
development hardened in the 1980*s. A survey conducted of communities in New Jersey 
found that “less than one-third of the people in rural and new suburban areas wanted 
‘some* or a ‘great deal* of growth in their hometowns**(Neuman,1991,346).
Because they were unable to raise taxes on existing residents, local governments 
had two courses of action open to them. They could try to slow down or stop 
development And they could at the same time to try to shift a greater share of the costs of 
development onto private developers.
Local governments sought to restrict and discourage new development in variety of 
ways. They tightened development controls to make it more difficult and costly to 
undertake development, revised zoning ordinances to limit what developers could build “as 
of right,” and lowered allowed densities of development. It was also increasingly common 
for local governments to adopt moratoriums on development, and/or to impose limitations 
on the number of building permits which could be issued, or the amount of development 
which could occur, in a given period of time. Inadequacy of local infrastructure was
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usually the primary justification for imposing such limitations on development. 
Infrastructure provision thus became an important tool for managing and limiting 
development In turn, municipalities became less and less inclined to make it easy for 
development to occur by publicly assuming the costs of infrastructure and facilities required 
by new development
The capacity of infrastructure in various areas increasingly provided the basis and 
rationale for local growth control ordinances. Some localities adopted “phased growth 
ordinances/’ under which they channeled public infrastructure investment into particular 
areas allocated for development while failing to provide infrastructure investment in other 
areas, and in turn restricting development in such underserved areas. Increasingly; 
communities “adopted a philosophy that it is not the responsibility of local government to 
fund public facilities to accommodate growth,” and that if new development were to be 
allowed, it had to pay its own way (Singell and Lillydahl,1990, 82). In this context, it 
became increasingly clear to developers that if they wanted to develop in areas where the 
existing infrastructure was inadequate, then they would have to be willing to pay for the 
cost of providing the necessary facilities and improvements.
A clear indication of the growing importance of infrastructure in controlling growth 
can be seen in the “concurrency” requirements adopted in 1985 as part of Florida’s “Local 
Government Comprehensive Planning and Land Development Regulation Act” The 
“concurrency” requirement, simply stated, “prohibits [local planning authorities] from 
permitting new development unless adequate infrastructure is, or soon will be, in place to 
support that growth” (Koenig,1990,4). Under the Act, each local government must 
prepare comprehensive plans for the provision of essential public facilities, and for the 
coordination of public facilities with new development. Local governments must also 
establish minimum standards of provision for specified public facilities and services.
Public facilities and services specified in the Act include transportation and traffic 
circulation, sanitary sewer, drainage, potable water, natural groundwater recharge, solid 
waste disposal, schools, parks and open space, recreation facilities, conservation, and 
housing. Having set minimum standards for those specified facilities, the Act states that “a 
local government shall not issue a development order or permit which results in a reduction 
in the level of services for the affected public facilities below the level of services provided 
in the comprehensive plan of the local government” (Florida Institute of Government,
1991, 86-87). It is significant that these demanding “concurrency” requirements were 
implemented at a time when the level of public funding for infrastructure was falling far 
short of what was needed to meet the demands of new development. A state comprehensive 
plan completed in 1987 “estimated that... $52 billion would be needed statewide by the 
end of the century to meet identified needs for public facilities. Taxes and fees... will cover 
only a fraction of the estimated cost” (Koenig,1990,4). It thus became increasingly likely
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that developers wishing to cany out developments would have to assume a greater share of 
the infrastructure costs.
Tools of Develoner Finance
In the U.S. in the 1980’s, there was no single approach to developer finance. 
Rather, a wide variety of approaches and techniques were used. Methods of developer 
finance varied among the 50 states, but there was also significant variation in approaches 
within any given state. In the United States, developer financing “emerged bottom-up, 
through a variety of uncoordinated local initiatives, without a national statute or policy to 
guide them, and no uniform language to describe them” (Alterman,1990,162).
Although the “American approach” to developer finance defies simple 
characterisation, an attempt has been made to classify these different methods of developer 
finance according to their major characteristics. As shown in Figure 2.01, methods of 
developer finance in the U.S. basically fell into one of two main groups. Some methods of 
developer finance in the first group were primarily rule-based, and prescriptive. Other 
methods of developer finance in the second group were more flexible and market-oriented.
Fi gure 2.01: Types of American Developer Finance 
Type One: Rule-Based and Prescriptive -  Mandatory
Regular Exactions
Fixed fee, based on cost 
(beneficial to development)
Impact Fees
Type Two: Flexible -  Optional 
Benefit-based charges 
(Benefits given, benefits received)
Special Assessments 
Tax Increment Financing 
Incentive Zoning
Extreme Exactions
Fixed fee, not based solely on cost 
(not beneficial to development)
Linkage
Inclusionary Zoning
Market-based charges
(Payments influenced by 
market conditions, and relative 
bargaining strength of parties)
Transfer Development Rights 
Public/Private Partnerships 
Negotiated Development 
Legal Agreements
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Within each of these two types of developer finance, there were also important 
differences in how developer obligations were calculated. Exactions and impact fees, for 
example, tended to be based on the cost of providing needed services. Extreme exactions, 
such as linkage and inclusionaiy zoning, tended to be based more on judgments about 
community need and ability to pay. Among the flexible methods of developer finance, 
there were also important differences in how developer obligations were determined. Costs 
imposed on developers by means of Special Assessments, Tax Increment Financing and 
Incentive Zoning tended to take into account both the cost of required improvements and 
the benefits received by applicants. The amount that a developer paid was affected by 
market conditions, and the relative bargaining strength of the respective parties.
Rule-Based. Prescriptive Approaches to Developer Finance
In the U.S., the practice of making developers pay took place predominantly within 
the context of a zoning-based planning system which was traditionally prescriptive in its 
approach to the regulation of development Under traditional zoning, there was little basis 
for local planning authorities to judge individual schemes on their merits, or for standards 
to be varied based on unique situations. Most zoning ordinances in the U.S. have 
traditionally set out clear rules and standards, to which all new development has had to 
conform. In any given zone, certain types of development are allowed, while other types 
of development are not. And all development must conform to the fixed standards imposed 
by the ordinance, in terms of building height, project density, building set-backs, parking, 
etc. Under such a system of development control, there is little if any opportunity for 
negotiation or the exercise of discretion. Given the prescriptive and non-negotiable nature 
of development control in most of the U.S., it is probably not surprising that the most 
widely used methods of developer finance in the U.S. involved the imposition of uniform 
and fixed charges which did not vary with market conditions, and which were entirely non- 
negotiable. Two types of fixed charges are distinguished in the literature- exactions and 
impact fees. Like the application of traditional zoning requirements, the imposition of 
exactions and impact fees involves the routine application of predetermined standards and 
rules.
Exactions -  On Site
Alterman and Kayden (1988,24) have defined “exaction-based developer 
provisions" as being "those public benefits required of private developers by the public 
sector through the land-use regulatory process.” In the U.S., the imposition of exactions 
on developers for on-site improvements has been a common practice since the 1920’s. 
Required exactions have normally been specified in municipal regulations governing the 
subdivision of land. In order to subdivide land for sale which does not front on an existing
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public road, a developer is typically required to construct on-site roads, sewers, drains, and 
water lines, etc. to specifications set by the municipality, and then to dedicate and transfer 
those completed facilities, including the land and rights of way on which they were 
constructed, to the municipality. Some municipalities imposed exactions requiring 
dedications of land for public open space, although this was less common.
In the 1980's, the practice of requiring developers to dedicate land for public use, 
and to construct on-site public improvements increased considerably, and the purposes for 
which such exactions were imposed widened. Exactions involving dedications of land 
have been much more common than exactions involving cash payments. A survey of 
development exactions published in 1987 indicated that 58 per cent of local governments 
required cash payments as compared to nearly 90 per cent for land dedication or building 
requirements (Frank and Rhodes,1987 as reported by Wakeford,1990,194). However, in 
recent years it has become increasingly common for municipalities to seek cash payments in 
lieu of land dedications. By obtaining cash payments, it is possible, for example, to 
establish a large park on a centrally located, accessible site, rather than having to have small 
pieces of dedicated park land scattered haphazardly among various developments. State 
courts were not initially inclined to support the practice of requiring cash payments, but 
more recent court decisions have tended to sustain them (R.M. Smith,1987,14). For 
example, .. the Wisconsin Supreme Court upheld an ordinance requiring a subdivider to 
pay $200 per lot instead of dedicating land at that value for school, park, or recreational 
needs.. .”(Ibid.,15). A Utah court upheld an ordinance requiring the developer to pay the 
cash equivalent of seven percent of the subdivided land for flood control and recreational 
purposes,” and in Oregon, a court upheld required cash-in-lieu payments, even in the 
absence of an assurance “that the money collected would be used to directly benefit 
subdivisions regulated”(Ibid.).
Impact Fees
In the 1980's, a new form of exaction appeared, which became known as “impact 
fees.” The use of impact fees increased substantially in the U.S. during the 1980's, 
especially in high growth areas (Bauman and Ethier,1987). Impact fees are a type of 
exaction because they are not voluntary but are, rather, required. The fees “are levied 
only against new development,” and must be paid “as a condition of permit approval” 
(ICMA,1988,2). A major feature of impact fees, which has distinguished them from more 
traditional types of exactions, is that they have been applied to obtain payments for off- 
site as well as on-site improvements. Also they have much more frequently involved 
cash payments than has been the case with traditional exactions. The assumption in 
levying an impact fee is that “it is possible to allocate to each development its proportionate 
share of the future cost of providing public services, such as parks and highway
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improvements” (R.M. Smith, 1987,16).
The imposition of impact fees by local governments in the U.S. is a relatively 
recent phenomenon. According to the results of a survey published in 1987,35% of all 
impact fee ordinances in effect in 1987 were adopted between 1980 and 1985, another 36% 
were enacted in the 1970's, and only 10% were in existence before 1960 (Bauman and 
Ethier, 1987,59). In Florida, more than 40 local governments enacted impact fee 
ordinances between 1985 and 1987 (Siemon,1987,115). A survey conducted by the 
International City Management Association in 1986 found that communities in 36 states 
used exactions or impact fees to finance capital projects (ICMA,1988,3). California had 
the most communities using development exactions and impact fees-* with Florida having 
the second most, followed by Washington, Oregon, Colorado and Texas (Ibid.).
“Once the legal reasoning behind impact fees became accepted, it dissolved any 
geographic restriction on location of the facilities, allowing local authorities to require 
provision of major city wide or even regional facilities. ...’’(Bosselman and Stroud, 1986 as 
quoted by Alterman,1990,166). Moreover, once they were allowed to impose financial 
charges and fees, rather than simply requiring dedications of land, local governments found 
it easier to charge developers for a greatly increased range of facilities and services. Impact 
fees were not only used to fund off-site sewage treatment plants, potable water supply and 
distribution improvements, storm drainage facilities, roadways and interchanges, and solid 
waste disposal facilities, but also off-site parks and recreation facilities, public schools, 
public buildings such as libraries, fire stations and police stations, and other community 
facilities (Nicholas,1990,lect.). In some communities, impact fees were even used to pay 
for the provision of law enforcement, emergency medical services and facilities, and public 
cemeteries (Ibid.).
Two key court cases in Florida signified the shift toward seeking cash payments as 
well as land dedications, and toward obtaining payments for off-site as well as on-site 
facilities. In 1978, in Contractors & Builders Association v. City o f Dunedin, a Florida 
appellate court upheld the imposition of a fee on the construction of homes and buildings at 
the time of connection to municipal water and sewage systems for the purpose of paying 
for the capital costs of expanding the city's water and sewer system (R.M.
Smith,1987,16). And in a 1983 case, Hollywood, Inc. v. Broward County, a Florida 
court upheld an ordinance requiring developers to dedicate at least 3 acres of land for every 
1000 residents in a proposed subdivision, to pay an amount of money equivalent to the 
value of the land that would have been dedicated, or to pay a fee set by a schedule in the 
ordinance (Ibid., 16-17). The only limitation imposed by the ordinance was that the 
developer's funds had to be spent to acquire land within fifteen miles of the property which 
generated the payment (Ibid.,17).
The legality of impact fees was challenged by developers in a number of state
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courts, as well. In reviewing the legality of different various impact fee ordinances, state 
courts applied different legal tests. Three main legal tests emerged were:
- the “reasonable relationship” test
- the “specifically and uniquely attributable” test
- the “rational nexus” test
The least demanding and loosest test of the legality of impact fees is the “reasonable 
relationship test” It is this test that state courts in California applied in upholding the use 
of impact fees. Any impact fee which bore a “reasonable relationship” to the development 
and its impacts was found to be legal.
The “specifically and uniquely attributable” test is the most stringent 
(Whiteman,1990,2). This test asserts that a developer cannot be charged for a given 
capital improvement unless that improvement is directly necessitated by a particular 
development. Since most major infrastructure improvements are forced by cumulative 
growth, it is often impossible to meet the test, and in states where this legal interpretation 
has been upheld, the effect has been to make the widespread use of exactions illegal 
(Whiteman,Ibid.) The “specifically and uniquely attributable” test has been applied by 
courts in Illinois and Rhode Island (Callies,1990,lect).
The principles underlying the "rational nexus" test were first articulated in a 1976 
Florida court case. According to the Florida court, three conditions must be met for an 
impact fee to be legal:
- the new development must require that the present system of 
public facilities be expanded;
- the fees imposed must be no more than what the local government 
unit would incur in accommodating the new users of the system;
- the fees must be expressly "earmarked" for the purposes for which 
they were imposed, and kept in a separate account (Snyder and 
Stegman,1989, 59).
In other words, for a “nexus” to exist “there must be a finding that a particular development 
will create a need... and that the amount of the exaction bears a roughly proportionate 
relationship to the need generated by the development” (Susskind and McMahon,1988, 
216). Under the “rational nexus” test, a developer can be required to pay "for only the 
costs of the portion of the facilities needed by the development, and not for the total cost of 
infrastructure from which it only partially benefits" (Snyder and Stegman, 1989,57).
Local impact fee ordinances which have met the above tests have often specified 
that the funds collected must be deposited into dedicated accounts specifically reserved for
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the approved purposes (rather than deposited into the municipality's general fund.) 
Provisions have also often been included in ordinances requiring that the funds be spent for 
the approved purposes within a specified time period- and if not that the funds be returned 
to the developer.
In most states the legality of impact fees has hinged has been whether the fees are 
judged to be a tax, or a form of regulation (Snyder and Stegman,Ibid., 61). Courts in 
states which have upheld impact fees as legal have tended to rule that impact fees are 
regulatory in nature, rather than a tax on development., and are implemented for the 
purpose of protecting public health, safety and welfare. State courts which have ruled 
against impact fees have tended to view impact fees as an unauthorised and selective tax on 
development, violating the equal protection clause of the U.S. Constitution. California and 
Colorado present exceptions to the rule, because of the uniqueness of their state 
constitutions. Courts in California and Colorado have upheld the legality of impact fees 
even while recognising that impact fees may constitute a selective tax on development. In 
so doing, the California and Colorado courts have allowed local governments in those 
states wide discretion to set and impose whatever fees they deemed appropriate — even in 
situations where there was no pressing public facility need requiring the collection of a fee. 
In Orange County, California, $1.3 million was raised for school construction by imposing 
fees on new development at a time when the district had more than a dozen empty 
elementary schools, and when there was no need to build new schools (Fulton,1987,7-8). 
Elsewhere in California, local governments collected “payments for roads, schools, or 
libraries that were nowhere near the development in question... on the theory that the 
development increased the overall demand for those facilities” (Ibid., 8).
If and when state enabling legislation has been passed authorising the use of impact 
fees, it still remains for each individual municipality to adopt and implement its own impact 
fee ordinance and fee structure. In theory, the amount of the fee imposed should be directly 
related to the costs that a particular development imposes. “An impact fee is calculated 
backwards, based on what it costs to deal with the impacts of development”
(Nicholas,1990,lect.).
Proponents of impact fee ordinances have argued that the adoption of impact fee 
ordinances encourages and necessitates local planning. They argue that communities which 
wish to adopt impact fees sustainable in court must carefully analyse their local 
infrastructure capacity, prepare forecasts of demand for future growth, and formulate local 
plans and policies to guide and control that growth. Localities must also estimate the future 
impacts of different types of development on a wide array of public facilities and services 
based on certain accepted formulas and standards, calculate the cost of upgrading local 
facilities to deal with those anticipated impacts (adding in a factor to take account of 
increased construction costs and inflation,) and allocate those costs on a per unit basis to
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different types of development in some defensible manner.
The concept underlying impact fees has been that the amount paid by each unit of 
new development should be proportionate to the costs that it imposes on the community.
But deciding how to apportion infrastructure costs to different types of development has 
proven to be a difficult task. Some local governments invested in major planning and fiscal 
studies to justify the formulas they adopted for allocating such costs. However, other 
localities relied on cruder “rules of thumb'* to apportion costs. Some localities allocated 
costs proportionate to the amount of frontage of a given property, or alternatively based on 
the size of a parcel (i.e. acreage). In other cases, fees varied depending on the number of 
bedrooms in housing developments, or on the amount of floor area in commercial 
developments (Whiteman,1990,1). Some localities apportioned costs based on the relative 
valuations of different properties— placing the highest burden on land having higher 
property assessments (Snyder and Stegman,1989,70).
Some local governments simply imposed a flat rate charge which took no account 
of variations in lot size or frontage, house size, number of bedrooms, etc. Sewer 
connection charges were frequently assessed as a uniform cost per home, without taking 
into account the distance from the existing main drain- even though the public cost of 
providing the sewer connection increases proportionately with that distance. The problem 
with this approach is that “uniform fees provide no incentive for development to occur in 
one place instead of another, and arbitrary fees provide the wrong incentives” (Ibid.,30).
With the passage of time, local governments became more experienced in devising 
and using impact fees, and some became quite sophisticated in using impact fees as a tool 
for growth management. For example in San Diego, three basic areas were designated — 
urban, urbanising, and rural— each with its own system of fees (Fulton,1987,10). These 
areas were called Fixed Benefit Areas (FBAs). This approach allowed the City to set fees 
which more accurately reflected the true physical and social cost of development in different 
locations— to impose high fees in areas where infrastructure provision was more costly, 
and lower fees in areas where infrastructure costs were lower.
Developers in urban (already developed areas) pay no fee. Developers in urbanizing 
areas pay fees that are considerable but do not discourage growth. Developers in 
rural areas, because they must pay the full freight of long-distance infrastructure, 
must pay very high fees (Fulton,1987,10).
The San Diego infrastructure assessment charge is important and unique in a 
number of respects. “Benefit assessments have traditionally been used for public 
improvements such as streets, water mains, and sewers. By utilizing benefit assessments 
to fund transit systems and fire stations, the FBA scheme extends the use of benefit 
assessments to those public facilities traditionally financed out of general revenues” 
(R.M.Smith,1987,21). Within the North University FBA of San Diego, developers and
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landowners were expected to pay 96% of the $55 million cost of providing infrastructure 
and public facilities, with only approximately 4% paid for out of the city's general revenues 
(Ibid., 23). Fees levied against properties in San Diego were also used to provide parks, 
libraries, school buildings, and police stations. Another unique feature of the 
implementation of San Diego's infrastructure assessment charge was that it was levied not 
only against developers who wished to develop their property, but also against owners of 
undeveloped property as well. The charge is recorded as a lien against that property, and is 
“payable in one lump sum at the time the building permit is issued, or, if the improvement 
has not yet commenced, at the time of the commencement” (Ibid. 21).
Linkage Fees
Wakefoid has characterised “linkage fees” as an “extreme type of exaction” 
(Wakeford,1990,194). “Linkage fees” are somewhat similar to “inclusionary zoning,” in 
that they were invented to increase the provision of affordable housing by private sector 
developers. What is different about linkage requirements is that they have attempted to 
impose these additional housing requirements on developers of large-scale commercial 
projects (whereas inclusionary zoning has most often been imposed on residential 
projects).
The argument commonly put forward to justify the adoption of linkage fees was 
that new high-rise office space buildings, employing thousands of people, led to increased 
housing demand, increased housing costs, and in turn a shortage of low and moderate cost 
housing. Therefore, it was argued, developers of new high-rise office buildings should 
contribute financially toward the alleviation of the problems they have helped to create, by 
financially contributing toward the provision of low and moderate cost housing.
A number of cities, including Boston, San Francisco, Sacramento, Chicago, 
Seattle, Santa Monica, and Hartford adopted linkage payment requirements during the early 
and mid-1980’s, at a time when they were experiencing surging demand for the 
development of new, high-rise office buildings. The fact that the market for high-rise 
office space at the time appeared to be so lucrative, made it an easy political target for those 
who argued that some of this new-found wealth should be shared with people who were 
less fortunate (Susskind and McMahon,1988,205).
The Linkage requirement for commercial developers in Boston began in 1983, with 
the adoption of Article 16. Under linkage, developers were required to pay an exaction of 
$5 for each square foot of gross floor area in excess of one hundred thousand square feet 
These payments were mandatory, and could not be reduced through negotiation. Linkage 
payments collected from developers were deposited into a special fund, called the 
Neighborhood Housing Trust, dedicated to the creation of new low and moderate cost 
housing in the city. A portion of the linkage funds paid by developers was also used for
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the cost of providing job-training for low income persons. Developers were allowed to pay 
the exaction in twelve equal annual installments spaced over twelve years, with the first 
installment due within 24 months of the granting of the building permit Legal agreements 
were routinely entered into between the City and developers to assure payment of the fees 
over the 12 year period, and to enforce other stipulations related to planning approvals.
Once the city adopted its $5 per square foot fee, that fee remained unchanged, 
despite a severe downturn in the downtown property market The amount of the fee is 
specified in the city's Zoning Ordinance and can only be changed by officially amending 
the zoning ordinance. As of 1991, no thought had been given to revising the fee either 
upward or downward. In the judgment of the person administering the Linkage 
programme, the fee was relatively small, representing less than 5% of total development 
costs, and not in itself a major deterrent to development (O’Malley, 1991, int.).
San Francisco's office-housing linkage programme (OHPP) was adopted in 1985, 
at a time when there was intense pressure by private developers to build high-rise office 
buildings in the city. It was also a time when there were growing citizen demands for 
major high-rise development to be curtailed or sharply limited. "Coincident with the 
passage of the ordinance the city adopted a downtown plan that limited office space 
growth" (Goetz, 1989, 67). Under the San Francisco OHPP, the number of housing units 
a developer had either to provide or pay for was based on an estimate of the additional 
housing demand that would eventually be generated by the proposed office development. 
The formula used in calculating the additional housing demand assumed that office use 
generated one employee per 250 gross square feet, that 40 percent of all office employees 
resided in San Francisco, and that 1.8 working adults occupied each residential per unit 
(Ibid.).
An important feature of the San Francisco programme has been its flexibility in 
allowing developers to meet its requirements in a variety of ways, and its use of incentives 
rather than rigid requirements. The ordinance encourages developers to provide larger 
housing units (i.e. containing two, three, and four bedrooms) by counting each bedroom 
provided as a credit against a developer's housing obligation. Thus,“[i]f a developer 
wished to fulfill an obligation of 50 [units],.. .25 two bedroom units would be an 
acceptable option”(Ibid.,68). Developers receive a four-for-one credit for units which are 
affordable to low income households, a three-for-one credit for units affordable to 
moderate income households, and two-for-one credit for affordable rental housing units 
which involve some other form of rental subsidy (Ibid.).
The San Francisco ordinance does not require that developers provide low income 
housing, but encourages the provision of low income units by offering the above- 
mentioned additional housing credits. If a developer chooses not to provide the needed 
housing directly, he can make arrangements for the needed housing to be provided by
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others somewhere in the city. For example, developers can meet the linkage requirement 
by providing “gap financing" that allows other developers to build housing units affordable 
to low and moderate income people. Or, alternatively, the developer may chose to make a 
cash payment to a dedicated affordable housing fund, which the city can then use to 
develop new, affordable public housing. The ordinance does not specify how much a 
developer must pay toward the provision of new affordable housing if he chooses not to 
provide the new housing directly. Rather, the amount that a developer is required to pay 
will vary, depending on the specific circumstances and costs involved.
Prior to the adoption of the linkage programme in Boston, the City had a zoning 
ordinance which allowed several developers to build 600 foot high office towers 
(King,1990,7). When linkage was adopted in Boston, the City simultaneously adopted a 
new zoning ordinance which capped most new office buildings at 155 feet, with up to 465 
feet permitted in areas where development was encouraged (Ibid.). After this significant 
down-zoning was accomplished, the Floor Area Ratio (FAR) of development reflected in 
land values was significantly greater than the amount of development which could be 
undertaken by right. “In effect, all downtown commercial projects must seek zoning relief 
to gain a FAR that will allow profitable development” (Susskind and McMahon, 1988,
211-212). Other cities also “down-zoned” their downtown areas to limit the level of as-of- 
right development and to increase opportunities for securing benefits from developers. In 
1982, when New York City adopted a sweeping revision of zoning in the Mid-town area, it 
reduced allowed floor area ratios from 18-21 to 15-18 (Whyte,1988,250).
Linkage fees imposed on office developers have varied considerably. The linkage 
fee imposed in San Francisco in 1985 was $5.35/square foot (Susskind and McMahon, 
1988,204). Sacramento, California’s linkage fee ordinance requires commercial 
developers to pay up to 95 cents a square foot to the city’s low-income housing fund 
{Planning / APA, October 1991). Fees collected are not negotiable. The only way to avoid 
payment of the fee is not to proceed with development
During the property boom of the 1980’s, the Boston Linkage programme produced 
a significant flow of revenue for the production of affordable housing. Between 1983 and 
1990 Boston's office/housing linkage requirements were applied to 41 separate 
development projects, resulting in developer commitments of $76 million to housing 
projects (King,1990,5). As of mid-1990,2900 new housing units had been built with 
funding from developer linkage payments-- 84 percent of them affordable to low and 
moderate income persons (Ibid.).
Linkage has represented an extreme developer exaction- requiring office 
developers to pay for purposes which one might argue are unrelated to the developments 
which occasioned the payments. For that reason, some legal experts, such as David 
Callies, believe that linkage fees face an uncertain legal future in the U.S. Nevertheless,
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courts in key states have ruled that there is a sufficient connection between new commercial 
development and the need for affordable housing to sustain linkage fee ordinances.1
Inclusionary Zoning
During the 1980's, as housing costs escalated, and as the federal government 
decreased its financial support for the provision of low-cost housing, local governments 
devised inclusionary zoning ordinances in an attempt to shift some of the burden of 
providing affordable housing onto private developers. "Inclusionary zoning" ordinances in 
the U.S. typically required private developers to include affordable, low-cost housing units 
in their developments, or to provide those units on another site, or to make a financial 
contributions so that affordable housing could be provided by the city or some other entity 
on another site, as a condition for obtaining permission to build. Some local inclusionary 
zoning ordinances required that up to 20-25 percent of the units in specific developments be 
affordable to low and moderate income persons, that a portion of the units constructed by a 
developer be dedicated to the local public housing authority or to a non-profit housing 
agency, and/or that the developer agree to make even more substantial payments into a 
dedicated affordable housing fund. An ordinance adopted in 1987 in Princeton Township, 
New Jersey “required developers either to construct low-cost housing, or to donate 10 per 
cent of their land to the township, or to contribute to an affordable housing trust fund a fee 
of $42,700 per affordable unit required (equivalent to a contribution of $17,080 per 
acre...)” (Wakeford, 1990, 236).
Like other zoning provisions, inclusionary zoning ordinances were adopted locally, 
subject to state approval. Thus, inclusionary zoning ordinances varied considerably among 
different states, and among different communities. In some localities, the provision of 
affordable housing in new residential projects above a certain size is stated as an absolute 
requirement. However that did not necessarily assure that affordable housing units would 
be provided; a developer could escape the provisions simply by not constructing new 
housing units in localities that adopted such provisions. In some localities the inclusion of 
affordable housing has been encouraged by offering an incentive in the form of a density 
bonus. A developer who agreed to include affordable housing units in a proposed 
development would thus be permitted to build at a higher density. The idea was that the 
increased income and profits generated by being able to develop and sell/or rent more units 
would off-set or exceed the loss of income resulting from the inclusion of lower-priced 
housing units.
Most inclusionary zoning ordinances required developers to include the desired
1 A court of appeals in San Francisco in the fall of 1991 upheld the constitutionality of Sacramento’s 
linkage ordinance, which required non-residential developer to make payments to the city’s low-income 
housing fund.
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affordable housing units within their proposed development. This requirement reflects a 
social policy goal of encouraging "income-mixing" in new development However, some 
communities which have adopted inclusionary zoning ordinances have incorporated 
provisions which permit flexibility in where the affordable housing units can be provided- 
so that a developer may choose to build the affordable housing units on a site which is 
separate from the main development
The goal behind the enactment of inclusionary zoning was to spread the burden of 
providing low and moderate income housing more equally in communities, especially 
between wealthy suburbs and more economically depressed inner cities. But developers 
were often reluctant and unwilling to provide low and moderate income housing in the very 
areas where it was most needed. A 1987 study report prepared at the Woodrow Wilson 
School, Princeton University, found that many suburban municipalities were not providing 
their required share of low and moderate income housing within their municipal boundaries 
(Wakeford,1990,246). Moreover, critics of inclusionary zoning, such as Ellickson, 
contend that inclusionary zoning requirements tend, unwittingly to intensify the very 
housing problems they are designed to ease.
[M]ost ’inclusionary1 programs are ironically titled because the programs are 
essentially taxes on the production of new housing. These taxes can be expected to 
increase general housing prices, thus further limiting the housing opportunities of 
moderate-income households. In short, despite what their proponents assert, most 
inclusionary ordinances are just another form of exclusionary practice (Ellickson, 
1982, 136-137).
Flexible Approaches to Developer Finance/ Benefit- based
Special Assessments
The use of “special assessments” has provided local governments with a means of 
paying for some or all of the cost of improvements that afford direct benefits to particular 
properties. “Special assessments are based on a formula that relates the charge against a 
parcel of property to the services or benefits received” (Thomas and Colton,1989,111-5 to 
111-6). In some states, such as Massachusetts, special assessments are referred to as 
“betterment levies.” Special assessments actually represents a hybrid between rule-based 
and flexible approaches to developer finance. Special assessments are prescriptive, and 
rule-based in the sense that they are levied in a manner which is similar to a tax, and are 
based on a formula. However, special assessments are a highly flexible tool of developer 
finance. The decision as to whether or not to levy a special assessment can only be made 
after consultation with the owners of affected properties. Under Massachusetts General 
Laws (Chapter 80, Sec.297), a number of steps must be taken before a special assessment, 
or betterment charge is levied. First, a public hearing must be held, and all owners of
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affected properties must be sent specific notice of the public hearing. Also, two-thirds of 
the affected property owners must vote to approve the assessment However, once the 
special assessment has been approved, it becomes mandatory, and must be paid by owners 
of all affected properties. The special assessment, once collected, must be spent within the 
district exclusively for the infrastructure improvement for which it was given.
Special assessments have a long history in the U.S., but their popularity has tended 
to rise and fall with the property market. “Special assessment reached its peak of popularity 
during the first 30 years of this century” (Misczynksi,1978,314). During that period, up 
until the Stock Market Crash of 1929, property values were rising, and local governments 
made heavy use of special assessments as a way of financing public improvements related 
to development
In 1913, cities with populations greater than 100,000 obtained an average of 12 
percent of their revenue in this way, and in four cities— Los Angeles, Kansas City, 
Portland and Oakland— special assessments were responsible for 20 percent of total 
revenue... Almost every large city used special assessments. The rapidly growing 
cities of the west were particularly avid users (Ibid., 315).
However, the overuse of special assessments had dire consequences in the 1930's, 
as land values depreciated. When property values fell, the financial justification for the 
improvement, and the ability to repay the cost, was undermined. ‘The depression of the 
1930's caused widespread delinquencies in payment of special assessments that had... 
been levied to construct... physical improvements in platted subdivisions... Special 
assessment liens were foreclosed, [and] only a fraction of the assessments due were 
realized...” (R.M. Smith,1987,6). The severity of the problem was compounded by the 
fact that the failure to require developers to construct physical improvements on their 
properties had led to “the premature subdivision of land” and in turn to “an oversupply of 
partially improved subdivisions” (Ibid., 5). As a result of this negative experience with 
special assessments, more and more cities took the approach of requiring developers to 
construct required physical improvements as a condition of obtaining subdivision approval.
In the 1980's there was a revival in the use of special assessments to finance 
infrastructure projects. In California there was a surge in use of special assessments, 
following passage of Proposition 13, which limited the ability of local governments to raise 
revenue from property taxes (R.M. Smith,1987,19-20; Chapman,1991,16). The 
advantage of special assessment revenue was that it was exempt from the limitations 
imposed by Proposition 13. Special assessment districts also proliferated in Florida and 
Texas (Nicholas, 1987, 89).
Special assessments have been used by local governments to finance the 
construction of roads and sidewalks, sewers, storm drains, street lights, and parking 
facilities. In rarer instances they have been used to obtain private financing for parks, tree
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planting, and public amenities. The concept behind a special assessment is that the charge 
levied against any given property should be proportionate to the benefit that it receives from 
the public improvement As specified by Massachusetts General Law, for example, "no 
such assessment shall exceed the amount of such adjudged benefit or advantage." (MGL, 
Chapter 80,297). In practice, however, it is technically very difficult to measure benefit. 
“... [N]o one knows how to measure benefits accurately... [and] this problem is especially 
acute for special assessments... because of the tradition that the amount of assessment 
against each parcel be determined before the project is constructed”(Misczynski, 1978,
323). This technical problem was essentially solved in the U.S. by pragmatically basing 
the assessment, not on the benefit, but on the cost of the project. Costs were apportioned 
according to convenient rules-of-thumb, such as relative frontage, relative lot size or 
assessed value. In no case can the amount of money raised through a special assessment 
exceed the public cost of the project In most typical cases, the amount raised through 
special assessments contributes only a portion of project cost. During the late 1980's 
approximately 5% of the revenue used in local government in the U.S., excluding 
education, was raised through special assessments (Wakeford,1990, 193).
Tax Increment Financing
As property values in most parts of the U.S. rose in the 1980*s, and as local 
governments searched for new ways of paying for public improvements, it became 
increasingly attractive to finance geographically targeted infrastructure and public 
improvements through the method of Tax Increment Financing (TIF). Tax increment 
financing, or tax increment bonds were first devised and used in California during the early 
fifties (Joint Economic Committee,1984,124), but came into widespread use in the 1980’s. 
TIF is a method of funding public investments "... by recapturing, for a time, all or a 
portion of the increased tax revenue that may result if the redevelopment stimulates private 
investment" (Casella,1985,1). Thus TIF provided a way for cities to raise money and 
spend public money in particular areas, without raising property taxes in areas not 
benefiting from those improvements. In effect, TIF gives owners of selected properties a 
special benefit (concentrated infrastructure and public improvements) which will raise the 
value of their properties, in exchange for asking them to make increased payments in lieu 
o f taxes (PILOTS) against the increases in property values within the targeted area that 
result from the public investment
State laws authorising the use of TIF have been specifically drafted to limit the use 
of TIF to areas which have been officially designated by the municipality as “blighted”, and 
not likely to be developed or improved without TIF funded improvements (Hood,1990, ii). 
In addition, state TIF legislation typically establishes a number of procedural requirements. 
Under 1986 Missouri legislation, for example, a draft TIF plan must be prepared, including
-49-
a statement of project objectives, costs, sources of up-front funds, assessed values, 
existing land uses in the area, relocation plans, and estimated dates of completion for the 
TIF project A public hearing must also be held, and all taxpayers in the area must be 
notified of the hearing 45 days in advance; and the final version of the TIF plan and 
ordinance must be officially voted on and approved by the locally-elected government 
within a certain time of the public hearing. Thus, under this process it is likely that the plan 
for publicly financed improvements that is finalised will reflect the concerns and interests of 
owners of affected properties. Under the law, TIF financing can only be used in cases 
where the parcels included in the district will “substantially benefit” from the proposed TIF- 
funded improvements (Gilmore and Bell,1990,4).
The point in time when the TIF district is established becomes the “base year” for 
purposes of calculating future tax increments. As of that "base year" the local property tax 
revenue that the local government unit will receive from the area is effectively “frozen” 
(ACIR.,1984,27). Bonds are then issued to finance the costs of public improvements (i.e. 
land assembly and infrastructure improvements, etc.) From that point on, all increases in 
the valuation of property in the area produced by this injection of investment (i.e. increases 
in value of existing properties and new development in the area) become subject to 
PILOTS, which are diverted to the designated TIF agency to pay back the cost of the TIF 
bonds. The period of time that this diversion of increased revenue can continue is limited to 
a period of between five and thirty years, depending on state enabling legislation 
(Casella,1985,1).
As of 1985, thirty-three states in the United States had adopted TIF enabling 
legislation (Kim,Forrest and Przypyszny,1985,11). California was one of the most active 
states in making use of Tax Increment Financing. For example, San Jose, California made 
extensive use of TIF districts to finance downtown public improvements and amenities. 
However, not all localities were equally able to make use of the advantages of tax increment 
financing.
Although disadvantaged communities might have most need for the program's 
putative benefits, these places have been least able to ... attract investors ... or to 
sell their bonds on the marketplace. Thus... prosperous towns and suburbs have 
been the heaviest users. Cities like Palm Springs, Santa Barbara, and Belmont have 
designated their most valuable and booming areas as redevelopment zones; the city 
of Indian Wells, with one of the highest per capita incomes in the world, made all 
land within its city limits (even wilderness) an official redevelopment area. The city 
that went deepest into redevelopment debt was tiny City of Industry, which began 
the process with the largest tax base per capita of any city in the state (Logan and 
Molotch,1987,174-175).
TIF provided a seemingly painless, and therefore politically attractive way, of 
financing public improvements. Indeed, given its attractiveness there has been
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considerable risk of overuse. Local governments would sometimes delineate “a larger 
district than necessary in order to ‘capture* PILOT funds from more property owners (who 
may not direcdy benefit from TIF improvements)** (Hood,1990,10). In other instances, 
localities used TIF to fund public improvements which themselves had little or no impact 
on property values (which would have risen anyway). Thus, TIF was a tool which seemed 
to be prone to abuse. H F can be “like casting a fish-net across the landscape to catch all 
the increases in property values that occur** (M. Bunnell,1989, int).
There are also risks for cities in making too great a use of tax increment financing. 
Future increased tax revenue generated within TIF districts is, in effect, siphoned away 
from general city revenues. Thus, if a TIF district accounts for too large a proportion of a 
city's area, there might not be enough money available in the future from property tax 
collections to cover future increases in the costs of city-wide services and facilities. For 
that reason, legislation authorising TIF typically included provisions to assure that TIF 
districts do not represent too large a proportion of a municipality's property tax base.
South Dakota stipulated that a project in municipalities with over 5000 population may not 
exceed 12 per cent of the valuation of taxable property; and in Minnesota, no more than one 
percent of the total area of a city can be included in any one project and not more than three 
percent of a municipality may be included in all projects (Kim et al., 1985, 11-13).
Incentive Zoning
Another way of financing public improvements at little or no cost was through the 
technique of “incentive zoning,'* which involved granting a developer some special 
development right, such as the right to build a bigger building, in exchange for the 
developer providing some desired public improvement. The first incentive zoning 
ordinance was devised in New York City, in 1961. Under this ordinance, the City granted 
a 20 percent density bonus within a designated area of Midtown Manhattan to developers 
who agreed to set their buildings back from the street and to construct a pedestrian plaza 
that met the qualifications in the ordinance (Barnett, 1982,72). Over ensuing years, 
numerous developers took advantage of these incentive provisions by building new 
skyscraper office buildings along Sixth Avenue (the Avenue of the Americas.)
When in 1967 a developer applied to New York City's Planning Commission for 
permission to build an office building on the site of the Astor Hotel larger than the zoning 
ordinance permitted, the Commission decided that, in exchange for this special advantage, 
the developer should include and construct a legitimate theatre in the building. “After 
negotiation, the Planning Commission determined that a 20 percent larger tower was a 
legitimate form of compensation for the costs of building a theatre- costs that could not be 
paid for out of the income the theatre would generate” (Bamett,Ibid„ 78). The City 
proceeded to formalise its planning and design objectives, and to publish guidelines
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whereby future developers could obtain permission for increased building density, by 
adopting special provisions for the "Theatre District"
After its adoption of the Theatre District, New York City proceeded to delineate a 
number of additional Special Zoning Districts. The planning and design objectives were 
different in each of the Special Districts, based on the differing characteristics and needs of 
the different districts, and the differing planning objectives. In the Fifth Avenue District, 
density bonuses were offered to developers who included specified retail uses at ground 
level of office buildings (excluding airline ticket offices and banks, which were already 
overly abundant) Density bonuses could also be obtained for providing through-block 
pedestrian connections, arcaded sidewalks, shopping arcades, atriums, gallerias, building 
setbacks with plazas, and "vest-pocket" parks. (Whyte, 1988) Inclusion of housing on 
upper floors of office buildings was also encouraged in the Fifth Avenue District by means 
of density bonuses (Ibid.,83-84). In the Lincoln Center Special District, incentive 
provisions were tailored to encourage the inclusion of small shops and restaurants which 
would operate at night when Lincoln Center was open (Ibid.,80). “To spur developers to 
build continuous sequences of arcaded sidewalks, a special Lincoln Square Zoning District 
offered floor-area bonuses to developers of buildings along Broadway if they would 
provide arcaded sidewalks...” (Whyte,1988, 246). In another use of incentive zoning, the 
City offered a 20 per cent density bonus to developers willing to build subsidised theatres 
within proposed new developments. A density bonus was granted for the Phillip Morris 
Building in Midtown Manhattan, in exchange for having most of the first floor of the 
building set aside to accommodate a branch of the Whitney Museum. Cash payments were 
also encouraged. Developers were allowed to build bigger buildings if they agreed to pay 
for improvements to subways stations and other transit-related improvements. In 1990, a 
major development firm paid $13 million to connect its building to the subway system, and 
in return was allowed to increase the floorspace of the building by 20% over the maximum 
allowed for the zone in which the project was located {New York Times, August 26, 1990).
Incentive zoning provided city planning departments in major American cities with 
a powerful tool for managing development, and for achieving publicly desired objectives at 
little or no cost The “trick” to this approach was, in effect, to “create a currency in the 
public domain that then [could] be traded” (Wakeford,1990,225). Other cities followed 
New York City's lead by incorporating incentive provisions in their zoning ordinances.
San Francisco enacted zoning provisions offering density bonuses to developers who 
provided arcades, plazas and other amenities (Barnett, Ibid.). Developers of downtown 
office buildings in Boston were offered density bonuses of up to 10 percent for devoting 
space to non-profit arts groups or to businesses from nearby Chinatown (King,1990,9). 
Planning permissions for projects of over 100,000 square feet became conditional on the 
provision of day care centres (Ibid.). Cincinnati, Ohio adopted zoning provisions
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allowing an automatic 20 per cent increase in allowable Floor Area Ratio for any project 
that completed the City's design review process, and design review was required if a major 
parking garage was included in the project (Getzels and Jaffe,1988). The Planning 
Commission in Coral Gables, Florida granted developers a 20 percent density bonus if they 
designed and constructed their building in a “Mediterranean" architectural style. In a 
number of New Jersey communities, density bonuses were available to developers to 
encourage the provision of low and moderate income housing (Wakeford,1990, 222). In 
rural and suburban communities, density bonuses were offered to encourage developers to 
save and restore landmarks and historic buildings, and to preserve farmland and open 
space.
As American cities gained greater experience in using incentive zoning over time, 
they became more aware of the need to calibrate the incentives given to developers to the 
value of the public benefits they provided. Seattle's density bonus system was adjusted 
over time to account for changes in the value of land (Getzels and Jaffe,1988,17). Up 
until 1984, San Francisco's incentive provisions were determined on the basis of “marginal 
cost-to-profit” Under this approach, “the cost of providing each square foot of an 
amenity... [was] defrayed by a specific amount of square feet of bonus floor area equal in 
value to the amenity cost”(Ibid.,19). San Francisco abandoned its bonus system in 1984, 
when it adopted its downtown plan establishing a ceiling on new office space. The City 
reduced FARs and allowed heights, and shifted from incentives to exactions (Ibid., 20).
The use of incentive zoning by certain American cities was a transitional step 
toward greater flexibility in American development control, and toward increased 
negotiation. Indeed, with the invention of “special districts” and incentive zoning, 
development control became increasingly ad hoc and subject to modification on a case by 
case basis. With the proliferation of “special districts,” zoning provisions became 
negotiable, as “.. .developers [tried] to negotiate even the basic requirements of special 
zoning districts...” (Barnett,1982,101), and as cities became more inclined to respond to 
the opportunities which flexibility offered.
When a 1977 staff study stopped to count up the changes in the zoning resolution 
since the comprehensive revisions adopted in 1961, it turned out that die zoning 
resolution had grown from 937 sections to 2131, and only 27 percent of the current 
total had remained unchanged since 1961. Sixteen percent of the sections had 
themselves been amended since they were adopted. In addition to these text 
changes, there were about 1200 map changes during the same period (Ibid., 100- 
101).
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Flexible Approaches to Developer Finance/ Market-Based
Transfer Development Rights
The concept of Transfer Development Rights (TDR) was first devised and 
promoted in a highly influential book by John Costonis entitled Space Adrift (1974). 
Costonis devised TDR as a way to preserve historic buildings, without having to pay the 
enormous cost of either publicly acquiring the properties, or compensating owners for their 
loss of development rights and profits. The problem, as Costonis saw it, was that historic 
buildings were usually smaller than what could be built by right under zoning. Thus there 
was often considerable economic pressure to tear down an historic building to make way 
for the construction of a much larger, new building. But it would not be necessary to 
demolish historic buildings if their owners could sell unused development rights and 
transfer them to other sites. TDR as an approach to historic preservation was first used on 
a significant scale in New York City. Among the landmark buildings protected through 
TDR were Grand Central Station and St. Bartholomew’s Church. Development rights 
from landmark sites in Midtown Manhattan were purchased by Donald Trump to make his 
Trump Tower much bigger than otherwise would have been allowed (Barnett,1982).
TDR was used in a more ambitious manner as a means of protecting a large, 
environmentally sensitive area in the state from development pressure, by deflecting that 
development to more appropriate areas. In 1979, the State of New Jersey passed the 
Pinelands Protection Act, with the intent of preserving and protecting over 1 million acres 
known as “the Pinelands,” an area which comprised approximately 22% of the area of the 
entire state. The goal of the Act was to significantly limit development within the 
Pinelands, and to encourage development to occur instead in designated growth centres 
outside the Pinelands. At the prompting of the state, a comprehensive plan was prepared 
for the Pinelands Area, involving the participation and input of 52 municipalities and 7 
counties. Had the plan which was prepared called for prohibiting or severely limited 
building within the Pinelands without the TDR provision, then there is little doubt that the 
courts would have ruled that such an action constituted a “taking” of private property.
Under those circumstances, the state and/or local governments would have been required to 
compensate property owners up to the full market value of the property, and the huge 
damage payments that would have been required would have led to the abandonment of the 
scheme. Instead, the 1979 Act established a Pinelands Commission, along with a Central 
Bank to facilitate the selling and buying of development rights. Owners of property in 
restricted areas of the Pinelands were able to sell their unused development rights (which 
were called Pinelands Development Credits) to owners of properties in designated regional 
growth areas (Babcock and Siemon,1985,146). In turn, the state adjusted its capital 
spending programme to give priority to infrastructure improvements in designated growth
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areas, and to encourage and reinforce development in those areas, rather than in the 
Pinelands. The Pinelands experiment proved to be a remarkable success. It is reported that 
in the 5 years following the adoption of the plan, ninety-six percent of all development was 
located in areas designated for growth (Ibid., 156).
Negotiated Development and Use o f Legal Agreements
In the U.S., the most common approach to planning and development control has 
been to set mandatory rules and standards, and to enforce standards in a consistent and 
prescriptive manner. Planners in the U.S. have never been comfortable with the idea of 
bargaining and negotiating with developers. “To planners [in the U.S.], bargaining seemed 
uncomfortably unprofessional. It compromised purity, the detachment, of the planner’s 
vision and skills” (Popper,1985,27). But by the mid-1980’s, there were indications that a 
more positive attitude toward bargaining was emerging:
... now, spurred by their loss of faith in standard devices like comprehensive plans, 
hard-and-fast zoning ordinances, and regulation itself, planners, developers, and 
the public have all begun to rely more on bargaining— indeed to expect it... The 
new bargaining has new upscale labels: negotiated development, conflict resolution, 
collaborative problem solving, case-by-case decision making (Popper,1985,27).
One factor which may led to increased acceptance of negotiation was the federal 
Urban Development Action Grant (UDAG) programme. Under the UDAG programme, 
which began in 1978 and operated until 1988, the federal government offered grants to 
municipalities which they could invest in approved private development projects. 
Approximately $500 million in grants were made each year during the life of the 
programme. What was unique about the UDAG programme is that it "taught cities how to 
be deal-makers... UDAG staff went into the field instructing city officials how to 
bargain”(Segalyn,1990,433). The amount that a locality might invest in a particular 
project, and the terms of that investment (whether it was an outright grant or a loan), were 
not set in advance by statute or formula, but were instead to be negotiated on a case by case 
basis. In cases where the city was considering loaning money to a developer, the terms of 
repayment (interest rate and time period) would have to be negotiated. Most importantly, 
any repayment of UDAG loans was back to the municipality, rather than to the federal 
government, so that the municipality approving the development had a direct and positive 
financial interest in the deal which they were negotiating.
The increased respectability of negotiation was also indicated by the growing 
number of books and articles which emphasised the usefulness of negotiation and 
mediation in resolving conflicts and “getting things done.” A number of books on 
negotiation became national “best-sellers,” -- such as You Can Negotiate Anything
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(Cohenl980) and Getting to Yes (Fisher and Ury, 1981). Articles by Talbot (1983), 
Susskind and Ozawa (1983), SusskindJBacou and Wheeler (1983) and Forester (1983) 
focused on the growing importance of negotiation and mediation in planning and 
development control. They suggested that planners could play an important role in 
mediating development-related disputes. Perhaps because of the growing attention paid to 
negotiation, it became increasingly common for local governments in the U.S. to enter into 
negotiations with developers as a way of achieving public objectives.
Major downtown development projects undertaken in the 1970’s and 1980’s which 
gained national acclaim for their excellence in planning and design frequently came about 
through a process of public/private negotiation. For example, the redevelopment of the 
historic Faneuil Hall Marketplace area in Boston, which involved a complex negotiated 
agreement between the City of Boston and developer James Rouse, became a model for 
other such negotiated developments. The City owned the land and historic buildings which 
provided the basis for the project. In the past, the City might have been content to simply 
select a developer, and sell the land outright to that selected developer. Instead, the Faneuil 
Hall Marketplace project “broke new ground for public finance,” in that the City of Boston 
regarded itself as a co-investor in the project, and wished to share in the future profits of 
the scheme (Frieden and Segalyn,1989,137). The public/private “deal” negotiated in 
relation to Faneuil Hall project was soon followed by other projects involving profit- 
sharing agreements in other cities. During the 1980’s, numerous other major projects were 
carried out in American cities involving negotiated development agreements, such as: the 
Harborplace project in Baltimore; the Town Square project in St. Paul, Minnesota; Fountain 
Square in Cincinnati; and Horton Plaza in San Diego (Ibid., 133-153). Another major 
development project carried out on publicly owned land subject to the terms of a complex 
development agreement was the huge Battery Park City project in New York City— a 
project which involved the construction of 6 million square feet of office space and 14,000 
housing units (Light, 1985,42). Under the agreement, the developer (Olympia and York) 
agreed to contribute a portion of the profits generated by the development over a period of 
years to support the construction of low and moderate-income housing throughout the City 
(Gill, 1990,70; Fainstein,1991,28). Total contributions in excess of $1 billion dollars are 
expected (Gill, Ibid.). The agreement also specified that the developer would construct, 
dedicate, and thereafter maintain significant portions of the project adjoining the Hudson 
River for public use, including a continuous public walkway and landscaped areas along 
the river.
Every major commercial or institutional development which was approved in the 
1980*s by the Boston Redevelopment Authority (BRA) involved the negotiation of a 
“Cooperation Agreement,” and these agreements typically contained offers of significant 
contributions (O’Malley, 1991, int.). Contributions sought by the BRA in these
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Cooperation Agreements were in addition to the payments required of commercial 
developers under the city’s Linkage programme (discussed earlier in this chapter). The 
standard sequence of events, as described by a senior official at the BRA, was as follows:
A developer would apply to the City to rezone a property as a Planned 
Development Area (PDA). Under PDA zoning, the project could be as large as the 
City wished to allow. Designating the area as a PDA was, in effect, a way for the 
City to grant an exception to the zoning without having to meet the strict legal test 
required for a variance... The application for rezoning would be submitted to the 
City Council, which would make the final decision... By the time the rezoning 
came before the City Council, the BRA would have already met with the applicant 
and attempted to negotiate a “Cooperation Agreement” containing offers of 
developer contributions. The BRA would tell the applicant that it couldn’t 
guarantee zoning approval, but that it would support the re-zoning application, if 
the applicant and the BRA were able to reach a satisfactory agreement (Webb, 1991, 
int.).
Once an agreement was signed, the BRA would prepare Master Plan in support of the 
rezoning. In most cases, the Council acted in accordance with the recommendation of the 
BRA.
During the 1980*s, the City of Boston extended the negotiation of agreements to 
most major developments, including those which did not require rezoning to Planned 
Development Areas. The City adopted an ordinance requiring that, before any project of 
100,000 square feet or more could be granted planning approval, a Transportation Access 
Plan had to be prepared. In preparing the Transportation Access Plan, the City would 
study the existing situation, and the expected impacts of the proposed project, and negotiate 
with the developer regarding measures to mitigate those impacts (Garver, 1991,int.).
In Ann Arbor, Michigan, it became common for the City and developers of major 
commercial and residential projects to enter into “site development agreements” in which 
the developer agreed to construct roads and other essential infrastructure. Developers were 
not required to make such contributions, “but if they didn't, the improvements might not be 
done for a long time” (Overhiser,1992,int.).
In some parts of the country, local governments took advantage of strong 
development pressures to negotiate significant contributions from developers in exchange 
for granting regulatory certainty. The first state in the country to enact legislation 
authorising local governments to enter into agreements with developers for the purpose of 
granting regulatory certainty was California, which passed the Development Agreement Act 
in 1979 (Cowart,1989); the second state was Hawaii in 1985 (Callies,1989); and the third 
was Florida in 1986 (Taub and Rhodes,1989). The main reason behind enactments of this 
kind was the perceived need to protect developers of large-scale projects (requiring many 
years to complete and substantial up-front expenditures) from future changes in zoning and
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land use regulations which might jeopardise completion of the project
... although a United States developer may have automatic development rights in 
accordance with.. .zoning, he has no guarantee that the scheme will not be changed 
or other regulatory requirements imposed once the development process has 
commenced. To secure that guarantee on a major project he may be willing to 
assume substantial infrastructure responsibilities (Callies and Grant,1991,239).
The increased reliance on developers to provide infrastructure formerly funded publicly 
through taxation, gave added impetus to the signing of agreements guaranteeing developers 
regulatory certainty.
The problem of regulatory security [was] magnified by the abandonment of tax- 
based infrastructure finance in post-Proposition 13 California. So long as 
government was building public facilities, the developer's up-front risk was 
minimized. Now that developers are often required to finance project-related 
infrastructure, their risks are magnified and the need for security is greater 
(Cowart, 1988, 220).
Under California law, developers could negotiate with local governments to have 
their currently held development rights permanently “vested.” Once “vested,” a developer 
was guaranteed the right “to complete all phases of their projects, even if a growth control 
measure is passed before buildout” (Fulton,1989,4). In order to obtain such regulatory 
certainty, however, developers had to agree to make significant contributions, and to 
confirm such commitments in the form of legal agreements. Courts in California have not 
required that such agreements meet the so-called “rational nexus” test (Callies,1990 lect). 
Despite that fact, developers in California were often eager to enter into agreements with 
local governments. In addition to allowing developers to purchase regulatory certainty, the 
process of negotiation also afforded developers “the legal opportunity to engage in open- 
ended bargaining on virtually all aspects of the community's land use controls”
(Cowart,1989, 9).
Increased use of legal agreements was also reinforced by the environmental 
movement, and by increased interest in mitigating the impacts of development Throughout 
the 1980’s, laws, standards, and procedures enacted to protect the environment became 
increasingly complex and demanding. Major developments were required to complete 
complicated environmental impact reviews, and to demonstrate that they would not cause a 
deterioration in air and water quality, generate excessive noise, fumes or emissions, or 
adversely affect officially designated historic structures and districts. State and local laws 
to protect wetlands were tightened, and increasingly enforced. As a result of this increase 
in environmental legislation, there was an increased tendency to negotiate with developers 
regarding measures to make proposed developments environmentally more acceptable.
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“With the advent of environmental review, local governments ... gained the power to 
demand that developers mitigate the adverse effects of their projects. Mitigation could take 
any form (land, buildings, or cash) and was usually negotiated on a case by case basis” 
(Fulton,1987, 8).
A 1986 survey of local government use of development agreements in California 
was conducted by the University of California at Berkeley. The survey of 40 local 
governments found that the most frequently cited reason for entering into development 
agreements was to obtain private developer contributions for infrastructure costs.
Table 2.02; Reasons for Signing Agreements. California Local Governments
Source: Study by University of California at Berkeley, as reported by Cowart (1989,30)
As of the end of 1989, approximately 500 development agreements had been 
signed in California (Callies,1990,lect). A more recent survey of 450 cities and counties 
in California, reported on by Callies and Grant (1991,241), found that 150 local 
government units were using development agreements. Another 100 localities expressed 
interest in using agreements (Ibid.).
Agreements have also been used in other ways, to require and coordinate the 
private provision of infrastructure related to large private developments. Sacramento, 
California used agreements to help coordinate the development of tracts of land under 
separate private ownership. Agreements were used “to equitably divide the cost of 
infrastructure among several developers”(Porter,1989,151). “Recapture agreements” were 
used to allow developers of major developments to construct off-site infrastructure 
improvements needed for their developments, and then to collect funds back from owners 
of adjoining properties benefiting from the improvements.
No. Percentage
Infrastructure/Public 
Land Dedications 
Low Income Housing 
No Special Conditions 
To Setde Lawsuits
23 57.5%
14 35.0%
8 20.0% 
4 10.0%
3 7.5%
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Conclusions
Amidst the wide variety of approaches to developer finance in the U.S. there were 
really two main approaches. Most localities followed the traditional rule-based approach, 
setting and imposing fixed, mandatory fees. In large parts of the country, planning 
authorities remained distrustful of systems of development control which allowed planners 
and public officials to negotiate with developers. Meanwhile, in areas with strong property 
markets, it became increasingly common for municipalities to act opportunistically, and to 
capitalise on strong market conditions by seeking to negotiate exceptional benefits and 
contributions from developers in exchange for granting either planning permission or 
regulatory certainty. As Alterman has observed, “It is as yet difficult to assess which trend 
will dominate the U.S.A.- greater formalization or more negotiated arrangements; likely 
they will continue to co-exist” (Alterman,1990,168).
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CHAPTER THREE: EVOLUTION OF DEVELOPER FINANCE IN 
BRITAIN
Most of the tools of developer finance used in the U.S. to shift costs and 
obligations onto developers described in Chapter Two have been either entirely absent, or 
rarely used in Britain. For example, special assessments have received surprisingly little 
use in Britain. The London County Council promoted Bills to Parliament in 1890,1892 
and 1893 seeking approval to levy a betterment charge as a means of financing the cost of 
street widening and bridge improvements along the Victoria Embankment, “but were unable 
to secure the acceptance of the principle” (Uthwatt, 1942, para. 267). It was only after 
considerable study by a Select Committee of the House of Lords that the principle of 
assessing a charge for the cost of improvements was (apparently reluctantly) accepted in 
1895 (Uthwatt, Ibid., para 267; Misczynski,1978,312). Other than that notable case, 
special assessments have rarely been used, except to finance the construction of seawalls 
and barriers protecting coastal properties from storm damage.
There has also been considerable reluctance in Britain to finance public 
improvements through user fees. Homes and businesses have traditionally been charged a 
flat fee for water services, rather than a variable fee based on the amount of water they use. 
Tolls for the use of bridges, tunnels, and motorways are also not common in Britain. A 
recent exception to this rule has been the privately financed Dartford Bridge, which opened 
in 1991. Under a deal negotiated through the Department of Transport, the private 
consortium built the bridge and will collect tolls from the users of the bridge for up to 20 
years to recover its investment and make a profit. After that period, the bridge will be 
turned back to the government (and perhaps the tolls eliminated.)
Particularly striking from an American perspective has been the unwillingness of 
public authorities in England to impose exactions and fees on on landowners and 
developers when land is developed. American planning authorities have routinely required 
developers to dedicate land for roadways, and to construct various types of public 
infrastructure, including roads and curbing, sidewalks, lighting, water lines, sewers and 
surface water drainage systems. But such has not been the case in Britain.
Very little in the way of exactions is permitted in England. It is apparently assumed 
in England that governmental entities will provide parks, roads and the like. One 
would have to turn the clock back in America to a conservative state law in the 
1940's to find a situation where the public costs associated with new development 
were so minimally imposed on developers (Hagman and Pepe,1974,557).
In Britain, with its centrally controlled system of government and development 
control, there has been only one way for local governments to obtain benefits or payments 
from developers, and that has been by negotiating agreements. Three factors appear to
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have pushed local authorities toward negotiating agreements. First, the flexibility and 
discretion incorporated into the British planning system after World War II led naturally to 
negotiation between local planning authorities and developers. Secondly, local authorities 
found it increasingly difficult to finance infrastructure costs related to new development, as 
a result of strict financial limitations placed upon them by central government. Thirdly, the 
negotiation of agreements has been encouraged by the fact that local planning authorities 
have been limited in their ability to achieve planning and development control objectives by 
means of conditions.
Discretion and Negotiation in Development Control
The transformation of the British planning system after World War n, from reliance 
on fixed plans, toward a more flexible approach to development control, produced a 
development control system in which almost everything was negotiable. Under the 1932 
Town and Country Planning Act, development control in Britain was primarily “regulatory 
and restrictive” (Cullingworth,1988,5). Planning authorities, in effect, prepared zoning­
like plans which specified the uses and densities of development allowed in particular 
areas. By way of contrast, the 1944 and 1947 Town and Country Planning Acts provided 
for a more flexible form of regulation, with allocations of land made with a “broad 
brush”(Jowell,1977a, 66). Under these Acts, “the rigid detailed zonings of the 1932 Act 
system” were to be avoided (Ibid.). The most explicit evidence of this flexible approach to 
planning was the inclusion in the 1947 Town and Country Planning Act (and subsequent 
Town and Country Planning Acts through 1991) of the “material considerations” clause, 
which stated that:
... where an application is made to a local planning authority for planning 
permission, that authority, in dealing with the application, shall have regard to the 
provisions of the development plan, so far as material to die application, and to any 
other material considerations, and~
a.)... may grant planning permission, either unconditionally or subject to such 
conditions as they think fit; or
b.)... may refuse planning permission (TCPA 1971, Section 29).
Local planning authorities were not required to base their decisions on planning 
applications solely on the content of the official development plans. Rather, the LPA could 
also take into account “other material considerations,” — a phrase which was left 
deliberately vague and undefined. As Grant has forcefully put it (1982,277), “It is on the 
face of it, one of the least fettered discretions in the whole British administrative system, 
especially bearing in mind the potential distributional effects of planning decisions.” Thus,
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the range o f“material considerations'* was broad enough to include a consideration of 
factors such as “housing, transportation, recreation and leisure facilities and the effect of 
the development on the social balance of the community*’(Loughlin,1981,61). As the 
Nuffield Commission Report of 1986 argued, “The general test applied in the courts that 
any consideration which relates to use and development of land is capable of being a 
‘planning consideration’ sensibly places the emphasis on the circumstances of each 
application and means that no exhaustive list of material considerations can be 
produced”(Nuffield Commission,1986, para 9.14 and 9.15,153). Indeed, the exercise of 
discretion under the British system has been so sweeping that it has appeared to Hallett 
(1988,190) that the system has operated “largely outside the law, in the sense that local 
planning authorities had complete discretionary power to give or withhold planning 
permission, subject to an appeal to the Secretary of State (who also had complete 
discretionary power.)”
Given the lack of fixed plans, and the considerable discretion exercised by local 
planning authorities, it is not surprising that local planning authorities and developers 
frequently engage in negotiation. Indeed, it has been commonplace under the British 
system for developers to negotiate with planning authorities prior to submitting planning 
applications (Marsh,1990,int; Dimoldenburg,1990,lect.). The negotiation of planning 
agreements including planning gain simply took the exercise of discretion and negotiation 
one step further.
Financial Pressures on Local Authorities
In Britain, as in the U.S., efforts by national government to reduce overall public 
expenditure levels of taxation played a role in encouraging a shift toward developer 
finance, although probably not to such an extent as in the U.S. The trend toward decreased 
government infrastructure expenditure actually began in Britain in the 1970's, and 
continued throughout the 1980's. “Until the early seventies, the amount spent in the public 
sector was based upon the Public Expenditure Survey (PESC),” which attempted to 
forecast the demand for public expenditure in the future (Synnott,1983,58). The concept 
at the time was that “the level of demand for a publicly provided commodity or service was 
the dominant factor in the allocation of public resources”(Ibid.). However, in the mid- 
1970's, fiscal policy concerns took precedence, and planning was made subservient to 
public expenditure policy. As a result, public sector capital spending as a proportion of 
Gross National Product (GNP) steadily declined. In 1974, public sector capital spending 
represented 5.7% of GNP, but by 1983 it had fallen to just 2.0% of GNP (GLC,1985,
68). Capital spending by London Authorities in 1985 was more than £100 million a year 
below the level of spending which existed in the mid-1970's (Ibid., 9-10). Over that same 
period, the Greater London Council's gross capital expenditure authorisations (set out in
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the Money Bill) had been reduced by approximately 30% in real terms (Ibid, 3).
Because of their capital intensiveness, public water authorities were particularly 
vulnerable to cuts in funding from the Treasury (Synnott,1983,59). The regional water 
authorities became increasingly “subject to annual borrowing limits and capital expenditure 
ceilings set by Central Government” (Ibid., 16). Budget restrictions imposed earlier in the 
1970’s by the Labour Government were made even tighter when the Conservative 
Government of Margaret Thatcher took office in 1979. Shortly after taking office, “the 
inherited expenditure plans of Labour for 1980/81 [for the RWA's] were cut back by 4%, 
and for 1982/83 by 8%”(Ibid., 59).
Throughout the 1980's, steps were taken by central government to limit local 
government expenditure, with particular attention on limiting local authority capital 
expenditure. The first step was taken in 1981 with the passage of the Local Government 
Finance Act “The new legislation replaced the [former] system of loan sanctions with 
annual expenditure allocations to each authority” (Travers, 1986,141). These allocations 
effectively limited the amount that local authorities could spend on capital improvements 
each year. Under the Act, the government could set specific spending targets for each local 
authority, and could impose grant penalties if an authority spent above its target (Ibid., 
125). Furthermore, the government added an additional layer of control on the finances of 
local government “Up until 1981-82, the Government had controlled authorities powers 
to borrow money to fund capital expenditure. From 1981-82 onwards control was 
exercised over expenditure” (Ibid. 137).
Local governments were initially able to supplement the revenues available to them, 
and to compensate for funds cut by central government, by selling off capital assets, such 
as land with planning permission. Indeed, from the 1970's through the 1980's, the 
proportion of local government capital expenditure financed through the sale of capital 
assets increased substantially, while the importance of borrowing decreased. In 1974-75, 
approximately 84% of all local government capital spending was financed through 
borrowing; by 1982, only 51% of local government capital spending was funded through 
borrowing (Travers,1986,139). In its first few years of the Thatcher administration, the 
government actually appeared to encourage local authorities to be more enterprising by 
raising money in this way. As of 1981-82, local authorities could use 100% of the net 
receipts obtained from the sale of capital assets to supplement their allocations of 
government funding, and by so doing could increase their level of capital spending above 
the level set by the government. However, that financial advantage was soon eliminated.
Subsequently limits were put on the proportion of a year’s receipts which could be 
used within that year. In 1983-84,50% of housing and non-housing capital 
receipts (with small exceptions) could be used. By 1985-86 the proportion of 
housing capital receipts available was cut to 20 per cent The proportion of an 
authority's receipts which could be used to increase their basic allocation has thus
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been severely cut back (Travers,1986,142).
These limitations imposed by central government on local government finance had 
the unintended effect of making it all the more advantageous for local authorities to 
negotiate contributions from private developers. By signing an agreement calling upon the 
developer to construct the facility, rather than having the local authority spend its own 
money constructing the facility, a local authority could escape the borrowing and spending 
limitations which the government sought to impose. “By shifting a capital cost onto the 
private sector, the authority benefits not only to the extent of the interest charges it would 
otherwise have to meet, but also to a much greater extent, in terms of grant gain”
(Grant,1986,102).
In an apparent effort to discourage this practice, the government issued the so-called 
“Ridley Rules” in March,1989, which stated that the cost of any facility constructed for a 
local authority by a private developer would be deducted from the local authority's 
Prescribed Expenditure (Stevenson,1990, int.). Nevertheless, some local authorities were 
still able to get around this restriction through an even more convoluted use of agreements. 
They discovered that if the developer paid the local authority the money for the facility, and 
then the local authority immediately paid the developer back, and then the developer 
constructed the facility, then it would not have to be deducted from local authority's 
Prescribed Expenditure (Ibid.). The ingenuity of local authorities in escaping central 
government spending limitations through the use of agreements became one of the 
hallmarks of the planning gain game. In response, a new rule was enacted by the 
government on April 1,1990, whereby 50% of the revenues obtained by a local authority 
through planning gain must go toward repaying local debt (Ibid.).
Limitations on the Use of Conditions
The need for planning agreements was considerably intensified by legal restrictions 
placed on the ability of local authorities to restrict and regulate the use of land by attaching 
conditions to planning permissions. Writing in 1975, McAuslan found a large number of 
rulings by the Minister in which conditions imposed on developments were deemed 
excessive and ultra vires (McAuslan, 1975, 426-429). The most important legal principle 
limiting the use of conditions was articulated by Lord Denning in 1958 in the case of Pyx 
Granite Co. Ltd. v. Minister o f Housing and Local Government. The principle articulated 
in the Pyx Granite case was that “The condition, to be valid, must fairly and reasonably 
relate to the permitted development” (Grant, 1982,338). In the words of Lord Denning, as 
quoted by Grant (Ibid.), “The planning authority are not at liberty to use their powers for 
an ulterior object, however desirable that object may seem to them to be in the public 
interest” As a result, local authorities were prevented from using conditions to require
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developers to provide low cost housing. In a 1974 ruling, in R.V. Hillingdon Borough 
Council v. Royco Homes, the court ruled that a condition attached to a planning permission 
designed to restrict occupation of dwellings to persons on the local authority waiting list 
was invalid (Redman, 1991,214).
Conditions were regarded as particularly inappropriate for the imposition and 
enforcement of off-site obligations. Court rulings prevented planning authorities from 
using conditions to achieve environmental improvements for areas affected by proposed 
developments (Grant, 1982,340) and from using conditions to “achieve balanced planning 
gains, by requiring the cessation of activity on one site in return for permission to 
undertake it elsewhere”(Ibid.,342). Local authorities were also prevented from imposing 
conditions for the purpose of requiring financial contributions.
The doctrine has emerged that a condition may be invalid as unreasonable if it 
requires the applicant to give up or contribute money, and or other rights to the 
authority, or if it otherwise interferes with his proprietary interests. The question is 
one of principle, rather than of quantum, and its inflexibility in the context of land 
development has led authorities and developers to alternative forms of relationship, 
primarily through planning agreements (Grant,1982,343).
Although Circular 1/85 appears to have been intended to clear up the confusion 
regarding when conditions could and could not be used, in many ways it only added to the 
confusion. The overall thrust of the Circular was that local authorities should use 
conditions wherever possible, and avoid unnecessary use of agreements.
It may be possible to solve a problem posed by a development proposal equally 
well by imposing a condition on the planning permission or by concluding an 
agreement under section 52 of the Act or under other powers. The Secretaries of 
State consider that in such cases the local planning authority should impose a 
condition rather than seek to deal with the matter by the making of an agreement.... 
(DoE Circular 1/85,para 10,40817).
What the Circular failed to recognise was that one of the main reasons for entering 
into agreements was to impose restrictions which would be ultra vires if imposed as 
conditions (Loughlin,1981). “It is precisely because most of the matters now covered by 
Section 52 Agreements would be ultra vires if they if they were made the subject of a 
planning condition that local planning authorities have taken to insisting upon the 
completion of section 52 agreements before planning permission is granted'* (Heap and 
Ward,1980,635). Echoing that same point, Litchfield has observed that,
... the guidelines [in Circular 1/85] encourage the control [by conditions] of the 
very matters which come outside conditions, by a separate agreement under Section 
52....; it is precisely because conditions cannot be achieved in relation to the 
planning permission that they must be 'voluntarily' offered by the developer. In
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brief, a process which does not stand up in regulatory planning law is legitimised in
contract law (Litchfield, 1989,69).
Statutory Authorisation for Agreements
Authorisation for local authorities to enter into legal agreements was first conferred 
on local authorities by Section 34 of the Town and Country Planning Act of 1932 (Ward, 
1982,75; Keogh, 203-4). Similar authorisation was included in the 1944 and 1947 Town 
and Country Planning Acts. However, agreements could not be entered into without the 
consent of the Minister, and "this made them rather cumbersome instruments of control" 
(Ward,1982,75). The requirement of Ministerial approval for agreements was lifted in 
1968. Prior to that happening, the evidence is that agreements were little used. Between 
1964 and 1968, when the requirement of Ministerial approval was still in place, only 500 
agreements were approved by the Minister for the entire country (Ibid.). The lifting of the 
requirement of Ministerial review of agreements in 1968 represented a major step in 
allowing agreements to be more widely-used in development control. Even after removing 
the requirement of ministerial review however, the use of agreements was still limited by 
law to the enforcement of negative controls, and could not be used to enforce positive 
obligations on developers.
In 1971, local authorities received much broader authorisation to use agreements to 
achieve positive planning objectives. Section 52 of the Town and Country Planning Act of 
1971 permitted authorities to enter into agreements “for the purpose of restricting or 
regulating the development or use” of land and buildings, and provided that “any such 
agreement may contain such incidental and consequential provisions (including provisions 
of a financial character) as appear to the local planning authority to be necessary or 
expedient for the purposes of the agreement” (TCPA,1971,s52, (1))- The legal basis for 
granting such power was that the local authority was deemed to “be possessed of adjacent 
land,” and the purpose of allowing the authority to enter into such legal agreements was “to 
place the authority in the same position as a landowner entitled to enforce a restrictive 
covenant against an adjoining landowner” (Grant,1982,364).
Legal authority for local authorities to enter into agreements was further reinforced 
by subsequent statutes. Under the Local Government Act of 1972, s.l 11, local authorities 
were given the power “to do anything... which is calculated to facilitate, or is conducive or 
incidental to, the discharge of their functions.” Nevertheless, the ability to use agreements 
was still limited by the fact that most local authorities could only use such agreements to 
enforce covenants of a restrictive nature (Ward,1982,76). Although some local 
authorities, such as those undertaking town centre redevelopment schemes, had been 
individually granted special powers by Parliament to enter into positive agreements in the 
1960's (Grant, 1975,503), it was not until the passage of Section 126 of the Housing Act
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of 1974 that all local governments were given the power to enforce positive provisions in 
Section 52 agreements against successors and assigns (Ward 1982,76; Loughlin, 1984, 
240). The provisions of Section 126 of the Housing Act of 1974 were subsequently 
superseded by Section 33 of the Local Government Act (Miscellaneous Provisions) of 
1982, which reiterated that local authorities had authority to enter into agreements and 
enforce positive covenants relating to land for the purpose of “securing the carrying out of 
works on or facilitating the development or regulating the use of land in the Council's 
area...”
Additional authorisation for the use of agreements related to highway infrastructure 
improvements was provided in the 1980 Highway Act Section 38 of that Act authorised 
highway authorities to enter into agreements related to the construction and adoption of 
internal roads, footpaths, and cycleways. Section 278 of the 1980 Highway Act Act 
authorised highway authorities, as well as the Department of Transport to enter into 
agreements with developers related to privately-funded improvements to county and trunk 
roads, related to newly permitted developments.
The provisions originally included in Section 52 of the Town and Country Planning 
Act, authorising local authorities to enter into agreements which were enforceable against 
successors in title, were retained without alteration throughout the 1980's. The Town and 
Country Planning Act was revised again in 1990, and the provisions contained in Section 
52 of the former act were shifted to Section 106 in the new act. Nevertheless, no 
substantive change was made in the wording of the provisions related to agreements.
Central Government Policy on Develoner Contributions
Over a period of many years, various policy statements were issued by central 
government on the subject of planning agreements and developer contributions. One of the 
first policy statements issued by the government on the subject of developer agreements 
was Circular 54, issued in 1967. The circular was directed at what the government saw as 
the growing practice of local authorities seeking contributions from developers for the 
provision of car parking facilities (Hawkes, 1981,91). The Circular stated that “it was 
improper for a decision on a planning application to turn on the readiness of a developer to 
make a financial contribution in lieu of the provision of car parking spaces" (Ibid.).
Many years passed without additional government comment The first important 
government policy statement on agreements in the 1980’s was Circular 22/80, which was 
issued in November, 1980. The Circular formally acknowledged that agreements had a 
useful role in facilitating and regulating development
Problems may arise when development is proposed where the necessary 
infrastructure is not available and pending its availability the consequences of 
development would be unacceptable In preference to a refusal on the grounds
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that infrastructure is lacking it is better to consider whether the problem can be 
solved by an agreement with the developer under section 52 of the Town and 
Country Planning Act of 1971. Even if it is a compelling objection that provision 
of the necessary infrastructure would be too costly, the possibility that the developer 
would offer a section 52 agreement which adequately met the objections should be 
explored before a refusal is issued...
Where the particular problem is one of creating or aggravating an existing sewerage 
overload pending new works in prospect, it may be right to grant permission if it 
seems certain that the houses will not be ready for occupation before the works are
complete If the prospect of the completion of [sewerage] works being
completed on time is not firm, the situation might be covered by a section 52 
agreement under which occupancy or rate of building depends on completion of the 
works as specified” (Circular No. 22/80, para 9-10,40484-40485).
Circular 22/80 was not, however, to be the government's last word on planning 
agreements. Indeed, even as it was preparing to issue Circular 22/80, the government was 
aware of the possible need to modify and/or clarify government policy on agreements.
Eight months prior to issuing Circular 22/80, the government turned again to the Property 
Advisory Group, to provide advice on what the policy of the government should be on 
agreements. As noted by McAuslan (1984,85), the PAG, because of its composition, was 
extremely sensitive to the needs of the development industry. The PAG delivered its report 
to the Minister of the Department of Environment in July, 1981. In it, the PAG defined 
planning gain as arising “when, in connection with the obtaining of a planning permission, 
a developer offers, agrees or is obliged to incur some expenditure, surrender some right or 
concede some other benefit which could not, or arguably could not, be embodied in a valid 
planning condition” (PAG, 1981,4). This definition reflected the perception of planning 
gain was very onerous to developers. The PAG's definition, for example, failed to 
acknowledge the possibility that, in certain cases, offers of contributions might be initiated 
by developers in an attempt to obtain a permission which otherwise might be refused.
Given this narrow and one-sided definition, the PAG concluded that planning gain had no 
place in the legitimate exercise of planning control.
Our main objection to the general idea of planning gain is that, as soon as a system 
of accepting public benefits is established which goes beyond the strict 
consideration of the planning merits of a proposed development, the entire system 
of development control becomes subtly distorted, and may fall into disrepute. 
Developers may come forward with schemes to which no conceivable planning 
objection could be raised, but be left with the impression that if they are not 
prepared to offer up some wholly extraneous planning gain, their application may 
receive a less sympathetic or less speedy consideration; there might have to be an 
appeal against a deemed, if not an actual, refusal of permission, which will cause 
expense and delay; and in the end, in order to overcome purely political difficulties 
which could not in any way be explained in technical, planning or legal terms, the 
developer may simply give way, and pay up. It is, in our view, utterly inconsistent 
with the principles of sound public administration that any member of the public
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should be left with the impression that he can receive more expeditious or more 
sympathetic treatment by offering a collateral benefit to the public authority with 
which he is dealing (PAG, 1981,7-8).
The PAG Report had considerable influence on the drafting of Circular 22/83, 
which was to become the operative government policy statement on planning gain 
throughout the rest of the 1980’s. Circular 22/83 begins by acknowledging receipt of the 
PAG’s report, and the need for new “guidance to local authorities and others concerned” in 
light of the report. The definition of planning gain presented in Circular 22/83 reflects the 
influence of the PAG report According to Circular 22/83, “planning gain” arises 
“whenever, in connection with the grant of planning permission, a local planning authority 
seeks to impose on a developer an obligation to carry out works not included in the 
development for which permission has been sought or to make some payment or confer 
some extraneous right or benefit in return for permitting development to take place” (DoE 
Circular 22, 1983, 1).
Circular 22/83 acknowledged that agreements may “assist towards securing the best 
use of land and a properly planned environment,” but stated that “this does not mean that 
an authority is entitled to treat an applicant's need for permission as an opportunity to 
obtain some extraneous benefit or advantage or as an opportunity to exact a payment for the 
benefit of ratepayers” (DoE Circular 22,1983,2). The Circular lays out a test of 
"reasonableness" which any obligations imposed on developers must meet. According to 
Circular 22/83, the obligation:
- must be needed to enable the development to go ahead...
- in the case of financial payments, such payments must contribute to 
meeting the cost of providing such facilities in the near future; or
- must be otherwise so directly related to the proposed development.... 
that the development ought not to be permitted without it...
Furthermore, the extent of the obligation being required or sought from a developer must 
be “fairly and reasonably related in scale and kind to the proposed development.”
Circular 22/83 also sought to limit the practice of accepting commuted payments 
from developers for the cost of maintaining, public facilities, particularly those constructed 
and provided by the developer. In cases where a developer was willing to contribute to the 
capital costs of a public facility, "the developer's responsibility should be limited to 
providing what is needed in the first instance," and “... the costs of subsequent 
maintenance should normally be borne by the authority or body in which the asset is to be 
vested” (DoE Circular 22/88,4).
Circular 1/85 stated that “no payment of money or other consideration can be 
required when granting a permission or any other kind of consent” (DoE Circular 1/85,
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para 63,40826). This directive against seeking cash payments was again reiterated in 
Planning Policy Guidance 1 (PPG 1), issued in 1988, which stated that “the planning 
authority is not entitled to use the mechanism [a Section 52 Agreement] and the applicant's 
need for planning permission as an opportunity to exact a payment for the benefit of 
ratepayers at large” (PPG 1,1988, para 25, 6056). Nevertheless, PPG1 reiterated the 
government's recognition of the important role of development agreements, by saying that:
There are matters which, while necessary in planning terms if a proposed 
development is to proceed, cannot be dealt with by way of a planning condition.... 
This may be so, for example, where the action is not reasonably within the power 
of the applicant to secure.... In such circumstances, it may be possible to grant 
permission if the matter is made the subject of an agreement under, for example, 
section 52 of the 1971 Act or a similar provision. Used in this way, agreements can 
assist towards securing the best use of land and a properly planned environment 
(DoE, PPG 1,1988, para 25, 6056).
The 1990 White Paper on the environment, This Common Inheritance, summarised 
the government's view of agreements in a way which was remarkably consistent with 
Circular 22/83. First, it emphasised the need for certainty in the development process. 
“Everyone has the right to know the basis on which planning applications are decided” 
(White Paper,1990, 84). Secondly, the statement reiterated that “authorities must not try, 
unfairly, to use the applicant's need for planning permission to seek payments or other 
benefits which are not related directly to the proposed development”(Ibid., 88).
Based on these official government pronouncements, many commentators 
concluded that the attitude of the Thatcher Government toward planning gain was largely 
negative. According to McAuslan, “... an attempt has been made [by central government] 
to impose some controls on planning gain and generally to whittle down the ambit of 
discretion in development control at the local authority level” (McAuslan,1988, 692). 
Nevertheless, the government did relatively little to limit the use of agreements, and the 
negotiation of planning gain (Marsh, 1989). Indeed, the government appeared tom by 
competing and opposing concerns.
It is ideologically committed to regulatory systems that will work efficiently and 
will produce development with a minimum of delay. To many developers, planning 
gain achieves just that by minimising risk and delay. On the other hand, the 
government is ideologically opposed to any form of taxation burden on the private 
sector that might inhibit the attractiveness or profitability of development and 
therefore is deeply suspicious of planning gain (Grant,1989, 86).
Despite its apparent reluctance at seeing local authorities become too successful in 
negotiating developer contributions, as the 1980's progressed central government appeared 
to become increasingly interested in negotiating contributions from developers for trank
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road improvements As indicated in a report issued by the Department of Transport entitled 
New Roads by New Means, the central government supported the idea to negotiating 
highway contributions, and of entering into agreements, “when they enhance the capacity 
of the network for general road users” (DoT,1989, § 8). Although central government 
appeared to object to local governments extracting significant contributions from 
developers, under Section 278 of the 1980 Highways Act the government, through the 
Department of Transport, was often more than willing to enter into agreements with 
developers for contributions to improve roads which were part of the national trunk road 
system. As Callies and Grant (1991,225) have observed, “central government has 
pursued similar aims [as local authorities] in regularly seeking developers contributions 
(commonly at the rate of 100 percent) to finance new works on main highways where they 
are required to accommodate new development”
Evolution of Local Authority Policies on Agreements
When the Town and Country Planning Act was amended in 1971, including the 
amended provisions for agreements included in Section 52, the use of legal agreements to 
achieve planning objectives was still in its infancy, and formal policies at the local authority 
level regarding how agreements would be used were non-existent The first local authority 
policy statement on agreements was put forward by the Greater London Council (GLC) in 
1972. The policy statement, which appeared in the Greater London Development Plan 
Statement Revisions (GLC,1972), declared that all large office developments should 
provide “planning advantages.” The planning advantages specified in the plan were: 
redevelopment of areas of poor layout or design; provision of residential accommodation in 
conjunction with the development; improvement of the public transport system, especially 
in relation to interchanges and railway termini; provision of specific benefits in the form of 
buildings, land or other facilities for the use of the public; conservation of buildings or 
places of architectural or historic interest; and provision of small suites of offices, 
particularly if available on a rental basis (GLC,1972, §4.16,18).
The GLC's policy of seeking “planning advantages” in relation to large office 
development schemes had a direct impact on the planning policies of individual boroughs, 
inasmuch as the Boroughs had to refer all applications pertaining to developments of any 
significance to the GLC for its concurrence (Stevenson,1990, int). Writing in 1974, 
Ratcliffe was able to report that the “planning advantages” policy initiated by the GLC had 
been independently incorporated in the local development plans of a number of London 
Boroughs (Ratcliffe,1974,149). The legal significance of including the “attainment of 
planning advantages” in local development plans was that the pursuit of planning gain 
became a valid “material consideration” related to applications for planning permission — 
conferring upon the custom a higher degree of legitimacy (Ratcliffe, 1981,411), and thereby
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presumably making it less likely to be over-ruled on appeal. According to Ratcliffe, most 
large development companies had come to "accept the inevitability of planning gain and are 
increasingly prepared to provide an element of community benefit in their proposals 
(Ratcliffe, 1974,149).
Examples of purposes achieved by London Boroughs through the requirement of 
“planning advantages,” reported by Ratcliffe were:
- To establish and enforce a ratio between permitted commercial 
floorspace and the required provision of council housing.
- To implement conservation policies- ... where the local authority 
required the developer... to rebuild a previously damaged historic 
monument in return for central area office permission.
- To achieve the provision of public amenities that would not 
otherwise have been supplied... (Ibid.).
The GLC policy of seeking “planning advantages” from large-scale office 
development schemes, expressed initially in the 1972 Draft Revisions, were retained 
virtually unchanged in the final version of the Greater London Development Plan (GLDP), 
which was officially approved by the Secretary of State for the Environment on 9 July 
1976. It is interesting to note that the Secretary of State let Policy 4.15 stand without 
comment or alteration. Section 4.15 of the 1976 GLDP reiterated that new office 
developments granted permission within approved areas would be expected to provide 
“planning advantages.” The specific planning advantages called for were similar to those 
articulated in the initial 1972 document: improvement of the public transport system at 
railway termini and interchanges; provision of buildings, open space, pedestrian access 
and other facilities for public use; redevelopment of areas of poor lay-out or design; 
conservation of buildings or places of historic or architectural interest; provision of 
residential accommodation in conjunction with the development; provision of small suites 
of offices, particularly on a rental basis (GLC, 1976b, §4.15,30).
A separate “Issue Paper” released in 1976 stated that it was the GLC’s policy was 
to “introduce strict restraint” on most types of proposed new commercial development 
outside the 106 centres designated in the plan, and that all development in the designated 
towns centres was expected to produce “community benefit...” (GLC,1976a).
Based on these early policy statements, it does not appear that during the 1970's 
there was much emphasis on using planning gain to finance basic infrastructure needed in 
support of development. The only significant infrastructure item contained in the list of 
planning advantages related to “improvement of the public transport system at railway 
termini and interchanges”-- but the literature of the 1970's does not provide indication that 
this was much used. In general, there appears to have been a greater emphasis in the
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1970's on assuring a balance of housing and commercial development, the inclusion of 
social housing, the conservation and restoration of historic buildings, and the provision of 
public amenities and social benefits. Writing in 1975, Malcolm Grant reported that “as far 
as can be gathered, for there are no official statistics available, the use of agreements has 
not been widespread in the past” (Grant, 1975,506). However, Grant also noted at that 
time that local authorities were beginning “to shift the burden of infrastructure costs from 
the authority to the developer,” and that planning agreements were playing an increasingly 
“central role in such arrangements..."(Ibid., 507). In the opinion of Jowell (1977b), the 
property boom of the early 1970's was an important factor contributing to the surge in 
planning gain negotiation.
By the 1980's, a consensus appeared to be emerging that the practice of making 
developers pay was becoming widespread. According to Ward (1982), local authorities 
had succeeded in persuading developers that agreeing to pay for much, if not all, of the cost 
of new sewers, roads or other public facilities was the only way to overcome problems of 
“prematurity” in areas where existing infrastructure was at capacity. (Ward,1982, 76). 
McAuslan (1984,84) put forward the view that agreements were being “widely used.. . , ” 
and frequently required developers to contribute “toward putting in infrastructure to make 
the land developable— roads, sewers, water pipes, and the like— an infrastructure that 
customarily was put in by local authorities...” And in 1986, eleven years after his 1975 
article on planning gain negotiation, Grant reported that “Over the past 15 years or so there 
has been a substantial shift in responsibility for the provision of off-site infrastructure from 
the public sector to private developers” (Grant,1986,99).
Conclusion
Local authority policies and practices related to agreements and contributions 
appeared to evolve significantly from the 1970's through the 1980’s. Most observers 
agreed that this evolution was driven almost entirely by local planning authorities, in the 
face of central government opposition. Moreover, as indicated by Grant’s 1986 assertion, 
quoted above, the belief had taken hold among knowledgeable observers that the 
negotiation of contributions for off-site infrastructure improvements had become 
widespread— perhaps even commonplace.
Review of recent history suggests that local planning authorities in Greater London 
were probably first to recognise and exploit the potential for negotiating “planning 
advantages” and contributions, and that experience in negotiating agreements and 
contributions very likely diffused from Greater London boroughs to local authorities 
outside of London. However, the extent to which local planning authorities in districts 
outside London took hold of this approach has not been firmly documented, and there is 
some basis for believing that local authority use of agreements has been uneven.
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Throughout the 1980*s, central government frequently reiterated its opposition to 
the practice of requiring contributions in exchange for planning permission, and sought to 
limit the scope of developer obligations to those contributions which were directly related to 
and necessary for developments to be approved. Increased central government concern 
regarding local authority use of agreements, combined with impassioned statements by the 
PAG and individual developers, tended to heighten the perception that the practice of 
extracting contributions was becoming commonplace throughout the South East.
As noted at the beginning of this Chapter, there has been a long tradition in Britain 
of financing infrastructure almost entirely with government funds. Given that tradition, 
and the lack of experience with alternative methods to privatise the finance of development- 
related infrastructure, it is not surprising that any tendency toward shifting costs to private 
sector developers, even a small trend in that direction, would excite a storm of controversy 
and debate.
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CHAPTER FOUR: PERSPECTIVES ON DEVELOPER FINANCE
The negotiation of agreements and contributions in Britain raises a number of 
important research issues and questions. Some of these have received attention in previous 
research and the planning literature, but findings and opinions have often conflicted. The 
purpose of this chapter is to review current knowledge, professional opinion, and research 
findings related to issues and questions which are relevant to evaluating the negotiation of 
agreements and contributions in Britain, as contrasted against the U.S. approach to 
developer finance. American research findings, observations and opinions are introduced 
at various points in the discussion, not only to provide contrasting perspectives, but also to 
aid in interpreting British attitudes and practices related to developer finance.
Definitions
As noted in Chapter Two, planners in the U.S. in the 1980’s devised numerous 
techniques and approaches to shift public costs and responsibilities onto private developers. 
The impetus for this shift toward developer finance came largely out of financial necessity. 
Local governments in the U.S. were finding it increasingly difficult to raise sufficient 
revenue locally to meet the costs of development, because of cut-backs in federal spending 
on infrastructure, and because local tax-payers were increasingly unwilling to bear 
additional costs to sustain growth. In Britain, the origins and purposes of negotiated 
agreements were more ambiguous. Rather than talking about “making developers pay,'* 
planners and researchers in Britain have talked about the negotiation of “planning gain." 
Various definitions of “planning gain" have been put forward- most of them extremely 
broad. In general, the term “planning gain” has been used in such a way as to encompass 
almost any outcome which a local authority might view as desirable. Marsh (1989,155) 
defined planning gain as “a benefit to the community, achieved at no cost to that community 
... usually secured by the developer and LPA signing a planning agreement before planning 
consent is granted.” The loose way in which the term “planning gain” has been used has 
led to a great deal of confusion. As Stephen Byrne (1989,10) has observed, there has 
been a “... tendency to lump together all obligations and requirements made by local 
planning authorities under the generic term ‘planning gain.'”
I suggest that, at the most basic level, there have really been only two major types 
of agreements- agreements with contributions, and agreements without contributions. A 
“contribution” is offered when an applicant for planning permission agrees to incur some 
private cost (either to make a direct expenditure, to give up something of economic value, 
or to accept a loss of potential income), thereby enabling a public authority to obtain a 
public improvement or benefit that it or some other public authority would otherwise have 
had to spend public funds to obtain. Under this definition, the following offers by
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developers would classified as a “contribution:”
- contributing money for capital improvements;
- donating land or easements at no cost;
- constructing some improvement which would not otherwise have been required to 
serve the proposed development;
- constructing infrastructure improvements and/or public facilities to a standard or 
capacity greater than the developer would normally have been required to provide 
to meet the needs of the proposed development;
- donating some completed improvement;
- leasing completed space to the public authority, or some other entity (such as a 
• housing association) designated by the local authority at reduced or no cost;
- including unprofitable uses in the proposed project (i.e. low-cost 
housing, small commercial spaces, a creche, etc.) desired by the public 
authority;
- allowing public access and use of privately owned land and facilities;
- selling land to a public authority at less than market cost;
- assuming responsibility for maintaining land or facilities for public use, either 
permanently or for some specified period;
- paying money to a public authority toward the cost of operating and maintaining 
public land or facilities.
Although Marsh (1989) has argued that planning gain has allowed local authorities 
to achieve public benefits at “no cost,” in my view the definition of contribution should be 
flexible enough to include offers from developers which allow a local authority to achieve a 
benefit at less cost than it would otherwise have incurred. It should be noted that, as 
opposed to Jowell’s definition of planning gain, the definition of “contribution” which I 
propose does not require that the contribution be commercially dis-advantageous to the 
developer. Rather, contributions offered to the local authority, which are beneficial to the 
local authority, might also be beneficial to the developer.
For ease of description, agreements with contributions are hereafter referred to as 
“contributory” agreements. Agreements without contributions are referred to as “non- 
contributory” agreements.
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Institutional Context
Although the negotiation of agreements and “planning gain” has generated a lively 
public debate, and a large number of articles in the literature, remarkably little empirical 
data has been compiled documenting how often agreements have been signed, why 
agreements have been signed, how often agreements have involved contributions, what 
kinds of contributions have been offered, etc. One factor which has undoubtedly hampered 
the conduct of systematic research has been the fact that the negotiation of agreements 
between developers and local authorities is almost always carried out in secret (Grant,1975, 
Grant,1982; McAuslan,1984). Identification and documentation of agreements has been 
further impeded by the fact that local authorities have not been required to record 
information about agreements in local planning registers. As a result, detailed information 
about agreements and their contents has been difficult to obtain. “The Government has 
consistently resisted proposals to have planning obligations entered in the public register of 
planning applications and decisions, insisting that entry in the register of Local Land 
Charges Register was sufficient” (Encyclopedia o f Planning Law and Practice, 1991/5, 3). 
A major reason for the reluctance, according to Sir George Young, has been that 
“developers... may worry that the precise terms of the obligations that they have entered 
into might be widely known and that commercially confidential information might fall into 
their competitors’ hands” (Ibid.). Given this emphasis on secrecy, the negotiation of 
agreements and planning gain has seemed to be a clandestine activity that cannot stand the 
light of day. In the words of Martin Loughlin (1982,353), “Planning gain occupies the 
conceptual space between the legitimate use of conditions and corruption.”
Local authorities have probably also been reluctant to have systematic and detailed 
information compiled about agreements they have negotiated. As noted in Chapter Three, 
during the 1980*s there was increased tension between central government and units of 
local government, as central government sought to limit local government expenditure and 
discourage the negotiation of excessive contributions from developers. Given this 
institutional tension, local authorities have probably been quite guarded with regard to data 
on agreements, and certainly have not gone out of their way to assist researchers in 
compiling data on agreements -- for fear that publication of such information might provoke 
further central government action adverse to local government interests.
Lastly, an absence of litigation has kept agreements out of the public view, and 
made it difficult to monitor changes in policy and practice related to agreements. In the 
U.S., local government practices in obtaining contributions from developers have been 
continually tested in well-publicised court cases. Court cases and judicial rulings have 
established accepted standards and guidelines, and provided a way to “track” the evolution 
of local government practice. But in Britain, the signing of agreements has generated little 
case law. Developers have been able to appeal directly to the Secretary of State when they
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have felt that local authorities were making unreasonable requests for contributions. The 
ready availability of this administrative remedy greatly reduced the need for formal 
litigation. A second reason for the lack of litigation has been the fact that “Unlike planning 
conditions, terms of an agreement are not subject to appeal” (Grant,1975,507). The 
rationale for not allowing appeals of agreements has been that agreements are consensual, 
and that developers would not sign agreements which they felt were contrary to their 
interests. Thus, even if developers were legally permitted to appeal the terms of 
agreements which they signed, it seems unlikely that much case law would result.
Facts and Figures
The first systematic research examining the practice of planning gain negotiation 
was carried out in the 1970’s by Jeffrey Jowell. Jowell sent out a postal questionnaire to 
28% of all English local authorities (106), and obtained an 82% response rate. He 
followed up on the questionnaire by conducting in-depth interviews with 20 randomly 
selected planning or legal officers. In the questionnaire, local authorities were asked to 
estimate the number of occasions since 1 April, 1974 that they had achieved a “planning 
gain” in connection with an application for commercial development Jowell defined 
“planning gain” as “the achievement of a benefit to the community that was not part of the 
initial application (and was therefore negotiated) and that was not of itself normally 
commercially advantageous to the developer” (Jowell,1977b, 418).
One limitation of Jowell’s study was that the questionnaire asked only about 
planning gains associated with commercial development Local authorities were not asked 
about planning gains secured in relation to residential schemes. Jo well’s definition of 
planning gain also excluded gains negotiated by local authorities prior to the submission of 
applications (i.e. gains which were included in applications so as to improve the prospects 
for obtaining approval). Another limitation was that Jowell relied on local authorities to tell 
him how they had used agreements, and did not attempt to compile accurate first-hand data 
on the number of times local authorities obtained contributions for various purposes.
Approximately one-half of all authorities who responded to Jowell’s survey (44 of 
87) reported that they had achieved some kind of planning gain. The types of “gains” that 
local authorities reported having achieved, and the percentage of local authorities that 
reportedly achieved each type of gain, are shown in Table 4.01
Based on local authority responses, Jowell discerned two basic types of gains: 
“those that do and those that do not involve the authority in receiving a gift from the 
developer” (Ibid., 430). Seven of the nine purposes of agreements documented involved 
some kind of “gift.” Two of the purposes of agreements did not involve gifts -- 
“specification of use” and “extinguishing existing use.” In the terminology I have adopted 
for this research, seven of the nine purposes of agreements identified by Jowell were
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contributory. On the other hand, the two non-contributory purposes of agreements ranked 
high in percentage terms as reasons for signing agreements. Indeed, the non-contributory 
purpose of “specification of use” was the most frequently cited purpose for which 
agreements were signed.
Table 4.01 Gains Reported bv Local Authorities (Jowell.1977b)
29.0% Specification of use
19.5% Public rights of way on the developer’s land
18.4% Dedication of land to public use
16.1% Extinguishing existing user 
9.0% Commuted payments for car parking 
6.9% Provision of community buildings 
6.9% Provision of infrastructure 
6.9% Gift of site or buildings for residential use
6.9% Rehabilitation of property
A second study of the use of planning agreements by local authorities was 
conducted by J.N. Hawke, who compiled data on how agreements were used between 
1977 and 1980. Based on responses from 328 local authorities, Hawke found that local 
authorities signed agreements for eight reasons:
- Restriction of occupancy
- Abrogation, restriction or modification of land uses
- Regulation of future development of land
- Regulation of complex development
- Sewage and drainage requirements
- Acquisition of planning gain
- Pollution control
- Enforcement
Six of the eight purposes identified by Hawke were non-contributory, being related 
to regulatory purposes of development control. Two of the eight purposes (sewage and 
drainage requirements, and the acquisition of planning gain) involved gifts or 
contributions. Although his research findings did not indicate how often local authorities 
made use of planning agreements for various purposes, Hawke’s research led him to 
believe that the negotiation of planning gain was becoming more common. “Increasingly 
infrastructure and other ancillary facilities are being provided by the developer through 
agreements requiring the works to be undertaken directly by the developer or indirectly 
through his financial contribution to the works” (Hawke,1981, 89-90). In Hawke’s 
opinion, developers were frequently expected, through planning agreements, “to provide 
sewerage and highway facilities beyond the boundaries of the development site” (Ibid.) 
Developers also frequendy offered commuted sum payments for parking, in lieu of the
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provision of required car parking spaces on site (Ibid.).
The only comprehensive study to-date of the use of agreements within a defined 
geographic area was conducted by David Henry (1982), who systematically researched and 
analysed how agreements were used in the district of Wokingham. Henry conducted his 
research on two levels. First, he studied how planning agreements were used in 
conjunction with large-scale, primarily residential developments approved in three specific 
areas in the 1970's — Lower Earley, Woodley Airfield, and Woosehill. Secondly, he 
analysed the use of planning agreements throughout the District during the period 1974- 
1981. Much of development that was occurring in Wokingham during the 1974-81 period 
was on “green field” sites, where new sewer and water systems and highways were often 
needed.
Henry found that a total of 133 agreements were signed in Wokingham between 
1974 and 1981. Analysis of the content of those 133 agreements produced the breakdown 
of purposes shown in Table 4.02. Of the 218 purposes for which agreements were signed, 
112 were for highways and other infrastructure. Henry’s data, obtained from first-hand 
examination of the context of actual planning agreements, rather than by means of 
questionnaire, suggested that developer contributions for highways and other infrastructure 
were more common than was initially believed based on the research carried out by Jowell 
and Hawke.
Table 4.02: Agreements Signed in Wokingham. 1974-1981 (Henry. 1982)
Highway improvements (or provision) 32
Infrastructure 86
Other Sites 21
Reinstatement of gravel and mineral workings 6
Environmental impact 9
Phasing 11
Complete as per planning permission 15
Public access 13
Use restrictions 25
Henry found that developer contributions took two forms: either the developer 
constructed the improvements himself; or he paid a negotiated sum of money. However, 
the basis for calculating a developer's contribution tended to vary. Sometimes it was based 
on a percentage of the cost of the improvements, but other methods for calculating a 
developers' payment were also used (Henry, Ibid.). Where a number of developers were 
involved, the payment could be “calculated from the number of acres of developable land 
owned... or... based on the number of dwellings (either a fixed rate or a percentage of the 
sale price)...”(Ibid., 57).
Many of the gains which Henry identified in Wokingham would technically not
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have been counted under Jowell’s definition of planning gain. As noted earlier, Jowell 
defined planning gain as “a benefit to the community that was not part of the initial 
application.” Henry found that negotiation of planning agreements frequently began prior 
to the submission of an application for outline planning permission, and that gains desired 
by localities were frequently included as part of the initial application, rather than negotiated 
after the application was submitted(Ibid., 47).
Seven of the nine purposes of agreements identified by Henry had little if anything 
to do with “gifts” or contributions, and can thus be classified as “non-contributory.” The 
“other sites” category described by Henry involved “a mixed bag of provisions,” which 
local authorities imposed in agreements because they could not be legally imposed as 
conditions. Examples given by Henry of activities included in this category were: the 
removal of a mobile home or piece of equipment from a distant site; the demolition of an 
existing building within a given time of another being constructed elsewhere; or the 
alteration or cessation of certain activities on a distant site if consent were given on another. 
Henry found that agreements were particularly useful in regulating the phasing of large- 
scale developments, since the development of large sites typically involved the need to 
coordinate the actions of multiple landowners. In such cases, agreements were used to 
establish a contract binding different private land owners in the consortium, so that 
“....what was negotiated was the extent of involvement of each of the parties in the 
development, i.e. who could provide what, more akin to partnership agreements...”(Ibid.).
A very important finding of Henry's research was that a substantial majority of the 
provisions contained in agreements were positive in nature— i.e. imposing positive 
obligations as opposed to placing limitations and restrictions on the developer and on future 
owners. One hundred and eight provisions contained in the agreements identified by 
Henry were positive in nature, 35 were negative, and 30 were both positive and negative 
(Ibid., 63). Even when the provisions were negative, such provisions could be seen as 
serving both the interests of the local authority and the developer. For example, limiting the 
number of units that could be completed until major highway works were completed could 
be in the interest of all parties, “particularly if two or more developers were involved to 
avoid prejudicing the successful implementation of each others scheme”(Ibid., 59).
In a report prepared for the National House Building Council (NHBC), Martin 
Elson (1989) reported on the results of a study he conducted analysing recreation and 
community provision in 49 large-scale, privately-developed housing schemes of 750 units 
or more. The 49 projects were widely dispersed, but were located generally “in an arc” 
west of London. In addition, the report contains case histories of 11 additional very large 
residential projects outside the study area that involved “innovative” arrangements for 
recreation and community provision. Elson found that Section 52 agreements were often 
used to obtain gains in the provision of recreation, open space and community facilities.
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Unfortunately, Elson’s study was not specifically intended as a study of planning 
agreements, and therefore he did not take advantage of the opportunity to conduct a 
controlled study comparing recreation and community provision in developments with and 
without agreements. As a result, his study does not provide evidence that agreements 
encouraged developers to provide greater amenities and facilities than they would have 
otherwise chosen to provide. It is possible, as Henry (1982) suggests, that developers 
might have chosen to include recreational facilities and amenities on their own, without 
being forced to by localities, because they recognised that such amenities made their 
developments more valuable and marketable.
Research conducted by Byrne indicated that matters covered in agreements fell into 
five distinct areas:
- Those matters that are legitimately related directly to the development-- the 
physical infrastructure or associated facilities without which the project should not 
be approved;
- Those that are related to achieving a mix of uses to bring about a balance in the 
area, including low cost housing and employment;
- Those matters which can reduce the impact of development or produce a 
compensating improvement in conditions and a balance of advantage in favour of 
approval;
- Matters relating to safeguarding important aspects of heritage, either buildings or 
matters of archaeological importance;
- Those matters which are unrelated or remote in location or substance from the 
development proposed. (Byrne,1989,10)
Prior to conducting detailed empirical research within a selected study area, I 
interviewed various planning officers and planning consultants. Through those contacts I 
obtained copies of 24 planning agreements signed in 19 different local authorities. Ten of 
the agreements were signed in seven boroughs of Greater London: Camden (4);
Greenwich; Hammersmith; Hounslow; Merton; Newham; and Tower Hamlets.
Fourteen of the agreements were signed in twelve local authorities scattered throughout the 
southern half of the British Isles: Aylsham; Bracknell (3); Downton (near Salisbury); 
Long Stratton (between Norwich and Ipswich); Northampton; Rogerstone, Gwent, Wales; 
South Cambridgeshire; Stowmarket; Swindon; Woking; and Wokingham. The specific 
contributions offered in the 24 agreements, and the number of times those contributions 
were offered, are presented in Table 4.03.
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Table 4.03: Contributions in Twenty-four Selected Agreements
Type of Contribution Times Offered
Pay for construction of public roads 11
Construct public roads and donate when completed 4
Pay for public transport improvement 3
Construct sewer/drainage infrastructure 1
Pay for sewer/drainage infrastructure 2
Construct additional parking for public use 2
Donate land for public purposes (schools, libraries,
community centres, parks, etc.) 8
Construct public facilities, community
improvements, amenities 7
Pay for public facilities, community improvements,
amenities 9
Pay money toward cost of maintaining public areas,
facilities 2
Provide affordable housing 3
Pav money for no specified public purpose 2
Total Number of Contributions 54
Average Number Contributions per Agreement 2.35
Three of the twenty-four agreements which were analysed contained no offers of 
contributions, but rather were signed to achieve non-contributory purposes. One of the 
non-contributory agreements was signed to assure that an existing use (a commercial car 
park near Heathrow Airport in the Green Belt) would be terminated within a period of 
years. Two other agreements were signed to mitigate negative environmental impacts 
associated with proposed new uses-- setting limits on noise, industrial emissions, and 
hours of operation.
The Frequency of Agreements
As noted in Chapter Three, a consensus emerged in Britain in the 1980’s that the 
negotiation of agreements and contributions was becoming increasingly common.
However, empirical evidence to substantiate the perceived trends in agreements has been 
scarce. Only Henry’s 1982 study in Wokingham provides concrete data on the number of 
agreements signed over a period of years. As shown in Table 4.04, the number of 
planning agreements signed in Wokingham varied significantly from year to year, from 2 in 
1975 to 31 in 1980. However, the data seems to indicate that, over time, there was a trend 
toward signing more agreements. The average number of agreements signed per year over 
the eight year period was 16.6 agreements. During the first four years, 1974-1977, the 
average number of agreements was 9.75 per year, during the next four years, 1978-1981
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the average number of agreements was 23.5 per year.
Table 4.04: Planning Applications and Agreements in Wokingham. 1974-1981 
(Henry. 1982)
Year
Outline
Applications
Full
Applications Agreements
1974 240 1320 6
1975 216 1548 2
1976 217 1454 13
1977 154 1307 18
1978 185 1747 21
1979 242 1890 20
1980 278 1832 31
1981 189 1218 22
Total 1721 12,313 133
One of the only official counts of agreements signed nationally was provided in a 
May 1989 document, issued by the Department of Transport (DoT). In that report, the 
DoT reported that 50 agreements had been concluded in the three year period between April 
1986 and April 1989 calling for developer contributions for trunk road improvements, and 
that another 50 were “at an advanced stage of preparation” (DoT,1989a, 7). The report also 
asserted that “local highway authorities are increasingly getting considerable contributions 
from developers towards by-passes, relief roads, and other improvements” (Ibid.).
One reason for assuming that the use of negotiated agreements with contributions 
has increased has been that it became increasingly common during the latter half of the 
1980’s for local authorities to adopt official policies stating their intention to seek 
contributions. In the Autumn of 1989, for example, the Berkshire County Department of 
Highways and Planning issued a formal policy statement entitled “Infrastructure, Service 
and Amenity Requirements for New Development in Berkshire.” That policy statement 
indicated that contributions would be sought from developers, for educational facilities, 
social services, libraries, highways, and fire services, and for any other facility or service 
needs which might be directly related to proposed developments— and that contributions 
would be sought for off-site as well as on-site improvements. East Hampshire District 
Council adopted a policy that stated, “Developers will normally be required to contribute to 
the cost of any improvements which need to be made to the physical, social, and 
recreational infrastructure, both on and off site, in order to enable the development to 
proceed” (as quoted in MacDonald, 1991,4). The London Borough of Ealing adopted a 
policy of using applications for commercial development as occasions for seeking to 
achieve social and economic benefits (employment, job-training, child care, etc.) for local
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residents, particularly women, minorities, and the disabled (Knibbs, 1989, int.). The 
gains which Ealing sought to extract from commercial developers were described in a 
“Community Benefit Fact Pack,” which was given to prospective applicants for planning 
permission, and was widely publicised. However, the adoption of policy statements 
calling for the negotiation of contributions cannot necessarily be interpreted as proof that 
local authorities have actually sought such contributions in all cases. James Barlow at the 
University of Sussex surveyed over 360 local authorities in 1991 to determine the extent to 
which local authorities negotiated agreements to achieve the provision of social housing. 
Although a large number of local authorities had adopted policies calling for the negotiation 
of contributions for social housing, few such contributions had actually been negotiated, 
and very little new social housing had been produced as a result (Barlow and Chambers, 
1992).
Attitudes
Attitudes Toward Agreements
It has frequently been assumed that planners and local planning authorities have 
been eager to negotiate contributions from developers. The research which Jowell 
conducted during the 1970*s led him to believe that few local authorities objected in 
principle to indulging in bargaining as a means of achieving public gains. According to 
Jowell (1977a, 71), “where gain was not sought, the reason seemed to be less in 
disapproval of bargaining ( only three authorities expressed this view) than in the lack of 
opportunity to achieve gains...” Writing in 1981, the Head of the Department of Estate 
Management at South Bank Polytechnic reported that “In my own experience there are a 
great number of planners and plenty of planning authorities who support the concept of 
planning gain and are only too keen to engage in such transactions”(Ratcliffe, 1981,408). 
The 1985 Nuffield Commission Report on Town and Country Planning argued that local 
planning authorities should be able to impose costs on private developers, particularly in 
cases where they would otherwise be required to refuse planning permission because the 
existing public infrastructure was inadequate. The Nuffield Report further argued that the 
scope of contributions obtained from developers should be expanded to include 
contributions in the form of land, buildings and facilities for “social infrastructure,” such as 
schools, health, recreational or other community facilities. Planning and Environmental 
Law Bulletin (1991,22) expressed the view that “For some time many planning authorities 
have taken a bullish view toward planning gain.”
According to proponents of “public choice,” an important factor leading to the 
increased use of negotiation has been the desire of planners and government bureaucrats to 
increase their influence and importance (McAuslan,1988,691). Reade (1987,210) has
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blamed the “increasing reliance on bargaining with developers rather than on clearly stated 
policies and standards” on the “continued growth of the planning profession.” 
Notwithstanding this widespread perception that planners have been eager to negotiate 
planning gain from developers, there is little empirical evidence to prove that planners have 
in fact been active agents in promoting the negotiation of agreements. They may have 
wanted to obtain contributions, but they have probably also felt the need to proceed with 
caution and restraint in negotiating with developers. “Bargaining often has unsavoury 
connotations to the public, and can only be rendered respectable by means of being 
presented as the rational devising of means of achieving laudable public goals” 
(Sillence,1986,200).
There are a number of reasons planners might be reluctant to allow decisions on 
planning applications to be influenced by offers of contributions. In the first place, the 
negotiation of planning gain tends to draw attention to the tradeoffs which are often 
involved in planning decisions, and to the fact that projects which are approved might have 
disadvantages as well as advantages. “Many planners have difficulty accepting the idea of 
negotiation and compromise with private developers. Compromise means something less 
than perfect” (Pike, 1991, lect). The negotiation of measures to mitigate the negative 
impacts of development also tends to draw attention to the redistributive aspects of 
development control, and to the fact that a grant of planning permission for a specific 
development may benefit certain parties and interests, while harming others. The 
negotiation of agreements with developers “comes down to engaging with money, and 
dealing with money issues can be unpleasant The training of planners has not prepared 
them to deal with financial issues and tradeoffs” (Ibid.). Planners have tended not to want 
to think about let alone publicly acknowledge the redistributive aspects of planning and 
development control. Planners have commonly assumed that “the goal of the planning 
system is to achieve an efficient land use allocation,” and that “redistributional issues... are 
irrelevant” (Loughlin,1980,13).
Another reason planners may have had difficulty in accepting negotiation of 
planning gain as a legitimate exercise of planning and development control is that it appears 
to conflict with the traditional concept of how planning should be conducted. The 
dominant model of planning, which planners have promoted and felt most comfortable 
with, has been the “rational-comprehensive” model of planning (Lindbloom,1973; 
Sillence,1986,67). According to this traditional model, the goal of planning is to move 
toward the achievement of long-range objectives (the plan), and every individual decision 
should be made with those long range objectives in mind. In many ways the desire for 
rationality and comprehensiveness through planning reflects a desire for consistency and 
predictability. A plan is, in fact, “a set of rules governing human conduct” (Jowell, 1977a, 
65). The negotiation of planning gain on a case by case basis clearly falls far short of this
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“rational- comprehensive” model of planning. Instead, planning gain negotiation appears 
to be aligned with a much less respected model of planning — known as “incremental” 
planning (Baybrook and Lindbloom,1963; Lindbloom,1973; Faludi,1973).
The experience of planner Drew Stevenson may be indicative of the skepticism and 
uneasiness many planners have felt when called upon to negotiate contributions from 
developers. Prior to becoming Director of Planning of the London Borough of 
Hammersmith, Stevenson was Director of Planning Policy at the Greater London Council 
(GLC), beginning in 1982. In that capacity, Stevenson was responsible for drafting the 
policy statements on “planning advantages” contained in the 1983 revised Greater London 
Development Plan. (See Chapter Three for discussion of planning advantages called for 
GLDP.) However, Stevenson lost faith in negotiation as a way of achieving community 
benefits, because of what he saw as the “flawed” use of the planning advantages policy by 
London boroughs (Stevenson,1990, int.). Stevenson came to the conclusion that local 
planning authorities need to adhere to a much more prescriptive approach, and to limit the 
parameters of negotiation. “My views toward planning gain have changed... I now think 
we need direct planning policies saying what developers can or can’t do” (Ibid.).
Across the Atlantic in the U.S., support at the local government level for the 
negotiation of development agreements on an ad hoc basis has appeared stronger among 
locally elected officials than among planners. Agreements have appealed to elected 
officials as a “convenient way of simplifying complex problems, and of not making long- 
range decisions” (Porter,1989,149).
Elected community leaders often are reluctant to ponder long range futures and 
reticent to make commitments for development of land uses and public facilities that 
might transpire in 20 years. Long-range comprehensive planning... [has not 
appeared to be a] useful exercise to many political leaders... By contrast, 
development agreements appear to represent more concrete realizable mechanisms 
for planning because they refer to specific parcels of land, propose fairly detailed 
development over relatively short times... and tie specific improvements in 
infrastructure and approaches to financing to each phase of development. 
Development agreements seem to relate conveniently to ‘real world* planning at an 
understandable scale (Porter, 1989,149).
Although elected officials in the U.S. may have found the negotiation of short-term 
gains highly appealing, to many American planners, the negotiation of public gains 
through ad hoc agreements has appeared to be “a substitute” for planning (Cowart, 1989, 
34). The Director of Planning of Cambridge, Massachusetts had this to say about 
negotiation:
Planning Board members in Cambridge [Mass.] are wary of opening the door to 
negotiated deal making. They don’t want to put [elected] public officials into that 
position. It could open the door to considerable abuse. In American cities, I’d be
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very wary of a flexible process (Rosenberg, 1991, int.).
Professional planners in the U.S. have appeared much more inclined to support the 
imposition of mandatory, fixed fees, than to advocate the negotiation of consensual 
agreements. For example, the Massachusetts Section of the American Planning 
Association issued the following policy statement: “Massachusetts Planners encourage the 
use of development impact fees as a more predictable and standardized method of ensuring 
that new development pays its fair share of the cost of public infrastructure, in preference to 
negotiated exactions” (APA New England Chapter Bulletin Board, April 1992,7). A 1986 
survey of California cities and counties conducted by Robert Cervero of the University of 
California at Berkeley found that over two thirds of respondents favoured the use of fixed 
impact fees as opposed to “negotiated exactions” (ICMA,1988,4). A frequently cited 
reason for the low ratings given to negotiated financing programmes, according to Cervero, 
was that “developers are more skilled at bargaining than are planners, public 
administrators, or public engineers” (Ibid., 5).
In the U.S., the operation of government has been heavily influenced by certain 
guiding principles, and the imposition of predictable, fixed fees has been compatible with 
those principles. For example, the “Equal Protection Clause” of the U.S. Constitution 
requires that persons and properties be treated equally under the law. Given this 
requirement, it has been difficult in the U.S. to justify negotiation and other flexible 
approaches to developer finance as means for assessing costs against developers. As 
lawyer Fred Bosselman has observed, flexible approaches to developer finance, such as 
those involving negotiation, run the risk of replacing the “rule of law” with the “rule of 
man,” and “pose serious legal problems because what is gained in flexibility may be lost in 
inequity” (Bosselman, as quoted by Bauman and Ethier,1987,62). A somewhat similar 
concern has been expressed in Britain, that the negotiation of planning gain has represented 
“the abandonment of the legal value of ‘evenhanded justice,* of like cases being treated 
alike’* (Jowell,1977,431).
No systematic research has yet been conducted on the attitudes o f developers 
toward making contributions to local planning authorities. It has been assumed in many 
circles that developers are uniformly and consistently opposed to any extraction of 
contributions by local authorities. That certainly was the message of the Planning Advisory 
Group (PAG) Report of 1981, which was sweeping in its condemnation of efforts by local 
authorities to obtain contributions in exchange for granting planning permission. (See 
Chapter Three for discussion of PAG Report.)
Despite frequent public expressions of opposition to planning gain by developers, 
some commentators have questioned whether developers have really been fundamentally 
opposed to offering contributions in all instances. As early as 1974, John Ratcliffe (1974, 
149) expressed the view that large development companies frequently “accept the
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inevitability of planning gain and are increasingly prepared to provide an element of 
community benefit in their proposals.” A 1989 discussion document issued by the Royal 
Town Planning expressed a similar point of view when it stated that .. there is 
widespread acceptance among developers, housebuilders, politicians and others that major 
developments should contribute, not only to the necessary physical infrastructure and 
impact abatement measures, but also to meeting social needs indirectly related to their 
development”(Byme,1989,9).
To fully understand the attitudes of developers regarding the negotiation of planning 
gain, it is important to recognise that developers may agree to offer planning gain for 
different reasons, and under different circumstances. Ratcliffe has identified four types of 
planning gains:
- Those which a developer is only too pleased to provide as they do not detract 
significantly from the profitability of the proposed scheme and might even 
enhance the environmental amenity of the project
- Those elicited from a developer whose proposal would otherwise receive 
planning permission— albeit at appeal- but are bestowed upon an authority to 
expedite approval and preserve an amicable relationship.
- Those which are obtained where properly an application might well not receive 
approval, would certainly involve protracted negotiations and would be likely to 
attract onerous conditions even if permission were eventually granted.
- Those deemed acceptable to an authority where it is unlikely that planning 
permission would be forthcoming, even at appeal, but where the gain is 
considered to compensate for the detrimental impact of the proposal (Ratcliffe, 
1981, 407).
Ratcliffe’s classification of different types of planning gain provides a useful 
reminder that developers often have positive reasons for agreeing to make contributions, 
and often gain some benefit in return. Thus, although developers have often expressed 
sweeping and unqualified opposition to having to make contributions, the positions and 
attitudes of developers are likely to vary, depending on specific circumstances, and the 
nature of contributions sought by local authorities. According to a representative of the 
Housebuilders Federation, the main concern of developers “is that local governments are 
expecting and extracting contributions that go beyond what is necessary for the 
development itself ” (Coates,1989 int.). The main concern of developers in Britain thus 
appears to be that contributions they make be used for improvements which are related to, 
and beneficial to their developments.
A 1990 survey conducted by Rosslyn Research for KPMG Peat Marwick sheds 
additional light on what may be the evolving attitudes of developers. Seventy-seven 
percent (77%) of the 30 developers surveyed felt that the negotiation of planning gain had a
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legitimate place in the planning system, and 90% felt that planning gain was a useful tool 
for affecting public opinion (Rosslyn Research,1990). More specifically, a majority of 
developers surveyed (57%) agreed with the statement that “planning gain can result in 
developments that may not have occurred”(Ibid., 24). These survey findings suggest that a 
sizeable proportion of developers have come to recognise that offers of contributions can 
advance their own interests, and improve the likelihood of obtaining planning permission, 
particularly in areas where there is strong citizen opposition to new development In the 
words of a spokesman for a consortium of Britain's ten largest private developers, 'The big 
problem today is that no community wants development. Given that basic political and 
economic fact, it has become absolutely essential for developers to be able to offer planning 
gain as a way of overcoming local resistance to proposed development'* (Bennett,
1990,int.). Furthermore, the cost to the developer of offering contributions is softened by 
the fact that developer contributions for infrastructure are generally tax deductible (Callies 
and Grant,1991, 225).
Citizens have apparently begun to recognise the advantages of agreements in terms 
of enforcement, and in certain cases have encouraged LPAs to sign agreements (Thomas, 
1991, int.). If, for example, a local planning authority wished to require that noise ffom a 
factory not exceed a specified level, or to limit the times of day at which trucks could load 
and unload, it could attempt to place limitations on activities by means of conditions. “But 
if an obligation is imposed as a condition, then it would be up to the local planning 
authority whether or not to enforce the condition” (Ibid.). However, if a legal agreement 
has been signed, a third party can intervene to force the local authority to enforce 
compliance (Ibid.). The desire of citizens to assure that restrictions imposed at the time of 
planning permission are enforced therefore may be a factor encouraging LPAs to sign more 
agreements.
Attitudes Toward Growth and Development
In Britain, surprisingly little attention has been paid to the relationship between local 
government attitudes toward growth and the negotiation of agreements and developer 
contributions. Has the imposition of charges on developers reflected a positive or negative 
attitude toward new development? Equally if not more important, has the extraction of 
payments and benefits ffom developers led to a more positive attitude toward development, 
and made local planning authorities more willing to approve applications for new 
development?
In the U.S. there is considerable evidence that the imposition of charges on 
developers has often arisen because local governments, and local citizens have adopted a 
negative attitude toward new development Developer finance in the U.S. has been 
justified by two arguments. First, it has been argued that the need to improve and expand
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public facilities and services has arisen almost exclusively because of new development. 
Secondly it has been argued that existing residents derive no benefit from new and 
improved facilities which are provided, but rather that new residents are the primary 
beneficiaries.
These claims are only partially correct. When per capita income is rising, “even 
communities with slow population growth need to invest in infrastructure improvements,” 
because existing residents place increased demands on public facilities and infrastructure 
(Altshuler eta l., 1991). Also, existing residents often do benefit from the provision of 
new facilities, and from the up-dating and expansion of infrastructure. Furthermore, when 
impact fees are imposed existing residents are often the direct beneficiaries of windfall 
gains when they sell their homes, because impact fees often discourage the development of 
new housing, thereby allowing existing homes to command a higher price (Singell and 
Lillydahl,1990).
Although U.S. proponents of impact have clearly exaggerated the extent to which 
new development has adversely affected existing residents, the fact remains that “the act of 
imposing impact fees indicates that a legislative determination has been made that 
insufficient public benefits exist to warrant increased general taxation” to finance facilities 
in support of new development” (Nicholas,1988,138). Impact fees have been imposed on 
new development so as “to protect existing property owners from either a loss in the quality 
of public services or an increase in taxes as a consequence of growth” (Nicholas,1987,
95). Or, as Wakeford (1990,209) has put it, impact fees have have represented a “political 
tax imposed in order to slow down growth or at least satisfy existing constituents that new 
growth [paid] its own way.”
What effect, if any, has developer finance had on the willingness of local planning 
authorities to approve new development? Fainstein (1991,3) has argued that limited public 
funding from traditional sources has prompted cities to encourage development, and to 
enter into private/public partnerships so as to leverage private investment “while seeking to 
obtain some public benefit as part of the bargain.” Frieden and Segalyn (1989) have 
expressed a similar view, based on their research of public/private partnerships in American 
cities in the 1980’s. They argue that the need of municipalities to raise additional revenue 
locally encouraged public officials to act “.. .more like developers and less like rule-bound 
bureaucrats.. ..’’(Ibid., 134). However, it is important to keep in mind that local authorities 
in Britain and the U.S. have differed considerably in their ability to generate revenue 
locally, and in the extent to which they have benefited economically from new 
development. Because local governments in the U.S. have generated a large proportion of 
their revenue directly from the locally administered property tax, they have tended to benefit 
economically when new development has taken place. Thus, new development has 
traditionally been welcomed in most American communities as a contributor to public as
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well as private wealth. This coincidence of shared economic interests between local 
governments and private elites has made American cities into “growth machines** (Logan 
and Molotch,1987), and produced intense competition among local governments for new 
development that will enhance the local tax-base. On the other hand, in Britain 
“competition among local governments for growth in the property tax base... is virtually 
unknown**(Ibid., 148). The reasons for this lack of competition for growth are again 
largely rooted in the structure of British local government finance. Very little local 
government revenue in Britain is generated locally. Moreover, grants from central 
government, which have accounted for approximately 75% of local government revenue, 
are not adjusted upward when local property valuations increase as a result of new 
development
.. .there is no incentive to local politicians under this system to permit new 
development to occur so as to swell local revenues. All property tax (the ‘rates*) 
revenues on commercial property are now paid to the central government and 
redistributed to all local authorities on a per capita basis. Moreover, the allocation 
of government grants is designed to even out the resource differences between local 
authorities (Callies and Grant,1991,224).
What effect, if any, has the negotiation of contributions had on the willingness of 
British planning authorities to grant planning permissions? Mather (1988,7) has argued 
that “Introducing an explicit ‘price* for planning permission [as through the negotiation of 
planning gain] could strengthen the preparedness of local authorities to grant consent** 
Keogh, too, seems to suggest that the negotiation of planning gain should make LPAs more 
willing to approve applications for development.
If planning authorities are allowed to bargain for planning gain, and respond to this 
opportunity with effective negotiation, they will have every incentive to ensure that 
the rate at which land is taken for development is optimal... It is clear that the flow 
of land to developed use is less likely to be restricted where planning gain is 
permitted than it is under a system of absolute standards. (Keogh,1985,216)
Indeed, concern has been expressed that the negotiation of contributions might encourage 
local planning authorities to approve too much development “If anything, there is a danger 
that permitted development might overshoot the social optimum by allowing some 
development that could not cover its social cost** (Keogh,1985,216). Similarly, Bowers 
(1991,11) warns that the negotiation of planning gain may introduce an undesirable bias in 
favour of approving development, “since it constitutes immediate and tangible benefits to 
offset against what are frequently uncertain and generally unquantifiable costs.’* Bowers’ 
and Keogh’s arguments are based on economic theory, and expectations about how LPAs 
should rationally behave. In actual fact, however, we do not know for sure that the
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negotiation of agreements has increased the willingness of local planning authorities to 
grant planning permission.
Process
To many observers, the process of negotiation has appeared highly mysterious, and 
outside the realm of traditional planning processes. According to Henry, the process 
whereby [planning gain] is produced is often obscure” (1982,84). According to 
Loughlin/The process is discretionary, with few formal controls imposed on the use of 
powers to negotiate gains...”(1981, 89), and appears “to circumvent the formal process of 
development control”(Ibid.,65).
In the literature on agreements, there are few detailed accounts of the process 
whereby agreements have been signed, or of the circumstances under which agreements 
have been signed. In the absence of such detailed accounts, there has been a tendency to 
assume that the negotiation of agreements has proceeded in a largely ad hoc fashion, with 
local authorities taking advantage of opportunities to negotiate contributions, rather than 
using agreements in a deliberate way to achieve established planning policies and 
objectives. Two of the only written accounts of the negotiation process, by Marriott (1967) 
and Elkin (1974), describing how contributions were negotiated for two major office 
building projects in Central London in the 1960’s, tend to reinforce the impression of 
opportunistic local authority use of agreements.
The first and most celebrated of these two cases is that of the Centre Point office 
development The London County Council (LCC) wished to construct a roundabout at St. 
Giles Circus, at the intersection of New Oxford Street and Charing Cross Road, but lacked 
sufficient money to acquire the land needed to construct the improvement The developer, 
was aware of the LCC’s funding problem, and approached the Chairman of the Planning 
Committee in the autumn of 1958, offering to provide the land needed by the LCC for the 
road improvements in exchange for receiving permission to build a high-rise office 
building at the intersection (Elkin,1974,63; Marriott,1967,113). After almost a year of 
negotiation, the developer submitted a planning application in mid-August 1959 requesting 
permission to build a 24 story office complex containing 140,000 square feet of space 
(Elkin,Ibid., 65). After the initial application was submitted, the developer pressed the 
Council for additional floorspace, based on the high cost of assembling the land. In turn, 
the LCC engineer saw the developer’s request for additional floorspace as possibly 
allowing the LCC to obtain more road width (Ibid.,66). The final scheme which was 
approved allowed the developer to construct a 34 story office tower containing a total of
313,000 square feet--173,000 square feet more than the developer additionally applied for 
(Ibid., 69).
In the second case of a major negotiated contribution, described by Marriott, the
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LCC had developed plans to widen Euston Road, but its ability to obtain the land needed 
for the road-widening was jeopardised by the fact that a developer had obtained outline 
planning permission to build a 120,000 square foot office building at a key intersection. 
The LCC was short of funds, and could not afford to “buy off’ the developer (Marriott, 
1967,158). Instead, the LCC and the developer negotiated an agreement The developer 
agreed to acquire and donate the land the LCC needed for the road widening; in return the 
LCC agreed to grant permission for a massive office development containing as much 
office space as would have been permitted had the developer retained all of the land in 
private ownership. “In this way the local authority received perhaps £2 million worth of 
land for their road and in return... allowed the volume of building, which would have 
stood on the road, to be heaped on to the rest of the site”(Ibid., 162).
Despite the skillful way in which developers manipulated the LCC in the cases 
described by Marriott and Elkin, it has frequently been asserted that developers have been 
at a significant disadvantage when faced with the need to negotiate agreements with 
planning authorities who hold monopoly power over the granting of planning permission. 
According to Heap and Ward local authorities frequently misuse their “monopoly power of 
the grant of planning permission,” by allowing “self-interest to enter into their 
considerations” (Heap and Ward,1980,636). This characterisation of the negotiation 
process as one-sided-- i.e. strongly favouring LPAs and disadvantaging developers— 
conflicts with “the notion of bargaining [which] presupposes that participants both have 
something of value to provide and something of value to gain”(Loughlin,1981,63).
The major concern expressed in the U.S. has not been that developers might be 
treated unfairly, but that developers, if allowed to negotiate deals, will almost inevitably 
take advantage of public authorities. A study of 15 agreements negotiated in New York 
City, carried out by the New York State Comptroller in 1988, provides support for that 
conclusion. The New York State study found that in granting density bonuses to 
developers in exchange for obtaining public amenities such as plazas and subway station 
improvements, planners in the City of New York gave away much more than they received 
(Frieden,1990,426). The study found that the value of public amenities donated by 
developers totaled $5 million, while the market value of bonus floor area was $108 million 
(Ibid.).
According to planning gain consultant Richard Fordham (1990,580),“the 
development industry [in Britain] is becoming increasingly adept at using PR techniques on 
local voters: picking some long felt local want and presenting a scheme in the form: we’ll 
build you a by-pass if you let us add 20 percent to the size o f ... settlement...” No longer 
is it possible for local authorities to simply enforce preestablished standards and rules. 
“Skillfully handled by a developer, planning gain can bring considerable political pressures 
to bear on local politicians to grant planning permissions” (Grant, 1989,85). As one
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consultant admitted to me, negotiating with local officials in certain districts is like “taking 
candy from a baby’* (Interview, speaker asked to remain anonymous).
Developers may actually enjoy a number of advantages in negotiating with local 
authorities. First, “public officials engaged in ... negotiations often exhibit a range of skill, 
knowledge and experience in dealing with developers”(Beatley,1988,92). City planners 
often lack technical skills in real estate finance, and therefore will often be “at a serious 
disadvantage’* when negotiating with developers (Segalyn, 1990,436). Second, 
successful negotiation requires “monolithic behavior” (Cars and Snickars,1991,23), and 
local authorities are usually incapable of such monolithic behavior. Planning authorities 
often find themselves tom by desires to achieve multiple objectives. They are subject to 
conflicting opinions from planning committee members and planning staff, and also to 
conflicting pressures from citizens, affected residents, and the press. Developers, on the 
other hand, tend to have very focused objectives, and know what they want to accomplish. 
Third, developers will usually have better information than planners about the costs and 
expected rates of return of proposed scheme. Any contribution which a developer offers is 
likely to have been carefully calculated, and clearly within the limits of the profitability of 
the project. Lastly, developers, by temperament and inclination, tend to enjoy the process 
of negotiation much more than professional planners, and are usually very good at i t
Developers love negotiation. Not only is it the way they make money; there is 
something about the process that appeals to the temperament of people who go into 
real estate development in die first place (Barnett,1982,100).
One way to deduce who is taking advantage of whom in Britain would be to 
discover who usually takes the initiative in suggesting that a contribution be made. Many 
writers and observers have assumed that local planning authorities have almost always 
taken the initiative in seeking contributions from developers, and that developers have had 
to respond to those “requests.” Heap and Ward (1980,636) claim that “... more often than 
not, the initiative for these agreements comes from the authority, who then proceed to 
indicate to the developer that his planning permission depends upon his willingness to do 
as they ask.” As noted in Chapter Three, this view of planning gain was reflected in 
Circular 22/83, which defined planning gain as an obligation which was imposed on a 
developer.
Despite the widely held assumption that local planning authorities have been the 
instigator’s of negotiated agreements, there is some contrary evidence in the planning 
literature. In both the Centre Point and Euston Centre case studies, it was the developer 
who took the initiative in offering contributions in exchange for obtaining a generous 
planning permission. Furthermore, research conducted by Loughlin (1981,64) revealed 
that developers routinely offered major packages of benefits “apparently on their own
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initiative” in connection with applications for permission to build out-of-town 
hypermarkets. In the research he conducted in Wokingham, Henry (1982,64) found that 
"it will normally be the developer’s action... which will initiate the agreement process."
As reported in Chapter Three, a policy statement was included in the 1972 Greater 
London Development Plan (GLDP) calling for the negotiation of certain “planning 
advantages” from proposed office developments. The fact that such a policy statement was 
adopted seems to suggest that, in Greater London at least, the negotiation of planning gain 
was a purposeful activity deliberately undertaken by local authorities. However, Bowers 
(1991) portrays a different picture, suggesting that local planning authorities may not 
necessarily know what they want when major planning applications are put before them. 
“An alternative view... would be that the it [the process of negotiating planning gain] is one 
of discovery of the community interest.. .”(Bowers,1991,10). Offers of contributions by a 
developer may help the local authority to clarify not only what it wants to obtain in 
contributions, but also to test and measure the depth of its objections to a proposed 
development
As shown in Chapter Two, American communities have experimented with a 
variety of methods of developer finance. This diversity of approaches has inevitably led to 
some confusion regarding the underlying basis, or rationale, for seeking developer 
contributions. The most commonly used methods for obtaining developer finance— 
exactions and impact fees- have been theoretically and legally justified based on the cost of 
required infrastructure and facilities (Nicholas,1992). However, the fact that impact fees 
have varied so dramatically within the U.S., with some communities imposing high fees, 
while others imposed low fees or none at all, seems to suggest that fee levels may have 
been influenced by additional factors, and not solely by cost alone. (See discussion later in 
this chapter on “Geographic Variation.”) Meanwhile, many communities have used 
techniques of “benefit recapture,”-- granting special development benefits to developers in 
exchange for contributions. Communities which have used such methods of benefit 
recapture have attempted to some extent to equate the amount paid by the developer with 
the value of the benefits received. Even within the same jurisdiction, different tests have 
sometimes been applied. “While in one development exactions may be assessed on the 
basis of the benefit principle, in another they may be assessed according to a notion of 
culpability” (Beatley,1988, 92).
The debate in Britain over planning gain has also been fueled by confusion and 
disagreement regarding the basis for seeking developer contributions. As Grant 
(1982,333) has observed, “the rules” whereby developers have made contributions to 
capital costs have often been “arbitrary and ill-defined.” Some writers have suggested that 
local authorities have sought contributions based on the value of planning permission. For 
example, Heap and Ward (1980,632) have charged that “the scale of community-benefit
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provision which is being required of the developer is frequently assessed mainly, if not 
exclusively, by reference to the estimated profitability of the completed scheme.'*
However, there is very little hard evidence that local planning authorities have actually 
taken into account the value of planning permission when negotiating agreements. “Most 
LPAs do not do the sums to discover whether the fullest legally justifiable set of planning 
gains can be afforded by the developer”(Fordham,1990,580). Moreover, very few local 
authorities appear to have employed valuers to advise them in conjunction with their 
negotiations with applicants.
A second basis for negotiating agreements could be to mitigate negative externalities 
and social costs associated with proposed developments. Bowers (1992) has described 
this second category of gain as “compensatory gain,” as opposed to “betterment gain,** as 
described above. Keogh (1985) has argued that the negotiation of planning gain provides a 
mechanism for charging developers for the social costs imposed by their developments. 
According to Bailey (1990), developer contributions should be sought to mitigate the 
negative environmental impacts of development schemes, and to compensate the 
community for losses of amenity, traffic congestion and noise, etc. This conception of 
planning gain assumes that local authorities are able to predict the future impacts and 
ramifications of proposed developments, and to fairly attribute costs to new developments. 
“The problem of defining to what extent the developer can be required to contribute to other 
works beyond his own development seems to depend upon being able to attribute 
‘externality effects* directly to his works''(Henry,1982,66).
A third possibility is that local authorities have sought contributions when 
infrastructure and public facility improvements have been needed for development to occur. 
In contrast to the uncertainty engendered by negotiations based on the estimated value of 
planning permission, a need-based approach would provide a more predictable basis for 
arriving at developer contributions. As Ridley and Fawkner (1987,16) have pointed out, 
“it is easier to assess charges based on the costs that various properties impose.. .*’ than to 
“accurately predict and assess the benefits received by properties...” Economists have 
typically argued that fees imposed on developers should be based on the marginal costs of 
infrastructure so as to encourage an efficient pattern of development Assessing charges 
based on marginal cost should encourage development to occur in “low-cost areas (already 
provided with infrastructure)... in preference to areas outside the existing infrastructural 
system”(Bailey,1990,441). However, it is not clear that local planning authorities in 
practice have sought contributions based on need, or on the marginal cost of required 
improvements. According to Callies and Grant (1991,224), there has been “no ... 
proportional relationship between the need [italics added] generated by the development and 
the sum contributed.”
One final possibility is that the negotiation of agreements has had little to do with
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the above mentioned considerations. Indeed, some commentators have suggested that 
negotiations have primarily been influenced and shaped by the relative bargaining strength 
of the two parties (Callies and Grant,1991; Tiesdell and Oc, 1991).
The Factor of Delay
The government, through its collection and publication of statistics reporting on the 
percentage of planning applications approved by local authorities within eight weeks, has 
focused considerable attention on the problem of delay, and urged local authorities to issue 
decisions on planning applications in a timely fashion. Keogh and Evans’ (1992) analysis 
of the private and social costs of planning delay has drawn renewed attention to the issue of 
delay.
It has frequently been claimed that local authorities have used delay to force 
reluctant developers into making contributions. As one developer put it, planning 
authorities hold a very valuable negotiating position, the ability to delay [italics added], and 
it is this trump card which has secured bargains, even blackmail settlements, for the issue 
of valuable planning consents" (Osborne,1989,30). Nevertheless, no systematic research 
has been conducted comparing the length of time it has taken developers to obtain planning 
permissions with versus without agreements, or the length of time involved in signing 
agreementswir/i "contributions compared to agreements without contributions.
The Role of Planners in the Negotiation Process
Many writers have appeared to assume that planners have played a leading role in 
negotiating agreements with developers. However, little research has been carried out to 
analyse and describe the roles planners have actually played in negotiating agreements, and 
the roles played by other local authority actors. In the absence of such research, it cannot 
necessarily be assumed that planners have dominated the negotiation process. Henry found 
that "In terms of the amount of influence over the form of an agreement and its contents, 
the legal department is perhaps as equal in importance as either the developer or the 
planning officer”(Henry,1982,76). In some localities responsibility for negotiation might 
conceivably be delegated to other parties such as district solicitors, Chief Executives, or to 
specially constituted teams of negotiators.
Research conducted in the U.S. has suggested that planners in the 1980*s were 
more likely to engage in mediation and negotiation than they had in the past Schon 
(1983,109) has argued that new models of planning were emerging, and that planners were 
more likely to assume the role of "intermediary.” This "intermediary” role, is more like the 
traditional role of the lawyer (Schon,Ibid., 209). But how have planners adjusted to this 
new role? Research conducted by Forester (1987) led him to conclude that planners found 
it difficult to adjust to the mediator role. According to Forester (Ibid.,309-310), "the
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emotional complexity of the mediating role makes quite different demands on planners than 
those that they have traditionally been prepared to meet'*
Outcomes
When impact fees and exactions have been levied in the U.S., all developments, 
regardless of size, have had to pay fees. However, because the negotiation of agreements 
is costly and time-consuming, British LPAs have not been able to negotiate agreements for 
each and every permission. What, then, determines whether or not an agreement is 
negotiated? Is there a threshold size below which British local authorities feel it is not 
worth negotiating agreements? At what threshold of project size have local authorities felt it 
was worthwhile to seek to obtain contributions?
According to Healey, if  o/.(1988,101), planning and infrastructure agencies have 
generally found it easier to secure financial contributions from developers of large-scale 
projects, because of their inherent economies. Nevertheless, some local authorities, such 
as the London Borough of Tower Hamlets, had a policy during the 1980’s of seeking 
planning advantages “from all office developments over 200 square metres'*
(Redman,1991,208). The London Borough of Islington developed a plan in 1986 which 
stated that planning benefits would be sought from all office developments over 10,000 
square feet, and benefits might be sought from developments between 5000 and 10,000 
square feet (Ibid.) According to MacDonald (1991,5) a few authorities set thresholds for 
negotiating planning agreements as low as 50 houses and 100 square meters.
Nevertheless, there is no hard evidence that, in practice, local authorities adopting such 
policies negotiated many agreements for projects that small.
Another important question is whether local authorities have been equally inclined 
to seek contributions from commercial and industrial projects as from residential projects? 
An understanding of the spread of contributions among major types of development is not 
only of interest in its own right, but could also shed light on the rationale and purpose for 
negotiating contributions. As Bowers (1992,1332) has pointed out, it is reasonable to 
assume that “commercial and industrial uses of land confer negative externalities; [whereas] 
there are no externalities associated with housing.” If Bowers* assumption is correct, then 
a differential tendency toward negotiating contributions from commercial and industrial 
developments could indicate a desire to mitigate negative impacts of development
The Size of Developer Contributions
Previous research has produced little solid data on the magnitude and relative 
significance of developer contributions. In the absence of such data, perceptions of how 
much developers have paid have been shaped to an inordinate degree by individual
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accounts of the content of selected agreements, which have been repeated and passed on in 
speeches and journal articles. Based on these highly selective, and often-repeated accounts 
of agreements, a common folklore has been built up about agreements, conveying the 
impression that local authorities have often succeeded in extracting exceptionally large 
offers of contributions, and that such contributions have often been extraneous and 
unrelated to the developments seeking permission. One of the most frequently-related 
accounts of planning gain folklore is that the London Borough of Camden sought 
contributions for the pension fund of displaced workers in the newspaper publishing 
industry in return for granting permission for an office building on Gray's Inn Road. 
Although a request for such a contribution may indeed have been sought, an examination of 
agreements signed for the project at the Camden Planning Department produced no 
evidence that such a contribution was ever, in fact, agreed to. In another frequently 
mentioned account, it has been reported that Winchester City Council sought £153,000 in 
infrastructure contributions from a developer of merely three houses. However, again, it 
seems that this request for contributions came to no effect, inasmuch as the terms sought by 
the Council were disallowed on appeal
A review of the literature on planning gain yielded a number of selective accounts of 
contributions offered in agreements. For example, Debenham, Tewson, Chinnocks (1988) 
reported that a developer agreed to build and donate to the local authority a new community 
hall, and indoor cricket and tennis facilities, in exchange for obtaining permission to build a 
38,500 square foot superstore. Elson (1989) reported that, in exchange for obtaining 
permission for a major residential development, a developer agreed to contribute 8 percent 
of the average selling price of each dwelling to the local authority, with a guaranteed 
minimum total payment of £660,000. Wakeford (1990) reported that a developer agreed to 
construct and donate a leisure centre with swimming pool, social housing, two churches, 
and an extension to the town centre gardens, in exchange for receiving permission for a
400,000 square foot shopping centre. These and other highly selective accounts of the 
contents of agreements have reinforced the perception that local authorities have been 
highly successful in extracting significant contributions from developers.
Interviews I conducted prior to carrying out systematic research within in a selected 
study area yielded additional accounts of how much local authorities had negotiated from 
developers. The former District Valuer for the London Borough of Southwark reported 
that Southwark District Council generated £16 million in planning gain in 1989 
(Yates,1990, int.). The Head of the team in charge of negotiating agreements for Bracknell 
District Council reported that through January 1990 Bracknell had commitments of 
contributions for infrastructure improvements from developers worth a total of £19 million, 
including £1.5 million for the development of new community centres (Hawkins,1990, 
int.). Additional contributions were reportedly also obtained by Bracknell to secure
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housing units at 40% off the market price, which were then transferred to housing 
associations (Ibid). The estimated value of planning gain extracted by Bracknell through 
1989 was £13,000 per dwelling unit- £27,000 per unit if the value of land acquired for 
open space was included (Ibid.). It should be emphasised that the figures reported in 
Bracknell pertained to offers of contributions, not to what the local authority actually 
collected. Offers of contributions are generally received by a local authority only if and 
when the developer proceeds to implement development In many cases developers decide 
not to implement the permissions which they have received
The first and only known systematic attempt at estimating the value of negotiated 
developer contributions was carried out in 1989 by the Essex County Council Highways 
Department, on behalf of the County Surveyors Society. The Essex County Highway 
Department mailed out a survey to 47 counties in England and Wales in March, 1989 (at the 
end of the 1988-89 fiscal year) for the purpose of estimating the cash value of developer 
contributions for highway network improvements negotiated over a period of years.
Survey questions were intentionally phrased to elicit data about developer contributions for 
highway improvements likely to result in “significant benefits to the general traveling 
public.” Respondents were instructed to exclude from their estimates developer 
contributions for roadway improvements which simply met the traffic needs of the new 
development and which did not result in any significant benefit to other traffic.
The data compiled through the survey suggests that the total value of developer 
contributions for beneficial traffic improvements was substantial, and that the value of 
developer contributions for highways was increasing. For 1987/88, county councils 
reported developer contributions totaling £42,300,000; contributions valued at 
£70,000,0000 were reportedly negotiated in 1988/89. It was estimated that, at the time of 
the survey, developer contributions achieved through Section 52 agreements contributed 
13% of capital spending on local authority roads, and 5% of spending on trunk roads and 
motorways. Looking ahead to 1989/90, county councils reported that they expected to 
receive a total of £133,000,000 worth of developer contributions for beneficial highway 
improvements. Not all counties were equally successful in negotiating developer 
contributions, however. Seventy percent of all developer contributions reportedly 
negotiated between 1987 and 1990 was obtained in counties located in the Southeast and 
Southwest, while the remaining 30% was divided among the remaining seven regions. 
Moreover, planning gain receipts appeared to be increasing in the Southeast and Southwest 
at a much faster rate than in other parts of the country. A five-fold increase in developer 
contributions for highways, from £12.9 million in 1987/88 to £60.1 million in 1989/90 
was reported in the Southeast, whereas in other parts of the country (such as the East 
Midlands and Wales) yearly receipts of planning gain for highway improvements were 
expected either to remain level, or to decline (Essex County Council Highways
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Dept.,1989).
Unfortunately, the Essex County survey data cannot be accepted as wholly reliable. 
According to J.W. Patient (1990, int.), who directed the study, “people tended to 
significandy over-estimate developer contributions.” There are a number of reasons for 
believing that the estimated values of contributions given by county officials in the survey 
were inflated.
In the questionnaire I tried to be clear to have respondents exclude expenditures that 
solely benefited the development Responses should have included only those 
expenditures that created 'significant benefits to the general travelling public.'
Still, from talking to people afterwards I am convinced that people did not adhere to 
this distinction. They included expenditures that were only necessary for the traffic 
of the development (Patient, 1990, int.).
Estimates of developer contributions may have been inflated for other reasons as 
well. Although the questionnaire asked for an estimate of actual developer receipts for 
1987/88, respondents often failed to make this distinction. In many cases, respondents 
appear to have reported the total value of improvements offered by developers, rather than 
the total value of improvements actually received. Also, figures reported for 1988/89 and 
1989/90 were estimates of expected future receipts, and respondents may have been overly 
optimistic in estimating the value of future planning gain. One last factor which made it 
difficult for respondents to provide accurate estimates of the value of contributions was that 
developer contributions were often received in the form of completed improvements 
constructed by the developer. County officials could only guess what such improvements 
actually cost developers.
The Incidence of Developer Finance and the Collection of Betterment
Most of the debate in Britain about the negotiation of agreements has revolved 
around the question of whether local authorities have used agreements as a way of 
collecting betterment. In the U.S., the major focus of research and debate has been about 
the ‘incidence” of developer finance- in other words who ultimately bears the cost Is the 
cost paid for by the landowner (in the form of a reduced land price), by the developer (in 
the form of reduced profits) or by occupants of the property (in the form of higher property 
prices or rents)? The incidence of developer payments is clearly fundamental to the 
question of whether betterment has been collected. If costs assessed against developers are 
financed by paying landowners less money for their land, or by developers through 
reduced profits, then betterment has been collected. However, if charges imposed on 
developers are passed forward to consumers in the form of higher property prices and 
higher rents, then “none of the windfall has been recaptured from the original owners, and 
the ethical meaning of the tax is lost” (Hagman and Misczynski,1978a, xxxii). Thus,
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although the terminology in the two countries has been different, the issues and concerns 
raised in the parallel debates have overlapped to a considerable degree.
In Britain, it has been widely assumed that costs of contributions paid by 
developers have in most cases been incident on landowners. According to Callies and 
Grant (1991,225) “the most likely explanation in relation to a green field site'* is that the 
burden of the contributions will fall most directly “upon the price paid for the land by the 
developer." One possible explanation for the belief that costs of planning gain have been 
passed back to landowners has been the fact that in England many people believe that 
betterment should be assessed, and that local communities should be able to achieve 
benefits by capturing a portion of the increased value that they have created. As Hallett 
(1988,186) has put it, in Britain there has been a long-standing “obsession” with “creaming 
off the ‘unearned increment"’ The following statement by Litchfield is indicative of the 
view that betterment should be collected:
The impact of planning gain will inevitably be to cause land values to fall. The 
developer will earn a profit, but the passive landowner, who does nothing, will get 
less. This is fair. It is a transfer of gain from the landowner to the community 
(Litchfield,1989, lect.).
One problem with assuming that costs are passed back to landowners, however, is 
that the imposition of planning gain by local authorities has been regarded as largely 
unpredictable. Developers appear not to have known what contributions they have to 
make, and have therefore been unable, presumably, to take those costs into account when 
purchasing land for development. As Grant (1982,372) has pointed out, “Where 
requirements are known with certainty in advance of site acquisition they will affect the 
price paid for the site, and thus the advantage of a clear code is that it might act as an 
informal tax on development values.” On the other hand, the more unpredictable the costs, 
the more likely it is that those costs will be passed forward to purchasers and tenants 
(Nicholas,1987,96). Given the apparent unpredictability of planning gain negotiation, 
there is at least some basis for questioning the assumption that costs of planning gain will 
necessarily be passed back to landowners.
Despite the importance of the question of “who pays” related to the debate over 
betterment, there has been little or no empirical research in Britain documenting the actual 
incidence of costs imposed in agreements (Bailey, 1990). In the U.S., on the other hand, 
investigators and researchers have invested an inordinate amount of time and effort 
attempting to measure the incidence of fees imposed on developers. Most of this research 
has indicated that, despite the predictability of impact fees and exactions, it is unlikely that 
costs have been passed back to landowners.
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Developers can pass impact fees along to landowners only if the market for 
buildable land is highly competitive and if supply can be expanded just as quickly 
as demand warrants. That is not possible, because expanding the supply of 
buildable land requires installation of the very infrastructure for which development 
impact fees are supposed to pay (Huffman,Nelson,Smith and Stegman,1988,54).
Empirical research conducted in Loveland, Colorado and Sarasota County, Florida 
evaluating urban land price changes in response to the imposition of development impact 
fees found that “Urban land prices will rise rather than fall in response to imposition of 
impact fees” (Nelson, Lillydahl, Frank and Nicholas (1991,1). To be more precise, for 
every dollar levied in impact fees, property values tended to increase 85 cents 
(Nelson,1990, lect). The author’s theorise that the positive relationship between impact 
fees paid by developers and urban land prices is evidence that “impact fees imply a contract 
for development that is worth more as a package than no fees and uncertain 
development”(Ibid.). Research conducted independently by Skaburskis (1991,16) found 
that “In stable housing markets, development impact fees increase lot prices by an amount 
that is approximately 20 percent greater than the fee.”
The least likely party to pay the so-called “developers* fee” appears to be the 
developer.
Developers cannot pay impact fees in the form of lower profits since, in a 
competitive economy, profits are already at levels of return that justify the cost, 
bother, and risk of investment compared to alternative uses of investment capital. 
Developers will stop production and not resume until demand exceeds supply to a 
point where necessary profit levels are restored (Huffman,Nelson,Smith and 
Stegman,1988, 54).
Only when the rules change after the developer has bought the land and committed himself 
to carry out development can it be said that the developer actually pays the fee 
(Wakeford,1990,209). Thus, most research in the U.S. points to the conclusion that the 
cost of impact fees and exactions has been passed on to buyers and tenants in the form of 
increased property prices and rents (Nicholas, 1987; Bauman and Ethier, 1987; Soble 
1988; Huffman, Nelson, Smith and Stegman, 1988; Singell and Lillydahl, 1990). One 
factor which has increased the likelihood that costs are incident on consumers is the fact 
that “impact fees are levied most in areas of intense growth pressures, which are precisely 
the kinds of environments that enable land owners and developers to pass the additional 
costs on to the final tenants of the property” (Levine,1989,2).
The frequently-stated rationale for imposing impact fees has been that “existing 
residents should not be expected to subsidize new development” (Nicholas,1987,99).
The fact that costly infrastructure improvements, such as new sewage treatment plants, 
schools, water supply and distribution systems, etc., tend to be “lumpy” has only served to
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intensify demands of existing residents that new residents be assessed special fees. When 
capital investments are “lumpy” rather than continuous, “existing residents have to carry the 
costs of infrastructure in excess of their needs until growth catches up.. .’’(Wakeford, 1990, 
198). However, as impact fees and exactions have become more common, some writers 
have expressed concern that existing residents have used impact fees to unfairly shift costs 
onto new residents. According to Bauman and Ethier (1987,65) impact fees and similar 
exactions have been used to shift capital costs “from the general public tax base to a discrete 
segment of the public: those citizens buying and renting newly constructed housing.” R.
M. Smith (1987) has put it even more strongly. “What began as a means for preventing a 
subdivision from shifting to the municipality the responsibility for installing public 
improvements has been transmuted into a device by which municipalities are shifting to 
private land developers the cost of facilities and social programs for the general public that 
local government can no longer afford”(Smith,1987,28). Moreover, research in the U.S. 
suggests that existing residents (those who own property) often benefit handsomely from 
the imposition of impact fees.
First, rising entry and production costs reduce supply until excess demand forces 
rents to rise. Owners of existing holdings therefore gain increased rents if their 
property is competitive with new, more expensive buildings that must pay the fees. 
They gain another windfall when the jurisdiction uses impact fees to upgrade 
community facilities, thereby making the community even more attractive 
(Huffman, Nelson,Smith and Stegman,1988,55).
Empirical research conducted in the U.S. on the incidence of impact fees has shown 
that new home buyers have often have had to “incur an increase in housing price that is 
greater than the impact fee” (Singell and Lillydahl,1990,91). Snyder and Stegman (1989) 
found that developers had to “mark up” impact fees by approximately 28 percent to take 
account of their additional costs of financing and carrying the impact fee until it could be 
collected at the time properties had to be sold. Soble (1988) has calculated that an 
additional fee of $2,376 per home for the construction of a new school will, when financed 
over the life of a thirty-year mortgage financed at 12.5 percent, ended up costing each 
homeowner $13,878.
Given that the burden of new impact fees in the U.S. has fallen so directly on new 
residents, some American researchers have begun to consider the equity of development 
impact fees. In a major study conducted for the Urban Land Institute, Snyder and 
Stegman(1989) concluded that, under certain circumstances, levying fees on new 
development may serve to redress imbalances in costs between existing and new residents, 
and to create greater equity in financing. However, whether or not it is equitable and 
efficient to impose impact fees on new development (i.e. new residents) will depend on the 
rate o f growth that is occurring in the community, as well as the rate o f interest at which a
-106-
locality could finance infrastructure through municipal borrowing (Snyder and Stegman, 
Ibid.). H the rate of growth is greater than the rate of interest at which the public sector can 
finance the capital improvement, then, according to Snyder and Stegman, the imposition of 
impact fees is cost-justified in terms of maintaining equity. On the other hand, if the rate of 
growth is less than the rate of interest for borrowing, impact fees are not justified. An 
interesting implication of Snyder and Stegman’s research is that the need and justification 
for seeking payments from developers will vary over time. Indeed, there may be reason to 
expect that the negotiation of developer contributions should be cyclical, and at least 
somewhat related to the business and property development cycle.
An indirect but straight-forward way researchers might use to deduce if local 
authorities have collected betterment would be to analyse the exact purposes for which 
developers have made contributions. Such an examination of specific purposes should 
reveal whether contributions offered by developers have been related (and therefore 
beneficial) to the developments which occasioned them, or unrelated (and therefore 
onerous). The importance of distinguishing between “beneficial” and “onerous” taxation 
has been emphasised by Evans (1985). “Onerous” taxes are levied for purposes which 
provide little or no benefit to the parties which are forced to pay. Evans gives the following 
example of an onerous tax, and its negative effect on property values. Suppose that 
Borough A levies a tax on all properties in the borough to subsidise the housing costs of a 
small number of residents in its area, but Borough B, adjacent to Borough A does not. 
Under those circumstances, he argues, rents and property values will fall in Borough A 
relative to Borough B (Evans, 1985,166). “Beneficial taxes, on the other hand, pay for 
goods and services which benefit the tax payer”(Ibid.), and as a result can have a positive 
effect on the value of properties which are assessed. An example of beneficial taxation 
would be if a local authority taxed properties for the purpose of improving roads and 
roadway landscaping which generally enhanced the value of properties in the district.
Henry’s 1982 study of planning agreements signed for three large-scale residential 
developments in Wokingham (in Lower Earley, Woodley Airfield and Woosehill) included a 
useful evaluation developer contributions in agreements in terms of whether they were 
beneficial or onerous to developers. In all three cases, planning agreements were 
negotiated which required the developer to make cash payments for on-site and off-site 
infrastructure, such as roads and drainage (Henry,1982,45). Similarly, in all three cases, 
developers were required to dedicate or donate land for community facilities, schools and 
open space. But in Henry's opinion, these developer-financed improvements could not be 
regarded as solely a gain for the local authority. “It would be a mistake to presuppose that 
the purpose of an agreement is only to achieve a gain for a particular party”(Ibid., 46). 
Rather, obligations imposed on developers through planning agreements tended to achieve 
a dual purpose. “In all cases with one exception, these [improvements financed by
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developers] could be considered essential to the development, but have the potential to 
benefit a catchment area beyond the boundaries of the site”(Ibid., 45). Only in one 
instance, where a developer was required to dedicate land to the District Council, did Henry 
find a requirement imposed on a developer which was not “commercially advantageous” to 
the proposed development This led Henry to conclude that “the classic view of local 
authority opposition to development unless some 'gain' is offered is not true in the major 
sites described”(Ibid., 47). On the contrary, study of these three major cases showed that 
“one of the results of this process [of negotiation ] is that benefits can be identified for all 
parties, as well as some losses”(Ibid., 49).
Opponents of planning gain have sought to place strict limitations on what 
developers can be asked to make contributions for. Tucker (1978) and Heap and Ward 
(1980) have argued that developers should not be asked to provide facilities which it is the 
duty of the local authority to provide. Ward (1982,77) has argued that “The courts have 
made it clear that if a planning authority seek to use their powers to achieve some ulterior 
object, notwithstanding that the object may be connected with one of their other functions 
such as housing or highways, they will be guilty of a misuse of their powers as a planning 
authority.” He therefore argues that it is “unjustified” for local authorities to require 
developers to: provide roads or sewers in excess of what is required by the development; 
provide open space and community facilities in excess of what is required by the 
development; or to construct council housing for the local authority (Ibid., 77).
According to a report by Debenham Tewson & Chinnocks (1988,7), gains secured 
by local authorities through bargaining have often been “divorced, both functionally and 
geographically, from the proposals to which they relate.” As if to corroborate that 
conclusion, a 1990 survey of 112 local authorities and 30 developers conducted for KPMG 
Peat Marwick, found that the types of planning gain benefits most preferred by local 
authorities have been contributions for open space, off-site infrastructure, and highways. 
However, the survey also found that, in practice, “Most planning gain agreements related 
to on-site benefits only...”(Rosslyn Research, 1990,19). Only 1 in 10 of developers, plus 
a mere handful of authorities reported that they believed that the balance of benefits had 
changed toward the provision of off-site benefits (Ibid., 20).
Consistency with Established Plans and Policies
Many writers seem to assume that the main reason for agreeing to make 
contributions has been to obtain waivers and exceptions from established planning policies. 
According to Bowers (1992,1329), planning gain is negotiated when a planning 
application “is in some respect at variance with the statutory plan.” Loughlin (1981,65) 
has argued that the possibility of obtaining contributions “might affect the objectivity of the 
authority in performing its role of evaluating the planning merits” of proposed schemes.
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Local planning authorities might be willing “to trade off planning standards in order to 
obtain direct gains”(IbicL,90). Critics of planning gain negotiation have alluded to such 
concerns, arguing that the negotiation of agreements is inconsistent with the proper exercise 
of development control. As developer Trevor Osborne (1989,30) put it, “How can this 
[the practice of soliciting contributions while reviewing pending planning applications] be 
a logical or sensible way in which to carry out the development control function. A 
development is either justified and acceptable or it is not....”
There has appeared to be a very real risk possibility that the ability to negotiate 
contributions might tempt local authorities to approve developments which should be 
properly refused. Indeed, the willingness and ability of developers to offer contributions to 
planning authorities might be greatest in exactly those areas where planning policies have 
sought to exert the greatest constraint on development
There is the fact that the developer’s willingness to agree to onerous terms is likely 
to be greatest in circumstances where planning controls are most rigid— not simply 
because of a realisation that something substantial might be needed to induce the 
authority to relax their policies, but because of the vast potential difference between 
the value of the land with no permission and no apparent prospect of it, and its 
value with permission for development This quid pro quo approach to planning 
may lead to thoroughly bad development because the less likely the prospect of 
permission under established plans and policies, the greater the increment in land 
value if permission is actually granted (Grant,1982,359).
Martin Loughlin’s 1978 case study of the negotiation of developer contributions by 
Harrow Council suggests that local authorities have been willing to grant exceptions to 
established plans and policies in exchange for contributions. Harrow Council agreed to 
grant planning permission for a 91,000 square foot office development, in return for which 
the developer agreed: to construct a community centre which would be leased to the local 
authority for 125 years at a peppercorn ground rent; to include 18 residential flats in the 
development; to construct specified roadworks and transfer a petrol filling station property 
to the local authority for traffic management purposes at their own expense; to reimburse 
the Council for the cost of a roundabout and pedestrian underpass to be provided adjoining 
the site; and to make a number of parking spaces available for public use without charge in 
connection with a nearby British Railways station (Loughlin, 1978, 291). The LPA agreed 
to enter into the deal despite the fact that the proposed development was in “conflict with 
the Development Plan, and with the GLC's strategic policies for housing and employment’* 
(Ibid.). According to Loughlin, the Harrow case shows how the judgment of local 
planning authorities related to meeting local needs could be clouded and undermined by the 
lure contributions.
In this case... it is hard to resist the conclusion that this decision was significantly
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affected by the willingness of the developer to provide a package of benefits to the 
authority. In such a situation the financial incentives may well hinder the 
authority's ability to undertake a reasoned calculation of the merits and drawbacks 
of such schemes....(Loughlint Ibid.).
Henry's research in Wokingham led him to a different conclusion, even though he 
recognised that there were risks in making "over-enthusiastic" use of planning agreements. 
He reported that "... in the Wokingham example, where gains have occurred these would 
appear to be the result of seizing an opportunity rather than an overt policy to seek out 
considerations....”(Henry, Ibid., 80). He also recognised that the negotiation of 
agreements was often not an outgrowth of the preparation of forward-looking plans and 
policies, but rather was often a process of reacting to private sector initiatives. 
Nevertheless, Henry's overall conclusion was that agreements could play a useful role in 
achieving positive planning objectives. “In an area where the overwhelming majority of 
development has been left to the private sector, the planning agreement has been vital in 
articulating and protecting the interests of both the public and private sector, and in 
coordinating development''(Ibid., 83). Planning agreements were useful because they 
allowed a district planning authority to “achieve a saving on public spending," and also “to 
retain a measure of control over a development not found in planning permission"(Ibid., 
81).
In the U.S., planners have generally supported the adoption of impact fees and 
exactions, and have expressed few reservations about the consistency of such charges with 
the achievement of legitimate planning objectives. Nelson and Nicholas (1990, lect.) have 
argued that the adoption of impact fee ordinances has encouraged local governments to 
undertake comprehensive planning and to assess the adequacy of current facilities and 
infrastructure in relation to current and projected rates of growth. However, the 
negotiation of agreements has not been viewed so benignly. The fact that bargaining leads 
to a perception of “shared interest between the public and private sectors” (Kirlin,1985,5) 
has prompted concern that public officials might be encouraged “to behave like developers, 
rather than guardians of the public interest” (Porter,1989,150). In the U.S. there has been 
a particularly strong view that planning authorities must deal with developers at “arms- 
length”, and should not allow financial considerations to affect decisions either positively 
or negatively.
Zoning regulations and specific zoning decisions should not be tied to income 
generation for general public purposes. The Study Commission believes that such a 
practice, even if directed toward a worthy objective such as housing, would distort 
the purpose of zoning and could have damaging effects. If the real estate market... 
is to be tapped to provide necessary monies... then the obligation should take the 
form of a tax to be imposed uniformly on a broad base of real estate activity, not 
solely on projects requiring discretionary zoning actions (Development 
Commitments Study Commission, 1984 Report to Mayor of New York City, as
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quoted in Marcus,1988,78).
Geographic Variation
Experience with developer finance in the U.S. suggests that there is likely to be 
considerable geographic variation in the use of developer finance by local governments. 
Data compiled from 35 local governments in five states by James Nicholas (1990) found 
that impact fees charged by local governments have exhibited significant geographic 
variation. For example, road impact fees imposed by localities on new single family homes 
ranged from a low of $130 to a high of $7,348; the average road impact fee was $1521 per 
unit (Nicholas, 1990). School impact fees varied from $135 per unit to $2,096 per unit, 
with an average fee of $559 (Ibid.). Similarly dramatic differences in fees were found for 
other infrastructure and facilities such as parks, police and fire protection, and libraries 
(Ibid.). Some of this variation might be explained by differences in the cost of providing 
facilities and infrastructure in different locations, and some communities clearly set much 
higher standards of infrastructure provision than others. However, the major difference 
appears to have been that some local governments sought to recover a much greater share 
of facility costs from developers than others. Some governments have sought to recover 
up to 80% of development costs from developers while other's have been content to 
recover a much lower percentage of costs (Seskin,1990,int.). Although no empirical data 
has been compiled on this point, the ability to shift a large percentage of infrastructure costs 
onto developers has appeared to be have been at least partially related to the relative strength 
of local property markets.
Local governments in prosperous, fast-growing areas on the east and west coasts 
of the U.S. extracted the most from developers during the 1980’s. Boston and San 
Francisco— both of which experienced major development booms— were able to impose 
major costs on downtown developers, and to obtain payments for subsidised housing, 
because developers were anxious to develop in those cities during that period 
(Sawicki,1989,358). In Hawaii, where developable land was more expensive than 
anywhere else in the U.S., local governments were able to impose exactions amounting to 
60% of the development gain achieved by obtaining planning permission (Lowry and 
Kim, 1991). Meanwhile, local governments in slow-growing areas of the country found it 
economically infeasible to impose such fees. For example, “.. .in a city like Atlanta, where 
a downtown address is not considered very special, concessions are made to virtually 
anyone proposing to locate economic activity there”(Sawicki,1989,358).
Have all local authorities in Britain been equally likely to make use of agreements, 
and to obtain contributions? Or have some localities been much more active than others in 
using agreements and in negotiating contributions? Keogh (1985,226) has put the question 
another way, by asking “to what extent do local authorities compete for development
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through variations in the ‘planning gain price’ of development...?” And if there has been 
significant variation among localities in using agreements, what factors have effected the 
ability ofLPAs to negotiate agreements with contributions?
A number of factors might conceivably affect the ability of public authorities to 
obtain contributions from developers. Some of those factors might be: development 
pressure; degree of planning constraint exerted on development; rate of growth; 
characteristics of the area (urban versus rural, political affiliation); proximity of 
development sites to publicly-funded highways; extent of central government intervention.
It would seem reasonable to expect that local authorities should be in the strongest 
position to negotiate contributions in areas which are experiencing the greatest amount of 
development pressure. However, the degree of constraint exerted by the planning system 
may be an even more important factor affecting the value of planning permission, and in 
turn, the willingness of developers to offer contributions.
.. .the degree of restrictiveness in planning sets the limits on development and is 
instrumental in determining the value of development If planning is highly 
restrictive, the value of development land, and of property in the market, will be 
high(Keogh and Evans,1992,693).
A third variable which might affect the ability of local authorities to negotiate 
contributions is the rate at which growth is occurring. A 1986 survey of the use of 
development agreements in California by the University of California found that “The 
absolute growth in population showed a strong relationship with the use of 
agreements...’’(Cowart,1989,22).
It has been widely assumed that boroughs in Central London have been aggressive 
in negotiating contributions from developers. Nevertheless, even London boroughs have 
varied considerably in their use of agreements. When the Association of London Borough 
Planning Officers (ALBPO) surveyed the 33 boroughs in Greater London in 1989 it found 
that local authorities were divided into three roughly equal groups. Of the 22 boroughs 
which responded to the survey, eight (36%) had “no specific policies for planning gain 
other perhaps than the office policy contained in the Greater London Development Plan, 
namely that in granting applications for major office developments there should be the 
attainment of planning advantages....” (ALBPO,1989,4-5). Boroughs in this first group 
made relatively little use of agreements. Seven boroughs (32%) made moderate use of 
agreements. Boroughs in this second group typically had “more extensive policies than 
those in group one, embracing not only GLDP office policy but also policies in respect of 
commuted car parking, the provision of community and leisure facilities as part of major 
redevelopment schemes or the provision of housing as part of a mixed development” 
(Ibid.). Boroughs in this category reported that they signed between 6 and 27 agreements
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per year (Ibid., 7). Seven boroughs (32%) were categorised as falling in group three, and 
were the most active in using agreements. Boroughs in this third group used "the process 
of negotiation to encompass a very broad spectrum of planning gain”(Ibid.,5) and tended to 
enter into a higher number of Section 52 Agreements. One borough in this category 
reported that it entered into, on average, 40 to 50 agreements per year (Ibid.,7). Many of 
the gains negotiated by localities in this group were judged by the ALBPO report as falling 
outside the guidelines set down in Circular 22/83.
The results of the ALBPO survey serve as a reminder of how little is currently 
known about how local authority use of agreements has varied, and why. What factors 
explain why some local authorities use agreements more broadly and frequently than 
others? Have local authorities outside Greater London been less apt to negotiate 
agreements than boroughs in Greater London. Have rural planning authorities been more 
or less likely to negotiate agreements with contributions than urban districts? Land values 
in urban areas will be much higher than in rural areas, but gains in land value resulting 
from planning permission and the provision of infrastructure may be greater in percentage 
terms in rural areas than in urban areas. Moreover, the provision of new infrastructure may 
be more crucial for development to occur in rural areas than in urban areas, where existing 
infrastructure is already in place (albeit often at capacity).
The proximity of development sites to publicly-funded road improvements might 
have an impact on the negotiation of agreements with contributions. If LPAs were 
motivated by a desire to capture betterment, one of the best ways to do so would be to seek 
contributions from developments located in close proximity to publicly funded road 
improvements. Also, developers might be relatively willing and able to offer contributions 
when undertaking projects on sites made valuable by public highway investments.
It has often been assumed or implied that Labour authorities have been more 
inclined to try to force developers into making excessive contributions than Conservative 
local authorities. However, current evidence as to the effect of political affiliation on the 
willingness to negotiate contributions is relatively weak. According to Marsh (1990,int.), 
Conservative local authorities in outlying areas have often been particularly aggressive in 
negotiating planning gain. “These are areas where stockbrokers live, and these financial 
people participate in local government and understand deal-making: They favour policies 
of tight constraint, and at the same time drive a hard bargain”(Ibid.). In their research into 
the negotiation of contributions for social housing, Barlow and Chambers (1992) found 
that “Conservative councils were just as likely to pursue developer contributions for social 
housing as Labour councils/' and political stability was more important than political 
affiliation in determining whether contributions would be obtained (Barlow, 1991,int.).
The extent to which the Secretary of State over-rides local planning authorities, by 
granting planning permissions on appeal, is another variable which might possibly have an
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effect on the ability of local authorities to obtain contributions. It is also conceivable that 
the willingness and inclination of the Secretary of State to intervene and undermine local 
planning authorities might be partially or indirectly influenced by local authority political 
affiliation.
Effects on Development
Given the fact that a central purpose of urban planning is to shape the spatial 
distribution of development, perhaps the most interesting and important question for 
planning is this: what effect has developer finance had on patterns of development? 
Economists have long been aware that the pricing of infrastructure is likely to affect spatial 
patterns of development Neutze (1970,322) has pointed out that new urban development 
“is seldom required to pay the full costs its imposes on urban network services- especially 
roads.” In the U.S., the underpricing of public infrastructure, at least in the past, has 
appeared to be part of a conscious policy of encouraging development. The negative side 
effect of underpricing public infrastructure has been that it has encouraged low density 
“urban sprawl,” and led to too great a demand for transportation (Lee, 1981). If 
infrastructure costs were equated with actual costs, then the net effect would be a more 
compact and efficient pattern of development, and less difficulty in providing transportation 
infrastructure (Ibid.).
There are a number of ways in which a policy of “making developers pay” might 
affect patterns of development If charges levied against developers are made equal to the 
marginal cost of providing infrastructure, then developers will presumably have an 
economic incentive to build in areas in close proximity to existing infrastructure. At least in 
theory, the negotiation of contributions on a case by case basis offers the possibility for 
local authorities to adjust and impose charges to more accurately reflect marginal costs. On 
the other hand, an inherent weakness of fixed fees is that they tend not to reflect the varied 
public costs associated with developing in different locations. As Wakeford (1990,259) 
has pointed out, lump sum impact fees “distort developers decisions and lead to less 
efficient use of infrastructure.” Even worse, a system of uniform fees subsidises 
developers who develop sites which are poorly located in terms of existing infrastructure.
The effects of developer finance on the density of development is also an important 
issue. It is possible that developers might attempt to offset the cost of those contributions 
by trying to generate additional revenue, by making their projects bigger or more dense. 
Similarly, local authorities wishing to maximise their collection of planning gain might be 
inclined to allow developers to make their projects bigger and more dense if it meant they 
could obtain even greater gains in return. A private consultant who has specialised in 
planning gain related the following case:
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We ran ‘the numbers' on the proposed Bishopsgate project, and advised the 
community to support an increase in the amount of office space and in the size of 
die project Increasing the size of the project increased its profitability and in turn 
its ability to generate community benefit (Marsh,1990, int).
In the U.S., one of the main criticisms of incentive zoning, a type of developer 
finance described in Chapter Two, has been that it has encouraged municipalities to allow 
developers to increase the density of their projects as a way of financing desired public 
facilities and improvements. According to William Whyte (1988), the reliance of New 
York City on incentive zoning produced buildings which were bigger and taller than they 
should have been— resulting in unwanted congestion, loss of sunlight, and increased 
pressures for even more dense development In one case in New York City, “City 
negotiators stretched the zoning regulations to the limit and then added a 20 percent bonus 
in exchange for requiring the developer to renovate a nearby subway station. With the 
bonus the building limit was up to 2.7 million square feet of floor space, more than in the 
Empire State Building"(Frieden and Segalyn,1989,252).
Economists have argued that requiring developers to pay for infrastructure costs 
related to their developments should produce development which is more dense, and more 
compact However, researchers in the U.S. have begun to recognise that, in certain 
planning contexts, greater reliance on developer finance may have the opposite effect 
Developer finance may, in fact loosen constraints on development— allowing developers to 
overcome infrastructure limitations which had formerly provided planning authorities with 
the justification for denying planning permissions in underserved areas. As a team of 
American researchers observed,
... the payment of impact fees essentially establishes a contract between the fee- 
payer and the local government. (Nicholas, Nelson and Juergensmeyer,1990) In 
return for the fee, the [local government] promises to deliver public facilities and 
services more-or-less on demand... (Nelson,Lillydahl,and Frank, 1990,16).
In Florida, recent evidence has suggested that costs imposed on developers for highway 
improvements were often greatest for developments in highly developed, highly congested 
areas; as a result, developers were encouraged to build low density developments in less 
developed areas, where public infrastructure costs were lower. DeGrove (1992,7) reports 
that Florida's “‘pay as you grow* mandate of concurrency... as initially applied... tended to 
exacerbate the problem of urban sprawl.”
Developer Finance and the Property Market
One last, but very important research question is how developer finance has varied 
over time. Changes in obtaining contributions may suggest that local authority attitudes
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and practices related to agreements have evolved and changed over time. The ability to 
secure contributions from developers may also rise and fall depending on changes in the 
strength of the property market.
In the United States, the use of impact fees and exactions intensified during a period 
when the real estate market in many parts of the country was thriving. Acceptance of 
developer financing was eased, and opposition neutralised, by the fact that land values in 
most parts of the country were rising. Advocates of impact fees have generally failed to 
acknowledge the extent to which the ability to impose such fees was dependent on market 
conditions. By 1990-91, the property market in many parts of the U.S. had seriously 
collapsed. Nevertheless, planners in the U.S. continued to push for the adoption of impact 
fee and exaction ordinances, and for the adoption of strict growth management statutes.
As a profession, planners have tried to convey the impression that the exercise of 
planning and development control has been based primarily on technical considerations, 
and that economic or market considerations play a minor role. However, particularly in the 
area of planning gain negotiation, market factors may be crucial in determining the 
willingness of developers to make contributions, and the ability of local authorities to 
secure them. During the 1980’s there was a growing recognition, particularly in British 
planning circles, that market forces often did, and should, exert an influence on planning 
and development control. Case study research conducted by Healey (1982,13) showed 
that although the planning system has often been presented “as the public sector regulating 
or managing the private sector,” in practice there is often a considerable amount of 
“interpenetration across the public/private boundary.” Grant conveyed a somewhat similar 
message when he noted that,
There is a complex, two-way relationship between market forces and planning 
regulation, and authorities who ignore or misunderstand market pressures may find 
that development fails to take place following the grant of permission, or that it 
proceeds in a different way than envisaged by them (Grant,1982,290).
Given the cyclical nature of the property market, it might be assumed that 
developers would be most willing and able to offer contributions when market conditions 
are most favourable. On the other hand, given the market’s ups and down, developers 
may not necessarily be willing to give away potential profits to local authorities even when 
times are good. As one developer put it:
As a developer I can confirm that [development] is a high-risk and cyclical business 
and if on occasion an exceptional profit is made this will be used to finance other 
developments or balance less successful speculation. Developers’ margins are as a 
norm not high and in downturns in the market they are often eliminated altogether... 
It is not always the case that there is sufficient enhancement in value to allow any 
planning gain to be achieved... (Gill,1991,36).
-116-
Variations in market conditions over time may also affect local authority attitudes 
and policies toward seeking contributions. Weiss (1991) has observed that public sector 
policies in the U.S. related to the regulation of development have tended to be adopted in 
response to development cycles. When the real estate market has declined, public policies 
have been adopted to stimulate and encourage development When the economy has 
become over-heated, public policies have been adopted to slow down development, and 
regulate excesses. There has almost always been a lag between real estate cycles and the 
adoption of public policies in response to those cycles. “Few substantive public policy 
changes are made at the high point of the cycle when real estate is booming” (Weiss,Ibid., 
3). Public policies designed to curb excesses of development tend to be adopted only after 
the boom is over, when the downturn has already begun (Ibid.). An important implication 
of Weiss* findings is that public policies are almost always out of sync with property 
market cycles, and tend to fail because the conditions they were intended to address are no 
longer present. A further irony is that the failure to synchronise policies with market cycles 
may have the effect of intensifying market swings. Barras (1985,99) has warned that 
public authorities have all too often exercised development control in ways which have 
“tended to reinforce rather than smooth out the [development] cycle.”
The above discussion provides a potentially useful perspective from which to 
evaluate local authority use of agreements. How quickly did local authorities react to rising 
property markets in seeking developer contributions? Did local authorities experience 
increased success in negotiating contributions as the property market surged between 1984 
and 1988? And after 1988, when the property market softened, did local authorities 
negotiate fewer contributions? Lastly, but equally important, did local planning authorities 
moderate and temper their policies on seeking contributions as the property market 
continued to weaken between 1990 and 1992? Or did they press and expand their efforts to 
obtain contributions even in the face of a declining property market?
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CHAPTER FIVE: METHODOLOGY AND STUDY AREA
Introduction
In the previous chapter, a number of crucial issues and questions relevant to an 
understanding of developer finance were identified To provide answers to these 
questions, I decided to cany out intensive research within a defined and contiguous area in 
Britain. My decision to cany out geographically-focused research was based on a belief 
that it was important to evaluate developer finance in relation to on-going planning and 
development control, and its possible impact on patterns of development
Previous researchers who have studied the negotiation of agreements have relied 
heavily on questionnaires asking local authorities to describe how they had used 
agreements. I decided instead to collect first-hand data from actual local authority records 
and files, to document how local authorities in actual fact had used agreements. Collecting 
data first-hand allowed me to compile accurate statistics on the frequency with which 
agreements were signed, on how often they involved contributions, and the exact purposes 
for which contributions were made. Such a precise statistical description of agreements 
could not be obtained by sending questionnaires to local authorities.
I also decided to conduct interviews in person as much as possible, rather than by 
means of telephone. An important reason for conducting first-hand interviews was that I 
wanted to discern the attitudes of local authority planners toward negotiating contributions 
(as possibly distinct from official written policies). I felt that it would be difficult to gauge 
such attitudes through a questionnaire sent to local authority officials. I also wanted to 
become familiar with the characteristics of the communities and areas where agreements 
had been signed, to better understand the planning context.
The advantage of surveys and questionnaires is that they make it possible to obtain 
responses from large numbers of local authorities, from all over the country. However, 
asking officers or staff of local planning authorities to fill out questionnaires describing 
how and why the used agreements in the past, even in the recent past, may not be the best 
way of obtaining an accurate picture of what has actually been occurring at the local level.
Planners work in teams,... and belong to a profession, all of which carry their own 
blinkered view of the world. They have personal and intellectual differences of 
opinion with colleagues and the public. Their decisions have implications for 
people, for jobs, for leisure opportunities, for accessibility, and so on. Any 
research which attempted to come to terms with such complexity would always 
have to be aware of the questions: ‘Why was that meaning given to that action at 
that time?* (Sillence,1986,207).
Respondents to questionnaires may not necessarily mean to provide inaccurate
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responses, but their responses may nevertheless be misleading. People may find it hard to 
distinguish between how they actually performed, and how they tried to perform, and 
therefore answers provided on questionnaires may reveal more about intentions than about 
actual past practice. Respondents may also be inclined to emphasise successes in 
negotiating agreements rather than failures. This suspicion was confirmed in the course of 
personal interviews I conducted in the course of this research. I found that local authority 
planners frequently attached great importance to agreements they were in the process of 
attempting to negotiate. They were usually extremely confident that the agreements they 
were working on would eventually be signed. However, follow-up interviews often 
revealed that the agreements, which seemed so close to being signed, often actually weren’t 
signed, and the contributions which were expected were not realised. This discovery 
suggests that planners may be overly optimistic when responding to questionnaires. 
Respondents may also find it difficult step back in time, and to accurately describe their 
attitudes and practices regarding agreements in the past, as opposed to their current attitudes 
and practices. Indeed, the only way to accurately assess how local authorities felt about 
negotiating agreements in the past is by going into the field, by finding the agreements they 
signed, and by reviewing the actual content of those agreements.
The fact that I was a foreign observer, and had prior professional experience as a 
planner in the United States, was an advantage in carrying out this research. When I 
contacted local authorities, requesting interviews and access to planning department files, I 
explained that I was an American-trained city planner, and a former planning director of an 
American city, and was conducting research comparing British and American approaches to 
developer finance. This introduction was successful not only in obtaining interviews with 
chief planning officers, and other local authority officials such as solicitors, but also in 
obtaining access to planning department files and records. Once I established my mission, 
and became known to local officials, I was usually accorded a high degree of cooperation, 
and in most cases was allowed considerable freedom in examining relevant project files, 
including internal memoranda and notes related to permissions which were subject to 
agreements. Moreover, in interviews I believe that local planning officials were less 
guarded in expressing their views than they might have been had I been a British 
investigator, because I was planning to return to the U.S. and was therefore unlikely to use 
my research findings to embarrass them with DoE and government officials.
Choice of Study Area
Current opinions and perceptions about how local authorities have used agreements 
have been disproportionately influenced by reported accounts of how agreements have been 
aggressively used by Boroughs in Greater London. And yet, experience in Central London
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in using agreements may be unrepresentative of experience elsewhere in the country. 
Conditions in Greater London, particularly in Central London, are very different than in 
most other parts of the country where development is occurring -  in terms of the cost of 
land, sizes of development sites, intensity of development, and availability of 
infrastructure. In London, most land has already been intensively developed, and few 
large open sites are available for development; the cost of land is usually high; and 
infrastructure is often already in place, so that new development may not be dependent on 
the provision of new infrastructure. Outside of London, development projects are more 
likely to involve large green field sites; land costs are comparatively low, and are likely to 
represent a smaller proportion of total development cost; and new infrastructure and public 
facilities are more likely to be needed for new development to occur. Another significant 
difference which needs to be recognised is that local governments in Greater London, at 
least since the dissolution of the Greater London Council (GLC) in 1986, have functioned 
in a different governmental context than local authorities in most other parts of the country. 
With the demise of the GLC, there is no longer any overall strategic planning authority in 
Greater London. Instead, London Boroughs are unitary authorities. With no other layer of 
government between them and central government (such as county government), Boroughs 
in London are no longer constrained by the need to conform to an overall strategic regional 
plan. (In other parts of the county, local planning authorities are guided, and to some extent 
constrainedly the need to conform to county structure plans.) Moreover, as sole local 
government providers of public infrastructure and facilities not provided by central 
government, Boroughs in London have greater infrastructure responsibilities than local 
authorities outside London, and as a result possibly more to gain from negotiating 
contributions from developers than local authorities in other parts of the country. (Outside 
London, county governments are important providers of infrastructure and public facilities, 
and would be likely to claim at least some of the contributions obtained from developers.) 
For all of these reasons, the use of agreements in Greater London may be unrepresentative 
of how local authorities have used agreements elsewhere in the country. I therefore decided 
to choose a study area outside Greater London.
I further decided to select a part of the country where development demand and land 
values had risen sharply in recent years, and where conditions appeared favourable for 
negotiating contributions from developers. Conditions thought to favour the negotiation of 
agreements were: above average rate of growth; intense development pressure; strong 
planning constraint; and substantial public investment in improving highways and other 
transportation infrastructure. It was also important to select an area which was large 
enough to yield a substantial number of projects which were subject to agreements, and 
also large enough to contain within it areas of greater and lesser development demand, and
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greater and lesser planning constraint, etc., so as to allow for an evaluation of the 
importance of factors thought to have an affect on the use of agreements. Finally, it was 
important to select a study area which contained within it a number of different local 
planning authorities, so as to make it possible to observe and compare local authority 
attitudes and behavior, and the effects of different local planning policies.
Based on these criteria, I selected the County of Cambridgeshire, in the region of 
East Anglia, as the study area for research (See Figure 5.01). During the 1980’s, East 
Anglia was one of the fastest growing regions in Britain. Moreover, Cambridgeshire was 
the fastest growing county in East Anglia. Between 1980 and 1990, the population in 
Cambridgeshire increased by 69,534 (12%), from 598,660 to 668,200. During the period 
1980-89, Cambridgeshire was the second fastest growing County in Britain in terms of 
population, out of 64 counties, trailing only behind Buckinghamshire (Cambridge Regional 
Economic Review,1990, 37). During the period 1981-89, traffic in Cambridgeshire 
increased 78%, an average of 7.5% per year, compared to the nationally observed annual 
rate of 4.5% (Cambridgeshire County Council, 199la). Moreover, growth in the region 
appeared to be accelerating. Traffic volumes on County roads increased 8.5% in 1989 
alone (Ibid.).
Property markets are shaped not only by past trends, but also, perhaps to an even 
stronger extent, by expectations about the future. The feeling of prosperity and optimism in 
Cambridgeshire was fueled not only by the county’s strong growth during the 1980*s, but 
also by the expectation of continued strong growth in the 1990*s. It was forecast that 
Cambridgeshire would be the fastest growing county in population during the period 1989- 
2000, with an expected annual growth rate of population of 1.27% per annum (Cambridge 
Regional Economic Review,1990, 37). Out of 64 counties, Cambridgeshire ranked fourth 
in employment growth between 1980 and 1989, and was expected to rank second in 
employment growth between 1989 and 2000, with an annual growth rate in employment of 
1.3% per annum (Ibid.).
The County of Cambridgeshire covers an area of 1315 square miles (over twice the 
area of Greater London), and is comprised of seven local authorities: the shire county of 
Cambridgeshire; and six district authorities— Cambridge, East Cambridgeshire, Fenland, 
Huntingdonshire, Peterborough and South Cambridgeshire (see Figure 5.02). At the time 
this research was undertaken, two of the local authorities (Cambridge and Peterborough) 
were controlled by the Labour Party, while the four district authorities (East 
Cambridgeshire, Fenland, Huntingdonshire and South Cambridgeshire) were controlled by 
the Conservative Party. Cambridgeshire County Council was also Conservative. Each of 
the six district authorities was responsible for the preparation of local plans and policies, 
and for reviewing and acting on planning applications for the development of sites within
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its boundaries. At the same time, these district authorities were also subject to the overall 
guidance of the Cambridgeshire Structure Plan, which was prepared by the Cambridgeshire 
County Council. Thus, the selection of Cambridgeshire afforded an opportunity for two 
levels of study. Firstly, it was possible to analyse how agreements were used over time 
within a large region which was subject to a single unified strategic plan. Secondly, it was 
possible to examine geographic variations in the use of agreements, and to compare and 
analyse the attitudes and behavior of six different, contiguous district authorities.
A significant stimulus to growth in Cambridgeshire was the fact that a publicly- 
financed New Town was developed within a 15,940 acre area in Peterborough. The 
designation of Peterborough as the site for a New Town in July 1967, and the appointment 
of the Peterborough Development Corporation (PDC) in February 1968, marked the 
beginning of a period of rapid and sustained growth in Peterborough. In April 1970, when 
construction of the New Town began, the population in the New Town area was 86,000. In 
March 1988, the population in the New Town area had increased 56% to 133,885 (PDC, 
1988). During the same 18 year period, employment in the New Town Area increased 
64% from 45,500 to 74,570(Ibid.). Throughout the period, public officials and 
community leaders in Peterborough maintained a distinctly positive attitude toward growth 
and development. One major reason why growth was welcomed during this period was 
that most of the cost of public facilities and infrastructure related to new development was 
paid for with government funds made available through the Development Corporation. An 
agreement was entered into between the Minister of Housing and Local Government and 
Peterborough, with the approval of the Treasury, assuring that there would be “no undue 
burden” placed on the local authority for the costs of accommodating new development 
(Bendixson,1988,47). Under the agreement, “up until 1981-82 the development 
corporation would pay 85% of the cost of the main roads, £4 towards amenities for every 
person housed by the development corporation, and 50% of the capital costs of schools as 
soon as education investment became burdensome” (Ibid.). Capital expenditure by 
Peterborough Development Corporation peaked in 1980/81 at £29 million. From 1970 
through 30 September 1988, over £452 million was spent in Peterborough on public 
investment, for purposes such as the construction of 26.5 miles of new or improved 
primary roads, and the construction of 23 new schools (Ibid., 218).
The attractiveness of Cambridgeshire as a residential and business location was 
further enhanced in the 1980’s by a number of major publicly funded transportation 
infrastructure improvements. The Ml 1 Motorway was extended from Bishops Stortford to 
Cambridge in 1980, making the southern half of the County increasingly accessible and 
attractive for development. Completion of the Cambridge Northern Bypass in 1979, and 
improvement and widening of the A604 (a main east-west highway) also gave a boost to
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development in Huntingdonshire and particularly along Cambridge's northern fringe. 
Electrification of rail lines to Cambridge from London, completed in 1987, cut rail travel 
time between Cambridge and London by up to 30 minutes. This major improvement in rail 
passenger service made the Cambridge sub-area increasingly attractive as a place for 
London commuters to live, and had a very positive impact on the housing market in the 
area. The designation of Stansted Airport as London’s third airport in 1979, and 
construction of a major airport terminal at Stansted capable of handling 15 million 
passengers per year {M il Corridor Review, September 1990, 3), and the anticipated 
construction of a direct, express passenger rail link between Cambridge and Stansted 
Airport (which began service in 1991), further reinforced the perception of Cambridgeshire 
as an advantageous business and residential location. High-speed and frequent passenger 
rail service between Peterborough and London also reinforced the locational importance of 
Peterborough, and communities along the Peterborough-London rail corridor, such as 
Huntingdon and St. Neots.
During the second half of the 1980's, the Cambridge area achieved increased 
prestige as a corporate location. The area developed the reputation of being an English 
equivalent to the “Silicon Valley” in California. An influential study by Segal Quince 
Wicksteed (1985) entitled The Cambridge Phenomenon: The Growth o f High Technology 
Industry in a University Town drew attention to the to the large number of high tech 
businesses which had been formed as spinoffs from the University of Cambridge 
(involving commercial applications of knowledge gained from University research), and to 
the unique prospects for growth in and around Cambridge. Follow-up studies confirmed 
that the Ml 1 Corridor region was fulfilling its economic promise, and had the potential of 
rivaling the prosperous Thames Valley /  M4 Corridor west of London as a national centre 
of high tech employment growth (Breheny and Hart,1986; Breheny and Hart 1989a; 
Breheny and Hart 1989b). Developer awareness of the strengths and assets of the M l 1 
Corridor as a desirable locus for future development projects was further stimulated by a 
new monthly publication, based in Cambridge, entitled M il Corridor Review: A Monthly 
Analysis o f Expansion Trends, which began publication in December 1986. The following 
is typical of the message and up-beat tone of monthly issues of the publication:
The reasons for growth of both jobs and people are well documented: the 
continuing expansion of high technology firms, both locally formed and, 
increasingly, those attracted to the area from elsewhere; improved communications, 
particularly to London, making Cambridge more attractive to commuters; the 
planned expansion of Stansted; the enormous number of visitors to Cambridge, all 
spending money in the city; and the rapid growth of East Anglia and the emergence 
of Cambridge as a regional service centre (Cambridge Publications, November 
1988, 17).
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The Boom of the 1980»s
In Britain during the mid to late 1980’s,as in the U.S., there was a development 
“boom.” The “boom” was particularly evident in London, where a total of 2.3 million 
square metres of office space was given planning permission between 1984 and 1988 
(Diamond,1991,82). “The peak in applications for planning permission was reached in 
mid-1987, with over 840,000 square metres...”(Ibid.). However the boom was not 
limited to London. Throughout the South East of England, there was a surge of 
development activity. As shown in Figure 5.03, the number of planning permissions 
granted throughout the Outer South East region rose steadily from 1985 onward. The 
number of permissions for major residential projects in the Outer South East peaked in the 
first quarter of 1989; permissions for major commercial projects peaked in the first quarter 
of 1990.
In the East Anglian region, the boom was more intense than in most parts of the 
United Kingdom. As reported in the Financial Times (4 November, 1988,17), “Rental 
growth in East Anglia has been among the highest of the English regions.” Although 
housing land prices in East Anglia lagged behind those elsewhere in England and Wales 
between 1980 and 1984, by 1988 housing land prices in East Anglia were running 595% 
above 1980 prices, compared to 316% for England and Wales as a whole (see Table 5.01). 
As shown in Table 5.02, the rise in the value of bulk land sales for residential development 
was particularly strong. The price of bulk residential land in East Anglia in Autumn 1983 
was £135,000 per ha., significantly less than the price which pertained in England and 
Wales as a whole. However, by Spring 1989 the price per hectare of bulk land for 
residential development in East Anglia had risen approximately over 800%, to £1,219,000 
per ha., at which point it was significantly higher than the price for bulk residential land in 
England and Wales as a whole. This data is represented graphically in Figure 5.04. 
Similarly, the cost of new homes built in East Anglia rose much sharply during the 1980’s 
than in most other parts of Britain. As shown in Table 5.03, the mix-adjusted price index 
of new homes in East Anglia increased 293% between the first quarter of 1983 and the first 
quarter of 1989, compared to 211% in the United Kingdom as a whole. Over the course of 
the decade of the 1980’s, East Anglia also led all regions in Great Britain in terms of the 
average annual number of house completions per 1000 population. An average of 6 new 
houses per 1000 population was completed in East Anglia in the years 1980-1990 
(DoE,1990,56). The second most active region in terms of house completions was the 
South West, which had 5 house completions per 1000 population during the same period 
(Ibid.).
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Figure 5.04:
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Table 5.01 : Private Sector Housing Land Prices (Per Hectare')
Average Price % Change Average Price % Change
Year East Anglia Since 1980 England and Wales Since 1980
1980 £60,420 £102,820
1981 £41,060 -32% £114,210 11%
1982 £77,090 28% £133,690 30%
1983 £69,740 15% £151,580 47%
1984 £74,160 23% £159,800 55%
1985 £137,780 128% £198,170 93%
1986 £130,080 115% £261,270 154%
1987 £205,260 240% £354,400 245%
1988 £419,930 595% £427,250 316%
Table 5.02 : Land for Residential Development. Bulk Land Sales. Per Hectare
Year
Autumn 1983 
Spring 1984 
Autumn 1984 
Spring 1985 
Autumn 1985 
Spring 1986 
Autumn 1986 
Spring 1987 
Autumn 1987 
Spring 1989 
Spring 1990 
Autumn 1990 
Spring 1991 
Autumn 1991
Price Per Ha. 
East Anglia
% Increase 
Since 1983
Price Per Ha. 
England and Wales
% Increase 
Since 1983
£135,000 £174,000
£163,000 21% £194,000 11%
£196,000 45% £220,000 26%
£240,000 78% £246,000 41%
£272,000 101% £267,000 53%
£350,000 159% £301,000 73%
£467,000 246% £343,000 97%
£625,000 363% £399,000 129%
£718,000 432% £468,000 169%
£1,219,000 803% £943,000 442%
£761,000 464% £706,000 306%
£651,000 382% £621,000 257%
£505,000 274% £529,000 204%
£458,000 239% £504,000 190%
Source: Inland Revenue Valuation Office, Property Market Report
Although East Anglia had more of a boom than most other parts of the country, it 
also experienced a greater deflation of property and land values than other parts of the 
country after 1988. As shown in Table 5.03, house prices in East Anglia declined almost 
24%, compared to a decline of approximately 12% in the United Kingdom as a whole. 
Similarly, after 1989 the average price of bulk land for residential development in East 
Anglia fell sharply. The average price of bulk land for residential development in Autumn 
1991 was only slightly more than one-third what it was in Spring 1989 (see Table 5.02).
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Table 5.03; Change in Mix-Adjusted New House Price Index. 1983-91
East Anglia Annual Change United Kingdom Annual Change
Period Index (Percent) Index (Percent)
lrstQtr.1983 100.00 100.00
lrst Qtr. 1984 115.10 15.1 112.50 12.5
lrst Qtr. 1985 136.80 18.9 125.00 11.1
lrst Qtr. 1986 154.60 13.0 134.30 7.4
lrst Qtr. 1987 183.80 18.9 150.30 11.9
lrst Qtr. 1988 234.80 27.7 164.50 9.4
lrst Qtr. 1989 293.00 24.8 211.10 28.3
lrst Qtr. 1990 269.90 -7.9 205.10 -2.9
lrst Qtr. 1991 227.00 -15.9 190.10 -9.2
Source: Nationwide Building Society House Price Index, First Quarter 1991
Perhaps the clearest evidence of the development boom in Cambridgeshire, and the 
eventual bust, can be seen in the number of planning applications submitted in the County 
between 1979 and 1990 (see Figure 5.05). After a period of declining applications 
between 1979 and 1982, the number of planning applications in Cambridgeshire rose 
steadily. The period from 1985 through 1988 saw the sharpest increases in planning 
applications, with applications peaking during 1988. But after 1988, the number of 
planning applications dropped precipitously.
The rising demand for development in Cambridgeshire, and the increasing cost 
(and value) of land, was reflected in rising office and industrial rents in the two major 
commercial centres in the county. In Cambridge between March 1984 and March 1990, 
office rents increased 179%, and industrial rents rose 175% (see Table 5.04). Rental 
increases in Peterborough were somewhat more modest than in Cambridge, because of the 
greater supply of office and industrial premises, but were still substantial (see Table 5.05). 
Office rents in Peterborough rose from £5.25/square foot in 1984 to £13.50 per square foot 
at the beginning of 1990. Industrial rents increased 120% during the period. It is 
interesting to note that commercial and industrial rents did not fall in 1989 and 1990, as the 
property market in the County weakened.
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Table 5.04: Office and Industrial Space Rental Trends- Cambridge
Rent/Sq. Ft. % Change Rent/Sq. Ft. % Change
Offices From Prev. Yr. Industrial Space From Prev. Yr.
First Qtr. 1990 £19.50 21.9% £5.50 22.2%
First Qtr. 1989 £16.00 39.1% £4.50 28.6%
First Qtr. 1988 £11.50 21.1% £3.50 16.7%
First Qtr. 1987 £9.50 11.8% £3.00 33.3%
First Qtr. 1986 £8.50 6.3% £2.25 12.5%
First Qtr 1985 £8.00 14.3% £2.00 0.0%
First Otr. 1984 .£ 7,00 7,7% £2.00 0 .0%.
Increase,'84-90 £12.50 179.0% £3.50 175%
Source: Jones Lang Wootton, 50 Centres: A Guide to Office and Industrial Trends
Table 5.05 : Office and Industrial Space Rental Trends— Peterborough
Rent/Sq. Ft. Percent Change Rent/Sq. Ft. Percent Change
Offices From Prev. Yr Industrial Space From Prev. Yr
First Qtr 1990 £13.50 35.0% £4.50 18.4%
First Qtr 1989 £10.00 25.0% £3.80 26.7%
First Qtr. 1988 £8.00 6.7% £3.00 25.0%
First Qtr 1987 £7.50 15.4% £2.40 6.7%
First Qtr. 1986 £6.50 18.2% £2.25 2.3%
First Qtr. 1985 £5.50 4.8% £2.20 7.3%
First Otr 1984 £5,25 5.0% £2.05 0,0%
Increase,'84-90 £8.25 157% £2.45 120%
Source: Jones Lang Wootton, 50 Centres: A Guide to Office and Industrial Trends
As planning applications in Cambridgeshire increased, greater numbers of planning 
permissions were granted by local planning authorities in the County. As shown in Table 
5.06, the number of housing units granted planning permission peaked in 1988, when 
permissions were granted for a total of 13,581 new housing units. Thereafter, the number 
of housing units granted permission began to fall. Permissions for commercial 
development also peaked in 1988 (see Table 5.07). In contrast to the data on housing 
permissions, the amount of commercial development granted permission remained at a 
fairly high level 1989 and 1990.
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Table 5.06: Number of Housing Units Receiving Permission in Cambridgeshire. 
1982-1990. bv Type of Permission
Year Outline Final Total
1982 2157 4242 6399
1983 1627 5352 6979
1984 2414 5007 7421
1985 3438 6359 9797
1986 4222 6803 11025
1987 4127 6527 10654
1988 4902 8679 13581
1989 5555 7068 12623
1990 2320 2932 7252
Table 5.07: Amount of Permitted Commercial Development Per Year. 
Cambridgeshire. 1982-1990
Outline Permissions Final Permissions
Year Site Area (hectares) Floor Area (sq. metres)
1982 46.41 144,713
1983 61.56 255,117
1984 53.35 361,589
1985 25.09 287,917
1986 76.39 307,602
1987 142.63 424,617
1988 154.36 554,108
1989 144.99 523,153
1990 150.20 508,599
Operative Planning Policies in Cambridgeshire
One of the important questions which this research seeks to answer is whether local 
authorities in Cambridgeshire used agreements in ways that undermined and conflicted with 
established plans and policies. Thus, before attempting to analyse and interpret the data 
which was collected on agreements signed in Cambridgeshire between 1985 and 1990, it is 
important first to review county structure plan policies which were operative during the 
study period.
As noted by Sellgren (1989,50) “... although the planning system may be seen as 
negotiative, negotiation is not conducted in a vacuum, but takes place within a more or less 
firmly established policy context.” Indeed, district planning authorities in Cambridgeshire 
were not simply free to grant any permissions they wished. Rather, local plans and 
policies, and actions by district planning authorities on individual planning applications,
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were circumscribed by the county planning authority, and the county-prepared structure 
plan. The study period 1985 -1990 was actually affected by two county structure plans: 
first, the 1980 Structure Plan, which was officially adopted in 1979 and which was the 
official Structure Plan of the County through 1989; and the 1990 Structure Plan, which 
was in the process of being prepared during much of the study period. Draft copies of the 
proposed 1990 Structure Plan were first distributed for public consultation in 1986, and the 
final version of the plan was approved by the Secretary of State, with revisions, in 1989. 
As a result, proposed changes in planning policy being considered for inclusion in the 1990 
Structure Plan probably had some effect on development control decisions, and the actions 
of developers and landowners, during the study period, even though it was not the official 
plan.
A “Key Diagram,” representing the general planning and development control 
policies contained in the 1980 Structure plan, is presented in Figure 5.06. The 1980 
Structure Plan allowed and encouraged growth in a number of market towns 
(Peterborough, Huntingdon, S t Neots, St. Ives, Ely, Ramsey, March, Whittlesey and 
Wisbech) and to a lesser extent in certain rural centres (Bar Hill, Sawston, Sawtry, 
Kimbolton, Soham, Somersham, Sutton, Littleport and Chatteris). At the same time, the 
1980 Structure Plan sought to constrain development in many other areas. The most severe 
constraint on development was in the 3- 5 mile wide Cambridge Green Belt The plan also 
classified large parts of the county as “areas of best landscape,” where development was 
discouraged. Areas designated by the plan as having the "best landscape" were heavily 
concentrated in the southern third of the county. Other areas identified as having the "best 
landscape” were located around Ely, and in western portions of Huntingdon and 
Peterborough. Six rural centres located either within the Green Belt or in “areas of best 
landscape,” (Bottisham, Cottenham, Comberton, Melboum, Linton and Yaxley) were 
identified for “little growth.” Five of the six rural centres designated in the 1980 Structure 
Plan for "little growth" were immediately outside Cambridge.
Planning policies put forward in the 1990 Structure Plan were broadly similar to 
those contained in the 1980 Structure Plan, although there were some changes in emphasis 
(Vigor,1990,int.). For example, the 1990 Structure Plan exerted even greater constraint on 
development south of Cambridge, so as to maintain a buffer of countryside between 
Cambridgeshire and urbanising areas to the south. The Key Diagram contained in the 1990 
Structure Plan classified most of the area south, east and west of Cambridge as either being 
in the Green Belt, or as “Areas of Best Landscape.” Furthermore, the village of Sawston, 
located south of Cambridge, which was designated for growth in the 1980 Structure Plan, 
was no longer identified for growth in the 1990 Structure Plan.
Both the 1980 and 1990 Structure Plans sought to limit new office and industrial
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Figure 5.06
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development in the Gty of Cambridge, except in cases involving the development of space 
for high technology and research and development firms requiring a Cambridge location. 
However, the 1990 Structure Plan was even clearer than the 1980 Plan in seeking to 
disperse new commercial and industrial development away from Cambridge and toward to 
other districts and towns, so that other parts of the County could share in the employment 
growth and economic prosperity generated by Cambridge’s increased reputation as a 
business and industrial centre. This policy of dispersal was given added impetus by a 
major study by the Department of Land Economy of the University of Cambridge 
Department of Land Economy (1989), which concluded that the growth effects due to the 
growing concentration of high technology firms in Cambridge did not need to be limited to 
the Cambridge area, and recommended strategies for dispersing future growth to secondary 
centres in the county and region. In addition, the 1990 Structure Plan strengthened and 
extended the policy of constraining major housing development in the area surrounding 
Cambridge. The 1990 Structure Plan admitted the need to produce enough new housing in 
Cambridge and South Cambridgeshire to meet local housing needs, but— even more than 
the 1980 Structure Plan— sought to discourage the building of new housing in and around 
Cambridge which would attract commuters to London to live in Cambridge 
(Vigor,1990,int.).
One important planning policy change which did occur in the 1980’s, and which 
was reflected in the 1990 Structure Plan, was an important revision to the Cambridge 
Green Belt. When the A45 Cambridge Northern Bypass was completed in December 
1978, running east and west along the northern fringe of Cambridge, it was built through 
the Cambridge Green Belt As a result, the undeveloped land lying between the new 
bypass and the northern edge of the City was shown in town maps as being in the Green 
Belt. The City of Cambridge favoured removing the land south of the A45 from the Green 
Belt, so that it could be developed to accommodate high-technology and research and 
development (R&D) firms. South Cambridgeshire District Council, on the other hand, 
contended that the land was still officially in the Green Belt, and sought to refuse planning 
permission for a proposed science and office park development on its side of the boundary. 
(For further discussion, see Appendix Two— Selected Agreements, S t John’s Innovation 
Park.) In 1984, the Cambridgeshire County Council’s Green Belt Local Plan called for the 
removal of much of the land south of the A45 from the Green Belt Then in March 1989, 
in approving the Cambridgeshire Replacement Structure Plan, the Secretary of State 
directed that additional land south of the A45 be removed from the Green Belt. A total of 
55 acres of land was removed from the Cambridge Green Belt in these two separate actions 
(see Figure 5.07). To compensate for this loss of Green Belt land, an even larger area was 
added to the Green Belt south of Cambridge. Figure 5.08 provides an overview of the
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99
Cambridge Green Belt, showing areas added to and removed from the Green Belt between 
1984 and 1989.
Two major new planning ideas were put forward in the 1990 Structure Plan which 
had major implications for the negotiation of agreements. First, the 1990 Structure Plan 
stated that developers would be expected to bear a much greater share of the burden of 
providing facilities and infrastructure related to new development. The 1989 County 
Structure Plan policy on developer contributions and agreements was as follows:
Developers will be expected to provide sites and buildings for 
community facilities and infrastructure needed to serve the 
development or to contribute to provision in proportion to the scale 
of development. The local planning authorities will be looking to the developers 
of any proposals requiring new infrastructure or new community facilities (or the 
expansion of existing facilities), to provide sites and to cover the costs of 
construction. In the case of smaller developments contributions towards such 
provision will be sought This provision may include, for example, roads, 
schools, libraries, sports and leisure facilities, open space, day centres and health 
centres etc. as may be necessary. These requirements will normally be secured by 
legal agreements, including arrangements for phasing, and financial guarantees. 
Such agreements should be secured before the granting of planning permission 
(Cambridgeshire Structure Plan, Explanatory Memorandum, March 1990, 83).
This policy of seeking developer contributions was accompanied by specific 
standards for the provision of facilities and amenities related to new development. For 
example, Policy R5 stated that “Playspace should be provided in all new residential areas of 
more than 20 houses at a standard of 15 square metres per dwelling. Such playspaces 
should have a minimum size of 1000 square metres, and shall be equipped...”
The second major new planning idea was that a considerable share of new 
development in Cambridgeshire would be accommodated in at least two privately- 
developed New Settlements. The idea of the New Settlements was in many ways 
connected to the previously-cited policy on developer contributions, since it was expected 
that agreements would be negotiated through which developers of the New Settlements 
would agree to make substantial contributions toward the provision of need public 
infrastructure and facilities. The need for a new method of accommodating growth in 
Cambridgeshire was to some extent forced by a slow-down in the pace of development 
within the Peterborough New Town, and the phase out of the Peterborough Development 
Corporation in 1988. For example, whereas the 1980 Structure plan called for the 
construction of 23,700 housing units in Peterborough in the 1980’s, the 1990 Structure 
plan called for the construction of only 18,600 new units in Peterborough between 1990 
and 2000 (5100 fewer than was called for in the 1980’s). Given this decrease in growth 
within Peterborough New Town, and increased constraint on development south of
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Cambridge, new areas had to be designated to accommodate future growth. Existing 
market towns, and a number of rural centres, such as Chatteris, Ramsey, Soham, etc., 
were designated to handle increased amounts of new development But other areas for 
development also needed to be designated. In a bold planning move, Cambridgeshire 
County Council proposed that at least two New Settlements be developed outside of 
Cambridge to accommodate a total of 4500 new housing units. Precisely where these 
Cambridge New Settlements were to be located was was not specified in the plan, but it 
was envisioned that they would be located somewhere generally along the A45 or A 10 
corridors, either in South Cambridgeshire or in East Cambridgeshire. In the Spring of 
1989, a third, and much larger, proposed New Settlement, expected to accommodate 5300 
new housing units, was added to the Cambridgeshire Structure Plan by the Secretary of 
Environment (M il  Corridor Review, November 1991,6). The site for the third New 
Settlement, specifically selected by the Environment Secretary, was a 2000 acre disused 
brickworks property, formerly owned and operated by London Brick Co, located to the 
South Township of Peterborough, located partially in the Southern Township of 
Peterborough, and partially in Huntingdonshire.
Development Pressure and Development Control in Cambridgeshire
Although development pressure was relatively strong in Cambridgeshire 
throughout much of the study period, development pressure was undoubtedly more intense 
in some local authorities than in others. One frequently used index of development 
pressure is the number of planning applications per year per 1000 population.
Table 5.08: Development Pressure Per District. 1984-1989 — Applications Per 1000 
Population.
Applications /  Year Average Pop. Applications
(6YgarAvgM’84-*89) x m - i m  Per 1000 Pop,
Cambridge 1302 103,170 12.74
East Cambs. 1427 58,260 24.49
Fenland 1362 71,000 19.18
Huntingdon. 2267 137,000 16.55
Peterborough 1197 146,000 8.20
South Cambs. 2508 112,700 22.25
According to the data in Table 5.08, districts in Cambridgeshire which experienced 
the most development pressure, in rank order, were East Cambridgeshire, South 
Cambridgeshire, and Fenland. Peterborough and Cambridge were apparently under the 
least development pressure. While this data is useful in that it suggests that there was
-139-
considerable pressure for development in rural districts of Cambridgeshire, it is also 
somewhat misleading. A crude index of applications per 1000 population always tends to 
produce low scores for heavily built-up areas (Hebbert, 1992). Moreover, highly 
publicised policies of constraint in Cambridge and South Cambridgeshire undoubtedly had 
the effect of discouraging the submission of planning applications in those high demand 
areas-- because developers were convinced that they stood little change of obtaining 
approval.
Table 5.09 presents data showing the percentage of all Section 29 planning 
applications (residential and commercial applications, major plus minor applications) 
approved in the six districts between 1985 and 1991. The data shows that the highest 
overall rate of approval of planning permission was in Peterborough, and the lowest rate of 
approval was in South Cambridgeshire.
Table 5.09: Percent of Section 29 Planning Applications Approved. 1 April.1985 - 30 
March.1991
Table 5.10: Percent of Maior Development Applications Approved. 1 January. 1985 - 
31 December. 1990
Cambridge
East Cambridgeshire
Fenland
Huntingdonshire
Peterborough
South Cambridgeshire
73%
73%
80%
78%
86%
65%
Source: DoE Development Control Statistics
Residential Commercial
Cambridge
East Cambridgeshire
Fenland
Huntingdonshire
Peterborough
South Cambridgeshire
59%
73%
75%
66%
82%
49%
61%
81%
91%
83%
82%
73%
Source: PS-2 Quarterly Reports Filed by Local Authorities with DoE
A more revealing and discriminating way of measuring the constraint exerted by 
individual planning authorities is to exclude minor planning applications, and instead to 
consider the percentage of major planning applications which the various planning
authorities approved. It is also useful to distinguish between approvals of commercial and 
residential projects. As shown in Table 5.10, local planning authorities in Cambridgeshire 
exerted much greater constraint on major applications for residential development than they 
did on major applications for commercial development. In Fenland, for example, 91% of 
all major commercial applications were approved, compared to 75% of major residential 
applications. In South Cambridgeshire, 73% of all major commercial planning applications 
were approved, but only 49% of major residential applications. Only in Peterborough and 
Cambridge did planning authorities approve roughly equal percentages of major 
commercial and residential applications. Comparing Tables 5.10 and 5.09, we see that 
rates of approval for major residential applications were almost always lower than for all 
Section 29 planning applications, while rates of approval for major commercial 
developments were almost always higher than for all Section 29 planning applications. 
Only in Cambridge was the rate of refusal of major commercial planning applications lower 
than the rate at which it approved all Section 29 applications— which is a clear indication of 
Cambridge’s effort to constrain major commercial development
Patterns of Growth and Development in Cambridgeshire in the 1980's
Not all districts shared equally in the growth that occurred in Cambridgeshire 
between 1980 and 1990 (see Table 5.11). These differences in rates of growth were to 
some extent the product of differences in market demand, but were also influenced to a 
considerable degree by planning and development control policies drafted at the county 
level, and implemented by local planning authorities. For example, the population in the 
City of Cambridge actually decreased by 540 persons (-.01%) during the decade, not 
because there was no demand for additional housing, but because the planning authority 
sought to discourage the construction new housing, other than to meet local needs. The 
largest increase in population was in Huntingdonshire, where the population increased by 
22,000 (17%).
Table 5.12 presents data showing the number of new houses completed in the six 
districts in the county between 1982 and 1984, and between 1985 and 1990. As shown in 
the table, more new houses were completed in Huntingdonshire between 1985 and 1990 
than in any other district in the county. However, comparing the average number of 
housing completions in 1982-84, against the period of 1985-90, we find that the greatest 
growth in housing completions, in percentage terms, was in the rural districts of Fenland 
and East Cambridgeshire. By way of contrast, fewer houses were completed on an annual 
basis in the urban districts of Cambridge and Peterborough between 1985 and 1990 than in 
1982-84. The fall-off in house completions in Cambridge was particularly dramatic, given 
the fact that 1985-90 was a boom period.
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Table 5.11: Change in Population, bv District. 1980-90
District Population 1980* Population 1990* Change Percent Change
Cambridge 103,440 102,900 -540 0%
East Cambs. 54,920 61,600 6,680 12%
Fenland 66,800 75,200 8,400 13%
Huntingdonshire 126,000 148,000 22,000 17%
Peterborough 136,600 156,000 19,400 14%
Sauth Cambs. 110.900 124.500 13.600 12%
Total 598,660 668,200 69,534 12%
Source: CIPFA Finance and General Statistics 
* Local Authority’s own estimate
Table 5.12: House Completions bv District.1982-84 Versus 1985-90
% Change
1982-84 Avs./Yr 1985-90 Avg./Yr 82-84/85-'
Cambridge 1487 496 2416 403 -19%
East Cambs. 1101 367 3234 539 +47%
Fenland 1351 450 4828 805 +79%
Huntingdon. 3201 1067 9013 1502 +41%
Peterborough 4360 1453 8330 1388 - 4%
South Cambs. 2536 845 5269 878 + 4%
Total 14,036 4,679 33,090 5,515 +18%
Source: Cambridgeshire County Council
Monitoring of commercial and industrial development by Cambridgeshire County 
Council did not begin until 1986. Therefore no statistics are available to compare the 
amount of commercial space that was completed during the study period (1985-90) against 
that of a prior period. However, data compiled for 1986-1990 (see Table 5.13) indicates 
that Peterborough was the primary centre for industrial, office and retail development in the 
County. Huntingdonshire was the second most important district in terms of industrial and 
office development, while Cambridge was second in terms of new retail floorspace. Little 
retail development occurred in East Cambridgeshire or in South Cambridgeshire.
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Table 5.13: Commercial Floorspace Completed 1986-1990
Cambridge 
East Cambs. 
Fenland
Huntingdonshire
Peterborough
South Cambs, 
Total
Industry and Offices 
Completed (sq. m.l
128,450 (16%) 
44,030 ( 6%) 
55,625 ( 7%) 
169,394 (21%) 
265,130 (34%) 
127.734 (16%)
790,372 (100%)
Retail Floorspace 
Completed (sq. m.)
14,436 (21%) 
381 ( 1%) 
9,899 (14%) 
9,618 (14%) 
30,289 (44%) 
3.766 ( 6%)
68,389 (100%)
Source: Cambridgeshire County Council, Land Use Monitoring Unit, December 1990
Although varying levels of market demand for different types of development 
certainly played a role in the uneven pattern of development, the distribution of 
development within the County was strongly shaped by County planning policies, and by 
local planning authorities who operated within the framework of those County policies. 
According to a report prepared by the Land Use Monitoring Unit of the County Council, 
during the 3 1/2 year period from the middle of 1986 through December 1989, 80% of all 
housing completions in Cambridgeshire took place in areas targeted by the structure plan as 
“growth settlements” (CCC,1989c).
As development activity increased in Cambridgeshire after 1985, there was an 
inevitable increase in speculative activity. Applications for planning permission were often 
submitted in the absence of concrete plans for development, simply in the hope of profiting 
from the rise in land values. One indication of this speculative activity can be seen in data 
on the volume of outstanding, unimplemented planning approvals.
Table 5.14: Unimplemented Approvals — Housing Units
31 Dec. *86 30 June *88 31 Dec.»89
Cambridge 1572 1906 1988
E. Cambs. 1883 2121 2831
Fenland 3376 4223 7149
Huntingdonshire 6421 6412 6712
Peterborough 2952 5076 5081
South Cambs. 3590 3202 2861
Total 19,784 22,940 26,587
Source: Cambridgeshire County Council, Land Use Monitoring Unit, December 1989
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As shown in Table 5.14, unimplemented approvals for housing rose substantially 
in the county between the end of 1986 and the end of 1989. Only South Cambridgeshire 
had fewer unimplemented planning permissions for housing in December 1989 than in 
December 1986. In East Cambridgeshire, the number of unimplemented approvals for 
housing in December 1989 was 50% greater than in December 1986. In Fenland, the 
number of unimplemented housing units with planning permission more than doubled 
between December 1986 and December 1989. In fact, according to a monitoring report 
prepared by Cambridgeshire County Council, by December 1989 there was a 22-year 
supply of land with planning permission for housing in Fenland, based on the rate of 
development forecast in the Structure Plan (CCC,1989c, 2).
By the end of 1990 there was also large supply of commercial land with 
unimplemented planning permissions, particularly in some districts. As shown in Table 
5.15, the total amount of land with outstanding planning permission for industrial 
development at the end of 1990 was 513 hectares-- almost three times greater than the total 
amount of industrial land that was developed during three and a half years, from mid-1986 
through the end of 1990. The largest supply of land with outstanding permissions for 
industry/warehousing/high tech. was in Fenland (169 hectares). As 1990 ended, there was 
also an ample supply of unimplemented permissions for office development (see Table 
5.16). Over half of the office space with outstanding permission was in Peterborough, 
while a third was in Huntingdonshire.
Table 5.15: Industry / Warehouse I High Tech. Completions and Take-up. bv District
(Hectares)
Completions Under Outstanding
Mid 1986- Construction Permissions
End 1990 End 1990 End 1990
Cambridge City 6.13 — 13.12
South Cambs. 30.54 4.92 47.54
East Cambs. 15.68 2.44 62.09
Fenland 21.24 4.78 169.64
Huntingdonshire 49.75 13.04 110.66
Peterborough 50.17 7,19 109,72
Total 173.51 32.37 512.77
Source: Cambridgeshire County CouncilJLand Use Monitoring Unit, December 1990
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Table 5.16: Office Completions. Take-up. and Outstanding Permissions, by District 
(Square Metres)
Completions Under Outstanding
Mid-1986- Construction Permissions
End 1990 Endl29Q End 1990
Cambridge City 98,020 13,340 18,969
South Cambs. 33,731 8,306 14,162
East Cambs. 7,939 1,950 3,741
Fenland 6,188 713 4,241
Huntingdonshire 39,324 14,855 65,358
Peterborough 67.993 99.169 118.152
Total 253,195 138,333 224,623
Definition of the Study Period
An attempt was made to select a study period long enough to allow for an analysis 
of how local authority use of agreements has varied and changed over time. On the other 
hand, it was not possible to go back in time too far in researching local authority project 
files, and still be assured of accuracy and completeness. With the passage of time, there 
was an increased likelihood that old project files would be missing or incomplete. At the 
County Highway Authority, because of space limitations, project files were put in storage 
after seven years because of space limitations. Another consideration which set a limit on 
the research period was that it was desirable to be able to conduct follow-up interviews 
with planning staff about particular projects and agreements. This became more difficult to 
do as more years passed, given frequent staff turnover. Thus, practical considerations 
helped to set a limit the time period of the research.
It was especially important to try to define a time period during which the “rules of 
the game,” (i.e. government policy regarding agreements, government taxing policy related 
to betterment, etc.) were largely the same. In March 1985 the Development Land Tax was 
abolished. While the Development Land Tax was in effect, developers were much less 
inclined to want to obtain permission to develop land, and local authorities were less 
inclined to rely on agreements to obtain contributions. It therefore did not appear wise to 
extend the study back much before March 1985. It also did not seem to make sense to 
extent the study period beyond 1 April 1990, inasmuch as from that day forward 
developers were required to pay a mandatory fixed fee (called an “infrastructure charge”) 
toward the capital costs of improving and expanding off-site water-related infrastructure. 
With the imposition of the infrastructure charge, it presumably became less necessary for 
local authorities to sign agreements with developers involving contributions for sewer and 
drainage infrastructure. According to the Department of Environment (1989,9), with the
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water infrastructure charge in place, “planning decisions should no longer turn on the 
willingness or otherwise of developers to enter into agreements under section 52.”
With these two benchmark dates in mind, the study period which was chosen was 
1 January 1985 through 31 March, 1990. Throughout this study period, there was no 
change in official central government policy on planning agreements, as expressed in 
Circular 22/83. It was only after the study period ended, that the government issued 
revised policy statements and legislation affecting the use of agreements: Circular 7/91 on 
Planning and Affordable Housing (May 1991); and the 1991 Planning and Compensation 
Act (For a discussion of developments after the study period, see Chapter Eight.) The 
only significant legal and institutional change during the study period which may have had 
an effect on the negotiation of agreements was the privatisation of the regional water 
authorities, which took effect in September 1989.
The choice of 1985-1990 was fortunate, inasmuch as it encompassed a period 
during which the property market swung both up and then down. For much of the study 
period, the property market was rising and buoyant, and developers might have been 
particularly willing to offer contributions. However, during the end of the study period, 
the market was weakening, and developers might have been less willing to offer 
contributions. Thus, the study period afforded an opportunity for evaluating the effects of 
the changes in the property market on the negotiation of agreements.
Research Approach in Cambridgeshire
Collection and Analysis of Data on Planning Permissions
Two special requests for computer-generated data were made to Cambridgeshire 
County Council. First, a computer print-out was obtained which provided an accurate 
accounting of the total number of residential and commercial planning permissions granted 
by individual districts in Cambridgeshire between 1 January 1985 and 30 March 1990, 
including planning permissions granted on appeal, broken down on a quarterly basis,
Secondly, a more detailed computer print-out was obtained which provided specific 
information on planning permissions which were granted for projects of a major size 
(defined as 50 or more housing units or 900 or more square metres of commercial and 
industrial floor space), broken down by individual districts. For each major project listed, 
the following information was obtained:
Application number
Type of application (Outline, Final or Reserved Matter)
Grid Reference Number 
Size of Site 
Type of Project
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Address
Name of applicant
Date of application
Date approved
Size of Project (Amount of floorspace or number of housing units)
Identification of Agreements and Permissions Subject to Agreements
An initially difficult and challenging aspect of this research was how to compile a 
complete list of all agreements signed in each district in Cambridgeshire during the period 
of study. None of the six district planning authorities, nor the Cambridgeshire Council 
Council, maintained a register of planning agreements they had signed. Moreover, with 
frequent staff turnovers within planning departments, members of the planning staff often 
did not know whether or not previous planning permissions had been subject to planning 
agreements.
The difficulty of compiling a complete list of planning agreements was initially 
confronted in a pilot study carried out in the City of Cambridge. The only way to identify 
permissions in Cambridge which involved agreements appeared to be to manually search 
the project files of each and every planning permission granted during the study period. 
After fifteen days of combing the files of planning permissions in Cambridge, I met with 
the District Solicitor, who informed me that all signed planning agreements were kept in 
notebooks in the Local Land Charges Office. I knew when a Section 52 agreement was 
signed it was recorded as a “local land charge,” but that did not necessarily mean that 
copies of agreements would be kept in notebooks in the Land Charges Office. (It should 
be noted that no one in the Planning Department mentioned, or appeared to know, that all 
planning agreements were kept in the Land Charges Office.)
In most of the other districts in Cambridgeshire, I also found that the Local Land 
Charges Office was the place to go to compile a complete list of planning agreements. Only 
at East Cambridgeshire were copies of signed planning agreements entered into the 
Planning Register maintained in the Planning Department At South Cambridgeshire, 
copies of agreements were filed in notebooks kept in the Land Charges Office-- not 
chronologically, but by parish. In Peterborough, where very few agreements were signed 
before 1988, the Land Charges clerk luckily decided on her own initiative to keep copies of 
agreements in a folder in her desk. The greatest difficulty in identifying and obtaining 
agreements was at Fenland District Council, where the Land Charges Office did not place 
signed planning agreements into notebooks. Complicating the search for agreements was 
the fact that planning agreements were often signed in Fenland without referencing the 
number of the planning application which occasioned the agreement-- so that it was often 
difficult to link planning agreements to planning applications. Moreover, a large number of
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planning agreements were not kept at the District Council Offices, but were eventually 
found to be kept at the offices of a private legal firm retained by the District to assist it in 
drafting agreements. Fortunately, a clerk in the Local Land Charges Office maintained an 
informal list of Section 52 agreements for her own use, which included names of applicants 
and project locations.
Once Section 52 Agreements were identified, I went back to the Planning 
Departments in each district and requested the relevant project application files for review. 
The project application files contained a wealth of information, including considerable data 
on the proposed project and site, site maps, internal memoranda within the Planning 
Department and between planning officers and district solicitors, reports and 
recommendations from the Chief Planning Officer and staff, minutes of planning committee 
meetings, letters to the planning authority from the Anglian Water Authority and the county 
water authority commenting on proposed schemes and the possible need for infrastructure 
contributions, communications back and forth between local authority officers and 
applicants, etc. Reviewing these project application files often made it possible to 
reconstruct the sequence of actions, and back and forth negotiations, that accompanied 
projects which were subject to agreements. Through a review of material in project files, I 
was also able to identify instances where the content and nature of proposed developments, 
and offers of contributions, changed over time based on the negotiations.
Interviews
Interviews were conducted within the study area with local authority officials in 
Cambridgeshire (chief planning officers, planning staff, technical officers and staff, and 
district solicitors). These interviews were helpful in a number of ways. I was able to learn 
about local authority attitudes toward negotiating agreements and contributions, as well as 
to uncover background information on specific projects which involved agreements. I was 
also able to gain insights on LPA policies and practices regarding agreements which were 
not necessarily reflected in official plans and policy statements. Twenty-three different 
district authority officials were interviewed over the course of the study, some of whom 
were interviewed more than once. In each local authority, I conducted at least 3 
interviews. The maximum number of interviews conducted in an individual district 
authority was 7. I also interviewed senior officers of the regional water authority (Anglian 
Water Authority), as well as officers of the National Rivers Authority, and the Commission 
for New Towns (CNT). Related to the study of agreements in Cambridgeshire, I 
conducted 52 interviews, as follows:
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- Local authority officials- planning officers, technical staff, and district 
solicitors(32);
- County Structure Plan Officer and staff(3);
- County Highway Authority planners and engineers(5);
- Anglian Water Authority officials(5);
- Developers and the National Land Coordinator of The Housebuilders 
Federation(6);
- Commission for New Towns(l)
Other Sources of Data
To obtain as accurate and complete a picture as possible of the planning and 
development context in Cambridgeshire, and of the forces and factors affecting local 
authority use of agreements, I sought additional data through the following methods and 
sources:
Examination o f Documents
- County Structure Plans of 1980 and 1990
- Monitoring reports of “Outstanding Commitments for Housing,” and 
“Outstanding Commitments for Commercial Land,” compiled by the Corporate
Planning Department of Cambridgeshire County Council
- Issues of Chartered Surveyor Weekly, Estate Times, and M il Corridor 
Review~ for data on development projects and local authority actions during the 
study period
- Relevant local plans and policy documents, planning department studies and 
reports, progress reports, proposals and draft policies, etc.
- Newspaper articles about relevant projects and developments in Cambridgeshire
- Development control statistics-- General Development Control Returns (“PS 2 
reports”)-- prepared on a quarterly basis by local planning authorities for the 
Department of Environment
- Data on major publicly-funded trunk road and county road improvement schemes 
completed during the 1980’s, and anticipated highway improvement schemes for 
trunk roads and county roads scheduled for completion in 1990-1993
- Anglian Water Authority Annual Reports and Financial Statements
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Observation
- Site visits to selected projects involving agreements with significant 
contributions(18)
Agreements Counted and Not Counted
My initial intent in conducting research in Cambridgeshire was to document and 
evaluate the use of agreements under Section 52 of the Town and Country Planning Act 
(TCPA) of 1971, as amended. What I had read about agreements in the planning literature 
led me to believe that most agreements were signed at the district authority level under the 
provisions of Section 52 of the Town and Country Planning Act (The provisions of 
Section 52 were later incorporated unchanged as Section 106 of the 1990 TCPA, which 
was adopted on 24 May 1990.) However, in researching agreements at Local Land 
Charges offices it soon became clear that agreements were frequently signed which 
referenced legislation other than the Town and Country Planning Act I found agreements 
that were signed under Section 111 of the Local Government Act of 1972, and others 
which were based on Section 33 of the Local Government Act (Miscellaneous Provisions) 
of 1982. Such Section 33 and Section 111 agreements were not counted in this research if 
they were signed without also referencing to Section 52, TCPA.
Another type of agreement signed at the district level were agreements providing for 
the dedication and maintenance of amenity areas, including play areas and internal 
footpaths. Such agreements might be entered into between developers and local districts, or 
in certain cases with individual parish councils responsible for managing and maintaining 
open space. Authorisation for entering into such open space agreements was cited as 
Section 9 of the Open Spaces Act of 1906. Such open space agreements were not counted 
unless they also referenced Section 52, TCPA. A significant number of agreements were 
found to have been signed, not by district planning authorities, but rather by Anglian Water 
Authority and the County Highway Authority.
Water-Related Agreements- Foul and Surface Water Sewers
For purposes of water infrastructure facilities and services Cambridgeshire is 
served by Anglian Water Authority. The geographical relationship between Cambridgeshire 
and the much larger Anglian Water Authority region is shown in Figure 5.09. Prior to 
1974 the provision of water-related infrastructure and services was the responsibility of 
local districts and councils. However, governmental arrangements for the provision of 
water and sewer services underwent a major reorganisation in 1974, at which time ten
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public regional water authorities were created, one of the largest of which was Anglian 
Water Authority. Figure 5.09 also shows that part of Cambridgeshire is served by the 
Cambridge Water Company, a private water company. Within the Cambridge Water 
Company district, water-infrastructure responsibility is divided between Cambridge Water 
Company and Anglian Water Authority. Cambridge Water Company is responsible for 
providing "clean water", and Anglian Water is responsible for “dirty water” i.e. foul and 
surface water sewers. The service area of Cambridge Water Co. includes all of the City of 
Cambridge and South Cambridgeshire District council, as well as a portion of 
Huntingdonshire, including St. Ives and Ramsey.
Given the rate of growth in Cambridgeshire, it seemed likely that a large number of 
agreements might have been signed during the 1985-90 period involving developer 
contributions for water-related infrastructure. Indeed, a study of water infrastructure 
provision in East Anglia, issued in 1991, reported that:
The system [in East Anglia] is close to full capacity in most areas and requires fresh 
investment before it can be expanded. For this reason, Anglian Water recoups die 
cost of local infrastructure from developers, and because of past under-investment, 
does it to a greater extent than other utilities (Rural Development 
Commission,1991, 32).
There were two major types of agreements signed by Anglian Water Authority during the 
study period-- “Section 18” agreements and “Section 30” agreements.
Section 18 Agreements
Most of the agreements signed by Anglian Water Authority during the study period 
were based on Section 18 of the Public Health Act of 1936, related to the public adoption 
of sewers. Section 18 Agreements were usually signed when developers constructed 
sewers needed for particular developments, with the intention of transferring the completed 
works to be adopted and maintained by the Authority. In some few cases, work covered 
by Section 18 agreements extended somewhat beyond the site for which permission was 
granted, such as make a connection between the new on-site sewer and the existing off-site 
sewage system. However, most Section 18 Agreements were limited to covering the 
provision of on-site site sewers needed to serve the proposed development Thus, Section 
18 agreements has not been intended or used to impose additional off-site infrastructure 
responsibilities on developers, but rather to assure that the sewers constructed on site by 
developers arc constructed properly before the public authority accepts responsibility for 
maintaining them.
Section 18 agreements which were signed without referencing the provisions of 
Section 52, were not counted because they were deemed to involve matters which had no
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bearing on whether planning permission would be granted or denied. Agreements which 
referenced Section 18 were only counted if they related to the construction of off-site 
sewers, and if they also specifically referenced Section 52.
Section 30 Agreements
In attempting to develop land, developers frequently found themselves in what is 
referred to as a “ransom situation*’— being unable to acquire land or easements across 
someone else’s land to connect a proposed new development to the existing sewer network. 
In such cases, a developer might request (requisition) the Water Authority to use its 
statutory power to acquire the needed easement for the sewer by serving notice to the 
adjacent landowner(s), and to construct the sewer connection. Agreements entered into 
under such circumstances were typically based on Section 30 of the Anglian Water 
Authority Act of 1977.
When Section 30 agreements were signed in Cambridgeshire they were always 
accompanied by a Section 52 agreement, because assurance that the off-site infrastructure 
connection could be made was needed before planning permission could be granted. For 
this reason, contributions negotiated under Section 30 were effectively counted in the 
process of counting Section 52 agreements. As required by the 1973 Anglian Water 
Authority Act, all Section 30 Agreements must be registered as a local land charge—and 
were therefore able to be identified in Local Land Charges Offices.
PrivateAgreements With Internal Drainage Boards
Although Anglian Water Services was the major actor in signing agreements in 
Cambridgeshire, it should be noted that agreements for surface water drainage were also 
sometimes signed with private Internal Drainage Boards. However, such agreements 
signed by private Internal Drainage Boards were not counted in this study.
Highway-Related Agreements
A search of legal agreements revealed a number of highway agreements based on 
provisions of Section 38 of the 1980 Highways Act Section 38 allows public highway 
authorities to adopt land for new roads (and by inference, to acquire roads built by 
developers on their land), by agreement Section 38 does not say anything explicit about 
improving or widening existing public highways, and its provisions are not intended to 
cover the construction of new roads on land not being donated. In theory, Section 38 
agreements should only be used when a road is constructed on land owned by the 
developer, and when the land and completed road is to be adopted and maintained by the
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highway authority. When off-site highway improvements are constructed or paid for by a 
developer, then a Section 52 agreement should be used. However, in practice the 
distinction between Section 38 and Section 52 agreements was sometimes blurred. In 
cases where a developer was constructing a new turning lane within an existing public 
highway, connecting to a new estate road, either a Section 38 or a 52 Agreement might be 
used. In one case, a major off-site highway improvement constructed by a developer ( the 
alteration of an existing public highway and the construction of a new roundabout) was 
covered by a Section 38 Agreement, rather than a Section 52 agreement. On the other 
hand, Section 52 agreements were often signed which related to nothing more than the 
construction of on-site estate roads by developers.
All Section 52 agreements signed by the County Highway Authority pertaining to 
highway improvements were counted, including those which simply pertained to on-site 
improvements. Section 38 agreements which imposed significant off-site highway 
obligations were also counted. However, Section 38 agreements which simply applied to 
on-site estate roads, and which did not cite the provisions of Section 52, were not counted.
Highway agreements could also be signed under Section 278 of the Highways Act 
of 1980. Such agreements were signed when there were developer-funded improvements 
to trunk roads under the responsibility of the Department of Transport. Because Section 
278 agreements always involved off-site highway improvements, and were often crucial to 
obtaining planning permission (removing traffic objections which otherwise would have 
required denial of planning permission), it was decided that any such agreements signed 
during the study period should be counted.
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CHAPTER SIX: FIVE YEARS OF AGREEMENTS
In this chapter, data is presented and analysed at the county level, documenting how 
planning agreements were used in Cambridgeshire between 1 January 1985 and 31 March 
1990. In Chapter Seven the data is broken down and analysed by geographic location 
within the county to identify variations in local practice, and factors which may have 
affected the ability and willingness of local authorities to use agreements to obtain 
contributions or achieve other planning objectives. The importance of this empirical 
research is that it provides, for the first time, an accurate measure of the extent to which 
agreements were used, the purposes for which they were used, and factors and conditions 
which affected their use. By compiling data on agreements over a 63 month period, the 
research also provides a direct measure of how local authority use of agreements evolved 
and changed over time.
Three hundred forty-nine planning permissions granted in Cambridgeshire between 
1 January, 1985 and 31 March, 1990 were subject to the terms of planning agreements. 
Two hundred and fifty (72%) of those planning permissions were residential, and ninety- 
nine (28%) were commercial.
206 Residential Planning Agreements Signed During Study Period
44 Residential Permissions Subject to Agreements Signed Prior to 
Study Period
88 Commercial Planning Agreements Signed During Study Period
11 Commercial Permissions Subject to Agreements Signed 
Prior to Study Period
349 Total Permissions Subject to Planning Agreements
The number of planning permissions subject to agreements was remarkably small 
compared to the total number of planning permissions granted. As shown in Table 6.01, a 
total of 14,127 planning permissions were granted in Cambridgeshire during the study 
period. Thus, only 2% of all planning permissions were subject to agreements. The high 
proportion of agreements signed for residential projects (72%) was generally consistent 
with the fact that 71% of all planning permissions granted during the period were for 
residential development
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Table 6.01: Planning Permissions 1985-1990. Cambridgeshire
Residential Commercial Tptal
1985 1596 840 2436
1986 1773 791 2564
1987 1893 842 2735
1988 2320 827 3147
1989 2108 601 2709
1990 (3 mo.) 402 134 536
Total 10,092 (71%) 4,035 (29%) 14,127 (100%)
Source: Cambridgeshire County Council
County-wide data on planning permissions was also analysed to estimate the 
proportion o f newly permitted development that was subject to planning agreements. This 
analysis was carried out separately for residential and commercial development In cases of 
outline planning permissions, where the area of the site was known but the exact amount of 
new development was not specified in the application, the amount of development which 
might eventually take place on the site was estimated using densities and floor area ratios of 
development which generally prevailed in the district
During the study period, planning agreements were signed for a total of 12,025 
housing units. Permissions for another 3901 housing units were subject to agreements 
signed prior to 1 January 1985. Thus, it is estimated that planning permissions for 15,926 
housing units were subject to planning agreements. During the same period, a total of 
59,777 housing units received some form of planning permission. Although this figure 
clearly overstates the actual total amount of newly permitted residential development, 
inasmuch as it includes both outline and final planning permissions and therefore double­
counts a number of developments, it nevertheless provides a useful benchmark. Using this 
figure as the basis for comparison, it is estimated that more than a quarter (27%) of all 
newly permitted housing was subject to planning agreements.
59,777- total housing units which received permission
15,926— total housing units covered by agreements (27%)
A much smaller proportion of the total amount of commercial development 
permitted in Cambridgeshire was subject to planning agreements. It is estimated that, 
during the 63 month study period, permissions were granted in the County for a total of 
4,373,228 square metres of commercial floor area. During that period, planning 
agreements were signed for commercial developments which had a total estimated floor
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area of 417,578 square metres. Permissions for another 38,866 square metres of 
commercial floor area were subject to planning agreements entered into prior to the study 
period. Thus, 456,444 square metres (only approximately 10%) of newly permitted 
commercial floor area was subject to planning agreements.
Planning Applications Which Occasioned the Signing of Agreements
As shown in Table 6.02, there was a strong tendency to negotiate agreements in 
relation to applications for outline planning permission. Sixty-nine percent of the 
agreements for major residential projects were signed related to outline permissions- twice 
the rate of outline permissions which characterised major residential permissions without 
agreements. Forty-eight percent of all major commercial agreements were signed at the 
outline stage, a finding that is impressive given that only 10% of all commercial planning 
permissions in the county, and 28% of all major commercial permissions, were outline 
permissions.
Proponents of the use of planning agreements to secure developer contributions 
have frequently argued that the cost of developer contributions is passed back against the 
cost of the land. However the ability to pass back the cost of contributions will likely to 
vary, depending on the stage in the development process that the agreement is negotiated. 
If an agreement is negotiated earlier in the development process, before the land has been 
purchased, it is more likely that the cost of the contribution can be passed back to the 
landowner, and taken out of the value of the land. However, if an agreement is signed at a 
later stage, after the land has been purchased, there would be less likelihood that the cost 
of the contribution could be taken out of the value of the land— and therefore a greater 
likelihood that the cost would have to be borne by the developer. Thus, the strong 
tendency in Cambridgeshire to negotiate planning agreements at the outline stage appears 
highly significant2 It suggests that parties who signed agreements were often in a good 
position to pass the costs of contributions back against the enhanced value of the land, and 
were therefore relatively willing and able to offer contributions.
For the information of American readers, under the British planning system, applicants can apply for planning permissioi 
in two basic ways. They can apply directly for Final planning permission by submitted a detailed planning application. Or the 
can submit a less detailed application fra* Outline permission. Outline permission does not allow an applicant to proceed with 
development, but it does establish the principle that a particular site can be developed for a certain type of development, and 
therefore serves the purpose of conferring a new value on the property. Having obtained Outline permission, an applicant 
wishing to proceed development must obtain Final permission by applying for approval of Reserved Matters.
-157-
Table 6.02: Types of Planning Permission in Cambridgeshire, bv Type of Development
Residential Commercial
Outline Final* Outline Final*
All Permissions 
During Study Period 3725 (37%) 6367 (63%) 409 (10%) 3626 (90%)
Major Projects 
Without Agreements 54 (38%) 90 (62%) 57 (28%) 144 (72%)
Major Projects With 
Points of Agreement 41 (69%) 19 (32%) 21 (48%) 23 (52%)
* Data on Final Permissions Includes permissions relating to Reserved Matters
Additional insights regarding the possible incidence of developer contributions was 
gleaned from the content of Section 52 Agreements. Agreements reveal the name and 
address of the applicant, and thus indicate whether the address of the applicant is the same 
as the subject property. Agreements similarly reveal whether the applicant is an individual, 
a married couple, a group of landowners owning contiguous pieces of land, or a 
professional developer. Moreover, agreements routinely state whether the applicant owns 
the land in fee simple, or has a contract to purchase the land. In cases where there was 
some doubt, additional information was collected by examining project files, and by 
questioning planning staff who were familiar with the applications. In this way, it was 
possible to categorise applicants who signed planning agreements as shown in Table 6.03.
Table 6.03: Status of Applicants Who Signed Agreements for Maior Developments
Applicant Status
Long-time landowner
Developer had contract with 
landowner to purchase the property 
upon obtaining planning permission
Developer owned the property 
outright in fee simple
Maior Res. Proi. Maior Comm. Proi.
31 (53%) 
16 (27%)
12 (20%)
16 (36%) 
8 (18%)
20 (45%)
Total 59 (100%) 44 (100%)
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One striking finding from the data in Table 6.03 is that 80% of all major residential 
agreements were signed either by landowners, or by developers who had contracts with 
landowners to purchase the subject properties when and if planning permission was 
obtained. In other words, over four-fifths of all major residential agreements were signed 
in situations were it was likely that the cost of developer contributions could be passed back 
to the landowner. Approximately fifty-five percent of applicants who signed agreements 
for major commercial projects were in a position where they might hope to pass the costs 
back to landowners. Forty-five percent of major commercial agreements were signed 
developers who had purchased the properties which were the subject of planning 
permission, and therefore in no position to pass costs back to the former owner.
Further analysis was carried out to identify more precisely the economic interests of 
landowners who signed major agreements, and who at the time of the signing of the 
agreement had not entered into contracts to sell their properties to developers. The point of 
this analysis was to determine in each case whether the landowner was applying for 
planning permission so as to carry out a proposed development himself— i.e. where the 
landowner was the prospective developer— or intended to sell the property with planning 
permission to someone else who would carry out the development. A landowner selling a 
property after obtaining planning permission might receive somewhat less money as a 
result of entering into an agreement, but would be enriched nonetheless. However a 
landowner who intended to carry out the development himself would be faced with having 
to pay the cost of contributions out-of-pocket, at a time when money was flowing out 
rather than in. As a result, landowners undertaking developments themselves might be 
expected to be more resistant to making contributions— at least for purposes which were 
not absolutely necessary for development to proceed.
Under normal circumstances, it would be hazardous to attempt to gauge the 
intentions of persons applying for planning permission. And yet, by virtue of the fact that 
this study was a retrospective look at a five year period, it was possible in many instances 
to deduce what the applicant’s past intentions were by looking at what actually happened 
after planning permission was obtained. For example, Trinity College and St. John's 
College of Cambridge University applied for permission to develop business parks on the 
northern fringe of Cambridge, and went forward to do exactly that Long-time owners of a 
number of large farm properties applied for permission to construct major farm structures, 
and carried out the proposed improvements themselves. In other cases, it was possible to 
deduce that a property which was subject to an agreement had been sold by the fact that 
subsequent detailed and reserved matter permissions were granted to applicants other than 
the original landowner. In cases where developments were not carried forward, it was still 
possible to make judgments with reasonable confidence regarding the intentions of
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landowner applicants- particularly when landowners having no development experience 
applied for planning permission for very large residential developments. In cases where 
there was uncertainty as to whether the applicant intended to develop or sell the property, 
planning staff were contacted who were familiar with the project application.
Based on these varied methods for gauging the intentions of developers, judgments 
were made with reasonable confidence regarding the intentions of approximately half of the 
applicants who received major planning permissions and signed planning agreements.
TABLE 6.04: Profile of Landowner Applicants Who Signed Agreements for Major 
Protects
As shown in Table 6.04, almost all of the landowners who signed agreements for 
major residential projects (97%) appeared to have had little or no intention of developing 
the projects for which they were applying for planning permission. However, the profile 
of landowners who signed agreements for major commercial projects was markedly 
different Sixty-three percent of landowners who signed agreements for major commercial 
projects appeared likely to carry out the proposed developments themselves. This 
difference in the profile of applicants who signed residential and commercial agreements 
should be kept in mind when examining data on the contributions offered by residential 
versus commercial developers, inasmuch as it could at least partially explain why fewer 
contributions were extracted from commercial developers than from residential developers.
Contributory Versus Non-Contributorv Agreements
Jowell identified nine different types of agreements. Six of the nine types of 
agreements identified by Jowell can be classified as "contributions" as defined in Chapter 
Four:
- public rights of way over developers' land
- dedication of land to public use
- provision of community buildings
- provision of infrastructure
- gift of site or buildings for residential use
- commuted car parking payment
Likely to Sell
Major Commercial Projects 6 (38%)
Major Residential Projects 29 (97%)
Likely to Develop
10 (63%)
1 ( 3%)
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So as to maintain continuity with Jowell's important earlier study, an attempt was 
made to retain Jowell's categories of agreements. However, Jowell’s categories tended to 
emphasise the form  of contributions, and often failed to identify the public facility or 
infrastructure need that was met through the contribution. In order to correct this 
imbalance, a two-tiered classification of contributions was employed, so as to document 
not only the nature or form of the developer contribution, but also the purposes for which 
contributions were offered. As a further step toward greater precision, the data was 
compiled to distinguish whether contributions were obtained from residential or commercial 
developers. Contributions were categorised as follows:
Purposes of Contributions:
- Water infrastructure improvements (off-site)
Foul sewer improvements
Sewage treatment plant
Sewage pumping station
Surface water drainage improvements
- Highway improvements (off-site)
- Footpaths/cycleways
- Schools
- Other public buildings /  facilities (community centre, library, police station,
public conveniences, etc.)
- Recreation/open space /amenities (playing fields, soccer pitch, recreation
pavilion, landscape improvements, preserve landscape,
children's play facility, etc.)
- Housing
- Parking
- Public transportation
- Miscellaneous
Forms of Contributions:
- Cash payment toward capital cost of constructing facility or improvement
(including commuted payment for construction of off-site parking spaces)
- Construct facility or improvement to specifications approved by public authority,
and then dedicate the completed facility or improvement for public use
- Donate land or permanent easement
- Sell land to public authority, at below market price
- Maintain public improvements for a specified period of time
- Cash payment for maintenance or operating expenses
- Joint-funding to expand infrastructure capacity to serve subsequent
development in surrounding area
The last developer obligation on this list (i.e. joint-funding scheme) needs some 
explanation. In certain cases, agreements were signed in which developers agreed to 
construct sewers or drains to a larger capacity than required to meet the needs of their own 
developments, thereby helping to meet the infrastructure needs of surrounding areas.
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Developers agreeing to assume this obligation were promised some payment from the water 
authority in return, and such payments were presumably adequate to cover the cost of the 
additional work by the developer. Nevertheless, for purposes of this study, developers 
who agreed to construct additional infrastructure capacity under such joint-funding 
arrangements were considered to have agreed to make a contribution. The fulfillment of 
this obligation by developers was contributory in that it freed the water authority from 
spending its own funds to obtain the desired infrastructure, and imposed additional burdens 
on developers to construct public improvements that were not needed to serve their own 
developments. Moreover, money paid by the water authority to the initial developer for 
the added infrastructure capacity was subsequently recovered by the authority by 
negotiating "contributions" from other applicants seeking planning permission to develop 
adjacent parcels of land served by the jointly-funded infrastructure. Agreements which 
provided for jointly-funded infrastructure were classified as contributory.
Non-Contributorv Agreements
An examination of the content of agreements in Cambridgeshire, as well as of other 
agreements signed in districts outside Cambridgeshire, revealed that agreements often 
contained provisions which were unrelated to contributions. For convenience, such 
provisions in agreements have been called non-contributory. Thirteen non-contributory 
purposes for signing agreements were identified. The first three of these purposes were 
identified by Jowell in his 1977 study:
- Specify use
- Extinguish existing user
- Rehabilitate/ improve property
- Restrict occupancy
- Control or minimise adverse impacts
- Set timetable/deadline for completion of specified tasks
- Phase development
- Limit total development on site
- Waive right to claim compensation
- Revise terms of previous agreements
- Give notice to local authority
- Preserve historic buildings or artifacts
- Pay legal costs involved in preparing agreement
The following pages provide a more detailed description of the non-contributory 
provisions found in agreements in Cambridgeshire.
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Specify Use: Agreements were frequently entered into for the purpose of 
specifying the exact use or uses that could take place on a given property, or in a given 
building, and/or specifically prohibiting other uses. Provisions such as the following were 
included in agreements: "said property shall not be used otherwise than for residential 
development”; and ‘‘thereafter the only permitted use shall be for town centre retail 
shopping facilities along with appropriate ancillary uses.” Another way in which 
agreements specified use was by stating that development had to be carried out "in strict 
conformity with the approved plans," and that the restrictions imposed under the agreement 
were binding on succeeding owners of the property.
Extinguish existing use rights: This provision was included in agreements to 
terminate the right to use a given site or building in a way which up to that point had been 
permitted. The use being extinguished might conceivably be located on the property which 
was the subject of the planning application, although in most cases it was not In most 
instances, this provision was agreed to in connection with applications seeking permission 
to move an existing use from one site to another. For example, a local planning authority 
might agree to grant planning permission for an industrial use, or a caravan site, to be 
moved to a new site, as long as there was assurance that the use would be extinguished at 
its former site once the move was completed. Under this provision, applicants agreed to 
give up the right to use a property in a way which had otherwise been permitted. As a 
result, when applicants agreed to this provision there was always a quid pro quo — i.e. the 
applicant would agree to give up an existing use right in exchange for receiving planning 
permission to establish a use on a site where that use was previously prohibited.
Restrict Occupancy: Another not infrequent reason for signing agreements was to 
restrict the occupancy of land and buildings. Permissions for family annexes were often 
accompanied by agreements requiring that the new unit be occupied only by family 
members. Agreements were also found specifying that particular housing units could only 
be occupied for short stays by “holiday-makers,” or by students. Some agreements 
specified that the local authority had the right to nominate occupants. Occupancy 
restrictions incorporated into agreements could also be work-related-- specifying, for 
example, that particular housing units could only be occupied by persons employed in 
certain activities or on the premises. Permissions for new farmhouses in rural areas were 
often accompanied by agreements requiring that the new residence be occupied by persons 
employed locally in agriculture. Occupancy restrictions were also found in a limited 
number of agreements signed for commercial developments -- i.e., to limit occupancy to 
local firms or particular types of firms (such as R & D).
Control or minimise Adverse Impacts: Agreements included provisions designed to 
limit and reduce the impacts which newly permitted development might otherwise impose 
on adjacent properties. Agreements for major commercial developments included
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provisions restricting hours of operations, or the hours during which trucks could 
load/unload goods. The agreement signed in connection with an application seeking 
permission to expand London City Airport in the Docklands limited the numbers of flights 
which could operate at given times and within specified time periods. Another way in 
which agreements have sought to limit impacts has been be setting performance standards 
for noise and emissions which the permitted use could not exceed. Agreements have also 
required the construction of specific physical improvements- such as fencing, screening, 
or landscaped mounds or earth banks— so as to absorb and deflect noise, and/or visually 
screen unsighdy uses.
Rehabilitate/Improve/Preserve Subject Property: Agreements were signed calling 
upon applicants to restore, enhance, or protect valued features present on the property at 
the time they have applied for planning permission. Provisions in agreements considered 
to fall in this category were:
- remove debris from the site
- preserve existing trees and landscaping
- plant trees or landscaping in specified areas
- construct specific on-site improvements — such as a gatehouse, stone wall, etc.
- demolish a decayed building
- restore a listed building
- preserve and record archaeological finds during site excavation and construction
Set Timetable/Deadline for Completing Specified Tasks: Some agreements specified 
that development had to commence or be completed by a specified date, or within a certain 
period of time after the grant of planning permission. Even when a particular date was not 
specified, wording was sometimes included stating explicitly that the agreement was valid 
only for the period of that given planning permission. Applicants were advised that if they 
failed to implement the planning permission within the period of time during which it was 
valid (which was usually between 3 -5  years) then the agreement would become null and 
void, and it would be necessary to negotiate a new agreement in connection with a new 
planning application.
Phase Development: A variety of provisions were included in agreements 
requiring that development be phased in various ways. In other words, applicants agreed to 
undertake or complete certain tasks or aspects of development before commencing or 
completing other stages of development. The following are examples of the kinds of 
phasing provisions included in agreements:
- Construction may not commence until plans for sewer and drainage works have 
been approved.
- No dwelling shall be occupied until the approved sewer and drainage works have 
been satisfactorily constructed and approved.
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- No dwelling shall be occupied until the footpath has been completed to the 
reasonable satisfaction of the Director of Transportation.
- Construction of units may not begin until the entire spine road has been 
constructed.
- No more than 20 units may be completed and occupied in a given year.
Phasing requirements were particularly relied upon in cases where permission was being 
given for the development of large tracts of land owned by multiple landowners.
Limit Development on Site: Agreements were sometimes used to place limits on 
the amount or types of new development that could be undertaken on sites which were the 
subject of applications for planning permission. Agreements could limit the total amount of 
development that could take place (i.e.no more than 150 housing units may be built on the 
site) or the amount of development in various phases of development (i.e. no more than 8 
units in Phase I). Other examples of limitations on development imposed through 
agreements were: a provision limiting future enlargement of housing units subject to the 
agreement; a provision stating that "no building on the land shall comprise more than 2 
stories, subject to a maximum height of 12 metres to eaves level; and a provision limiting 
the number of employees who could work in the subject building at any one time."
Waive right to claim compensation'. In some agreements, applicants agreed to 
waive the right to seek compensation for any loss of value or damages resulting from use 
restrictions imposed by the planning authority in the Agreement. The following is an 
example of how this provision was sometimes worded: "The applicant hereby further 
agrees that any rights to claim compensation arising from any limitation or restriction on the 
planning use of the applicant's land under the terms of this Agreement are waived." This 
provision could be combined with some other non-contributory provision— such as the 
setting of a timetable for commencing development For example, one agreement included 
the following wording: "Development must commence within 12 months or the planning 
permission may be revoked without compensation."
Revise or remove terms o f a previous agreement. As the number of properties 
subject to agreements has grown, new agreements have had to be entered into to revise the 
terms of previous agreements, or to remove restrictions imposed by a previous agreement 
(i.e. “the Agreement dated shall cease to have effect”).
Notify Local Authority: Provisions have been included in agreements intended to 
assist the planning authority in enforcing other terms included in agreements, or possibly 
conditions imposed on the planning permission outside of the agreement. For example 
some agreements included a requirement that the local planning authority be notified within 
21 days of any disposition of legal interest in the property. Such a requirement of 
notification of a change in ownership was usually related to the authority's interest in
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enforcing terms of understanding contained in the agreement— as in cases where planning 
permission had been granted to a specific party, and where an agreement stated that the use 
of the property must revert to its former use if and when there was a change in ownership. 
Similarly, in agreements which required that certain housing units be made available for as 
social housing units, wording might be included such as “the applicant shall provide notice 
to the local authority before each house is made available for occupation, identifying the 
housing, and stating that the house is ready for human occupation.'*
Historic and Archaeological Preservation: Agreements were used to require 
applicants to preserve archaeological artifacts encountered during excavation and 
construction. For example, one agreement included the following statement: “Safeguards 
shall be taken to safeguard the recording of any matters of archaeological interest within the 
site.”
Pay legal costs: A significant number of agreements included a provision stating 
that the applicant agreed to pay the legal costs of preparing the agreement. Although this 
provision involved a promise to pay money (thus partially conforming with the of a 
"contribution"), local authorities did not gain net economic benefit from the payment A 
local planning authority would not enter into an agreement for the sole purpose of including 
a provision requiring the applicant to pay for the legal costs of preparing the agreement. 
Rather, inclusion of this provision allowed local authorities to avoid a cost which might 
otherwise have deterred them from entering into an agreement Moreover, the need to 
spend public money for such a purpose would not have existed without the signing of such 
agreements. As a result, this provision was considered to be non-contributory.
In many agreements, the exact cost of the preparation of the agreement was not 
specified. Rather, agreements often included a statement such as “The owner shall pay the 
council's reasonable costs in the preparation of this agreement.” In other agreements the 
amount of the costs due was specified and limited by stating that the cost might be up to a 
certain amount. In agreements where the amount of the legal costs was specified, the legal 
costs imposed ranged from £50 to £260.
Analysis of Countv-wide Data on Agreements
Using the above definitions of contributory and non-contributory agreements, the 
294 planning agreements signed in Cambridgeshire during the study period were analysed 
and categorised as to whether or not they involved contributions. Agreements which 
included only non-contributoiy provisions were classified as non-contributory agreements. 
(It should be understood that agreements which involved contributions, and which were 
therefore classified as contributory, may also have included non-contributory provisions.) 
As shown in Table 6.05 (below), less than half (44%) of all agreements signed in
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Cambridgeshire involved contained some kind of contribution, while over half (56%) did 
not A somewhat higher percentage of residential agreements contained contributions than 
was the case with agreements signed for commercial projects.
Table 6.05: Total Agreements Signed- With and Without Contributions
Agreements With Contrib. Without Contrib.
Residential Projects 206 93(45%) 113(55%)
Commercial Projects 88 37(42%) 51(58%)
Tbtal 294 130 (44%) 164 (56%)
Agreements Signed for Major Projects
During the 63 month study period, a total of 501 planning permissions were issued 
for “major projects,” defined here as residential projects of 50 or more units, and 
commercial projects with 900 sq. metres or more of floor area during the study period.
One hundred and three (20%) of those permissions occasioned the signing of an agreement 
(see Table 6.06).
Table 6.06: Maior Permissions Which Occasioned the Signing of Agreements
Total Perms. Agreements signed
Residential Projects 245 59 (24%)
(50 units or more)
Commercial Projects 256 44(17%)
(900 sq. metres or more)
Total 501 103 (20%)
Source: Cambridgeshire County Council
Eighty-percent of all permissions for major developments were granted without 
agreements. The data also indicates that agreements were more likely to be signed for 
major residential projects than for major commercial projects. Twenty-four percent of 
major residential permissions involving the signing of agreements, compared to only 16% 
for major commercial permissions. Nevertheless, over three quarters of all major 
residential developments were approved without agreements.
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As shown in Table 6.07, a majority of agreements signed for major residential 
developments pertained to schemes proposed by private, for-profit developers.
Table 6.07 : Types of Maior Residential Developments Subject to Agreements
46 Private housing schemes 
7 Council housing 
1 Sheltered housing 
1 Council and sheltered housing 
1 Private housing including some sheltered units
1 Private housing including shared ownership units
2 Private housing including some council housing
59 Total agreements signed for major residential schemes
Similarly, as shown in Table 6.08, all 44 agreements signed for major commercial 
projects pertained to profit-oriented new construction projects carried out by private 
developers.
Table 6.08: Types of Maior Commercial Developments Subject to Agreements
1 petrol station and retail
1 Petrol station
1 Petrol station, restaurant and cafe
1 Petrol station, motel and restaurant
6 Office buildings 
3 Offices and retail
6 Light industrial space, including warehouses (storage and distribution)
1 Light industrial space and retail
12 Business parks (e.g. B1 Class space, light industry + offices)
2 Retail schemes
2 Retail, light industrial space, and offices
1 Multi-use development (hotel, restaurant, light industrial space, petrol station) 
1 Heavy industrial facility (machine and rubber company)
1 Private surgical /  medical facility and associated beds
1 Garden centre 
1 Farm museum
3 Farm buildings (2 with associated dwellings)
44 Total agreements signed for major commercial buildings
As shown in Table 6.09,18% of major commercial planning permissions granted 
without agreements were related to applications for changes of use. Another 8% of
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permissions without agreements were for alterations, renovations, and demolitions. In all, 
26% of major commercial planning permissions granted without agreements were for 
developments other than new construction. By way of comparison, ninety-five per cent of 
the 44 agreements signed for major commercial developments pertained to the construction 
of entirely new buildings on cleared sites. All 59 agreements signed for major residential 
developments developments pertained to new housing construction. The heavy 
preponderance of agreements signed for developments involving new construction 
suggests that LPAs focused their attention on signing agreements for developments which 
had significant land use and infrastructure impacts.
Table 6.09: Types of Maior Commercial Developments. With and Without Aereements
1m .
New Construction
Change of Use
Construct Extension 
to Existing Building/ 
Building Alteration
Demolish and Replace 
Existing Building
Renovate/Refurbish
Permissions 
With Agree.
42 (95%) 
0
2 (5%)
0
0
Permissions 
Without,Agree,
147 (73%) 
37 (18%) 
13 (6%)
2 (1%)
2 (1%)
TOTAL 44 (100%) 201 (100%)
Table 6.10 presents data on the number of permissions for major developments 
which were subject to agreements which involved some kind of developer contribution. 
This data shows clearly that agreements signed for major projects usually involved some 
kind of developer contribution.
%
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Table 6.10: Permissions for Maior Development Subject to Agreements
Total With Contrib. Without Contrib.
Residential agreements signed 59 57 (97%) 2
Commercial agreements signed 44 32 (73%) 12
Res. Permissions Subject to 
Previous Agreements 44 38 (86%) 6
Comm. Permissions Subject to 
Previous Agreements 11 11(100%) 0
Total Major Permissions
Subject to Agreements 158 138(87%) 20(13%)
Agreements Signed for Minor Projects
Over the course of the study period, almost twice as many agreements were signed 
for minor developments as for major developments. As shown in Table 6.11, a total of 
191 planning agreements were signed during the study period related to minor 
developments (compared to 100 for major developments), approximately three-quarters of 
which were for small residential projects. Only approximately one-fifth of all agreements 
for minor developments involved contributions. Once again, however, significant 
differences were observed in the treatment of commercial and residential projects. Twenty- 
four percent of the agreements signed for minor residential projects involved contributions, 
compared to only eleven percent of agreements signed for minor commercial projects.
Table 6.11: Percent of Minor Agreements With Contributions.
Agreements Agreement with Contrib.
Minor Residential Projects 147 36 (24%)
Minor Commercial Projects 44 5 (11%)
Total 191 41 (21%)
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Understanding Agreements
Analysis of data compiled on agreements signed in Cambridgeshire helps to shed 
light on a number of the issues and questions about agreements raised in Chapter Four. 
What was the average size of projects for which agreements were signed? Were projects 
with agreements with contributions larger than projects with agreements but without 
contributions? And were projects with agreements and contributions more dense than 
projects with agreements but without contributions?
To answer these questions, data was compiled on the additional floor space, and 
additional housing units authorised in planning permissions which were subject to 
agreements with contributions, compared to permissions with agreements but without 
contributions. Permissions granted for changes of use, and for alterations and renovations 
which did not result in added floor space, were excluded from the analysis.
The data in Table 6.12 presents a two-fold picture regarding the size of projects 
with agreements. Relatively few housing units (an average of 8) were added when 
agreements were signed not involving contributions. However, when agreements were 
negotiated involving developer contributions, much larger numbers of new housing units 
were involved. Indeed, the analysis suggests that the average threshold size of projects 
which triggered the negotiation of agreements with contributions was remarkably high.
Table 6.12 : Average Size of Projects With Agreements— With vs. Without Contributions
Further analysis was carried out to compare the size and density characteristics of 
major projects, with versus without agreements. The size and density of major 
permissions with agreements but without contributions was not included in this analysis 
because only two such agreements were signed during the study period. In this analysis, 
only permissions for major projects which produced 50 or more new housing units, or 
which added 900 square metres or more of new commercial floor area, were included. 
Permissions for changes o f use which did not involve additions of new commercial space 
were excluded. As shown in Table 6.12, major commercial permissions with agreements 
occupied substantially larger sites, and involved much larger additions of floor area, than
Added Floor Area Added Housing Units 
Comm. Projects Res. Projects
Agreements with Contribution 9,165 sq.m.
(N=38)
121 units 
(N=91)
Agreements without Contribution 1,453 sq.m.
(N=54)
8 units 
(N=113)
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permissions granted without agreements. Also, contrary to the expectation that projects 
with agreements would be more dense than projects without agreements, the average floor 
area ratio (FAR) of projects with agreements was actually one third lower (.59 versus .79) 
than projects granted permissions without agreements.
Table 6.13: Size and Density of Maior Commercial Permissions- With vs. Without 
Agreements ♦
Permissions With Agree. Permissions Without Agree. 
QL=56) (N = 148)
Average Site Area 3.47 HA. 1.06 HA.
Average Floor Area 7323 Sq. M. 3406 Sq. M.
Average F.A.R. .59 .79
An attempt was then made to analyse and compare the size and density 
characteristics of commercial developments whose agreements did and did not include 
contributions (see Table 6.14). Major commercial projects whose agreements did not 
include contributions, like those whose agreements included contributions, tended to be 
larger, and to occupy larger sites, than comparable projects without agreements. One 
finding which varied from the pattern was that the average FAR of projects with agreements 
without contributions was significantly lower than that of agreements with contributions 
(.35 versus .61). However, the small number of major commercial agreements without 
contributions (12) makes it difficult to place much weight or significance on these apparent 
differences.
Table 6.14: Size and Density of Maior Commercial Permissions — With vs. Without 
Agreements and Contributions
Avg. Floor Area
(Sq. Metres') Site Area (Ha.) Floor Area Ratio
Permissions Without
Agreements 3,406 1.06 .79
(N=148)
Agreements
Without Contributions 5,792 4.20 .35
(N=12)
Agreements
With Contributions 9,014 3.46 .61
(N=44)
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Data compiled for major residential permissions revealed a roughly similar pattern. 
As shown in Table 6.15y major residential projects with agreements which included 
contributions occupied sites almost twice as large, and added over 60% more housing 
units, as major residential projects approved without agreements. Major residential projects 
with agreements and contributions were also less dense than major residential permissions 
approved without agreements. The small number of major residential agreements signed 
without contributions (8) makes it difficult to draw firm conclusions about the 
characteristics of such projects. In terms of site area and project size, developments 
approved with agreements but without contributions appeared to resemble major 
permissions without agreements. However, the FAR of such projects was roughly 
midway between those of projects without agreements and projects with agreements and 
contributions.
Table 6.15: Size and Density of Maior Residential Permissions — With and Without 
Agreements and Contributions
Avg. Site Area 
(Acres)
Projects Not Subject 
to Agreements
(N=143) 7.0
Projects Subject to 
Agree, without Contrib. 6.9
(N=8)
Projects Subject to 
Agree, with Contrib. 13.0 
(N=93)
Avg. Density 
Avg. No. Units (Units/Acre)
89 17.7
79 14.6
146 12.9
There could be a geographical explanation for the observed differences in the size 
and density of major permissions with and without agreements, and with versus without 
contributions. It could be, for example, that agreements with contributions were most 
often signed for sites in out-lying areas, where infrastructure improvements were necessary 
for development to proceed. In such peripheral and out-lying locations the density of 
development would naturally tend to be lower than in areas better served by infrastructure 
and existing public facilities. On the other hand, developers would be less likely to have to 
make contributions for infrastructure improvements when developing projects in already 
developed areas, where infrastructure and facilities were likely already in place, and where
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the density of development was higher.
Another question regarding the use of planning agreements raised in Chapter Four 
was whether local authorities may have used delay as a tactic to put pressure on developers 
to enter into agreements. To test this possibility, data was compiled and analysed on the 
elapsed time to obtain planning permission (from date of application to date of approval) of 
major and minor projects with agreements versus projects without agreements. For 
permissions with agreements, the date of approval was the date the agreement was signed. 
Data for projects with agreements was further broken down to distinguish whether or not 
the agreements involved contributions. This data, presented in Table 6.16 provides a clear 
measure of the extent to which the use of planning agreements lengthened the time required 
to obtain planning permission.
Table 6.16: Delay in Obtaining Planning Permission-- Maior vs. Minor Projects
Comm. Projects Residential Projects
A. Maior Projects
Permissions Without 
Agreements
Pts. of Agreement 
Without Contributions
Pts. of Agreement 
With Contributions
Permissions Subject to 
Previous Agreements 
(with + w/o Contributions)
124 days (199) 
234 days (12) 
331 days (32)
190 days (11)
150 days (144)
Insufficient data 
(only two projects)
306 days (56)
138 days (43)
B. Minor Projects 
Agreements
Without Contributions 345 days (40) 289 days (106)
Agreements
With Contributions 378 days (5) 340 days (33)
As shown in section A of the table, permissions for major projects not involving 
agreements were issued within an average of 124-150 days. However when planning 
agreements were signed which involved contributions, it took more than twice as long- an 
average of 306 days for major residential projects and 331 days for major commercial 
projects. A possible explanation, and justification, for this delay may lie in the fact, noted
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above, that major projects with agreements tended to be very large, and therefore probably 
raised numerous planning issues.
Section A also includes data on the elapsed time of permissions which were subject 
to previously negotiated agreements. Inasmuch as such permissions were not occasions 
for the signing of agreements, there might be reason to expect that the elapsed time of such 
permissions would be roughly the same as for other permissions granted without 
agreements, since no additional negotiations or legal work was involved. On the other 
hand, such permissions might have triggered certain internal administrative reviews which 
could possibly prolong the period for obtaining planning permission. The data does not 
really resolve the uncertainty. Major commercial permissions which were subject to 
previous agreements took longer to obtain than normal permissions without agreements 
(190 days versus 124 days). On the other hand, no such added delay was found for major 
residential permissions; residential permissions subject to previous agreements actually 
took somewhat less time than permissions without agreements (138 days versus 150 days).
Perhaps the most striking finding in Table 6.16 is that it took an average of 289-345 
days to obtain planning permission for minor projects which did not involve contributions. 
This finding is especially noteworthy, considering the extremely small size of many of the 
minor developments which were covered by agreements. Sixty-six (approximately one- 
third) of the 204 non-contributory agreements applied to only a single housing unit. Eight 
non-contributory agreements applied to only two units.
Table 6.17 consolidates data presented separately for major and minor 
developments in sections A and B of Table 6.16, and measures the delay brought about by 
the signing agreements for all projects, major and minor. As shown in the table, it took 
commercial developers who signed agreements with contributions 337 days to obtain 
planning permission. It took residential developers who signed agreements with 
contributions 318 days to obtain planning permission. Developers who signed agreements 
without contributions experienced only slightly shorter delays- 320 days for commercial 
developers, and 291 days for residential developers.
The difference in approval times between projects without agreements and projects 
with agreements (but without contributions) can be characterised as the “delay attributable 
to negotiation of agreements.” The difference in approval times between agreements with 
versus without contributions can be characterised as the “delay attributable to negotiation of 
contributions.” The “delay attributable to agreements” was 144 days for residential 
projects, and 193 days for commercial projects. But the "delay attributable to negotiation 
of contributions" for residential permissions was only 27 days, and only 17 days for 
commercial permissions. These differences in the time required to obtain planning 
permission are graphically presented in Figures 6.01 and 6.02.
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Table 6.17: Delay in Obtaining Planning Permission-- With vs. Without Agreements
Commercial Projects Residential Projects
Major Permissions
Without Agreements 127 days (212) 147 days (186)
All Points of Agreement
Without Contributions 320 days (52) 291 days (108)
(Major + Minor)
All Points of Agreement
With Contributions 337 days (37) 318 days (89)
(Major + Minor)
Delay attributable to 193 days 144 days
negotiation of agreements
Delay attributable 17 days 27 days
to negotiation of
contributions
Figure 6.01: Delay in Obtaining Permission- Commercial Projects
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Figure 6.02 : Delay in Obtaining Permission-- Residential Projects
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Throughout the 1980's, the DoE monitored the performance of local authorities in 
issuing their decisions, and compiled and published the results in annual reports entitled 
“Development Control Statistics.” This DoE data unfortunately did not measure the length 
of time in issuing decisions in days. Instead, it measured the percent of planning decisions 
in a given year that were issued with 8 weeks, within 9 - 1 3  weeks, or which took more 
than 13 weeks. Nevertheless, this DoE data provides a useful basis for placing data for 
Cambridgeshire in a larger regional and national context.
Table 6.18 compares the performance of various regions in Britain in meeting the 8 
week goal in 1985-86. At that time, authorities in East Anglia were above the national 
average in meeting the eight week goal. Seventy-two percent of all decisions in East 
Anglia in 1985-86 were rendered within eight weeks, compared to sixty-seven percent in 
England and fifty-one percent in Greater London. Northern regions, and those in the 
Midlands issued much higher percentages of decisions within eight weeks. Three years 
later, however, during the height of the boom, authorities in East Anglia had fallen below 
the national average in meeting the eight week goal, with only forty-eight percent of
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decisions rendered within eight weeks, compared to fifty-two percent in England as a 
whole (see Table 6.19).
Table 6.18: Percent of Planning Applications Decided Within Eight Weeks, bv Region-
1985-86
% Decided % Decided % Decided
Rfgipn Within 8 wks. Within 9-13 wks. Over 13 wks.
Northern 76 17 7
Yorkshire and Humb. 68 21 11
North West 72 19 9
East Midlands 73 20 7
West Midlands 71 21 8
East Anglia 72 19 9
South East 61 25 14
South West 70 21 9
Greater London 51 30 19
All of England 67 22 11
Table 6.19: Percent of Planning Applications Decided Within Eight Weeks. Bv Region— 
1988-89
% Decided % Decided % Decided
Redon Within 8 wks. Within 9-13 wks. Over 13 wks.
Northern 69 21 9
Yorkshire and Humb. 53 30 17
North West 62 26 12
East Midlands 61 26 13
West Midlands 63 26 11
East Anglia 48 30 22
South East 48 30 22
South West 47 33 20
Greater London 39 27 34
All of England 52 29 20
Source: DoE, Development Control Statistics
During the study period, the trend away from making planning decisions within 
eight weeks was even more pronounced in Cambridgeshire than in East Anglia as a whole. 
As shown in Figure 6.03, throughout the first half of the 1980's Cambridgeshire 
authorities determined a higher percentage of planning applications within eight weeks than 
was the case in East Anglia as a whole. From 1979 through 1985,75% - 80% of all
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planning decisions in Cambridgeshire were issued within eight weeks. However, after 
1985 the percentage of planning decisions issued within eight weeks declined precipitously. 
By 1987, the percentage of decisions made within eight weeks in Cambridgeshire was 
lower than in East Anglia as a whole, and by 1988 it had fallen to 41%, almost similar to 
the level of performance found within Greater London. This data clearly suggests that 
between 1985 and 1990 it took applicants longer and longer to obtain planning permission.
Figure 6.03: Planning Applications Decided in Eight Weeks
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An important factor which undoubtedly contributed to delay was the fact that local 
planning authorities during the boom were being faced with increased numbers of 
applications, and that they simply did not have the capacity to handle the huge volume of 
applications in a timely manner. However, data presented earlier in this chapter measuring 
the length of time involved in obtaining peimission with an agreement, compared to the 
length of time to obtain permission without an agreement, suggests that the increased use of
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agreements in Cambridgeshire, and throughout Britain, may have also been partially 
responsible.
Analysis of Contributions in Agreements
Table 6.20 presents data showing the number of agreements which contained 
contributions for various purposes. A total of 120 agreements contained contributions for 
foul sewers, drainage, sewage treatment plants, and sewage pumping stations, making this 
the largest single purpose for which contributions were offered. Contributions for 
highway improvements were offered in 53 agreements. The next most frequent purposes 
for which contributions were offered were footpaths and cycleways (36) and recreation and 
open space improvements (34).
Table 6.20: Number of Agreements With Contributions For Various Purposes 
Cambridgeshire
Purpose of Contributions Res. Agree. Com. Agree. Total Agreements
Foul Sewer 31 4 35
Sewage Treatment 19 2 21
Sewage Pumping Station 9 1 10
Surface Water Drainage 42 12 54
Roads 33 20 53
Footpaths /  Cycleways 27 9 36
Recreation/Open Space/Amenity 27 7 34
School 7 0 7
Other Public Building/Facility 2 4 6
Housing 10 1 11
Parking 2 5 7
Public Transport 2 0 2
Miscellaneous 1 2  3
Total 212 67 279
Percent 76% 24% 100%
A closer examination of Table 6.20 reveals interesting differences in the 
contributions made by residential and commercial developers. Contributions for surface 
water drainage and foul sewers were more frequently agreed to by residential developers 
than by commercial developers. On the other hand, contributions for road improvements 
were more common among commercial developers. Thirty percent of the contributions 
offered by commercial developers were for highway improvements, whereas only sixteen 
percent of the contributions offered by residential developers were for highway related
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improvements. Commercial developers were also more likely to offer contributions for 
parking than were residential developers.
Contributions for other purposes were relatively infrequent Only seven 
contributions were offered for schools (all by residential developers), and only six 
contributions were offered for other public or community facilities. Eleven contributions 
for housing were offered- ten of them by residential developers. The one commercial 
agreement that appeared to involve a housing contribution was actually a special case, in 
that it was linked to the sale of city council-owned land to a private developer. (For further 
discussion, see Barnwell Drive case in Appendix Two-Selected Agreements.) 
Contributions by commercial developers for recreation, open space and amenities were 
rare.
Developers frequently offered contributions in more than one form. For example, a 
contribution for sewers might have involved a donation of land, an offer to build construct 
the improvement, and also an offer to maintain the improvement once completed. Thus, 
the total number of contributions offered by developers (i.e. the total number of forms of 
those contributions) was greater than the number of purposes of contributions shown in 
Table 6.20. Table 6.21 presents statistics on the forms of developer contributions, and is 
the most accurate way of counting offers of contributions.
Table 6.21: Forms of Contributions Negotiated in Cambridgeshire
Residential Commercial Total Percent
Pay 41 14 55 14%
Construct 162 45 207 54%
Construct with joint-funding 5 0 5 1%
Donate land or permanent easement 62 14 76 20%
Sell land 9 2 11 3%
Maintain 7 2 9 2%
Commuted sum— maintenance 9 1 10 3%
Commuted sum — parking 0 5 5 1%
Sell /  lease space at below market cost 5 0 5 1%
Total
Percent
300
78%
83
22%
383
100% 100%
As shown in Table 6.21, there were 383 separate offers of contributions (i.e. 
different forms of contributions). Two hundred and seven (54%) of those forms of
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contributions involved offers to construct some improvement for a public authority. There 
were 76 offers to donate land or permanent easements, comprising 20% of all 
contributions, plus five instances when applicants agreed to sell land to the local authority 
on terms at less than market cost It is important to note that only 70 (18%) of the 383 
promised contributions involved payments of money— 60 for the construction of specified 
improvements, and 10 for the cost of maintaining and operating facilities and improvements 
once they were completed. Moreover, very few of those offers of money were likely to be 
collected by the local public authorities who were responsible for granting planning 
permission. Forty-seven (67%) of all offers of cash contributions were for sewer and 
drainage infrastructure improvements (their construction and/or subsequent maintenance 
and operations), and most of those contributions were intended for Anglian Water 
Authority. Six cash payments (11% of the total) were promised to Cambridgeshire County 
Council— five for improvements of county roads and one for a school. One cash payment 
was offered to the Department of Transport for the improvement of rail public transport. 
Only 16 (23%) of the 70 offers of cash contributions were for facilities and improvements 
which it was the responsibility of district councils to provide (i.e., recreation, open space, 
amenities, parking and miscellaneous improvements). Indeed, local districts and councils 
— compared to other authorities such as the County and Anglian Water Authority— gained 
relatively little from the agreements they signed. It is also important to emphasise that 
when cash payments were offered, they were always offered for the purpose o f obtaining 
some specific public facility or infrastructure improvement. Moreover, there was not a 
single instance where a payment was offered without specifically stating in the agreement 
the purpose for which the payment was being made.
Contributions for the maintenance of public facilities and improvements were 
relatively uncommon. There were nine instances when developers offered themselves to 
maintain public facilities and improvements for at least a period of time, and ten offers of 
commuted sum payments for maintenance — five for the maintenance of open space and 
recreation areas and five for the maintenance of sewers and drains. No contributions were 
offered toward maintaining highways. There were only two offers of contributions for 
public transport— both made in connection with one of the proposed new settlements in 
East Cambridgeshire.
The data presented above gives little indication as to the magnitude of developer 
contributions, and whether or not these contributions were beneficial to communities. As a 
way of indirectly measuring this aspect of developer contributions, data was collected and 
analysed regarding types of highway improvements which were subject to agreements.
Five types of road improvements covered by agreements were identified. Keeping in mind 
the important distinction between “beneficial” and “onerous,” as discussed in Chapter 
Four, it can be seen that three of these types of road improvements were clearly beneficial
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to proposed developments. Only two of the road improvements could be viewed as in any 
way onerous.
- Widen existing public road and/or construct a new turning lane adjacent to 
proposed development (beneficial)
- Construct estate road on-site (beneficial)
- Construct junction providing direct access into the development from an 
existing public highway (beneficial)
- Construct a new off-site road, to be adopted and maintained as a public 
highway (slighdy onerous)
- Construct off-site junction improvements ( i.e., new intersection or roundabout) 
some distance from the site, to an standard greater than necessary simply to meet 
the needs of the proposed development (onerous)
As shown in Table 6.22, the most frequent type of highway agreements called for 
the construction of junctions connecting new on-site estate roads to existing public 
highways. Thirty-six per cent of all highway improvements specified in agreements were 
of this type, and were clearly beneficial to the developments to which they pertained. The 
second most frequent type of highway improvement carried out or paid for by developers 
involved widening existing public roads adjacent to proposed developments, including the 
construction of dedicated turning lanes into proposed developments. Nine of the sixteen 
offers for this type of highway improvement were obtained from developers of commercial 
properties (shopping complexes, industrial estates and office parks). Again, highway 
improvements of this type were directly beneficial to proposed developments. Eight 
agreements were signed which simply called for the construction of on-site estate roads, 
without specifying any off-site improvements whatsoever. Thus, 46 (75%) of the 61 
highway improvements offered were directly related, and beneficial to the developments 
which occasioned the agreements. Not only were such improvements beneficial to the 
proposed developments, but they were indeed absolutely necessary for development to 
proceed.
Fifteen developer commitments (approximately 25%) involved more substantial, 
and more onerous, highway contributions which offered benefits to the community at- 
large. In five instances developers offered to construct new public roads which offered 
community benefit in terms of traffic circulation. But these offers of contributions were not 
solely altruistic, since they also made adjacent and nearby land owned by the contributors 
more valuable for development. Probably the most generous type of commitment from 
developers involved offers to construct or pay for junction improvements some distance 
from proposed developments. There were a total of ten commitments for this type of
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highway improvement, six of which came from developers of commercial properties.
Table 6.22 : Types of Highway Improvements Covered bv Agreements
Residential Commercial
Developments Developments Total
Construct
New Public Rd. 4 1 5 ( 8%)
Widen/Improve 7 9 (38%) 16 (26%)
Existing Public Rd.
Improve Junction 4 6(25%) 10(16%)
(not adjacent)
Construct Junction
connecting Estate 17 (46%) 5 22 (36%)
Rd. to Public Hgwy.
Estate Road 5 3 8(13%)
(entirely on-site)
Total 37 24 61
Analysis of Non-Contrihiitorv Provisions in Agreements
Table 6.23 presents county-wide data on non-contributory provisions included in 
agreements signed in Cambridgeshire during the study period (i.e. all non-contributory 
provisions found in agreements, including non-contributory provisions found in 
agreements with contributions). As shown in the table, agreements signed in 
Cambridgeshire during the study period contained a total of 454 non-contributory 
provisions. Sixty-two percent of those non-contributory provisions applied to residential 
permissions. However, as noted at the beginning of this chapter, 71% of all permissions 
granted during the study period in Cambridgeshire were residential permissions. On the 
other hand, 38% of all non-contributory provisions were applied to permissions for 
commercial development. Only 29% of all permissions granted in Cambridgeshire during 
the study period were commercial. Thus, even though numerically more non-contributory 
provisions were found in residential agreements, there was a somewhat greater tendency to 
impose non-contributory provisions on commercial developments than on residential 
developments.
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Table 6.23: Non-Contributorv Provisions in Agreements - Cambridgeshire
Purpose Res,j\gre& Com. Agree. Total Percent
Specify Use 53 46 99 22%
Extinguish Existing Use 3 10 13 3%
Restrict Occupancy 65 11 76 17%
Minimise Adverse Impacts 3 8 11 2%
Rehabilitate /  Improve /  Preserve 13 8 21 5%
Set Deadline /  Timetable 5 14 19 4%
Phase Development 42 17 59 13%
Limit Development 8 10 18 4%
Revise Previous Agreement 7 4 11 2%
Waive Right to Compensation 1 5 5 1%
Give Notice to LPA 0 4 4 1%
Pay Legal Costs of Agree. 81 36 117 26%
Total 281 173 454
Percent 62% 38% 100% 100%
One hundred seventeen provisions were found in agreements requiring the applicant 
to pay for the legal cost of preparing the agreement— making this the most frequent non- 
contributory provision in agreements. Forty percent of all agreements required the 
applicant to pay legal costs. However, that meant that in 60% of all agreements, legal costs 
involved in preparing the agreements were paid by the local authority. According to Chris 
Taylor, South Cambridgeshire District Council Solicitor (1991,int), a poll he conducted of 
local government solicitors in the South East in January 1991 showed that less than half of 
all local authorities charged for preparing legal agreements. The next three most common 
non-contributory provisions in agreements were to specify use (99), to restrict occupancy 
(76), and to regulate the phasing o f development (59). These three non-contributory 
purposes, when combined, comprised over half (52%) of all non-contributory purposes in 
agreements. The remaining nine non-contributory purposes occurred relatively 
infrequently in agreements; none of these nine purposes occurred in more than 5% of 
agreements, and the nine provisions combined comprised only 22% of all non-contributory 
purposes included in agreements.
Occupancy restrictions and phasing requirements were much more frequendy 
included in residential agreements than in commercial agreements. On the other hand, 
other non-contributory provisions were more likely to be imposed on commercial 
developments. For example, provisions intended to minimise adverse impacts, to set 
deadlines and timetables, and to limit development were found more frequendy in
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commercial agreements than in residential agreements — despite the fact that substantially 
fewer agreements were signed for commercial developments than for residential 
developments. Similarly, the provision waiving the right to claim compensation occurred 
in five commercial agreements, but in only one of the residential agreements. The 
provision requiring that the local authority be given notice occurred four times in 
commercial agreements, but in none of the residential agreements.
A majority of occupancy restrictions were imposed on applicants seeking to build a 
single dwelling unit The most frequent type of occupancy restriction involved applications 
to build a farmhouse, or to add a dwelling unit on a working farm, and required that the 
occupant(s) of the permitted unit be employed on the premises, or in local agriculture. 
Another way in which planning authorities applied occupancy restrictions to single 
dwelling units was to require that units added to existing homes be occupied by family 
members (i.e. as family annexes). Agreements were also used to ensure that certain new 
residential developments would be permanently available for occupancy by elderly persons. 
A breakdown of occupancy restrictions found in Cambridgeshire, and the number of times 
they were imposed in agreements between 1985 and 1990, is given in Table 6.24.
Table 6.24: Residential Occupancy Restrictions in Agreements- Cambridgeshire
Purpose of Restriction Times Imposed
Work-related restriction— units to be occupied only by persons 
employed on premises or in certain activities 
(i.e. in local agriculture) 36
Elderly persons 22
Family annexes 3
Students 3
Local residents; local firms; local user requirement 2
Short term, "holiday" flats 2
Local authority has right to nominate occupants 3
Particular categories of firms (i.e. R & D) 1
Occupancy limited to specific occupant or period of time 4
Total 76
Trends, During the 1985-1990 Period
As noted in Chapter Five, the 1980*5 saw a substantial increase in development 
activity in Cambridgeshire, and a significant rise in planning applications through 1988. 
This rise in planning applications, indicative of increased development pressure in the
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county, probably strengthened the ability of local authorities to secure contributions from 
developers (should they have been inclined to do so). Equally significant is the fact that 
local authorities responded to the increased numbers of planning applications by refusing 
an increased percentage of planning applications. The inverse relationship between 
changes in planning applications and changes in the overall approval rate of planning 
applications is graphically shown in Figure 6.04. As the number of planning applications 
increased between 1982 through 1988, local planning authorities responded by refusing an 
increasing percentage of planning applications. In 1988, when planning applications 
reached a peak, and when developers were undoubtedly most willing to offer 
contributions, local planning authorities approved the lowest percentage of applications 
during the decade. By refusing an increasing percentage of planning applications as 
planning applications increased, LPAs enhanced the strength of their bargaining position to 
seek contributions from developers. On the other hand, when planning applications fell 
after 1988, LPAs weakened their bargaining position by approving an increasing 
percentage of applications.
Figure 6.04:
Change in Applications Versus Change in Percent Approved
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There is no evidence to suggest that planning authorities consciously adopted a 
policy of refusing more applications as development pressure increased (or of approving 
more when development pressure decreased). Nevertheless, the data clearly shows, that the 
odds for approval or denial of planning applications clearly changed over time, and that 
such changes were related to and shaped by changes in the property market. Why then did 
local authorities in Cambridgeshire respond to the increased development pressure by 
refusing an increasing percentage of planning applications?
One possible explanation might be that as the boom progressed, more and more 
poorly conceived development proposals were submitted which were contrary to 
established planning policies and which were therefore not approvable. A second 
explanation might be that as development activity in the county intensified, there was 
increased opposition to development on the part of citizens, and that local planning 
authorities bowed to this increased opposition by refusing an increasing percentage of 
planning applications. Indeed there is some evidence to suggest that opposition to 
development intensified in the East Anglian region during the 1980’s. For example, a 1989 
report prepared by the Department of Land Economy of the University of Cambridge found 
that “In the Ouse Valley, South Cambridgeshire, and in Royston there has been very strong 
public opposition to further expansion and a belief that these areas have been taking more 
than their fair share of growth”(University of Cambridge,1989,77). Similarly, a feature 
article on Ml 1 Property Development in the Financial Times reported that “The recent 
surge in residential property prices in East Anglia reflects, at least in part, a desire among 
new owners to find, and the desire among established owners to consolidate, access to the 
countryside... there is, then, a powerful lobby against development"(FinancialTimes, 4 
November, 1988, 17).
How then did the negotiation of agreements, and agreements with contributions 
change during the 1985-90 period? As shown in Figure 6.05, the number of planning 
agreements signed annually in Cambridgeshire increased throughout the study period, from 
23 agreements in 1985 to 101 agreements in 1989. During the first three months of 1991 
(not shown in Figure 6.05), 29 agreements were signed. Had that pace of signing 
agreements been maintained throughout the year, a total of 116 agreements would have 
been signed in 1990.
A more detailed picture of the tendency toward an increased use of agreements is 
provided Figure 6.06, which plots the number of agreements signed in Cambridgeshire on 
a quarterly basis. This data shows that the signing of agreements reached its peak during 
the second quarter of 1988, and remained at a fairly high level thereafter, except for a 
sharp dip during the third quarter of 1988. The number of agreements signed in the first 
quarter of 1990 equaled the high reached during the second quarter of 1988.
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Figure 6.05: Number of Agreements Signed Per Year 
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A breakdown of the data on agreements, differentiating between agreements with 
contributions and those without contributions, helps to clarify what actually happened 
during the study period, and helps to explain somewhat the above contradiction. Figures 
6.07 and 6.08 present data on the number of agreements signed per quarter for residential 
and commercial developments which involved contributions. As shown by Figure 6.07, 
relatively few residential agreements with contributions were signed from 1985 through the 
middle of 1987. After the middle of 1987, the number of residential agreements with 
contributions tended to increase, before falling off sharply in the last two quarters. The 
signing of commercial agreements with contributions lagged well behind that of residential 
agreements. In 9 of the first 13 quarters of the study period, not a single commercial 
agreement with contributions was signed. In fact, in the first 13 quarters of the study 
period only 10 commercial agreements with contributions were signed, whereas during the 
last 8 quarters a total of 24 such agreements with contributions were signed.
Figure 6.07: Residential Agreements With Vs. Without Contributions
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Figure 6.08: Commercial Agreements With Vs. Without Contributions
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Figure 6.09 presents a composite picture of the total number of contributory versus 
non-contributory agreements signed per quarter between 1 January 1985 and 30 March 
1990. This figure clearly shows that, although the total number of agreements signed per 
quarter generally increased over time, non-contributory agreements were becoming more 
numerous than contributory agreements during the latter half of the study period. In fact, at 
the very end of the study period the number of agreements without contributions increased, 
whereas the number of agreements signed with contributions decreased.
The finding that the number of agreements with contributions declined toward the 
end of the study period, at a time when the property market was in decline, seems to 
suggest that the negotiation of contributions was sensitive to changing market conditions. 
The fact that the decline in agreements did not show up statistically until a year or so after 
the property market began to decline is to be expected, given the fact that it generally took a 
year or more for agreements to be finalised.
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Figure 6.09: Total Agreements With and Without Contributions
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Agreements with Contributions for Highways and Water Infrastructure
The two most frequently offered contributions in agreements were for the 
improvement of highways, and for the improvement of water-related infrastructure. It is 
therefore significant to note that offers of contributions for both these specific purposes 
declined sharply after reaching peaks at the end of 1988. Offers of contributions for these 
two specific purposes reflected a similar pattern of decline starting in the beginning of 
1989.
During the study period, a total of 54 agreements contained offers of contributions 
for highway improvements. As shown in Figure 6.10, few agreements with highway 
contributions were signed prior to 1988. In 1988, however, there was a burst of activity in 
signing highway-related agreements, which lasted approximately one year. The peak 
number of agreements with highway contributions signed in a single quarter was 12, 
during the last quarter of 1988. But In the first quarter of 1989, the number of highway- 
related agreements dropped sharply, followed by two additional quarters of declining 
contributions.
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Figure 6.10: Agreements With Highway Contributions
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According to a spokesman for Anglian Water Authority (Morrod,1991a,int), AWA 
sought to resist requisitions from developers seeking extensions of sewer and drainage 
lines to serve new development sites. When AWA did agree to use its powers to condemn 
and acquire rights of way needed for sewer extensions, it tended to encourage developers 
to construct the sewer connections, subject to a Section 30 agreement assuring that the 
sewers were properly constructed.
The Authority has preferred to have developers construct needed off-site sewers, 
rather than having the authority construct them. It saves the Authority the 
expenditure and effort of having to construct improvements, and then having to 
recover the money from the developer. And it is almost always less expensive for a 
developer to construct the sewer than to pay Anglian Water Authority to construct it 
(Morrod, Ibid.).
There is little question that it was almost always less expensive for a developer to 
construct the sewer improvements than to have Anglian Water Authority construct the off- 
site sewer. When AWA did agree to construct the sewer improvements, a developer was 
required to take out a mortgage, payable over 12 years, at a rate of interest set by the 
Director General, for the full cost of the project The developer was also required to 
provide financial security in the form of a deposit in advance for the full amount of the cost 
of the project— this financial security to be refunded only after the full amount of the 
mortgage was paid. Given these stiff terms, it is no wonder that developers so often chose 
to construct the improvements themselves, as AWA’s contractor.
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As shown in Figure 6.11, only four agreements with contributions for sewer and 
drainage infrastructure were negotiated in all of Cambridgeshire during the first year and a 
half of the study period. During the next three years, through the middle of 1988, there 
was a noticeable increase the number of agreements with such contributions. During the 
last two quarters, however, in the period leading up to the water infrastructure charge, the 
number of agreements with sewer and drainage contributions sharply declined.
Fig. 6.11: Agreements Signed With Sewer/Drainage Contributions
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One factor which may possibly have contributed to the decline in the signing of 
agreements with water infrastructure contributions was the fact that Anglian Water 
Authority, like other regional water authorities, was officially privatised in September 
1989. This transition from a public authority to a private corporation was obviously a 
major organisational adjustment, and might have temporarily interrupted the signing of 
agreements with developers. On the other hand, as the time drew closer to 1 April 1990, 
when the provisions of the 1989 Water Act were to take effect, Anglian Water Authority 
may have become increasingly unwilling to enter into agreements with developers— 
preferring instead to wait until after 1 April 1990, when a mandatory infrastructure charge 
would be automatically imposed.
Anneals
One factor which worked against the ability of local authorities to force developers 
into offering contributions was the ability of developers to bypass local authorities by 
obtaining planning permissions on appeal from the Secretary of State. Data compiled on 
the number of planning permissions granted on appeal between 1982 and 1990 suggests 
that, as development pressure increased, developers in Cambridgeshire were increasingly 
successful in appealing non-determinations and refusals of planning permission to the 
Secretary of State. As shown in Figure 6.12, the number of residential developments 
granted planning permission on appeal rose steadily after 1982, reaching a peak of 133 in 
1989. Between 1985 and 1990, at total of 455 residential developments in Cambridgeshire 
were granted permission on appeal.
Fewer commercial developments than residential developments were granted 
planning permission on appeal. As shown in Figure 6.13, the greatest number of 
commercial permissions granted on appeal was in 1986, when 28 commercial projects were 
granted planning permission by the Secretary of State. Between 1985 and 1990,90 
commercial projects were granted planning permission on appeal.
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Figure 6.12: Housing Permissions Granted on Appeal
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The analysis of agreements, contributions and non-contributory provisions 
presented in this chapter has provided an overview of local authority use of agreements in 
Cambridgeshire. Absent from this analysis has been any reference to specific projects 
which occasioned agreements. For a brief descriptions of specific agreements signed for 
specific developments, the reader may wish to refer to Appendix Two-- “Selected 
Agreements.” The brief case studies of selected agreements contained in this appendix 
describe the specific contributory and non-contributory provisions included in individual 
agreements, and the circumstances under which agreements were signed. The value of 
these case descriptions is that they provide a fuller understanding of how agreements were 
used in specific planning contexts. They also underscore the generally limited scope of 
contributions obtained in Cambridgeshire, and help explain why LPAs obtained so little 
from developers.
Summary of Findings
Analysis of agreements signed in Cambridgeshire at the county-level produced the 
following significant findings:
- Only two percent of planning permissions were subject to planning agreements. The 
majority of the agreements applied to minor projects, and did not involve developer 
contributions.
- Agreements which involved contributions tended to be negotiated for relatively large 
projects ( residential projects averaging 121 units, and commercial developments averaging 
9,165 square metres of floor area). Agreements which did not involve contributions tended 
to be negotiated for much smaller developments (residential projects averaging 8 units, and 
commercial developments averaging 1,453 square metres).
- Because of the tendency to negotiate agreements with contributions for large-sized 
projects, the percentage of total permitted development subject to agreements was greater 
than the percentage of permissions subject to agreements (as reported above) seemed to 
suggest Approximately 27% of all housing units granted planning permission, and 20% 
of all newly permitted commercial development were subject to planning agreements.
- The signing of agreements significantly lengthened the time it took for applicants to 
receive planning permission. However, there is little evidence to indicate that delay was a 
factor in forcing developers into agreeing to make contributions. Agreements not involving 
contributions took approximately as long to process as those involving contributions.
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- There was a greater tendency to negotiate contributions from residential developments 
than from commercial projects. On the other hand, there was a relatively strong tendency 
to impose non-contributory provisions on commercial developments, to minimise adverse 
impacts of those developments. Nevertheless, stipulations imposed on commercial 
developers typically fell short of requiring contributions to compensate the community for 
social and environmental costs imposed by those developments.
- There was a strong tendency to negotiate agreements in relation to outline applications, 
suggesting that applicants who signed agreements were frequently in a position to pass the 
costs of contributions back to landowners.
- Projects which were subject to agreements were actually less dense than projects which 
were not subject to agreements. This finding was unexpected, given previous writings by 
economists (see Chapter Four) suggesting that the negotiation of planning gain should 
produce more compact, more dense development
- Contributions for development-related infrastructure such as sewers, drainage, 
highways, footpaths and cycleways accounted for over 75% of all the contributions offered 
by developers. Contributions for off-site sewer and drainage infrastructure comprised the 
largest single type of infrastructure contribution. With few exceptions, developer 
contributions were directly related to the developments which were the subject of 
agreements, and were specifically ear-marked for infrastructure improvements which were 
necessary for development to proceed. In short, the vast majority of contributions offered 
in agreements were beneficial (not onerous) to developers and their proposed 
developments, and did not represent payment of betterment
- In most cases, developers took advantage of the flexibility offered through the 
negotiation process by negotiating agreements which allowed them to construct needed 
facilities themselves, rather than having to pay money for those facilities to public 
authorities.
- Most cash payments made by developers were collected either by Anglian Water 
Authority or the County Highway Authority, rather than by the district councils which 
granted planning permission. Less than 25% of all contributions offered by developers 
were for facilities and improvements which district councils were responsible for 
providing- open space and recreation, social housing, and parking. The small proportion 
of contributions collected at the district level calls into question the notion that local
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planning authorities have used their monopoly power over planning permission to extract 
contributions for their own benefit.
- The number of agreements signed in Cambridgeshire increased steadily over the course 
of the 1985-1990 study period. There was a particularly strong trend toward making 
increased use of agreements for non-contributory purposes. The negotiation of 
contributions in agreements showed a more variable pattern. Particularly noteworthy is the 
fact that negotiated contributions dropped off sharply toward the end of the study period, 
when the property market weakened and development pressure fell.
- Offers of contributions by developers were not sufficient to tempt local authorities to 
increase their rate of approval of planning applications. As the number of planning 
applications increased, and as developers likely became more willing to offer contributions, 
LPAs refused an increasing percentage of planning applications. On the other hand, when 
the number of planning applications fell sharply toward the end of the study period, LPAs 
reversed themselves and began to approve an increased percentage of planning 
applications- in effect undermining their bargaining position to obtain contributions at a 
time when developers were least likely to want to offer contributions. These findings 
suggest that Cambridgeshire LPAs did not act to maximise the collection of contributions.
- As development pressure increased during the study period, the number of permissions 
granted on appeal by the Secretary of State increased. The increased ability of developers 
to obtain planning permission on appeal, and to bypass local authorities, further weakened 
the bargaining position of local authorities in seeking contributions.
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CHAPTER SEVEN : GEOGRAPHICAL VARIATION IN USING 
AGREEMENTS
Conditions in Cambridgeshire during the period 1985-1990 were highly favourable 
for the negotiation of contributions from developers. “This is a booming region,.. with a 
fast improving infrastructure...’’(Inland Revenue,Autumn 1987,16). However, public 
investments in infrastructure benefited some districts more than others. Moreover, as 
discussed in Chapter Five, rates of growth, market demand, and degrees of planning 
constraint on development varied considerably within the region. For example, while the 
county’s population increased 12% between 1980 and 1990, Huntingdonshire’s population 
increased 17%, while Cambridge’ population actually decreased. In Cambridge and South 
Cambridgeshire, applications for new residential, commercial and industrial development 
were subject to unusually severe constraint. Meanwhile, the degree of constraint exerted 
on residential or commercial new development in Peterborough was uniformly low. 
Applications for commercial development were even less likely to be refused in Fenland 
and Huntingdonshire. By the end of the decade, these differential policies of constraint had 
produced major imbalances within the region between supply and demand. Within the 
Cambridge Sub-Area, there was a high level of unmet market demand, while in Fenland 
and Peterborough planning permissions were so freely granted as to produce a supply of 
land with planning permission well in excess of demand. Within the county there were 
also differences in political affiliation. Cambridge and Peterborough City Councils were 
affiliated with Labour, while the four remaining district councils, and the county council 
were Conservative.
Based on what has previously been theorised about agreements (as discussed in 
Chapter Four), such significant differences within the region might be expected to have had 
an impact on the ability, and possibly the inclination, of different districts to negotiate 
developer contributions. This chapter therefore analyses and compares the data on 
agreements signed in Cambridgeshire between 1985 and 1990 at the district level. Did 
local authorities differ significantly in the extent and nature of their use of agreements?
How did attitudes and policies of local planning authorities within the region differ toward 
using agreements? And what factors possibly played a role in shaping local authority use 
of agreements?
Analysis of the Data on Agreements hv District
South Cambridgeshire and the City of Cambridge City signed the most agreements 
for commercial permissions (see Table 7.01). Fifty-three of the 88 agreements signed for
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commercial projects in Cambridgeshire were signed in those two districts. Still, the 
percentage of all permissions which involved agreements in those districts was relatively 
small (5% for South Cambridgeshire; 4% for Cambridge). In Huntingdonshire and 
Peterborough, where much of the commercial development activity in the county was 
concentrated, few commercial agreements were signed. In Peterborough only 2%  of all 
commercial permissions were subject to agreement
'iiiW U L a k i i f p i iw u  l u i
Total Comm. Agreements
\j ▼ l y i o u i v i
Percent Perms.
Permissions* Signed With Agreements
Cambridge 598 23 4%
E. Cambs. 394 5 1%
Fenland 578 15 3%
Huntingdon 975 13 1%
Peterborough 819 2 2%
S. Cambs. 669 30 5%
Total 4035 88 2%
Table 7.02: Agreements Signed for Residential Permissions, bv District
Total Res. Agreements Percent Perms.
Permissions* Signed With Agreements
Cambridge 605 22 4%
E. Cambs. 1391 8 1%
Fenland 2555 67 3%
Huntingdon 1951 62 3%
Peterborough 1099 10 1%
S. Cambs. 1951 37 2%
Total 9552 206 2%
* Source: DoE Development Control Statistics
As shown in Table 7.02, Fenland and Huntingdonshire signed the largest number 
of residential agreements. However on a percentage basis, Cambridge was more active in 
signing agreements. Four per cent of all residential permissions in Cambridge involved 
agreements. Comparatively few agreements for residential permissions were signed in East 
Cambridgeshire and Peterborough, where only 1% of all residential permissions were 
subject to agreements.
Tables 7.03 and 7.04 present data showing the rate at which planning agreements 
were signed for permissions related to major developments, as previously defined. As
-201-
shown in Table 7.03, the largest numbers of agreements for major commercial projects 
were signed in South Cambridgeshire (13) and Cambridge (11). In Peterborough, which 
granted more permissions for major commercial projects than any other district, only 2 
major commercial agreements were signed. As shown in Table 7.04, the largest number of 
agreements for major residential projects was signed in Fenland (23), and again the fewest 
in Peterborough.
Tables 7.03 and 7.04 also show the number of major permissions which were 
subject to agreements negotiated in conjunction with previous planning applications. 
Adding these permissions subject to agreements to the number of agreements which were 
signed, gives the total number of permissions which were subject to agreements (see last 
column). For both commercial and residential applications, the largest percentages of 
major planning permissions subject to agreements were in South Cambridgeshire and East 
Cambridgeshire.
Table 7.03: Maior Commercial Permissions Subject to Agreements, bv District
Perms. Subject Total Perms.
Total Perms. Agreements to Prev. Agree. Subject to Agree
Cambridge 70 11 8 19 (27%)
E. Cambs. 13 5 1 6 (46%)
Fenland 21 7 0 7 (33%)
Huntingdon 48 6 1 7 (15%)
Peterborough 80 2 0 2 ( 2%)
S. Cambs. 24 13 1 14 (58%)
Tbiai 256 44 U  55 (21%)
Table 7.04: Maior Residential Permissions Subject to Agreements, bv District
Perms. Subject to Total Perms. 
Total Perms. Agreements Previous Agree. Subject to Agree
Cambridge 15 5 4 9 (56%)
E. Cambs. 17 7 4 11 (65%)
Fenland 58 23 1 24 (41%)
Huntingdon 57 11 15 24 (46%)
Peterborough 60 3 0 3 ( 5%)
S. Cambs. 38 10 20 30 (79%)
Tbtai 245 59 44 103 (42%)
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Tables 7.05 and 7.06 present data showing the number of agreeements signed for 
major developments, and the percentage of such agreements which involved contributions. 
In four of the six districts in Cambridgeshire, 100% of the agreements signed for major 
residential projects involved contributions. Districts were less consistent in using 
agreements to obtain contributions related to major commercial developments. Forty-six 
percent of major commercial agreements signed in South Cambridgeshire, and 33% in 
Huntingdonshire, did not involve contributions.
Table 7.05: Percent of Maior Commercial Agreements With Contributions, bv District
Agree. Signed Agreements Percent Agree.
Maior Comm. With Contrib. With Contrib.
Cambridge 11 8 73%
E. Cambs. 5 4 80%
Fenland 7 7 100%
Huntingdon 6 4 66%
Peterborough 2 2 100%
S. Cambs. 13 7 54%
Total 44 32 73%
Table 7.06: Percent of Major Residential Agreements With Contributions, bv District
Agree. Signed Agreements Percent Agree.
Maior Res. With Contrib. With Contrib.
Cambridge 5
E. Cambs. 7
Fenland 23
Huntingdon 11
Peterborough 3
S. Cambs. 10
5 100%
6 86%
22 95%
11 100%
3 100%
10 100%
Total 59 57 98%
Permissions for minor development (commercial projects of less than 900 square 
meters, and residential developments of less than 50 units) were much less likely to involve 
contributions. Only 11% of all agreements signed for minor commercial projects involved 
contributions (see Table 7.07). In Cambridge, East Cambridgeshire and Peterborough no 
contributions whatsoever were obtained from small commercial developments. Fenland
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and South Cambridgeshire signed only 1 agreement each for minor commercial 
developments. Twenty-four percent of all agreements signed for minor residential projects 
involved contributions (see Table 7.08). In Huntingdonshire, 51 agreements were signed 
for minor residential developments, but only 5 (10%) of those agreements involved 
contributions. In South Cambridgeshire, 27 agreements were signed for minor residential 
developments, but none of those agreements involved contributions. The one district 
which was active in extracting contributions from small residential developments was 
Fenland. Twenty-four of the 44 agreements signed for minor residential projects in 
Fenland involved contributions.
Table 7.07: Percent of Minor Commercial Agreements With Contributions, bv District
Agree. Signed Agreements Percent Agree.
Minoi.Cora. With Contrib. With Contrib.
Cambridge 12 0 0%
E. Cambs. 0 0 0%
Fenland 8 1 13%
Huntingdon 7 3 43%
Peterborough 0 0 0%
S. Cambs. 17 1 6%
Total 44 5 11%
Thble 7.08: Percent of Minor Residential Agreements With Contributions, bv District
Agree. Signed Agreements Percent Agree.
Minor Res. With Contrib. With Contrib.
Cambridge 17 4 24%
E. Cambs. 1 0 0%
Fenland 44 24 55%
Huntingdon 51 5 10%
Peterborough 7 3 43%
S. Cambs. 27 0 0%
Total 147 36 24%
Table 7.09 summarises and compares the overall performance of local authorities in 
signing agreements for all developments, large and small, and shows the wide disparities in 
behavior among the six districts. Fenland signed more residential agreements than any 
other district, and secured contributions in 69% of those agreements. Huntingdonshire 
signed the second largest number of residential agreements, but obtained contributions in
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only 27% of those agreements. South Cambridgeshire signed more commercial 
agreements than any other district, but secured contributions in only 27% of those 
agreements. Peterborough signed relatively few agreements for projects, but when it did 
they usually included contributions.
Table 7.09: Percent of All Residential and Commercial Agreements With Contributions
Res. Agree. Res. Agree. Com. Agree. Com. Agree.
Signed With Contrib. Signed With Contrib.
Cambridge 22 9 (41%) 23 8 (35%)
South Cambs. 37 10 (27%) 30 8 (27%)
E. Cambs. 8 6 (75%) 5 4 (80%)
Fenland 67 46 (69%) 15 8 (53%)
Huntingdon 62 16 (26%) 13 7 (54%)
Peterborough 10 6 (60%) 2 2 (100%)
Total 206 93 (45%) 88 37 (42%)
Thble 7.10 shows the number of times agreements were signed which contained 
contributions for various purposes, by district. This data further underscores the extent to 
which local authorities varied in their use of agreements. For example, a total of 30 
agreements signed in Fenland included contributions for roads, but not one agreement was 
signed in Huntingdonshire involving a road contribution. Fenland signed 22 agreements 
with contributions for footpaths and cycleways, while not one agreement in 
Huntingdonshire contained such contributions. On the other hand, Huntingdonshire was 
the only district in the county to sign agreements obtaining promises of commuted sum 
payments for parking (5). Among the six districts, Cambridge and East Cambridgeshire 
used agreements most often to obtain contributions for social and sheltered housing, and 
for schools. Huntingdonshire signed only one agreement involving a contribution for 
housing, and none for schools.
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Table 7.10: Number of Agreements With Contributions for Various Purposes
Purposes Cambridge S. Cambs. E. Cambs. Fenland Hunt. Pete.
Residential A greements
Foul Sewer 6 2 5 7 10 1
Sewage Treatment 1 1 1 8 8 0
Sewage Pumping Sta. 2 1 1 0 4 1
Surface Drainage 6 6 5 17 6 2
Roads 2 4 2 24 0 1
Footpaths/Cycleways 0 6 1 18 0 2
Rec./O.S./Amenity 5 5 3 6 5 3
School 1 3 3 0 0 0
Other BldgsVFacilities 0 0 1 0 1 0
Housing 4 0 3 1 1 1
Parking 1 0 0 1 0 0
Public Transport 0 0 1 1 0 0
Miscellaneous 0 0 0 0 1 0
Sub-Total 28 28 26 83 36 11
Commercial Agreements
Foul Sewer 0 1 0 3 0 0
Sewage Treatment 0 0 0 1 1 0
Sewage Pumping Sta. 0 0 0 1 0 0
Surface Drainage 4 5 0 3 0 0
Roads 3 6 4 6 0 1
Footpaths/Cycleways 1 3 0 4 0 1
Rec./O.S./Amenity 2 1* 0 1 1 2
School 0 0 0 0 0 0
Other Bldgs/Facilities 4 0 0 0 0 0
Housing 1 0 0 0 0 0
Parking 0 0 0 0 5 0
Public Transport 0 0 0 0 0 0
Miscellaneous 0 0 1 1 0 0
Sub-Total 15 16* 5 20 7 4
TOTAL 43 44* 31 103 43 15
* Contribution of £200,000 by Tesco not mentioned in agreement, not counted
More detailed analysis of the total numbers of contributions, and the forms those 
contributions took in each district, revealed the following variations in local practice.
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(Detailed tables showing forms of contributions by district can be found in Appendix 
Three.) Huntingdonshire obtained 24 contributions for sewer-related infrastructure (foul 
sewers, treatment plants and pumping stations), followed by Fenland (22), Cambridge 
(14) and East Cambridgeshire (11). The fewest sewer-related contributions were obtained 
in Peterborough (2). The most contributions for surface water drainage were obtained in 
Fenland (21), in South Cambridgeshire (15), and Cambridge (14). The fewest drainage- 
related contributions were again in Peterborough (2). The high number of water- 
infrastructure contributions in Huntingdonshire, compared to the total number of 
contributions obtained by that district, is particularly noticeable. Indeed, the total of 31 
contributions for foul sewer and surface water infrastructure in Huntingdonshire comprised 
63% of all the contributions the District extracted through agreements. The small number 
of water-related developer contributions in Peterborough is also worthy of comment. 
Peterborough was the only district in the County during the study period where developers 
could undertake development in relative certainty that they would not be asked to contribute 
for sewer and drainage infrastructure. One possible explanation for the absence of 
developer contributions for water infrastructure in Peterborogh might be that water 
infrastructure in Peterborough was more adequate than in other districts, due to previously 
high levels of prior public infrastructure expenditure in support of the New Town.
Districts in Cambridgeshire had a definite tendency to impose more contributions 
on residential developers than on commercial developers. For example, all fourteen of the 
contributions Cambridge obtained for sewer-related infrastructure were from residential 
developers. Twenty-three of the twenty-four contributions Huntingdonshire obtained for 
foul sewer-related infrastructure were from residential developers. Such disparities in 
obtaining sewer-related contributions might have some planning rationale, in that 
residential developments may place greater demands on sewers than certain types of 
commercial developments. However, a more likely explanation is that LPAs at the time 
viewed commercial and industrial development as being more beneficial and desirable than 
residential development, because of its job generation, and therefore usually did not ask 
commercial and industrial developments for infrastructure contributions. When offers of 
contributions were obtained from commercial developers they were almost always for 
purposes which were strategically related to and necessary for the development of 
commercial properties, such as for surface water drainage and roads.
Local authorities extracted relatively few contributions for maintenance costs for 
public facilities, although again some did so more often than others. South 
Cambridgeshire obtained seven contributions for maintenance- the largest number 
obtained by any District Huntingdonshire and Peterborough extracted only one 
contribution for maintenance, East Cambridgeshire two, Cambridge three, and Fenland 
four.
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Comparison of D istricts- Contributions Per Agreement
The best way of measuring and comparing the extent to which LPAs used 
agreements is probably not the number of agreements with contributions, but rather the 
average number of contributions per agreement for each district As shown in Table 7.11, 
the largest number of contributions per residential agreement was in East Cambridgeshire 
(5.6 contributions per agreement), with Cambridge a distant second (2.05). 
Huntingdonshire obtained by far the fewest contributions per residential agreement. 
County-wide, residential agreements contained an average of 1.46 contributions per 
agreement
The data for commercial agreements is slightly more ambiguous. Peterborough, 
which signed only 2 commercial agreements, had the largest number of contributions per 
agreement (3). Fenland, which signed 15 commercial agreements, secured the second 
highest number of contributions per agreement (1.6). Cambridge and South 
Cambridgeshire obtained relatively few contributions per commercial agreement 
Huntingdonshire secured the fewest number of contributions per agreement (.62). Within 
the County as a whole, commercial agreements contained an average of only .94 
contribution per agreement
Table 7.11: Contributions Per Residential Agreement. bv District
District Res. Agreements Contributions
Contributions 
Per Agreement
Cambridge 22 45 (38*) 2.05 (1.73*)
South Cambs. 37 45 1.22
E. Cambs. 8 45 5.63
Fenland 67 109 1.63
Huntingdon. 62 41 0.66
Peterborough 10 15 1.50
County Total 206 300(293*) 1.46(1.42*)
* Data in parenthesis eliminates “contributions*' obtained from sale of land at Nuffield Road
Table 7.12; Contributions Per Commercial Agreement bv District
Pistrifl
Contributions
Com. Agreements Contributions Per Agreement
Cambridge 
South Cambs.
23
30
5
15
13
2
17 (15**) .74 (.65**)
E. Cambs. 
Fenland
Huntingdon
Peterborough
23
5
24 
8
6
0.77
1.00
1.60
0.62
3.00
County Total 88 83 (81**) .94 (.92**)
** Data in parenthesis eliminates “contributions” obtained from sale of land at Barnwell 
Drive
Some qualification is needed in interpreting the data shown for the City of 
Cambridge in Tables 7.11 and 7.12. Follow-up interviews, and examination of project 
files, revealed two cases in the City of Cambridge where “contributions” were obtained in 
connection with the sale of district land. Seven so-called contributions were obtained in 
connection the sale of city-owned land at Nuffield Road for residential development Two 
major contributions were received by Cambridge in connection with the sale of land at 
Barnwell Drive for commercial development (For a full description of the Nuffield Road 
and Barnwell Drive cases, see Appendix Two, “Selected Agreements.”)
Taking into account the circumstances under which these two agreements were 
signed, it is clear that in these were not really “contributions” at all, but rather a different 
way for the City to receive payment for land it was selling— allowing the City to escape 
revenue and expenditure limitations imposed by the central government Removing these 
“contributions” from the totals (see data in parentheses in Tables 7.11 and 7.12) reveals that 
the City of Cambridge did even worse than originally supposed in obtaining contributions 
from developers. In terms of obtaining contributions from residential developers, 
Cambridge was only slightly above average, and well below the performance of East 
Cambridgeshire. From commercial developers, Cambridge negotiated only .65 
contribution per agreement (only slightly more than Huntingdonshire, which negotiated the 
fewest commercial contributions). The poor performance of the City of Cambridge in 
obtaining contributions- despite the fact that the Gty was philosophically receptive to the 
idea of seeking contributions, and exerted considerable constraint on development— is 
indeed one of the surprise findings of this research.
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Local Authority Policies. Attitudes and Contexts
To some extent, the variability of local authority behavior was due to the fact that 
attitudes toward agreements and developer contributions were evolving. Also, it took time, 
especially for some rural local authorities, to gain confidence and experience in using 
agreements. For example, Fenland District Council signed only 4 Section 52 agreements prior 
to 1985— the first of which was signed in 1979. In the first three years of the study period, 
Fenland signed only 12 agreements (an average of 4 per year). It was after 1987 that the 
District’s use of agreements accelerated. Between 1 January, 1988 and the 1 April 1990 the 
district signed 70 agreements (an average of over 31 per year). Sixty-seven of the 82 
agreements signed in Fenland during the study period were for residential developments.
Local authority use of agreements also varied because the contexts in which different 
local planning authorities were operating were very different, and the planning objectives in the 
various districts varied as well. The following section briefly reviews the planning contexts in 
each of the six districts, and the attitudes of local authorities toward agreements, as revealed 
through interviews with local planners and solicitors, and through a review of local authority 
plans and policy statements.
Cambridge and South Cambridgeshire -  The Cambridge Sub Area
The unique geographical relationship between Cambridge and South Cambridgeshire 
makes it difficult to discuss one district’s planning and development control policies without 
discussing comparable policies in the other. Cambridge and South Cambridgeshire both faced 
essentially the same strong market pressures for new development, and in the face of such 
pressures both exerted considerable constraint on development. New development within 
built-up areas of Cambridge was largely limited to renovation and minor expansions, and 
opportunities for major new construction projects were extremely limited. With the City of 
Cambridge completely surrounded and constrained by South Cambridgeshire and the Green 
Belt, and with few opportunities for new development within the historic university city, 
major projects receiving planning permission from Cambridge tended to be frequently located 
along the outer edges of the city. Similarly, development control policies constraining 
development in South Cambridgeshire had the effect of pushing development inward toward 
Cambridge. Not surprisingly, therefore, developers seeking planning permission for major 
development projects frequently focused their attention on sites on or close to the boundary 
separating the two districts.
An important element of development control policy in Cambridge was that new office 
and industrial space should only be occupied by research and development and high 
technology firms. This highly selective policy of constraining ordinary commercial and
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industrial development, while allowing and to some extent encouraging “R and D” firms, was 
an important trademark of development control policy in Cambridge. The other unique policy 
in Cambridge-- and the other exception to the policy of constraint-- was the policy of allowing 
new development if it provided premises for “local users.” A “local user” was defined as an 
existing firm which had been located in Cambridge for 2 years, or which had 50% of its clients 
located in Cambridge (Lane,19904nt). This “local user” requirement was included in both 
the 1980 and 1990 Cambridgeshire Structure Plans, and was an official element of planning 
policy in Cambridge throughout the 1980’s. Although the planning criteria adhered to in 
Cambridge appeared to limit the types of commercial development to be permitted, they 
actually catered to the fastest growing sources of demand for new commercial space in the City 
(Segal Quince Wicksteed, 1985). Indeed, the city’s policy of attempting to constrain 
commercial development and employment growth in Cambridge was only modestly 
successful. The Independent (26 May, 1991,4) reported that “Between 1981 and 1989,
16,000 net new jobs were created [in Cambridge], despite the city’s earnest attempts to 
discourage investment that could go elsewhere.”
Throughout much of the study period, the Planning Department in Cambridge lacked a 
formal or consistent policy on using agreements to obtain contributions. Instead, the City 
pursued a largely ad hoc approach toward the negotiation of developer contributions. The 
ability of Cambridge to negotiate contributions from developers was hampered by a lack of 
consensus regarding what benefits should be sought from developers. “There is not a lot of 
consensus in Cambridge about what should be sought. There are differences of opinion, and 
there is intense opposition to development” (Studdert,1992,int.).
Some of the policy drift in Cambridge was clearly due to a lack of continuity in the 
position of Chief Planning Officer, and to the fact that during almost one quarter of the study 
period the position of Chief Planning Officer was vacant. In January 1988, Cambridge’s City 
Planning Officer, D.W. Unwin, died unexpectedly. Throughout 1988, when planning 
applications were at their highest point, the Chief Planning Officer position was vacant, and the 
Department was headed by an Acting Director. “It was a period of flux and strain, and there 
was a lack of clear direction in the Planning Department.” (Winterbottom,1990b,int). In 
January 1989, John Popper became Chief Planning Officer in Cambridge, and quickly gained 
a reputation for his aggressiveness in seeking to negotiate contributions from developers. 
According to Popper, “In negotiating with developers, it's all economics. If they have a lot to 
gain, we push pretty hard” (Popper,1990,int.). It was during the period when the Planning 
Department was headed by Popper that Cambridge first began to develop formal policy 
statements on developer contributions. In April 1989, the Environment Committee of the City 
formulated what it called an “interim policy statement” on the negotiation of planning gain.
Two policy statements were, in fact, drafted- one for business and retail developments, and 
one for residential developments. Policy 3.6 stated that “All major business and retailing
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development schemes in excess of 200 square metres will be expected to provide one or more 
of the following planning advantages”(City of Cambridge, Environment Committee, 1989). 
Eight planning advantages were then listed, which were: special advantages in the form of 
buildings, open space, pedestrian access, and other facilities for the public; improvement of 
public transport; recreation, open space and other community facilities needed to meet demands 
arising from employees; pedestrian traffic management; relevant social and community facilities 
such as day care facilities; housing to meet the needs of additional employees, with emphasis 
on accessible low cost housing; off-street parking facilities and contributions to “park and 
ride”; and employment and training. Policy 3.7 stated that “All housing development involving 
more than 20 residential dwelling units will be expected to provide one third in the form of low 
cost”. .. and “community and recreation facilities arising from the development to meet the 
social needs arising from the scheme and the surrounding area.”
A good statement of Cambridge’s positive attitude toward developer contributions, put 
forward during Mr. Popper’s regime, was contained in a brief prepared by the City Council's 
Environment Committee in 1989 related to applications for residential development at 245-295 
Milton Road. Under the heading "Advantages Required," the brief stated:
This is a very substantial development by any standards, with correspondingly 
large financial benefits to the original land owners. While it is accepted that some 
of the profit ffom the sale of the land will go to provide improved athletics facilities 
for the University, it is also reasonable to seek tangible planning advantages for the 
community, especially in view of the high density of development being pursued 
(Cambridge City Council, Environment Committee, June 1989,4).
Mr. Popper’s tenure as Chief Planning Officer of Cambridge was short-lived, however. In 
January 1990, he abruptly resigned ffom the position, and for the last two months of the 
study period the Chief Planning Officer position was once again vacant
One final factor might be noted to help explain why the number of contributions 
obtained by Cambridge was not greater. A number of major planning permissions granted 
in Cambridge during the study period involved sites owned by Cambridgeshire County 
Council, which were intended for sale to private developers. For example, a number of 
major commercial planning permissions were granted for office developments on county- 
owned land at Castle Hill. A major residential planning permission was also granted for 
development of 105 housing units on county-owned land at the site of the former Netherall 
School. No agreements were signed for any of these major permissions. The fact that 
these sites were owned by the county, and were being sold for profit, meant that the 
County could recoup betterment directly, without having to resort to the indirect method of 
signing agreements. Moreover, because these were “deemed consents,” the City Council 
had no leverage to require that an agreement be signed containing contributions on its own 
behalf.
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South Cambridgeshire held to a consistently restrictive view regarding how 
agreements should be used. According to Chris Taylor, South Cambridgeshire's District 
Solicitor, the District only asked developers for contributions to improvements which it felt 
could be fully justified as being directly related to, and necessary for, the development to 
go forward (Taylor, 199la,int.). South Cambridgeshire District Council “never asked for a 
contribution which it didn't succeed in getting” (Taylor, Ibid.). This assertion probably 
says more about the modest nature of the District's requests for contributions than it does 
about the District's prowess in pushing developers for contributions. South 
Cambridgeshire was particularly conscious of the need to avoid asking for contributions 
which might encourage the planning authority to approve developments which should be 
refused planning permission. “If it's a bad proposal it will be refused”(Taylor,1991a,int).
Planning officials in South Cambridgeshire felt no need for a formal local policy on 
the use of agreements during most of the study period, because they were comfortable 
operating within what they viewed as the narrow constraints imposed by Circular 22/83. 
“We at the planning authority take a very strict interpretation of Circular 22/83”
(Miles,1991, int.).
East Cambridgeshire District Council
According to the Director of Planning, very little development activity was taking 
place in East Cambridgeshire in the early 1980*s. “It was stagnant here. But by 1987-88 
development was outpacing the ability of the District and the County to provide community 
facilities ... Our shift in approach has been provoked by perception of things like mobile 
classrooms stacked up in school yards” (Archer, 199la, int.).
Public response to the growing pressure of development was split along geographic
lines.
In the southern half of the District, where the most rapid development occured, 
residents became increasingly fed-up with new development, and wanted to see 
more restraint on development But in the northern half of the District, where less 
development occurred, residents saw new development as being positive, and as a 
way to secure community benefits from developers (Archer, Ibid).
Over the course of the study period, the local authority became increasingly aware of the 
way that developer-led contributions could undermine local planning policies. The 
following two case examples were cited by the District Solicitor
In Chippenham, there was a policy of constraint on development, but nevertheless 
an application was made on 30 June,1989 by a long-time landowner seeking 
permission to build 24 houses. The proposed development was in conflict with
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established planning policy, but the developer offered to donate land to the parish 
council and to construct a new village hall. The parish council were in favour of 
granting permission under those terms. The resolution of the Planning Committee 
to grant permission was made in 1989...
The village of Pymoor had a lovely cricket field. The Parish Council had built a 
clubhouse next to the field, but didn't own the cricket field. The owner of the land 
needed money, and applied for permission to build 8 bungalows. The Council 
might have turned him down, but the landowner could still make some money by 
selling the land for agriculture, and the Village would have lost its cricket field. As 
a result, even though the application was contrary to planning policy for the area, 
we negotiated an agreement with the landowner, wherein he agreed to donate the 
cricket field, and extra land for a soccer pitch, in exchange for planning permission 
for 8 bungalows. The owner also agreed to pay £8000 for future maintenance of 
the playing fields (Kratz, 1991,int.).
These experiences made the district's Director of Planning extremely aware of the 
way in which offers of contributions could distort planning decisions. “I see two potential 
abuses of planning gain negotiation. It is an abuse if planners allow the offer of a 
contribution to secure planning permission in an area where development would otherwise 
have been refused. The second abuse is when planners threaten refusal in an area allocated 
for development*' (Archer, 199 la,int.).
During the early years of the study period, the negotiation of developer 
contributions in East Cambridgeshire was largely ad hoc, and proceeded in the absence of a 
formally stated policy. The Planning Department would assess the impacts of individual 
developments when applications were submitted, and advise the District Solicitor as to 
what kinds of contributions should be sought in an agreement. Meanwhile, however, the 
Planning Department was working toward developing a formal, plan-based approach to the 
negotiation of contributions.
In 1988 the District released the Ely Local Plan, after 4 years of work. An 
important feature of the plan was that it called for fees to be assessed against developers so 
that the District could acquire land for a new school. The site to be acquired for the school 
was shown in the plan, as was the area designated for new residential development. 
Proposed fees varied in proportion to the scale and impact of development For example, 
proposed fees were adjusted according to unit size. “We would apply low charges against 
small, one-bedroom units, and larger fees against larger units” (Kratz,1991,int.). It should 
be emphasised that the district still retained its flexibility to negotiate with developers. “The 
proposed fee is not a strict requirement, but a starting point for negotiations. We negotiate 
the fee” (Kratz,Ibid.). The Ely Local Plan also called for developers receiving planning 
permission to finance other infrastructure improvements, such as a link road to relieve 
traffic around the city centre, and foul sewerage improvements.
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The preparation of draft Village Local Plans in February and March 1989 moved 
the District further along toward the adoption of planning policies requiring contributions as 
a condition for obtaining planning permission in certain areas. In February, 1989, the 
Public Consultation Draft of the Mepal Village Plan was issued. Mepal suffered from 
serious infrastructure deficiencies-- such as an overloaded sewage treatment plant, and 
inadequate drainage. Given these infrastructure limitations, all but small-scale, piecemeal 
development in the Village was impossible. On the other hand, without more significant 
development in the Village, it was likely that the village school would have to be closed. 
Residents in Mepal wanted to keep their village school, as well as have improvements to 
the village sewerage and drainage infrastructure, but saw no guarantee of public funds for 
the improvement of such facilities. As a result, citizens in the village supported the 
preparation of a local plan calling for:
.. .the release of one or more areas of land for moderate scale, but rapid housing 
estate development This would promote development(s) of sufficient size to make 
practical the levying and collection of private developer contributions towards the 
cost of improvements to facilities overloaded by additional development (East 
Cambs. D.C.,1989a).
A similar willingness to offer planning permission in exchange for developer 
contributions was expressed in the consultation draft of the Little Thetford Milage Plan of 
March, 1989. Under the previous structure plan, Little Thetford had been restricted to 
only a limited amount of infill development But the new Structure Plan submitted to the 
Secretary of State in May 1987 allowed the District to designate “limited rural growth 
settlements/* in which up to an additional 200 houses might be permitted. Citizens in Little 
Thetford saw new development as a way of obtaining improvements to the village school 
and other public facilities. The draft Milage Plan designated an initial 8 acre site for housing 
development, and identified other areas which might be subsequently released as well. 
However, in allocating such land for development, the plan clearly recognised that 
developers granted planning permission would be expected to make certain contributions.
It is felt that it would be fair, if there is to be new development, for there to be 
compensating benefits to the village. These can be secured through requirements 
for financial contributions to be made for specific purposes before the granting of 
planning permission. Normal candidates for such benefits include improvements to 
sewerage, the sewage treatment works and the water supply, and could be extended 
to include improvements to the school, road access and recreational facilities (East 
Cambs. D.C.,1989b).
In July 1989, East Cambridgeshire District Council issued a policy document 
entitled Housing fo r Locals expanding the benefits the District hoped to secure from 
developers to include the provision of affordable housing for existing residents. In the
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document the Council stated that “as an exception to the normal settlement policies applying 
throughout East Cambridgeshire the local planning authority may grant planning 
permission for residential developments which provide low cost housing in perpetuity for 
local people who are unable to compete in the open market”(East Cambs. D.C.,1989b, 3). 
The policy statement made it clear that the District intended to use planning agreements to 
assure permanent benefits from grants from planning permissions made as exceptions 
under the policy. This way of using agreements to encourage affordable housing was 
subsequently adopted as national policy, in the aftermath of the study period (see Chapter 
Eight).
Fenland District Council
Throughout the 1985-1990 period, Fenland District Council did not have a formal 
written policy on how agreements would be used, or under what circumstances developers 
might be asked for contributions. According to a District planner who was interviewed, 
“Relative to other districts in Cambridgeshire, Fenland has been much less aggressive in 
seeking developer contributions” (FumeU,1991,int). Fenland District Council’s attitude 
toward development was distinctly positive. “If someone knocks on the door, we try to 
please them... The Council has not wanted to put up barriers to investment by 
developers”( Ibid.).
Huntingdonshire District Council
Huntingdonshire was the fastest growing district in Cambridgeshire during the 
1980*s, and with a buoyant property market was in a strong position to extract 
contributions from developers. But Huntingdonshire was reluctant to do so. 
“Huntingdonshire has followed a fairly cautious approach regarding developer 
contributions” (Potter, 1991, int.).
The Planning Department in Huntingdonshire took a very restrained view of what it 
should seek from developers, and refused to accept contributions if it meant approving 
applications which they felt were contrary to planning policy simply because they offered 
contributions.
On several occasions substantial offers of contributions were made. But we felt that 
the developments were not approvable in planning terms, and they were denied. In 
one case, along the northern side of S t Neots, a developer offered to make a major 
contribution to the Council. Parish Councilors were influenced by this offer of a 
contribution, and wanted to approve the scheme, but we felt it was contrary to 
planning policy, and prevailed” (Potter, Ibid.).
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Peterborough Citv Council
During the study period, a large proportion of the development that occured in 
Peterborough took place within the New Town area, and was carried out under the direction 
of the Peterborough Development Corporation (PDC). New development was actively 
promoted by the PDC, and there was a strong presumption in favour of development. 
Developments approved by the PDC within the designated New Town Area were deemed to 
have planning consent, and did not require the specific approval of the City’s planning 
authority. The planning department at the City Council was relatively weak, and played a 
minor role in controlling development
During the years that it was in existence, the PDC had little need to make use of 
Section 52 agreements. Government funding was provided to the Corporation for 
infrastructure and public facilities, so that developer contributions for infrastructure and 
public facilities were generally not needed or expected. The Corporation could control the 
nature of development, and recover costs, through land leases and land disposition 
agreements.
As government funding for the PDC became tighter in later years, the Corporation 
increasingly relied upon developers and landowners to pay for the cost of amenities and 
public improvements. Still, however, the PDC did not find it necessary to use Section 52 
Agreements.
The Corporation sometimes apportioned the cost of developing park land to 
adjacent developments. The added cost of developing the park land was essentially 
added on to the sale price of the land. In other cases the Development Corporation 
issued development briefs inviting development of specific areas, and saying that as 
a condition of development a park should be provided in such and such a location 
(Brown,1990 int.).
Because of its special powers, the PDC was able to sell land with planning permission, 
thereby allowing it to collect not only the betterment directly, without need of Section 52 
Agreements. In three and a half years, between 1985 and the middle of 1988, the PDC 
collected £125 million from the disposal of properties (Bendixson,1988,217). In this 
way, the PDC, and in turn the Treasury, was able to recoup not oniy the betterment created 
by planning permission, but also the additional value created through publicly-funded 
infrastructure investment
In August 1988 the Secretary of State issued an Order calling for the dissolution of 
the PDC. Remaining property under the control of the PDC was transferred to the 
Commission for New Towns (CNT), effective 1 October, 1988, whose charge it was to 
manage and ultimately dispose of the remaining assets. With the dissolution of the PDC,
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the City's Planning Department assumed greater responsibility for planning and 
development control in the City. One indication of this new burden of planning was that 
the staff of the planning department grew from 45 to 73 between 1988 and 1990 
(Lee,1990, int). It took some time for the City’s Planning Department to gear up, and to 
become accustomed to using agreements as a way of managing development Prior to 
1988, only one Section 52 agreement was signed in Peterborough, and that was in relation 
to a planning application submitted by Cambridgeshire County Council. Ten of the 12 
agreements signed in Peterborough were signed in the last 8 months of the 63 month study 
period. Had the PDC been dissolved earlier, more agreements with contributions 
undoubtedly would have been signed in Peterborough during the study period.
Throughout the study period, the City Council had no official policy regarding the 
negotiation of developer contributions, and "was slow to catch on to negotiating developer 
contributions”(Wilkins,1990,int.). Offers of contributions from developers were not 
aggressively sought, and when offers were made they were not necessarily accepted. For 
example, the City Council denied planning permission for a 50 unit housing development at 
Gloucester Square, even though the developer offered to contribute to upgrading a 
children’s playground facility (Lee,1990 int.). However, after the demise of the PDC, the 
City's Planning Department began to take a much more active interest in planning 
agreements. One factor which led the Council to take a more positive stance toward 
negotiating contributions was the Council's growing difficulty in financing the public costs 
associated with accommodating the continued rapid pace of development. “Peterborough 
has traditionally welcomed growth, but there is beginning to be resistance to development 
for financial reasons”(Brown,1990, int.).
Analysis of Non-Contrihutorv Provisions in Agreements, bv District
As noted previously, one of the major factors which propelled the increased use of 
agreements was the increased use of agreements for puiposes other than obtaining 
contributions. In the following section, the types and frequencies of non-contributory 
purposes of agreements are analysed in detail. Tables 7.13 through 7.18 present a detailed 
breakdown of the number of times various non-contributory provisions were included in 
agreements in each of the six districts. Examination of this data suggests that there was 
considerable variation in the ways and extent to which the various districts used agreements 
for non-contributory purposes.
Provisions regulating the phasing of development were included 59 times in 
agreements, most commonly in Fenland (23 agreements). Phasing requirements were also 
heavily relied on in East Cambridgeshire (in 10 of 13 agreements). Other districts achieved 
the same purpose without signing agreements, by attaching conditions to grants of planning
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permission. Huntingdonshire District Council used negative conditions (i.e. “no 
occupancy until highway improvements have been completed") in ways that reduced its 
need to use agreements to regulate phasing (Potter, 1991,int.).
Table 7.13: Non-Contributorv Purposes in Agreements- Cambridge 
Purpose Residential Commercial Total
Specify Use 3 10 13
Extinguish Existing Use 0 5 5
Restrict Occupancy 11 2 13
Minimise Adverse Impacts 1 3 4
RehabiUtate/Improve/Preserve 1 1 2
Set Deadline/Timetable 0 2 2
Phase Development 1 1 2
Limit development 0 1 1
Revise Terms of Previous Agreement 0 0 0
Waive Right to Claim Compensation 0 1 1
Give Notice to Local Authority 0 0 0
Pay Legal Costs 1 2 3
Total 18 28 46
Table 7.14: Non-Contributorv Purposes in Agreements- South Cambridgeshire 
Purpose Residential Commercial Total
Specify Use 19 23 42
Extinguish Existing Use 0 0 0
Restrict Occupancy 9 7 16
Minimise Adverse Impacts 0 4 4
Rehabilitate/Improve/Preserve 0 5 5
Set Deadline/Timetable 1 3 4
Phase Development 3 3 6
Limit development 1 6 7
Revise Terms of Previous Agreement 1 1 2
Waive Right to Claim Compensation 0 0 0
Give Notice to Local Authority 0 2 2
Pay Legal Costs 19 19 38
Total 53 73 126
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Table 7.15: Non-Contributorv Purposes in Agreements— East Cambridgeshire
Purpose Residential Commercial Total
Specify Use 3 4 7
Extinguish Existing Use 1 0 1
Restrict Occupancy 1 1 2
Minimise Adverse Impacts 0 0 0
Rehabilitate/Improve/Preserve 2 1 3
Set Deadline/Timetable 0 3 3
Phase Development 6 4 10
Limit development 2 0 2
Revise Terms of Previous Agreement 0 0 0
Waive Right to Claim Compensation 1 4 5
Give Notice to Local Authority 0 1 1
Pay Legal Costs 1 0 1
Total 17 18 35
Table 7.16: Non-Contributorv Purposes in Agreements- Fenland
Purpose Residential Commercial Total
Specify Use 3 3 6
Extinguish Existing Use 1 4 5
Restrict Occupancy 19 0 19
Minimise Adverse Impacts 1 1 2
Rehabilitate/Improve/Preserve 8 1 9
Set Deadline/Timetable 2 3 5
Phase Development 22 1 23
Limit development 4 0 4
Revise Terms of Previous Agreement 2 0 2
Waive Right to Claim Compensation 0 0 0
Give Notice to Local Authority 0 0 0
Pay Legal Costs 60 15 75
Total 122 28 150
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Table 7.17: Non-Contributorv Purposes in Agreements- Huntingdonshire
Purpose Residential Commercial Total
Specify Use 23 6 29
Extinguish Existing Use 0 1 1
Restrict Occupancy 24 1 25
Minimise Adverse Impacts 0 0 0
Rehabilitate/Improve/Preserve 2 0 2
Set Deadline/Timetable 2 3 5
Phase Development 7 6 13
Limit development 1 3 4
Revise Terms of Previous Agreement 4 3 7
Waive Right to Claim Compensation 0 0 0
Give Notice to Local Authority 0 0 0
Pay Legal Costs 0 0 0
Total 63 23 86
Table 7.18: Non-Contributorv Purposes in Agreements— Peterborough
Purpose Residential Commercial Total
Specify Use 2 0 2
Extinguish Existing Use 1 0 1
Restrict Occupancy 1 0 1
Minimise Adverse Impacts 1 0 1
Rehabilitate/Improve/Preserve 0 0 0
Set Deadline/Timetable 0 0 0
Phase Development 3 2 5
Limit development 0 0 0
Revise Terms of Previous Agreement 0 0 0
Waive Right to Claim Compensation 0 0 0
Give Notice to Local Authority 0 1 1
Pay Legal Costs 0 0 0
Total 8 3 11
Seventy-six agreements in Cambridgeshire included provisions restricting 
occupancy. Huntingdonshire used agreements to restrict occupancy more often than any 
other districts, and 23 of the 25 occupancy restrictions it inserted in agreements were 
directed toward restricting occupancy of rural dwellings to persons employed in local 
agriculture. Fenland used agreements to restrict occupancy 19 times: ten restricted 
occupancy of rural dwellings to persons employed in agriculture; eight agreements assured 
that units were occupied by elderly persons. South Cambridgeshire inserted occupancy
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restrictions in agreements 16 times, most frequently for rural dwellings, elderly housing 
and family annexes, upon the recommendation of its district solicitor. In the opinion of its 
district solicitor, legal agreements offered greater assurance of enforceability than 
conditions, because “conditions are legally enforceable only for a period of four years” 
(Taylor, 1991,int.).
All our family annex agreements are 'conditionable', but we now insist on an 
agreement If it were a condition, we couldn't enforce the provision beyond four 
years. To violate the terms of permission would not be lawful after four years, but 
we couldn't take enforcement action against it if it were simply a condition 
(Taylor,1991a,int.).
On the other hand, East Cambridgeshire used an agreement to restrict residential 
occupancy only once. When asked how East Cambridgeshire regulated occupancy of farm 
dwellings, the District Solicitor answered that “agricultural occupancy we would treat as a 
condition” (Kratz, 1991,int.).
A case in Cambridge illustrates why local authorities tended to turn away from 
conditions to agreements. Throughout the 1980’s, and during the study period, the City of 
Cambridge was content to impose its Local User Requirement (restricting the types of 
business which could occupy new commercial developments) through a condition attached 
to planning permissions, rather than through agreements. Thus when the planning 
authority in Cambridge granted planning permission to Magdalene College in 1986, a 
condition was attached restricting occupancy of the space to businesses which met the 
Local User requirement. An agreement accompanying the permission was also signed, but 
it related to the construction of public conveniences in the development, and did not include 
the Local User requirement. The City felt it was unnecessary to include the Local User 
requirement in the agreement. Magdalene College went forward with the development, but 
subsequently filed an appeal with the Secretary of State against the Local User restriction as 
a condition. In November,1990 the Secretary of State ordered that the local occupancy 
condition attached to the permission be removed, so as to allow the space to be occupied as 
general office space, rather than solely for research and development. According to Acting 
Director, Deputy Planning Director, “We could probably have attached the local user 
requirement as part of the agreement signed for the development, but it never occured to us 
that it would be necessary” (Turner, 1991, int). This decision by the Secretary of State 
was perceived as a major blow to Cambridge planning policy, and the Local User 
requirement, because numerous other commercial permissions granted in the City had been 
granted subject to the same condition. Because of this loss on appeal, Cambridge’s LPA 
decided that henceforth it would try to negotiate the Local User requirement through 
agreements, rather than imposing it as a condition (Ibid.).
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Certain districts almost always charged applicants for the cost of preparing legal 
agreements, while others almost always did not charge. Huntingdonshire never charged 
applicants for the cost of preparing any of its 75 legal agreements. Peterborough also never 
charged. East Cambridgeshire only charged for legal costs once, and Cambridge did in 
only a few instances. On the other hand, Fenland almost always charged for legal costs, 
and South Cambridgeshire assessed legal costs in more than half of its agreements.
Comparison of Districts— Non-Contrihutorv Purposes Per Agreement
Tables 7.19 and 7.20 summarise data on non-contributory uses of agreements,
calculating the number of non-contributory provisions per agreement by district and for
Cambridgeshire as a whole.
Table 7.19: Non-Contributorv Provisions Per Agreement-Residential Agreements
District Agreements Non.-Contrib. Prov. Non.-Contrib./Agree
Cambridge 22 18 0.82
South Cambs. 37 53 1.43
E. Cambs. 8 17 2.13
Fenland 67 122 1.82
Huntingdon 62 63 1.02
Peterborough 10 8 0.80
County Total 206 281 1.36
Table 7.20; Non-Contributorv Provisions Per Agreement- Commercial Agreements
Pisffitf Agreements Non.-Contrib, Ptqy. Non.-Contrib./ Agree.
Cambridge 23 28 1.22
South Cambs. 30 73 2.43
E. Cambs. 5 18 3.60
Fenland 15 28 1.87
Huntingdon 13 23 1.77
Peterborough 2 3 1.50
County Total 88 173 1.97
As shown in Tables 7.19 and 7.20, commercial agreements signed in the 
Cambridgeshire as a whole contained 1.97 non-contributory provisions per agreement, 
while residential agreements contained 1.36 non-contributory provisions per agreement 
This data confirms what was previously suggested in Chapter Six— that although LPAs 
were less inclined to require contributions from commercial developers than from
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residential developers, they were more inclined to include non-contributory provisions in 
commercial agreements than in residential agreements. Among the six districts, East 
Cambridgeshire made by far the most frequent use of non-contributory provisions in 
agreements. Fenland made above average use of non-contributory provisions in its 
residential agreements, and South Cambridgeshire made above average use of non­
contributory provisions in its commercial agreements. Agreements in Cambridge and 
Peterborough, the two most urban districts, contained the fewest non-contributory 
provisions per agreement.
Geographic Distribution
Major commercial permissions without agreements were concentrated, to a 
remarkable extent, in a handful of growth centres: Cambridge, Peterborough, St. Ives, St. 
Neots, and to a lesser extent in Wisbech (see Figure 7.01). Many of these areas where 
large numbers of permissions were granted without agreements had relatively few 
permissions with agreements. As shown in Figure 7.02, the one main area where 
commercial agreements were concentrated was along the northern fringe of Cambridge.3 
There was also a small concentration of commercial projects with agreements in the 
northeast comer of the county, where Wisbech is located. Otherwise, commercial 
permissions with agreements tended to be geographically dispersed. Comparing Figures 
7.01 and 7.02, it can be seen that, although large numbers of major commercial 
developments were approved in Peterborough and Huntingdonshire, remarkably few major 
commercial permissions in those districts were subject to agreements.
Major residential projects which received permission without agreements were 
somewhat more widely dispersed than comparable commercial permissions without 
agreements (see Figure 7.03, and compare to Figure 7.01). Nevertheless, major residential 
permissions with agreements tended to concentrate in a few specific areas- with the largest 
numbers clustered along the northern and eastern fringes of Cambridge (see Figure 7.04). 
There were also multiple residential permissions with agreements in S t Neots, 
Godmanchester and Eynesbury, and Sawtry (in Huntingdonshire) and in Manea and 
Wisbech (in Fenland). In some areas, concentrations of permissions with agreements 
occured in areas where large numbers of other major permissions without agreements had 
also been granted. However it is also noteworthy that clusters of major residential 
permissions with agreements also occurred in areas where few if any major permissions 
without agreements had been granted.
9 Because of the large number of permissions granted in a few areas, such as the northern and eastern 
fringe of Cambridge, it was necessary in a number of the Figures to shift project symbols slightly to allow 
the number of permissions to be discernible.
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Figure 7.01
Major Commercial Permissions Without Agreements
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Figure 7. 02
Major Commercial Permissions
Subject to Agreements
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Figure 7.03
Major Residential Permissions Without Agreements
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Figure 7.04
Major Residential Permissions
Subject to Agreements
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Public Expenditure on Roads and Locations of Maior Developments
Figures 7.05 and 7.06 plot the locations of major residential and commercial 
permissions granted with agreements during the study period, in relation to publicly-funded 
road improvements completed between 1979 and 1990. These figures show that 
agreements were frequently concentrated in areas which had benefited from publicly- 
funded road improvements. This finding appears to suggest that local authorities used 
agreements in an attempt to recoup the betterment created by public investment in 
highways. However no evidence was found to indicate that local authorities had this in 
mind when they signed agreements. As shown in Figures 7.07 and 7.08, major 
permissions without agreements were also concentrated in close proximity to major 
publicly funded road improvements. The fact that so many major planning permissions 
were granted without agreements in locations which benefited from publicly-funded road 
improvements suggests that local planning authorities were not primarily motivated by a 
desire to capture betterment. When contributions were obtained in relation to development 
sites near publicly funded roads, the contributions were not payments for windfall gains 
received by landowners, but rather for infrastructure improvements which were essential 
for development to proceed. For example, when an agreement was signed for the 
Cambridge Science Park in 1984 (in close proximity to the publicly funded A45 Cambridge 
Bypass and A10 interchange) a contribution was obtained, but it was for necessary 
drainage improvements and not for road improvements. It therefore appears that planning 
authorities in Cambridgeshire were more interested in encouraging major developments to 
locate efficiendy in relation to publicly funded infrastructure, than they were in attempting 
to capture the betterment (which in practice would have penalised developments which 
located in proximity to publicly-funded highways). Indeed, if the goal of the planning 
system was to cause new development to locate in areas best served by highway 
infrastructure, then it is clear from Figures 7.05 - 7.08 that it succeeded.
Figure 7.05
Major Residential Permissions Subject to Agreements
In Relation to Government-funded Roads
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Note: Project Symbols Adjusted to Eliminate Overlapping
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Figure 7.06
Major Commercial Permissions Subject to Agreements
In Relation to Government-funded Roads
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Figure 7.07
Major Residential Permissions Without Agreements
In Relation to Government-funded Roads
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Figure 7.08
Major Commercial Permissions Without Agreements
In Relation to Government-funded Roads
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W ater Infrastructure Contributions
From 1974 until September 1989, when the regional water authorities were 
privatised, the ability of Anglian Water Authority (AWA) to respond to demands of new 
development for new infrastructure investment was limited by central government 
restrictions on capital spending and borrowing. The government set an External Financing 
Limit on the amount the authority could borrow from the Treasury. The ability to pass 
costs on to consumers in the form of higher water fees was also restrained by government- 
set limits on water charges. As development accelerated in the 1980’s, the Authority found 
it increasingly difficult to meet the burgeoning demand for infrastructure in 
Cambridgeshire.
By 1985 the Authority was experiencing increasing difficulty in providing new 
infrastructure to meet the demands of development There was a major backlog 
problem-- not enough capacity to meet the demand. Assisting new development 
became less of a priority (Morrod,1991a, int.).
Given the pressures it was facing in providing infrastructure in a region 
experiencing rapid development, AWA was not anxious to encourage development in areas 
which had inadequate water infrastructure (Morrod,1991a,int.). Instead, it preferred “to 
allow small and incremental development in those towns which [had] adequate capacity’* 
(Rural Development Commission, 1991,31). When applications were made to develop in 
areas with inadequate infrastructure capacity, AWA often filed infrastructure objections, and 
hoped that the applications would be turned down by the local planning authority. AWA 
did not go out of its way to encourage the signing of agreements to enable development in 
under-served areas. From the authority’s viewpoint, allowing developers to enter into 
agreements enabling new development to occur in areas with inadequate infrastructure 
capacity was a favour to the developers who entered into such agreements (Morrod,1991a, 
int.). If the LPA nevertheless chose to grant planning permission, the authority then sought 
contributions to finance the new infrastructure.
When AWA filed infrastructure objections to planning pending applications, 
disagreements sometimes arose between local planning authorities and AWA. Local 
planning authorities had the final say regarding the granting of planning permission. They 
could ignore AWA’s infrastructure objections altogether, and grant planning permission 
without condition, and without requiring contributions. Or they could agree to grant 
planning permission subject to a satisfactory agreement containing contributions for surface 
and foul water sewers.
Some local authorities in Cambridgeshire were more likely to uphold AWA’s 
infrastructure objections than others (Morrod,1991c, int.). Huntingdonshire was most
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likely to support AWA’s objections, and South Cambridgeshire was likely to support 
AWA’s objections when it came to large projects (Ibid.). According to the Director of 
Planning of Huntingdonshire, his District had a generally cooperative relationship with 
AWA. Indeed, almost two-thirds of all the contributions which Huntingdonshire negotiated 
in agreements were contributions for foul sewers, sewage treatment, sewage pumping 
stations, or surface drainage improvements. The only disagreements Huntingdonshire 
apparently had with AWA were over whether small projects should be required to make 
contributions. “In the case of some small projects, AWA requested developer contributions 
which we felt were too much in relation to the scale of development Our general break-off 
in the past was approximately 30 units. Below that we tended not to use agreements”
(Potter, 1991,int.).
East Cambridgeshire was much less cooperative with AWA, and was much less 
likely to support AWA’s infrastructure objections (Morrod, Ibid.). According to East 
Cambridgeshire’s Planning Director,
On countless occasions we have been at loggerheads [with Anglian Water]. Our 
response to Anglian Water Authority has been to ask * Who’s planning the area, us 
or the water authority?*... We have been particularly reluctant to force developers 
of small projects to make contributions to Anglian Water (Archer, 1991a, int.).
Fenland District Council also reported that it had frequent disagreements with AWA 
regarding requests by AWA that developers contribute for water infrastructure 
improvements.
Anglian Water often raised objections to applications for planning permission, 
particularly in Chatteris... and threatened that if developments there were approved 
serious problems would result. The members of the Planning Authority often ignored 
these warnings. They felt it was Anglian Water’s responsibility to provide the 
infrastructure, and to pay for it somehow (Fumell,1991, int.)
One reason why Fenland and East Cambridgeshire were particularly unwilling to 
force developers to pay for water infrastructure improvements was that they felt that AWA 
had not made sufficient infrastructure investments in their Districts, and had instead 
directed a disproportionate share of its capital expenditure to faster growing areas. Not 
only did they resent the lack of past infrastructure investment by AWA in areas allocated for 
development in local plans, but they felt that forcing developers to make contributions as a 
condition for developing in those areas (when developments in more prosperous, better- 
served areas were not required to make contributions) was fundamentally unfair in that it 
effectively discouraged and penalised development in their districts.
One other factor which possibly had a significant effect on the extent of 
contributions obtained in cases where the local authority agreed to uphold AWA’s
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infrastructure objections. Cambridge, Huntingdonshire, Peterborough and Fenland had 
“agency agreements” with AWA, which meant that those four local authorities acted as 
agents for AWA in negotiating developer contributions. In those four districts with agency 
agreements, the extent of contributions obtained for water-related infrastructure was 
determined by the district authority rather than by AWA, and contributions asked for from 
developers may have fallen short of what AWA would have insisted upon had it been 
negotiating on its own behalf. South Cambridgeshire and East Cambridgeshire, on the 
other hand, had no agency agreements with AWA. In those two districts AWA did its own 
negotiating, and decided what level of contributions was acceptable.
As this discussion has highlighted, there was often significant tension between local 
planning authorities and AWA over whether or not private developer contributions for 
water-related infrastructure should be required and, if so, over the extent of private 
contribution which should be sought This tension undoubtedly affected the willingness 
and enthusiasm of local planning authorities in seeking developer contributions. The 
privatisation of AWA in 1989 probably intensified these conflicts, and may have made local 
authorities even less enthusiastic about forcing developers to make infrastructure 
contributions to a private, profit-making corporation.
Had district authorities been responsible for the provision of water infrastructure, as 
they were prior to 1974, offers of water infrastructure contributions might have been 
perceived as more beneficial, and local authorities might have been more inclined to grant 
planning permission. However, because local authorities had little to gain themselves from 
negotiating contributions for water-related infrastructure on behalf of AWA, offers of 
contributions for water infrastructure held little sway with LPA’s, and certainly did not 
cause them to grant permissions for developments which they otherwise felt inclined to 
refuse. In fact, instances were identified where developers signed agreements offering 
contributions, and yet planning permission was denied. For example, an applicant who 
sought residential planning permission to develop 71 acres of land in Eynesbury, 
Huntingdonshire signed an agreement with AWA promising contributions for drainage and 
sewerage infrastructure. Nevertheless the district planning authority refused planning 
permission on 25 March, 1988.
Different Approaches to Negotiating Agreements
To some extent, variations in local authority practice reflected the differing styles, 
attitudes and preferences of individual chief planning officers. The shifts in policy in 
Cambridge that paralleled changes in the position of Chief Planning Officer (CPO), 
underscore that point As noted earlier in this Chapter, the City of Cambridge Planning 
Department experienced a number of changes of leadership during the study period. After
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the City’s long-established CPO died in January 1988, the Department was headed by an 
interim CPO for a year, and then by a new CPO who was appointed in January 1989. This 
new CPO was strongly in favour of negotiating agreements, and took the lead role in 
attempting to negotiate contributions from developers. Under the new CPO, the City 
Council's approach toward negotiating agreements became much more consistent and 
aggressive. However this new CPO held the position for only a year, and was ultimately 
replaced by yet another CPO, who appeared much less interested in the negotiation of 
agreements and contributions. In the words of this new CPO, the negotiation of planing 
gain “muddies the water. I therefore tend to think that it might be better to simply judge 
applications on their merits” (Studdert,1992, int.). Instead of taking an active role in 
negotiating agreements, this new CPO delegated responsibility for the negotiation of 
agreements to others in the Department
In Fenland, responsibility for negotiating agreements was dispersed within the 
planning department. Any one of 6 planners might be involved in negotiating an 
agreement, depending on where the project was located (there were three area teams) and 
which planner was responsible for that particular case. Nevertheless, staff planners, who 
might negotiate only a small number of agreements in a given year, were given no specific 
training in negotiating agreements (Fumell,1992, int.). In the case of large development 
schemes the Head of Development Control would also be involved. In Fenland, the 
District Solicitor was only minimally involved in the negotiation process, and in fact for a 
considerable portion of the study period, the District Solicitor position in Fenland was 
vacant, and the district relied on an outside firm of solicitors to draft many of its 
agreements.
Some districts made a conscious attempt to maintain responsibility for negotiating 
agreements within the planning department, as opposed to delegating responsibility to 
district solicitors. For example, in Huntingdonshire, the Planning Department took the lead 
role in negotiating agreements, and the Legal Department played merely a back-up technical 
role.
Either I myself [the Director of Planning], or the Assistant Director of Planning will 
lead the negotiations. We take the negotiations to the point where a general 
understanding has been reached with the developer. At that point we take the 
application to the Planning Committee to gain approval in principle. We may at that 
point need to go back to the developer to renegotiate or clarify certain points. Once 
the agreement has been approved in principle, the application goes to the Solicitor to 
draw up a draft agreement... It is important for negotiations to be driven by an 
understanding of the planning context in which the application is being reviewed. 
We try to keep the discussions with developers centered in the Planning Department 
(Potter, 1991,int.).
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However, in other local authorities, planners and planning departments were less 
involved in negotiating agreements, and district solicitors and legal departments took over. 
In South Cambridgeshire, the District Solicitor played the major role in negotiating 
agreements, and the planning department had limited influence on the detailed content of 
agreements. In East Cambridgeshire, the Planning Department was largely excluded from 
the process of negotiating developer contributions. “It has been the Chief Executive’s ... 
view that payments extracted from developers should be separated from planning concerns'* 
(Archer, 1991,int.). The Planning Department's perceived role in East Cambridgeshire was 
to assess whether or not a particular application should be approved, and if so what 
facilities and infrastructure would need to be provided. But after that it was left to the 
District Solicitor to negotiate the actual agreement and contributions. According to the 
District Solicitor, “I negotiate most agreements. If it is a big application, it would be me 
and the Chief Executive” (Kratz, 1991,int.). The Director of Planning expressed 
satisfaction with the arrangement “I don't want to get involved in discussion in the 
Planning Committee on matters of pounds and pence. We want to deal strictly with 
planning matters..."(Archer,1991,int.).
The delegation of responsibility for negotiating agreements to solicitors might have 
been expected to have led to a more legalistic and restrained approach to negotiating 
contributions. However, there is no consistent evidence that planners were more 
aggressive in negotiating contributions than district solicitors, or that who did the 
negotiating necessarily affected the rate at which contributions were obtained. In 
Huntingdonshire, where negotiation of agreements was firmly centered in the planning 
department, few contributions were obtained. In South Cambridgeshire, the District 
Solicitor played a major role in negotiating agreements, and relatively few contributions 
were obtained. But, in East Cambridgeshire, responsibility for negotiating agreements was 
centered with the District Solicitor, and a large number of contributions were obtained.
Explaining Negotiativeness
Local authorities varied considerably in the extent to which they used agreements to 
obtain contributions. Table 7.21 ranks the six districts in Cambridgeshire in terms of the 
total number of contributions per agreement they obtained. The fact that local practice in 
using agreements varied so much is, in fact, an important finding of this research. Most of 
the literature on planning agreements has seemed to assume that local planning authorities 
have behaved alike, or that it has been primarily Labour authorities that have aggressively 
sought to obtain contributions from developers. A failure to appreciate the variety of local 
behavior patterns has, in turn, blinded researchers to the importance of trying to identify
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and understand some of the factors and conditions which have affected local planning 
authority behavior. The following section considers and discusses factors and variables 
which might possibly explain, or be associated with, these observed differences in success 
in obtaining contributions.
Table 7.21: Total Contributions Per Agreement, bv District in Rank Order
Agree. Signed # Contributions Contrib./Agree
East Cambridgeshire 13 50 3.85
Peterborough 12 21 1.75
Fenland 82 133 1.62
Cambridge 45 53 1.18
South Cambridgeshire 67 68 1.01
Huntingdonshire 75 49 .65
Development Pressure
In undertaking this research, it was expected that local authorities which 
experienced the greatest development pressure would have the greatest success in 
negotiating contributions from developers. Among the six local authorities in 
Cambridgeshire, East Cambridgeshire and South Cambridgeshire experienced the greatest 
development pressure (see Chapter Five, Table 5.10). If development pressure were the 
key factor to signing of agreements with contributions, then East Cambridgeshire and 
South Cambridgeshire should have obtained the largest number of contributions per 
agreement East Cambridgeshire did in fact obtain the largest number of contributions per 
agreement (3.85), which seems to partially confirm the hypothesis that development 
pressure is positively associated with contributions. Fenland, which was experiencing 
above average development pressure was also fairly successful in obtaining contributions. 
However South Cambridgeshire, which experienced greater development pressure than all 
districts with the exception of East Cambridgeshire, obtained the second smallest number 
of contributions per agreement (1.01). Thus, it appears that the presence of strong 
development pressure did not assure that local authorities would seek to obtain large 
numbers of contributions.
Planning Constraint
In undertaking this research it was also expected that local authorities which exerted 
the greatest constraint on development, and which refused the highest proportion of 
planning applications, would have the greatest success in obtaining contributions. As
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shown previously in Chapter Five (Table 5.12), Cambridge and South Cambridgeshire 
exerted the greatest constraint on development While approval rates for major commercial 
developments ranged from 81% to 91% in the other 4 local authorities, Cambridge and 
South Cambridgeshire approved only 61% and 73% of all commercial planning 
applications respectively. Cambridge and South Cambridgeshire exerted even greater 
constraint on major residential applications, approving only 49% and 59% respectively.
If planning constraint were positively associated with the negotiation of 
contributions, then Cambridge and South Cambridgeshire should have negotiated the 
largest number of contributions per agreement. However, the data seems to suggests a 
negative association. Local authorities in Cambridgeshire which exerted the greatest 
constraint on development (Cambridge and South Cambridgeshire) secured relatively few 
contributions per agreement. Districts which exerted relatively little constraint on 
development (Peterborough, Fenland, and East Cambridgeshire) tended to obtain the 
largest number of contributions per agreement.
Urban Versus Rural Authorities
The data compiled in Cambridgeshire indicates that rural districts, with the lowest 
population densities, such as East Cambridgeshire (.9 persons per hectare) and Fenland 
(1.4 persons per hectare) tended to make greater use of agreements to obtain contributions 
than more highly urbanised local authorities such as Cambridge (25.3 persons per hectare) 
and Peterborough (4.7 persons per hectare).
Surprisingly, Cambridge- the most district densely developed district in the 
county, where land values were highest— was relatively unsuccessful in obtaining 
contributions. The following remarks by the Cambridge Chief Planning Officer, made 
with regard to the negotiation of affordable housing contributions, are indicative of the 
problem which Cambridge faced.
Prospects for obtaining contributions for affordable housing are limited in 
Cambridge. The best opportunities for securing commitments for affordable 
housing are at large green-field sites, but there are few of those in Cambridge.
Most sites for housing in the City are small. In cases where the City has tried to get 
commitments of affordable housing, it has usually had to up the allowed density 
(Studdert,1992, int.).
One explanation for this finding might be that gains in land value resulting from 
planning permission and infrastructure investment were proportionately greater in rural 
areas than in more urban locations (where land values were higher to start with), and that 
developers in rural areas were therefore more willing and able to offer contributions to
-240-
enable their developments to proceed. Also, infrastructure improvements were more often 
required in rural districts to enable development to occur than was the case in urban 
districts.
The tendency of agreements to be negotiated for sites on the periphery of developed 
areas, rather than for more centrally located sites, is clearly evident even within the 
Cambridge Sub Area. As shown in Figure 7.09, permissions for major residential projects 
in the Cambridge Sub-Area which were subject to agreements tended to gravitate toward 
the periphery of Cambridge. The largest concentration major residential permissions 
subject to agreements was just outside the easterly border of Cambridge, with a secondary 
concentration just north of the City. Figure 7.10 provides a closer and more accurate 
mapping of the locations of major residential permissions with and without agreements.
Agreements for major commercial projects had a similar tendency to be applied to 
sites along the periphery of Cambridge. As shown in Figure 7.11, the largest 
concentration of major commercial permissions with agreements was along the northern 
fringe of Cambridge. Figure 7.12 provides a closer look at the locations of major 
commercial permissions inside the Cambridge Green Belt, with and without agreements. It 
shows that the largest concentration of major commercial permissions subject to agreements 
was in the vicinity of the Cambridge Northern Fringe, in the very area where land was 
removed from the Cambridge Green Belt between 1984 and 1989 (see Chapter Five).
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Figure 7.09
Cambridge Sub-Area: Major Residential Permissions
Subject to Agreements
A604
• Agreement With Contribution 
ES3 Green Belt
Note: In areas of clusters of permissions, 
project symbols adjusted to eliminate overlapping
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Figure 7.10
Major Residential Permissions With and Without Agreements 
Cambridge City and Fringe*
Scale 1 : 300,000
Cambridge Green 3e.t 
] Cambridge Urbanizec Area 
Main Roads 
—  —  Cambridge City 3ou.ncary
•  Agreement With Contribution" 
X No Agreement*
* Actual Locations—  Symbols Overlap
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Figure 7.11
Cambridge Sub-Area: Major Commercial Permissions
Subject to Agreements
A604
•  Agreement With Contribution
O  Agreement Without Contribution
Note: In areas of clusters of permissions, 
project symbols adjusted to eliminate overlapping
£3 Green Beit
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Figure 7.12
M ajor Commercial Permissions With and Without Agreements 
Cambridge City and Fringe*
Scale 1 : 300,000
a  Cambridge Green Belt 
□  Cambridge Urbanized Area 
Main Roaos 
—  Cambridge City Boundary 
0  Agreement With Contribution*
(J Agreement Without Contribution* 
X  No Agreement’
* Actual Locations—  Symbols Overlap
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Rates of Growth and Expected Growth
There was a modest correlation between the rate at which local authorities grew 
between 1980 and 1990, and their success in obtaining developer contributions. 
Cambridge grew the least (in fact it lost population during the decade), and fared poorly in 
obtaining contributions. East Cambridgeshire and Fenland, which experienced 
considerable growth during the decade, were active in using agreements to obtain 
contributions. However, any clear association between growth and use of agreements is 
contradicted by experience in Huntingdonshire, which grew the most of any district in the 
County between 1980 and 1990, with a 22,000 (18%) increase in population, but which 
made the least use of agreements to obtain contributions of any district in the County.
The level of growth that a local authority expected in the future, and whether that 
growth was anticipated to be greater or less than in the past, does appear to have had a 
strong impact on local authority attitudes toward seeking developer contributions. South 
Cambridgeshire, which was to a great extent protected from growth by strong County 
Structure Plan policies of constraint, could afford to take to a fairly restrained view of 
agreements and contributions. On the other hand, localities which were expected to 
accommodate an increased and disproportionate share of development in the coming 
decade, were likely to shift their policies in the direction of seeking greater developer 
contributions. That was clearly the case in East Cambridgeshire, which was expected to 
absorb a disproportionate amount of county development between 1990 and 2001.
.. .[TJhere is a need to ensure that the provision of community facilities and 
infrastructure keeps pace with the rapid rate of development The Structure Plan, 
recently approved by the Secretary of State for the Environment, provides for an 
increase of 63,000 dwellings (25%) in the housing stock for the County between 
1986 and 2001. In East Cambridgeshire the increase is 7,250 (31%). This period 
of expansion coincides with a time when local councils are rinding it increasingly 
difficult to provide the capital resources required to keep support services and 
community facilities in balance with the growing population... The Councils have 
[therefore] resolved to adopt clear principles for the provision of new services and 
facilities, and for the division of responsibility between service providers and 
developers seeking planning permission (Memorandum Director of Corporate 
Planning, Cambridgeshire County Council, to C.C.C. Policy Committee, 22 
October 1990).
Political Affiliation of Local Authorities
Labour-dominated local councils such as those in Cambridge and Peterborough 
tended to be most philosophically disposed toward seeking developer contributions. Their 
willingness to assert demands for contributions can be interpreted as an expression of the
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traditional perception that obtaining contributions through agreements was a way of 
capturing betterment Conservative districts such as South Cambridgeshire and 
Huntingdonshire were extremely reluctant to use agreements to obtain contributions. And 
yet political affiliation was not necessarily a good predictor of local authority behavior in 
using agreements. Labour councils may have verbally expressed a greater willingness to 
seek contributions, but they were not necessarily more successful than Conservative 
districts in obtaining significant contributions. In fact, it was East Cambridgeshire District, 
a Conservative local authority, which took the lead in formulating and pushing for 
aggressive policies for seeking developer contributions through agreements, and which 
over the course of the study period showed the most success in negotiating a wide range of 
developer contributions. Moreover, Fenland District Council, another Conservative 
district, signed a remarkably large number of agreements with contributions, particularly 
with respect to new residential developments.
Appeals
Local authorities which were experiencing the greatest development pressure tended 
to have the most permissions granted on appeal (see Tables 7.22 and 7.23). Of the 108 
commercial projects which received planning permission on appeal in Cambridgeshire 
between 1982 and 1990,41 (38%) were in Cambridge. In 1986 alone, 13 commercial 
projects in Cambridge were granted planning permission on appeal. Of the 547 housing 
permissions which were granted on appeal in Cambridgeshire, 196 (36%) were in South 
Cambridgeshire, and 124 (23%) were in Huntingdonshire. Although increased 
development pressure presumably should have strengthened the bargaining position of 
certain local planning authorities, that power was considerably undermined through the 
ability of developers to circumvent local planning authorities by obtaining planning 
permission on appeal.
Appeals had a particularly chilling effect on local planning authorities which tried to 
extract contributions from developers. If a local planning authority pushed developers too 
hard for contributions, it could expect to have to devote an increasing amount of staff time 
and resources to defending itself in appeal proceedings, adding further stress on staff. 
Faced with the need to deal with mounting numbers of applications, local planning 
authorities inevitably became more cautious in turning down planning applications which 
they felt were likely to be taken to appeal. As the odds of losing on appeal increased during 
the study period, there was clearly an incentive for local planning authorities to grant 
permission, subject to an agreement containing at least some kind of contributions 
(however small)-- since if the developer appealed and won, its leverage to secure 
contributions would be even further diminished.
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Appeals had a direct effect not only on the number of agreements which were 
signed, but also on the content of many planning agreements. In a number of instances, 
contributory agreements were signed after permission had been granted on appeal. In such 
instances where local planning authorities lost on appeal, they were in a weak position to 
extract contributions. Any contributions agreed to following successful appeals were 
probably the minimum necessary to overcome infrastructure deficiencies and other planning 
objects. For example, a developer applied for planning permission to develop a 4.73 
hectare business park along the St. Ives bypass. The Huntingdonshire local planning 
authority initially turned down the planning application, but the applicant appealed the 
refusal and won. The Secretary of State directed that planning permission be granted, and 
the district council in turn granted permission subject only to an agreement requiring that 
the developer contribute to Anglian Water Authority to expand the sewage treatment works.
Table 7.22: Housing Permissions Granted on Appeal. 1982-1990. bv District
Year Cambridge E. Cambs. Fenland Hunt. Pete. S. Cambs. Total
1982 1 2 3 5 0 14 25
1983 3 8 3 10 2 11 37
1984 0 6 1 7 0 16 30
1985 8 10 1 8 4 20 51
1986 5 9 3 9 4 25 55
1987 10 11 8 11 2 35 77
1988 17 9 9 22 2 20 79
1989 11 25 11 39 9 38 133
1990 7 14 5 13 4 17 60
Total 62 94 44 124 27 196 547
Table 7.23: Commercial Permissions Granted on Appeal. 1982-1990. bv District
Year Cambridge E. Cambs. Fenland Hunt. Pete* $. Camb$r -3 M
1982 0 0 0 1 0 2 3
1983 1 0 0 3 3 0 7
1984 2 0 1 1 3 1 8
1985 4 0 0 1 3 4 12
1986 13 1 2 1 8 3 28
1987 6 1 1 3 2 2 15
1988 10 1 1 2 1 1 16
1989 4 0 0 5 0 0 9
1990 1 1 0 3 0 5 10
Total 41 4 5 20 20 18 108
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A total of 15 agreements with contributions were signed after successful appeals by 
developers--12 of which were for commercial projects (see Table 7.24). Six (6) of the 32 
agreements signed for major commercial projects in the County, were signed after the 
Secretary of State had granted planning permission on appeal.
Table 7.24: Agreements Signed for Developments Granted on Appeal, bv District
Residential Commercial
Cambridge 1 4
East Cambridgeshire 0 1
Fenland 1 0
Huntingdonshire 1 3
Peterborough 0 1
South Cambridgeshire 0 3
Total 3 12
Attitudes toward Development
Most of what has been written about the negotiation of planning gain in Britain has 
created the impression that local authorities used agreements in ways which were 
detrimental to the interests of developments, and which impeded development. If local 
authorities used agreements with the intent of impeding development, then it might be 
reasonable to expect some correlation between a local authority's attitude toward 
development and the extent to which it burdened developers with required contributions. 
Local authorities which viewed development most negatively might be expected to extract 
the highest number of contributions per agreement. On the other hand, local authorities 
which saw development as most desirable, might be expected extract the few est 
contributions per agreement from developers. The fact that local authorities in 
Cambridgeshire tended to secure fewer contributions from major commercial developments 
than from major residential developments seems to lend support to the notion that local 
authority attitudes toward development were important in shaping how they approached the 
negotiation of contributions. Throughout most of the study period, major commercial 
development was encouraged in at least four of the six districts in Cambridgeshire 
(excluding Cambridge and South Cambridgeshire) as a way of creating employment 
benefits-- which probably explains why fewer contributions were obtained from 
commercial developments than from residential developments.
Based on interviews with planners and district solicitors at the various districts in 
Cambridgeshire, I was able to able to form a subjective judgment regarding how local 
officials/i/t about development Planners and the solicitor in South Cambridgeshire
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appeared to hold the most consistently negative attitude toward development In South 
Cambridgeshire, large-scale development was almost always seen as undesirable. When I 
asked South Cambridgeshire’s District Solicitor which of the competing major shopping 
centre proposals the District Council favoured the most he responded by rephrasing my 
question so as to identify the proposal that the District “disliked the least”
(Taylor, 199lb4nt). The City of Cambridge also appeared to have a negative attitude 
toward new development, with the exception of high technology and science-based 
industries, relocations of firms doing business with Cambridge-based firms, and 
expansions of local industries. At the other end of the spectrum, Fenland and East 
Cambridgeshire District Councils appeared to have had the most positive attitudes toward 
development and were most inclined to want to encourage major development This 
positive attitude toward development was perhaps in large part a reflection of the fact that 
development in these two districts had lagged behind development in other districts. 
Peterborough City Council also seemed to have a positive attitude toward development, but 
not as naively positive as Fenland and East Cambridgeshire. The fact that Peterborough had 
experienced such explosive growth since the 1970's, and was continuing to experience 
steady growth, meant that planners there were somewhat less inclined to always believe 
that more development would necessarily make conditions in the district better.
These subjective impressions of local authority attitudes toward development find 
some confirmation in data compiled by CIPFA comparing the amounts of money district 
authorities in Cambridgeshire spent per 1000 population on economic development and 
promotion (see Table 7.25). South Cambridgeshire spent no money whatsoever on 
economic development and promotion. Cambridge and Huntingdonshire spent the highest 
amounts of money per 1000 population, but in fact generated more income from such 
activities than they spent. In other words, in Cambridge and Huntingdonshire net 
expenditure on economic development and promotion was actually negative. The Districts 
with the greatest net expenditure on economic development and promotion were actually 
Fenland (£1552 per 1000 population), East Cambridgeshire (£1291 per 1000) and 
Peterborough (£790 per 1000).
Local authority attitudes did have an effect on local authority use of agreements, but 
in the opposite direction from what was expected. South Cambridgeshire, which was 
eager to stop development, was reluctant to seek contributions. By not entering into 
agreements with developers to help make their proposed developments more palatable, and 
by not going out of its way to help developers to overcome planning and infrastructure 
objections, South Cambridgeshire actually succeeded in further discouraging development 
Fenland and East Cambridgeshire, which were eager to encourage development, were not 
at all hesitant to ask developers for contributions, particularly when such contributions 
were necessary and beneficial to development.
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Table 7.25: Net Expenditure Per 1000 Population on Economic Development and Promotion(£)
Year Cambridge East Cambridgeshire Fenland
Expenditure Income Net Expend. Expenditure Income Net Expend. Expenditure Income Net Expend.
1985-86 6721 9690 -2969 1813 541 1272 3992 2095 1897
1986-87 7289 11227 -3938 2561 964 1597 3858 2018 1840
1987-88 15440 20440 -5000 2722 1856 1066 3437 1942 1495
1988-89 17510 29007 -11497 3291 2062 1229 3341 2258 1062
1989-90 17040 27535 -10495 Data Not Available 3797 2351 1446
Average/Year 12800 19580 -6780 2597 1356 1291 3685 2133 1552
Year Huntingdonshire Peterborough South Cambridgeshire
Expenditure Income Net Expend. Expenditure Income Net Expend. Expenditure Income Net Expend.
1985-86 2000 4125 -2125 2146 1958 188 0 0 0
1986-87 2027 4121 -2095 1954 1415 539 0 0 0
1987-88 2875 4624 -1748 1591 51 1540 0 0 0
1988-89 2777 5847 -3070 1748 2223 -475 0 0 0
1989-90 1596 6687 -5091 2230 72 2159 0 0 0
Average/Year 2255 5081 -2826 1934 1144 790 0 0 0
* 1 April - 30 March of following year
Source: QPFA Planning and Development Statistics, Actuals
CHAPTER 8: THE AFTERMATH
As shown in Chapters Six and Seven, local authorities in Cambridgeshire secured 
surprisingly few offers of contributions in agreements between 1985 and 1990, despite 
economic conditions which were highly favourable to the negotiation of contributions.
The failure to obtain contributions appears to have been largely self-imposed. Especially 
during the early years of the study period, local planning authorities simply did not try very 
hard to obtain contributions— because official county and local policies legitimising efforts 
to obtain contributions were not in place. Local planning authorities were unwilling to 
solicit contributions until such official policies were in place. Moreover, in localities 
targeted in the County Structure Plan for severe constraint, local planning authorities were 
far more inclined to refuse planning applications than they were to accept offers of 
contributions.
The purpose of this chapter is to show how public policy and practice related to 
agreements evolved in the two year period following the end of the study period (between 1 
April 1990 and 31 March 1992). The chapter first describes central government legislation 
and advice which took effect in the summer of 1991, and which altered the rules and 
guidelines for negotiating agreements. The chapter then examines county and local policies 
on agreements which were drafted and approved, or proposed for adoption in local plans in 
the aftermath of the study period.
Revised Government Advice and Policy on Agreements
Two government documents issued in the spring and summer of 1991 promised to 
have a considerable bearing on local use of agreements. The first of these documents, 
issued in May 1991, was Planning and Affordable Housing (DoE Circular 7/91). During 
the 1980’s, the government adhered to the position that it was improper for local authorities 
to attempt to shift their statutory duty to provide affordable housing onto private 
developers. However, Circular 7/91 suggested that LPAs might, under certain 
circumstances, shift that responsibility onto private developers. The Circular asserted that 
“planning authorities may reasonably seek to negotiate with developers for the inclusion of 
an element of affordable housing..., and may include policies in local plans indicating their 
intention to do so”(DoE Circular 7/91,1). Circular 7/91 was striking in a number of ways. 
It explicitly accepted the notion that local authorities should be enabled to negotiate 
exceptions to restrictive local development control policies, in return for obtaining
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commitments to provide affordable housing. For example, the Circular suggested that 
limited development in the Green Belt, within existing settlements, might be allowed in 
exchange for commitments of affordable housing. In other words, the Circular authorised 
local planning authorities to take account of contributions for affordable housing in granting 
permissions which otherwise would not have been approvable. Thus, the position 
expressed in Circular 7/91 was at odds with previous policy statements which had insisted 
that offers of contributions should not be allowed to make unacceptable developments 
acceptable. Moreover, by stating that “such sites [for affordable housing] should not 
nonnally be so identified in the plan,*' the government appeared to abandon its insistence, 
repeated in a number of previous circulars, that developers needed to be provided with 
greater certainty in the development control process. The rationale for not specifically 
designating such sites for housing development in advance was that “Any provision for 
such rural affordable housing should be regarded as additional to the provision in the 
development plan for general housing demand. This is because the sites for exception use 
in rural areas would not normally be released for general housing*' (Ibid.). The guidelines 
put forward in Circular 7/91 were subsequently refined and articulated as national policy in 
the 1992 revision of PPG2 Land for Housing.
The second important piece of legislation issued during this period was the 
Planning and Compensation Act, the final terms of which were published in August 1991 
(DoE Circulars 14/91 and 16/91). The Act introduced a change in terminology, referring 
to “planning obligations,’* rather than to “planning gain,” or “developer contributions.” 
Much more importantly, however, the Act provided developers with a new avenue for 
obtaining planning permission, without having to enter into an agreement with a local 
authority. The Act continued to “allow developers to enter into a planning obligation ... as 
at present via an agreement with the local planning authority”(DoE Circular 16/91 Annex 
A). However, the Act also provided that “obligations may now be created other than by 
agreement (italics added) between the parties”(Ibid.), by the developer making a “unilateral 
undertaking.” Such an “undertaking” would normally be made when a planning 
application was being heard on appeal, after a developer had failed to reach agreement with 
a local authority over the nature and extent of obligations that the developer should assume. 
Developers who felt that they were being asked to make excessive contributions, could 
“submit with their section 78 appeal a unilateral undertaking dealing with the matters they 
(italics added) consider necessary to render their applications acceptable”(Pkmmng and 
Environmental Law Bulletin,1991,22). Planning permission could then be granted on
-253-
appeal “on the strength of the developer’s entering into the planning obligation voluntarily” 
(Redman,1991,204). The terms of the undertaking would then be made enforceable 
against and by the local authority by means of an agreement.
At the time of this writing, it is difficult to predict how widespread the use of this 
provision will be, and the extent to which it might adversely effect the ability of local 
authorities to secure developer contributions. In defending the “unilateral undertakings” 
provision in hearings held prior to its adoption, Minister for Housing and Planning, Sir 
George Young argued that “The provision is a safety value that can be used when 
recalcitrant local authorities obstruct otherwise sensible developments” {Encyclopedia o f 
Planning Law and Practice, Monthly Bulletin,1991/5,2). Young thus appeared to imply 
that the unilateral undertaking provision would only be used in extreme cases. However, 
if invoked on a widespread basis, the “unilateral undertakings” provision would virtually 
do away with agreements (Jackson, 1991,lect.)— giving central government the power to 
not only grant planning permission on appeal, but also to determine what obligations will 
be imposed on developers, without the consent of local planning authorities.
A provision which could have been included in the Act, and which would have 
strengthened the ability of local authorities to negotiate contributions from developers, 
would have been a provision restricting the practice of “twin-tracking” — the filing of 
duplicate applications for the same development, allowing the applicant to pursue an appeal 
to the Secretary of State on the one hand, while continuing to negotiate with the local 
authority on the other. As noted in Chapter Seven, the practice of “twin-tracking” was 
quite common in Cambridgeshire. In a consultation letter distributed by the Department of 
Environment on 6 March, 1991, the DoE invited comments on a provision which would 
have allowed local authorities to “decline to determine a planning application while a similar 
proposal was the subject of an appeal to the Secretary of State.” The DoE acknowledged 
that the practice of twin-tracking was wasteful of the resources of local authorities and the 
Planning Inspectorate, requiring them to review applications which often came to no effect. 
However, the Department also believed that “twin-tracking” had the advantage of providing 
an “incentive for local planning authorities to determine applications quickly, lest the 
proposal be decided instead by the Secretary of State” (DoE,1991d, 6). This latter point of 
view appears to have won out in the end, inasmuch as the Planning and Compensation Act 
contained no provisions restricting “twin-tracking.” As in the past, the government 
appeared to be primarily motivated by a desire to try to limit the extent to which developers 
might be made to pay for public improvements associated with their developments.
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Evolving I,oca I Policies
In the months following the end of the study period, local authorities in 
Cambridgeshire moved to seek a wider range of contributions from developers, and to set 
more explicit requirements for developer contributions. The evolution of local policy 
toward seeking greater developer contributions for public infrastructure and facilities was 
particularly noticeable at the County Council level. In March 1991, the County Council 
sent a memorandum to each district in the County, called “Schedule of Service 
Requirements,** outlining in detail the types of infrastructure improvements— from schools 
and roads to fire hydrants, etc.— which local authorities should seek to obtain from 
developers when granting permission in specific areas. The “Schedule of Service 
Requirements** placed particular emphasis on obtaining contributions for infrastructure and 
facilities which would otherwise have to be funded and provided by the County.
By the time competing out-of-town shopping centre proposals came under review 
in 1991, the County Highway Authority had adopted a fairly strict policy with respect to 
requiring developers to pay the cost of needed off-site road improvements. Policy 20/30 of 
the 1989 Structure Plan called for a major out-of-town shopping centre to be developed in 
the Cambridge Sub-Area. Four proposals for out-of-town shopping centre schemes were 
submitted in response to this Structure Plan policy — all of them for sites located in South 
Cambridgeshire. One of the proposed sites was at Duxford, two were at Bar Hill, and one 
was at Four Went Ways (see Figure 8.01). Each of the out-of-town shopping centre 
proposals called for the development of a half million square feet of commercial space — 
equivalent to a third of the existing floorspace in the City Centre of Cambridge- plus 4500 
car parking spaces (The Independent, 18 November, 1991, 3). Given its scale, the 
shopping centre development was expected to have a major impact on traffic. The 
Highway Authority projected that the out-of-town shopping centre, wherever it was 
located, would generate 9300 vehicle trips per day each way.
The position of the County Highway Authority was that "Any out-of-town 
shopping centre that is approved will have to agree to make substantial contributions 
toward improving roads in the area to a sufficient level to handle the increased traffic" 
(Boddy, 1991,int.). For each of the four proposed shopping centres, the County Highway 
Authority prepared an extensive programme of off-site road improvements that the 
developer would be expected to fund. For example, if the proposed shopping centre were 
located in Bar Hill, the developer was expected to pay for upgrading the A604 between
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Figure 8.01
Competing Development Proposals for 
Out-Of-Town Shopping Centre
A604
Cambrid<
Proposed Locations Under Review in 1991
1 River Spring
2 Slate Hall
3 Duxford
4 Four Wentways 
■ Main Roads
District Boundaries 
Cambridge Green Belt
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Girton and Bar Hill, possibly involving the construction of an adjacent collector/distributor 
road (Figure 8.02, #10). If the centre were located on the site in Four Went Ways, the 
developer was expected to pay for dualling the A1307 between the A11 and the Southern 
Relief Road at an estimated cost of £3-4 million (Figure 8.02, #12). In specifying the road 
improvements that would be necessary to accommodate each of the proposed centres, the 
County Highway Authority took the position that these improvements were non-negotiable. 
41We have simply said, if this project is given planning permission, this is what they will 
have to do ”(BoddyJbid.). Of course, it should be noted that the contributions required of 
developers were far from onerous, but were beneficial and necessary to the very success of 
any of the proposed out-of-town shopping centres.4
The County Highway Authority became increasingly disposed to encourage 
developer-funded road improvements in relation to other proposed developments as well.
In areas where a road scheme was felt to be desirable in terms of County traffic circulation, 
a landowner or developer could hope to obtain a planning permission which otherwise 
would have been denied by offering to pay all or most of the cost of constructing a public 
road. For example, to make a major development scheme potentially acceptable, 
landowners in Wisbech proposed to build a western bypass around Wisbech, two miles in 
length, including a bridge over the River Nene (see Figure 8.02, #4). The County 
Highway Authority’s response to this proposal was generally favorable. “This is not really 
a priority project in terms of County Highway priorities. But the County Highway 
Authority has said that if the developer will pay for the entire road he would be enabling his 
development to get planning permission” (Bruce, 1991,int.). During 1990 and 1991, 
additional developer-funded bypasses were considered by the Highway Authority in 
relation to pending major development applications in and around Ramsey, Longstanton 
and Willingham, Whittlesey, Papworth Everard, and the Stanground area of Peterborough 
(see Figure 8.02, #1,2,3,6,8 and 9). To assist such developer-funded schemes, the 
County Highway Authority set aside of roughly £300,000 in its 1990 budget, and 
£500,000 in 1991 budget, to “top-up” developer-funded road projects in instances where 
there was a shortfall of private funds (Bruce, 1991,int.).
4 As of October, 1991, South Cambridgeshire District Council had negotiated Section 106 agreements for 
all four of the competing out-of-town shopping schemes, and the County Highway Authority was in the 
final stages of completing and signing Section 278 agreements with each of the developers 
(Taylor, 199 lb,int.).
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Figure 8.02
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An increased emphasis on obtaining developer contributions, including 
contributions for off-site improvements, was also evident in the local plans and policy 
statements prepared by individual districts after the study period For example, the 
Consultation Draft of the Cambridge Local Plan, issued in September 1991, contained a 
statement on “Planning Benefits,” and a “Schedule of Planning Benefits To Be Considered” 
which listed specific developer-funded benefits and improvements which the City planned 
to seek from different types of development. The benefits sought by the City were not the 
same throughout the city, but rather varied from area to area, depending on the needs of 
particular areas. “These needs vary from one area to another and so different types of 
planning benefits will be appropriate to different developments” (Cambridge City 
Council,1991,170). While providing applicants with lists of suggested benefits ahead of 
time, Cambridge also made it clear, however, that it reserved the right to seek other 
planning benefits in the future.
While it [the Schedule of Planning Benefits] reflects needs and opportunities at the 
time of writing the Plan it is not seen as being definitive. The Council reserves the 
right to consider other benefits in the light of changing circumstances. The 
Schedule is only a summary which will require interpretation in the light of each 
application(Ibid.).
Types of benefits listed in the Schedule included: support for public transport, including 
land for improvements; extra support for park and ride over and above standard commuted 
payments; link road improvements; open space; and affordable housing.
During most of the study period, South Cambridgeshire had no formal local policy 
on the use of agreements, being content to operate within a strict interpretation of Circular 
22/83. However, in the process of preparing a District Local Plan, South 
Cambridgeshire’s Planning Department drafted policies intended to allow the District to use 
agreements to achieve two specific local planning objectives-- the provision of affordable 
housing and the provision of recreation facilities. These policies were included in the draft 
District Local Plan which was put on deposit in December 1989.
To achieve the provision of affordable housing, two specific policies were 
proposed. In areas where new housing development was completely prohibited, it was 
proposed that new housing developments of up to 8 units might be permitted, subject to an 
agreement stipulating that 100% of the housing would be affordable. Secondly, in villages 
where infill developments of up to 8 units were allowed, it was proposed that 
developments of up to 15 housing units might be approved, provided that an agreement
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was signed assuring that 30% of the units would be low cost. It should be noted that the 
way in which South Cambridgeshire proposed to use agreements to achieve affordable 
housing predated, and anticipated the issuance of DoE Circular 7/91 on Affordable 
Housing.
The new South Cambridgeshire District Local Plan also contained proposed policies 
which called for developer contributions for the improvement of recreation facilities. For 
each particular area where new residential development was allowed, the plan specified the 
contributions for recreation which would be sought. For example, with regard to the 
Milage of Caldecote, which was defined as a Rural Growth Milage, the plan stated that:
The Authority, either through the use of conditions following the granting of 
planning permission or through Section 52 Agreements, will seek financial 
contributions from developers... to provide for 17 acres of formal/informal 
recreational provision to the east of Bucket Hill and New Bams Plantations (South 
Cambs. D.C.,1989, Part 2, 28).
The requirements for developer-funded recreation facilities adopted by South 
Cambridgeshire were particularly demanding for the New Settlements which were 
proposed for sites in South Cambridgeshire:
Preference will be given to schemes which provide above (italics added) the 
minimum requirements... and which would therefore benefit surrounding 
communities.
The District Council considers that the following provision is essential:
a.) community sports hall (minimum 32m x 17m x 7m high)
b.) covered swimming pool
c.) golf course (9 holes, minimum 50-70 acres) and associated driving range
d.) indoor bowls facility (minimum 36m x 20m)
e.) outdoor bowls green (minimum 37m x 37m)
f.) squash courts (2)
g.) outdoor playing fields (football,hockey,cricket, rugby) — minimum 45 acres
h.) multi purpose floodlit games area comprising 2 macadam surfaced 
tennis courts and synthetic grassed area of 36m x 24m (South 
Cambs. D.C., 1989, Part 1, 43-44).
During the study period Huntingdonshire extracted fewer contributions from 
developers than any other district, despite a strong property market which placed the district 
in a strong bargaining position. Planners in Huntingdonshire were simply not inclined to 
seek contributions from developers. Nevertheless, the statement on developer
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contributions and agreements incorporated in Huntingdonshire’s Deposit Local Plan in June 
1990 suggests that the district’s thinking about developer contributions had undergone 
significant change. Huntingdonshire's Deposit Local Plan listed specific public facility and 
infrastructure improvements, area by area, to which developers would be expected to 
contribute. For example, the Local Plan stated that the existing primary school in Ramsey 
St. Mary’s was inadequate to meet the demands of new development, and that therefore 
developers would be expected to contribute toward expanding the primary school. As the 
District’s Director of Planning put it, “I still feel uneasy about contributions for schools. I 
and the members have tended to feel that such facilities should be provided by the 
responsible public authorities. It is only recently that Huntingdonshire has made requests 
that developers contribute for schools” (Potter, 199l,int).
The Draft Consultation Document of the Peterborough Local Plan, issued in May, 
1990, included the following policy statement:
Where appropriate, planning permission will normally only be granted for 
residential development if provision is secured, either as part of the development 
proposal or through means of a separate legal agreement, for all necessary 
community requirements including education, recreation, health, welfare, 
community and local shopping facilities, sewers, drains and a transport 
infrastructure. Where a planning application is made for part of what is ultimately 
planned to become a larger residential development, the local planning authority will 
require a contribution towards the necessary community requirements which will 
arise from the completed development (Peterborough City Council, 1990).
A parallel policy statement was drafted to apply to commercial and industrial development 
No commuted sum contributions for parking were negotiated in Peterborough 
during the study period. However, when interviewed in November 1990, Peterborough's 
Chief Planning Officer reported that the City Council was in the process of adopting 
policies on commuted car parking payments, requiring ’’contributions" of £6000 per space 
for off-site parking (Lee,1990,int.). He also reported that the Council was drafting policies 
which would require developer contributions for the provision of open space. The 
Planning Department believed that 9.6 acres of open space per 1000 population was a 
reasonable standard, and that developers should either set aside that amount of land on-site, 
and transfer the improved open space to the local authority, or contribute the value of the 
open space that they might have provided on-site, so that the Gty could assemble and 
improve tracts of parkland off-site (Brown,1990,int.). In the Village of Eye (east of 
Peterborough Centre), which the 1989 Structure Plan targeted to receive 500 additional
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housing units, planners hoped to convince developers to make a cash contribution, 
equivalent to the value of on-site land which otherwise would have been donated, so that 
the Council could buy surrounding agricultural land and establish a “proper-sized 
park”(Brown, 1992,int.). The City Council also hoped to secure commuted sum payments 
from the developers toward the cost of maintaining publicly dedicated open space.
Rather than wait for a development proposal to be submitted for a large site, and 
then attempt to negotiate an agreement in response to that proposal, the Peterborough 
Planning Department took a pro-active stance toward seeking contributions by issuing a 
brief in May 1990 inviting development proposals for the 70 acre Park Farm site. The brief 
oudined not only the mix and scale of development that the City wished to occur on the 
site, but also the contributions the City wanted to receive if planning permission were to be 
granted. According to the brief, planning permission would only be granted if the 
applicant entered into a Section 52 agreement with the Highway Authority to contribute half 
of the cost of building a bypass highway, estimated at approximately £1.6 million. Other 
contributions asked for were: land for a school and a new community building; two 2 acre 
sites to be used by the City or a registered housing association for low cost rented 
accommodation; 3.75 acres for playing fields; and 15.7 acres of informal parkland and 
amenity open space, distributed throughout the site.
The shift toward formal and explicit requirements for developers was particularly 
evident in the Draft Local Plan prepared by East Cambridgeshire. The Appendix to its 
Draft Local Plan, which was issued in February, 1991, stated that “all new public 
infrastructure and open space cost needed as a direct consequence of proposed 
developments will be sought from the developer at no cost to the public purse,” and that 
contributions would be sought for “off-site facilities on land not covered by the planning 
permission.. .where there is a direct relationship between the two.” The Draft Local Plan 
also stated that planning permissions for significant developments (of 30 or more houses) 
would be subject to commitments in agreements that between 10% and 40% of the units 
would be provided for low income and special needs groups.
As a follow-up to its Draft Local Plan, in September 1991, East Cambridgeshire 
released a concise but comprehensive document entitled “Service Implications of 
Development Proposals.” The purpose of this document was to outline the status of 
infrastructure and public facility needs in areas allocated for development in the local plan, 
and to let developers know the kinds of contributions they would be expected to offer when 
applying for planning permission in specific areas. “We feel that we need to give
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developers a clearer indication of the costs they may be required to contribute 
toward”(Archer, 1991 ,int.). Contributions asked for from developers varied, depending on 
the specific facility needs and deficiencies in specific areas. Developers were asked to 
contribute for schools in areas where there was a need for schools. For example, in 
Soham, where land was allocated for the development of 175 dwellings, it was stated that 
“Extensions to primary and secondary schools will be needed to accommodate additional 
pupils generated by this development Education capacity to support the whole site is 
expected to cost some £550,000. Developers are expected to make contributions to cover 
these costs”(East Cambs. D.C.,1991b, 15). However, contributions for schools were not 
asked for in areas where there was sufficient school capacity to meet the needs of projected 
development
By setting out the types of contributions which the district felt were most needed 
and beneficial, East Cambridgeshire sought to seize the initiative -- to avoid having to 
respond to what developers might choose to offer, and to place developers in the position 
of responding to its agenda of needs. “What we don’t want is for the negotiation of 
contributions to be developer-led... We wanted to avoid situations where developers might 
make offers of ‘goodies’ in an attempt to make unacceptable developments 
acceptable”(Kratz, 1991 ,int).
During the five year study period which ended 31 March,1990, local authorities 
rarely sought contributions from commercial developers. The prevailing view was that “... 
it was not justified to ask commercial developers to make contributions toward community 
facilities, recreation and housing” (Ibid.). However by September 1991 East 
Cambridgeshire’s policies regarding commercial developers had changed. “We now feel 
that we ought to be asking commercial developers to make contributions for open space 
improvements and housing somewhere in the District” (Ibid.). Not a single agreement was 
signed in Huntingdonshire between 1 January, 1985 and 31 March, 1990 calling upon a 
commercial developer to contribute to the improvement of a public road. However, in 
1990, Huntingdonshire entered into an agreement granting permission for a Tesco 
superstore in exchange for a £400,000 contribution for the improvement of a roadway 
intersection a considerable distance from the proposed development. The district also 
negotiated another major off-site roadway contribution from a commercial developer, this 
one for £350,000, in February 1991.
The formal policy statement on “Community Benefit and Planning Agreements” 
included in Fenland’s Draft Local Plan, issued in April 1991, was the least specific and
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least demanding of all the statements drafted by districts in Cambridgeshire. It stated that 
“Where appropriate the District Council will seek to secure, through planning agreements, 
the provision o f ... benefits in association with major proposals,’* and went on to list 
essential on-site and off-site services, highway improvements and car parking, community, 
education and recreational facilities, and environmental improvements (Fenland 
D.C.,1991a, 87).
Policy statements adopted in the aftermath of the study period increased the 
legitimacy of negotiating contributions, but at the same time narrowed the scope of potential 
contributions by specifying the types of contributions which would be sought and 
accepted. At the same time, the increased specificity of local plans provided a much clearer 
policy framework for developers regarding planning applications which were likely to be 
approved or denied. Taken together, these developments placed the negotiation of 
agreements in a plan-led context, and reduced the possibility that unsolicited offers of 
contributions might yield exceptions to established policy.
Growing Parallels to American Methods of Developer Finance
In the aftermath of the study period, LPAs incorporated and utilized a number of 
approaches which were similar to American methods of developer finance described in 
Chapter Two. In preparing its Local Plan, East Cambridgeshire District Council 
considered allocating additional land around the village of Littleport (population 
approximately 6000) for residential development All of the land around the village was 
owned by a single landowner. The LPA was inclined to recommend that this land be 
allocated for residential development, but before it did so it negotiated with the landowner 
for contributions which could address public needs in the Village. The planning authority 
told the landowner that it would recommend the land be allocated in the local plan for the 
development of an additional 500 houses, if the landowner agreed to donate over 23 acres 
free of charge- 5.5 acres for a primary school, and 18 acres for playing fields and a sports 
hall (Kratz,1992,int.). An agreement specifying these contributions was signed in January 
1991. This approach to the negotiation of contributions was innovative, in that the District 
took the initiative in seeking contributions, before a specific planning application was 
submitted. It was also similar to the approach of the Boston Redevelopment Authority, 
which used its influence over rezoning applications (for Planned Development Area zoning) 
as a basis for negotiating Cooperation Agreements with aspiring developers. (See Chapter
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Two-- “Negotiated Development and Legal Agreements.”)
Most noticeable, however, was that LPAs in Cambridgeshire became increasingly 
inclined to impose charges on developers in agreements which were remarkably similar to 
American impact fees. In an agreement negotiated in 1991, East Cambridgeshire imposed a 
fee which was based on a calculation of the average per unit cost of providing public 
facilities and services. A memorandum prepared by the District Solicitor in January 1991 
called for the following per unit costs to be imposed related to the proposed residential 
development:
Contribution to primary education £1250
Contribution to secondary education £ 1800
Contribution towards library facilities £ 150
Contribution towards facilities for frail elderly £ 100
Contribution towards fire and emergency services £ 100
Contribution towards police facilities £ 80
Contribution towards “Rural Management” facilities
(countryside,footpaths,archeology,etc.) £ 58
Contribution towards community based facilities £ 500
Total Fee £4038
Another agreement signed in East Cambridgeshire in 1991 required that the developer of a 
100 house development make a £300,000 contributions toward the cost of educational 
facilities. This total charge was arrived at by imposing a set fee against each housing unit 
in the development The fee for each one-bedroom units was £12; the fee for each two- 
bedroom units was £1,262; and the fee for each unit with three or more bedrooms was 
£3,062.
In another case which mirrored American methods of calculating impact fees for 
highway improvements, an agreement was signed in Cambridge in August 1991 calling 
upon the developer of the Cambridge Business Park to contribute £500,000 to the County 
Council for off-site road improvements. The contribution was based on a comprehensive 
traffic study, conducted by the County Highway Authority, which forecast the traffic 
impacts resulting from additional development at the Business Park, and then calculated the 
proportionate share of the cost of needed highway improvements attributable to the Park.
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The New Settlements— An Expanded View of Developer Obligations
Beginning in 1990, local authorities in South Cambridgeshire, East Cambridgeshire 
and Peterborough, and the County Council began the process of evaluating proposals for 
New Settlements submitted in response to 1989 Cambridgeshire Structure Plan. The 
County Council strongly encouraged the affected local authorities to negotiate agreements 
for each proposed New Settlement, and to seek a wide range of contributions. The County 
Council's position was that “developers should contribute to a wide range of community 
facilities” (Vigor, 1991,int.).
The Cambridge New Settlements
The Cambridgeshire Structure Plan called for two New Settlements to be developed 
outside Cambridge. Given the considerable pressure for development in and around 
Cambridge, and the high degree of planning constraint exerted in the Cambridge Sub-Area, 
developer interest in being selected to build one or both of the Cambridge New Settlements 
was keen. The potential economic gains to be reaped from designation were substantial. 
“The price of the agricultural land in question is a mere £2000 an acre in its raw and muddy 
state. With planning permission for a new village, it suddenly becomes worth about 
£600,000 per acre”(77ie Sunday Times, 14 January, 1990). Eleven competing New 
Settlement proposals were submitted (see Figure 8.03). Six of the proposed New 
Settlements were in South Cambridgeshire and five were located in East Cambridgeshire. 
Given the large number of proposals, and the economic stakes involved, the situation was 
tailor-made for a “beauty contest” in which applicants attempted to outbid each other in 
terms of offering planning gain.
Local officials in East Cambridgeshire were much more positively inclined to 
accept the New Settlements than were officials at South Cambridgeshire. As negotiations 
on the New Settlements proceeded, the planning authority and district solicitor in South 
Cambridgeshire appeared to take the position that both of the New Settlements should be 
located in East Cambridgeshire— arguing that putting the New Settlements in East 
Cambridgeshire was more desirable because they would be farther away from the City of 
Cambridge. South Cambridgeshire's lukewarm attitude toward accepting a New Settlement 
was reflected in a disinclination to negotiate beneficial contributions. South 
Cambridgeshire was, in fact, reluctant to accept significant contributions which might have
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Figure 8.03
Proposed New Settlements
HUNTINGDONSHIRE
SOUTH CAMBRIDGESHIRE
1 Swansley Wood
2 Belham Hill
3 Great Common Farm
4 Bourn Airfield
5 Scotland Park
6 Highfields
7 Denny
8 Waterfenton
9 Westmere
10 Allington
11 Hare Park
12 South Township
Scale 1 : 400,000
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some area-wide benefit. For example, Consortium Developments offered to build a major 
new road link in conjunction with the development of their proposed New Settlement called 
“Westmere” (see Figure 8.02, #5). South Cambridgeshire Council’s response to this offer 
was that developer-funding of the new road, which would have regional traffic benefits, 
could not be justified under the terms of Circular 22/83 (Miles,1990,int.). County 
planning officials, on the other hand, felt that the promised contribution for a road link was 
a very positive feature of the Westmere New Settlement proposal— making that proposal 
especially worthy (Vigor, 1991,int.).
East Cambridgeshire’s willingness to accept the New Settlements, and the growing 
prospect that both of the Cambridge New Settlements might be located in East 
Cambridgeshire, was, in fact, a major factor which pushed East Cambridgeshire District 
Council to adopt formal policies requiring developer contributions. As the District Solicitor 
in East Cambridgeshire put it, “The penny dropped when the New Settlements came along, 
and when we had to enter into serious negotiations with developers related to real 
agreements. There was no formal touchstone for negotiating such agreements. Everything 
up until that point had been ad hoc” (Kratz, 1991,int.).
Most of the New Settlement developers appeared to be quite willing to enter into 
substantive negotiations with District Councils regarding provisions to be included in 
agreements, and most were willing to agree to major contributions. Solicitors and planners 
who were interviewed in 1991 reported that verbal agreements had been reached with 
almost all of the developers, and they expressed confidence that agreements would 
eventually be signed with all but one of the developers. Only the developers of the 
proposed Scotland Park New Settlement expressed strong objections to the contributions 
sought by the County Council. The Scotland Park developers took the position that they 
would be willing to contribute a site for a primary school, but would not agree to pay 
money toward the costs of an off-site secondary school which would serve the 
development (Vigor, 1991 ,int.). The refusal of the developers of Scotland Park to agree to 
this contribution led the County Structure Plan Officer to regard this New Settlement 
proposal as unapprovable. In his words, “the presence or absence of developer 
contributions for such facilities will be a ‘material consideration’” when choosing among 
the competing New Settlement proposals (Ibid.).
Despite the positive expectations of local and county planning officials that 
agreements would be signed with all but one of the New Settlement developers, only one 
New Settlement agreement was signed in the two years which followed the end of the
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study period. (One New Settlement agreement was signed during the study period) That 
agreement was signed in August 1990 between South Cambridgeshire District Council and 
Erostin, developers of the proposed Waterfenton New Settlement The Waterfenton 
agreement called for the following contributions:
- donate a five acre site for a primary school to the County Council;
- construct a primary school, or have the County Council construct the 
school and pay the tender cost plus £100,000 plus 15% for professional fees;
> donate a .33 acre site for a library and caller service close to the school, and 
pay £240,000 for the construction of the library and caller service;
• donate a site for a fire station to the County Council;
- donate 37.5 acres of fully-serviced land free of cost for the construction of 
sheltered housing, shared equity housing, rented housing, and permanent 
low cost housing for sale or rent, land to be transferred to the County Council 
or any nominee of the Council;
- provide a public nature reserve of not less than 10 acres;
- construct a day care centre of 2500 square feet for the frail and elderly, on 
donated land -- or alternatively pay £300,000 to the County Council towards 
the provision of the complex, including car parking;
- pay £200,000 to the County Council for the improvement of fire services to 
the area;
- pay £75,000 as a commuted lump sum towards the cost of maintaining 
community facilities;
- pay up to £2.4 million for the expansion of secondary education facilities to 
serve the settlement (subject to a downward adjustment on the basis of £8000 
per pupil to take account of any unused capacity at an appropriate secondary 
school);
- provide free transportation to primary and secondary school children for a 
period of up to three years, until new primary and secondary schools in the 
settlement are completed and in use;
- pay a commuted lump sum of £1.5 million for the maintenance of public 
open space, planted areas and landscaping.
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It should be noted that a large proportion of the contributions obtained in the 
Waterfenton agreement were for facilities and services which were the responsibility of the 
County Council. The only contribution which benefited the District Council itself was the 
contribution of a commuted lump sum for the maintenance of public open space.
The Peterborough New Settlement
An application for Outline Permission for the New Settlement in Peterborough was 
submitted in December 1989. Peterborough's Planning Department analysed the likely 
impacts and demands that the New Settlement would impose on Peterborough, and 
attempted to negotiate a planning agreement containing a package of contributions to 
mitigate those impacts. A major planning concern in Peterborough was that the traffic 
generated by the New Settlement would exceed the capacity of the existing roadway 
network, and would lead to serious traffic congestion in the City Centre. Thus, the first 
priority of the City Council was to negotiate contributions for off-site road and 
transportation improvements. A second priority of the City Council was to secure a major 
commitment to provide affordable housing.
Relative to South Cambridgeshire and East Cambridgeshire, however, 
Peterborough was in a weak bargaining position to secure contributions, inasmuch as there 
was only one New Settlement proposal on the table to review, and therefore no competitive 
pressures. Also, because the site for the Peterborough New Settlement had been 
specifically chosen and designated by the Secretary of State, there was a strong 
presumption that planning permission for the Peterborough New Settlement would not be 
denied. The scope for obtaining developer contributions was further limited by the derelict 
state of the land, and the need for major expenditures simply to bring the site to a condition 
where it could be built upon. After decades of clay extraction, the site was scarred by deep 
clay pits; the City Council estimated that it could cost approximately £75,000 per acre to 
reclaim the land to the point that it would be developable (Brown, 1990,int.), thus 
considerably reducing the developers profit margin and ability to fund planning gain.
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In March 1991, the County sent a memorandum to the City Council asking it to 
seek the following contributions in relation to the Southern Township New Settlement:
- four primary schools- 420 places in each
- one secondary school
- one library
- three day care centres for frail elderly
- a children's centre
- one police station
- improvements to Stanground Fire Station
The City Council also received a late request from the County Highway Authority 
asking that it consider the possibility of having the developers pay for establishing a second 
railway station to serve the Southern Township. The new railway station, if built, would 
benefit the district as a whole, as well as the proposed development, by serving as a 
parkway station for commuters to London. A firm of consulting engineers and economists 
was employed jointly by the County Council, Peterborough City Council, and the 
developers to study the feasibility of the proposed new station, provisionally known as 
“Peterborough Parkway.” Their study concluded that “more than 2500 new railway 
travelers would use the station every day, as well as more than 1000 travelers who 
currently use the city centre station” {M il Corridor Review, November 1991,6). As a 
result of the study, and protracted negotiations, an amended application was made in June, 
1991, which included the provision of a second Peterborough railway station (Ibid.). On 
25 September, 1991 Peterborough City Council voted to grant outline planning consent, 
“conditional on the signing of an agreement covering what the developers will be expected 
to provide in the way of community facilities, schools, and land for low-cost 
housing”(Ibid.). As of October 1991, the planning agreement had not been signed, but the 
developers had verbally agreed to above-mentioned contributions, and in addition had 
agreed that 15% of the New Settlements housing units would be “affordable rental units,” 
and another 15% would be “near market” (lower profit) units (Brown, 1991, int.).
The Fate of the New Settlements
Although verbal agreements had supposedly been reached with all but one of the 
New Settlement developers by the fall of 1991, only two New Settlement developers had 
actually signed by that time. The weakened state of the property market in 1990 and 1991
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certainly was one factor which discouraged developers from signing agreements.
However, another factor which probably also encouraged developers to hold off signing 
agreements was the “unilateral undertakings'* provision included in the 1991 Planning and 
Compensation Act Given the increasingly aggressive stance of the County Council in 
seeking developer contributions, New Setdement developers who had not signed 
agreements may have concluded that they stood a better chance of achieving favourable 
terms of agreement by dealing directly with the Secretary of State.
The new Planning and Compensation Bill, by allowing for ‘unilateral 
undertakings,’ removed the incentive for developers to agree to what the local 
authorities were asking for... They may be hoping that the Secretary of State will 
call in the application, and not require that an agreement be reached with the local 
authority. Under such circumstances, developers may be free to offer what they 
like (Baldwin, 1991, int.).
As matters turned out, all of the Cambridge New Settlement planning applications 
were called in by the Secretary of State, and all of them were refused planning permission.5 
What led the Secretary of State to reject all the New Settlement applications can only be 
speculated about. The officially stated reason for rejecting the A10 New Settlements was 
that “none of the developers were prepared to meet DoT demands for a grade-separated 
junction upon dualling of the A20 or, if earlier, upon completion of the first 500 
dwellings,” which would have cost an estimated £5 million {Planning / U.K.,20 
December,1991). However, given the wide-ranging contributions negotiated by local 
authorities and the County Council from the New Settlement developers, and the reluctance 
of the government in the past to force developers and land owners into making major 
contributions unwillingly, it is difficult to believe that the New Settlement proposals were 
rejected because the developers offered too little. Quite to the contrary, by almost any 
standard, the contributions negotiated from the two New Settlement developers who did 
sign agreements, and the contributions which could have been negotiated from the 
remaining developers, were precedent-setting. The gains which were negotiated were so 
extraordinary that, had they been approved, they likely would have encouraged local 
authorities elsewhere to be much more ambitious in seeking contributions from developers. 
It was probably that prospect, more than any other, which worried the government most- 
given its ambivalence about imposing costs on developers and landowners.
9 The Secretary of State’s rejection of the A10 New Settlements came in December 1991; the A45 New 
Settlement proposals were rejected in March 1992.
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The Water Infrastructure Charge
Under the provisions of the Water Act of 1989, all new developments which 
received planning permission on or after 1 April, 1990 were required to pay a one-time 
“infrastructure charge.” This infrastructure charge was in addition to the “connection fee” 
which regional water authorities previously charged, and was levied to pay the capital costs 
of expanding the water and sewer systems to meet the increased demands of new users. 
The infrastructure charge represented a new way of funding the capital costs of expanding 
water and sewer infrastructure in Britain.
Two separate infrastructure charges were imposed-- a charge for sewer 
infrastructure, and a charge for water infrastructure. During the fiscal year which began 1 
April 1990, developers in Cambridgeshire were required to pay a sewer infrastructure 
charge of £597, plus a water infrastructure charge of £479, for each housing unit they 
produced. Thus, for each housing unit built, a developer had to pay £1076. In the 
following year beginning 1 April 1991, the infrastructure charge was increased to £1132 
per housing unit (£629 for sewer infrastructure and £503 for water infrastructure). 
Commercial and industrial developments paid “a multiple of the standard charge based on 
the number of water fittings within the development compared with what could be expected 
in an ordinary house or flat” (Housebuilders Federation Monthly Newsletter, Appendix, 
April 1991). The same infrastructure charge imposed throughout the Anglian Water 
Authority Region, covering over 27,500 sq. km (see again Figure 5.08).
As an alternative to negotiated contributions, the infrastructure charge appeared to 
offer developers certain advantages. It provided them with a high degree of certainty. It 
also eliminated delays normally involved when agreements had to be negotiated. However, 
the infrastructure charge also had a number of disadvantages. Developers had to pay the 
infrastructure charge even when their developments were located in areas where 
infrastructure capacity was adequate. Also, once the infrastructure charge was adopted, 
developers no longer had the option of meeting their obligations by offering to construct 
the improvements themselves at the time of development Nor could they offer to donate 
land in lieu of cash payments. Once the infrastructure charge was adopted, the only way 
that developers could meet their obligations was by making cash payments to the water 
authority. Perhaps an even more undesirable feature of the infrastructure charge, from the 
point of view of developers, was that even when the infrastructure charge was paid, there 
was still no guarantee that the infrastructure improvements needed for a particular
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development would be completed in a timely manner. Indeed, one of the major advantages 
of agreements to developers was that they assured that improvements necessary for 
developments would be completed when needed.
It was generally assumed that the adoption of the infrastructure charge would 
eliminate the need for signing agreements with water authorities involving contributions for 
sewer and drainage infrastructure. However, data obtained from the Director of Finance 
for Anglian Water Authority shows that after the infrastructure charge was imposed 
developers still often found it necessary to make additional payments and “contributions” to 
Anglian Water Authority. As shown in Table 8.01, between 1 April, 1989 and 31 March, 
1990 (the year prior to the infrastructure charge) developers paid a total of £7.1 million in 
requisitions and other contributions. Between 1 April 1990 and 31 March 1991, 
developers paid Anglian Water Authority £7.8 million in requisitions and other 
contributions, plus £17.5 million in infrastructure charges.
Table 8.01: Grants and Contributions Collected bv Anglian Water Authority. 1989/90 - 
1990/91
1989/90* 1990/91*
( £ m )  ( £ m )
Grants
Rural Water and Sewerage Scheme 1.6 1.6
ERDF/IDA 0.2
Contributions (from developers^
Water Requisitions (lump sum payments) 1.7 1.8
Sewer Requisitions 0.8 3.0
Other Contributions 4.6 3.0
Infrastructure Charges — 17.5
Total 8.9 26.8
* 1 April - 31 March of following year 
Source: P. Howarth, Letter, 15 July 1991
A comparably detailed accounting of developer contributions paid to Anglian Water 
Authority for the period prior to 1989/90 could not be obtained. Nevertheless, the amount
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that developers paid in contributions can be roughly estimated from data published in 
Anglian Water Authority’s annual reports. The middle column of Table 8.02 shows the 
total value of “grants and contributions” received by Anglian Water Authority; as reported 
in its annual reports. The last column shows the estimated value of cash contributions. 
This figure was arrived at by assuming that AWA received approximately the same amount 
of grant money each year between 1984/85 and 1988/89 as it did in 1989/90 and 1990/91 
(i.e. £1.7 million). Cash contributions shown for 1989/90 and 1990/91 are actual figures, 
derived from Table 8.01.
Table 8.02: Grants and Contributions Received bv Anglian Water Authority. 1984-1991
Grants + Contributions 
As Reported by AWA Cash Contributions
Year* Annual Reports (£nfr from Developers ('Em)
1984/85 10.3 8.6 (Estimated)
1985/86 8.3 6.6 (Estimated)
1986/87 6.5 4.8 (Estimated)
1987/88 21.8 20.1 (Estimated
1988/89 7.8 6.1 (Estimated)
1989/90 8.9 7.1 (Actual)
1990/91** 26.8 25.2 (Actual)
* 1 April to 31 March of following year 
** First year of Infrastructure Charge
Available evidence suggests that charges imposed on developers by AWA when the 
infrastructure charge was imposed in 1990 were greater than what developers agreed to 
contribute in previous years when agreements were negotiated. Since the infrastructure 
charge is collected when buildings are completed, the total amount paid by developers in 
infrastructure charges should vary in direct proportion to the pace of development activity. 
To simplify the analysis, let us assume that changes in residential development activity were 
generally descriptive of the changing pace of aU development activity in Cambridgeshire 
between 1984 and 1991. Table 8.03 presents data showing the number of housing units 
completed in Cambridgeshire between 1984 and 1991. From this data I have computed a 
ratio describing the changing pace of development activity in Cambridgeshire between 1984 
and 1991, with 1990 (the first year of the infrastructure charge) as the base year.
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Table 8.03: House Completions in Cambridgeshire. 1984-1991
Year House Completions Ratio
1984 5381 1.19
1985 5303 1.17
1986 4892 1.08
1987 6083 1.35
1988 6588 1.46
1989 5706 1.26
1990 4516 1.00
1991 3499 .77
Source: Cambridgeshire County Council
Since we know from Table 8.01 how much developers actually paid in 
infrastructure charges in 1990/91, we can use the index of development activity shown in 
Table 8.03 to estimate what developers would have paid each year between 1984 and 1989, 
had the infrastructure charge been imposed.
Table 8.04: Estimated Infrastructure Charges Developers Would Have Paid to Anglian 
Water Authority. 1984-1989
Year Est. Infra. Pavments
1984 £ 29,988,000
1985 £ 29,484,000
1986 £ 27,216,000
1987 £ 34,020,000
1988 £ 36,792,000
1989 £ 31,752,000
1990/91(Actual) £25,200,000
As shown in Table 8.04, the amount that developers paid in infrastructure charges 
in 1990/91 was less than they would have paid in any of the prior years, had a similar 
infrastructure been imposed. Moreover, comparing Tables 8.04 to Table 8.02, we find that 
in five out of six years between 1984 and 1989, developers would have paid more, had the 
infrastructure charge been imposed, than they actually paid when contributions were 
negotiated. Only in 1987-88 did developers make cash contributions which were greater
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than they would have paid in infrastructure charges.
It must be remembered, however, that the amount of money collected in cash by 
AWA from developers represented only part of the total value of developer contributions. 
As shown in Chapter Six, developers were most likely to negotiate agreements which 
allowed them to construct improvements themselves, and/or to donate land, so as to avoid 
having to make cash contributions. In Cambridgeshire during the 1985-1990 study period, 
there were 86 contributions in agreements offering to construct sewer and drainage 
infrastructure improvements, and 42 contributions agreeing to pay for sewer and drainage 
infrastructure improvements. In other words, developers were twice as likely to agree to 
construct water-related infrastructure improvements as they were to pay money to AWA for 
those improvements. Let us therefore assume that the value of improvements constructed 
by developers was twice the value of their cash contributions. Table 8.05 shows the 
estimated total value of developer contributions to AWA, assuming that works constructed 
by developers were twice the value of cash contributions. Comparing Table 8.05 and Table 
8.04, it still appears that developers paid less to AWA between 1984 and 1990, when 
contributions were negotiated, than they would have paid had the infrastructure charge been 
imposed during that period In the six years prior to the introduction of the water 
infrastructure charge, it is estimated that developers paid a total of approximately £159.9 
million, an average of approximately £26.5 million per year. Had the infrastructure charge 
been imposed during those years, developers would have paid a total of £189.2 million, or 
roughly £31.5 million per year.
Table 8.05: Estimated Total Value of Developer Contributions Received by Anglian Water 
Authority. 1984-1991
Estimated Value of Estimated Total Value
Estimated Cash Constructed of Dev. Contributions
Year* Contributions(£rri) Improvements (£m) (Cash + Constructed Imp.)
1984/85 8.6 17.2 £25,800,000
1985/86 6.6 13.2 £19,800,000
1986/87 4.8 9.6 £14,400,000
1987/88 20.1 40.2 £60,300,000
1988/89 6.1 12.2 £18,000,003
1989/90 7.1 14.2 £21,300,000
1990/91(Actual) 25.2   £25,200,000
* 1 April to 31 March of following year
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Summary Remarks
LPAs in Cambridgeshire were slow to warm to the idea of negotiating contributions 
from developers. It was not until 1990 and 1991 that LPAs appeared to fully embrace the 
validity of bargaining for contributions. LPAs increased willingness to negotiate 
contributions took effect only after the scope for negotiating contributions had been 
effectively defined and limited within a firm planning policy framework of county and local 
plans.
By the time LPAs reached the point of being willing to bargain with developers for 
contributions, the boom was over, and market conditions for negotiating contributions had 
turned distinctly unfavourable. At the same time, new provisions introduced into the 
Planning and Compensation Act, allowing developers to make “unilateral undertakings,*' 
further undermined the bargaining position of LPAs. The policy shift of LPAs toward a 
willingness to negotiate was characterised by new and emerging forms of practice which 
made British developer finance more similar to the American model. In the new policy 
framework which evolved in the aftermath of the study period, for example, there was a 
growing emphasis on obtaining cash payments, rather than allowing developers to 
construct improvements themselves. (American developer finance has tended to emphasise 
cash payments, while one of the major features of agreements during the study period had 
been its flexibility in allowing developers to save costs by constructing improvements 
themselves.) There was also a tendency to incorporate specific American methods of 
developer finance. South Cambridgeshire's proposed local plan policy to allow new 
developments of 15 units of housing in areas officially limited to 8 units, in exchange for 
receiving a commitment of affordable housing, was remarkably similar to the U.S. 
technique of “incentive zoning,” previously described in Chapter Two. LPAs also put 
forward preset standards for developer contributions in their local plans— for schools, 
public facilities, open space, parking, etc.— calculated on a per unit basis. And effective 1 
April, 1990, regional water authorities were able to impose a mandatory infrastructure 
charge— a practice which mirrored the prescriptive, average-cost based approach typified 
by American-style impact fees.
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CHAPTER HINEs CONCLUSIONS,
Empirical research I conducted in Cambridgeshire sheds light on a number of the 
research questions and issues discussed earlier in this thesis. Indeed, what I found in 
Cambridgeshire calls into question some widely held assumptions about negotiated 
agreements. However, before summarising the Endings of this research, two caveats are 
in order. First, local authorities in Cambridgeshire may not necessarily have acted in a 
manner similar to other local authorities in Britain. Cambridgeshire was chosen as the 
study area, not because it was typical of other regions, but because economic conditions in 
the region were exceptionally positive, and therefore highly favourable for the negotiation 
of developer contributions. One factor which may have led local authorities in 
Cambridgeshire to think and behave differently was the expectation that much of the future 
growth in the county would be accommodated within three large, privately developed New 
Settlements. Although the New Settlement idea did not become official policy until the 
1990 Structure Plan, the proposed content of the structure plan was under discussion as 
early as 1986 and 1987, and therefore may have made Cambridgeshire LPAs particularly 
attentive to planning policy. I must depend on other researchers to conduct similar research 
in other areas, to provide a comparative framework for interpreting the representativeness 
of my findings.
Also, it is at least conceivable that contributions offered by developers in 
agreements did not account for all the payments from developers to local authorities, and 
that some number of payments to local authorities may have been made outside the 
framework of legally-recorded Section 52 agreements. As noted in Chapter Seven, at least 
one cash payment of £200,000 was identified which was made without being referenced in 
a Section 52 agreement This payment was made after permission was granted on appeal, 
and had no influence on the granting of permission. Nevertheless, the very fact that this 
payment was made without being noted in the Section 52 agreement raises the possibility 
that other developer payments may have been made “on the side” or “under the table.” On 
the other hand, to conjecture about such payments is to venture away from the study of 
Section 52 agreements. There are, after all, possibilities for corruption and favouritism 
throughout the planning process, and not simply in the negotiation of agreements. If 
payments were made to LPAs outside of formally signed agreements, that is really a 
different subject of study altogether.
Having raised these caveats, this chapter summarises the important findings of the 
Cambridgeshire research, and draws comparisons where appropriate to findings from U.S. 
research. The advantages and disadvantages of the British approach of negotiated 
agreements are reviewed and compared to those of mandatory, fixed fees, as popularised 
by American-style impact fees. The chapter concludes by proposing a new perspective for
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evaluating alternative methods of developer finance.
Attitudes
British and American attitudes towards developer finance have differed 
significantly, due in large degree to differing perceptions of its incidence. In Britain, it has 
been widely assumed that costs of contributions in agreements have almost always been 
passed back to landowners. American perceptions of developer finance stand this 
conventional British view on its head. In the U.S., the major criticism of developer finance 
has been that it has increased the price of new homes. In other words, in the U.S. it is 
widely believed that fees ostensibly paid by developers have in fact been passed forward to 
new residents. Recent empirical research conducted in the U.S. has appeared to support 
this view.
By training and temperament, most planners in Cambridgeshire appeared to prefer 
the application of rules. In this regard, they resembled American planners, who for the 
most part have preferred to impose fixed and predetermined requirements rather than to 
negotiate agreements. Planners in Cambridgeshire had little experience in negotiating 
agreements prior to 1985, and none of the planners in any of the planning departments had 
special training in negotiation. Furthermore, it took time for planners to gain experience 
and confidence in using agreements.
LPAs in Cambridgeshire did not try very hard to secure contributions from 
developers between 1985 and 1990. They were especially reluctant to seek contributions 
for off-site improvements, even if such off-site improvements could be justified as 
functionally related to proposed developments. Local governments in the U.S. have been 
much more willing to try to make developers pay for off-site improvements functionally 
related to their developments.
One might normally have expected LPAs to welcome unsolicited offers of 
contributions from developers. However, planners in Cambridgeshire were not always 
happy when unsolicited offers of contributions were made. During the study period, 
developers were often more willing to offer contributions than planners were to accept 
them. Unsolicited offers of contributions sometimes led parish councilors and planning 
committee members to lobby in support of planning applications which the planners felt 
should be refused permission (Archer, 1991a,int). Planners wished to retain control of 
determining what contributions would be sought, and to avoid situations where the 
contributions in agreements were determined by developers and politicians. The increased 
specificity of local plans and policies related to contributions adopted after the study period 
represented an attempt by planners to minimise the unpredictability associated with 
negotiating contributions. Having firm and specific policies in place, indicating what types
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of contributions would be sought in specific areas allowed local authorities to take the 
initiative in making requests for contributions, and reduced the likelihood that unsolicited 
offers of contributions could influence the process of granting or denying planning 
permission.
Local authorities which made the greatest use of agreements to obtain contributions 
had a generally positive attitude toward development, and had adopted planning policies 
which sought to encourage development. Local authorities which made the least use of 
agreements to obtain contributions tended to have a more negative attitude toward 
development, and were more committed to policies of constraint
Differences in attitudes of local authorities toward imposing obligations on 
developers were not easily explained by political affiliation. Although it was expected that 
Labour local authorities might be more ideologically interested in imposing costs and 
obligations on developers, in fact some Conservative districts were more inclined to 
negotiate contributions than were Labour district authorities. By the end of the study 
period, the Conservative County Council had become particularly enthusiastic about 
negotiating developer contributions.
Toward the end of the study period, LPAs in Cambridgeshire began to draft district- 
wide local plans which included policy statements which promised to widen opportunities 
for negotiating developer contributions. Local authority attitudes toward using agreements 
to obtain contributions became more positive over time. The government's dissolution of 
the Peterborough Development Corporation, and reduced government funding for 
infrastructure investment in Peterborough, led that district authority to adopt a more 
positive attitude toward negotiating contributions.
P rocess
Because planners took so little pleasure in negotiating agreements, they were often 
willing to relinquish responsibility for negotiating agreements to solicitors. In Cambridge, 
South Cambridgeshire, and East Cambridgeshire, solicitors played a key role in negotiating 
agreements. The negotiation of agreements, rather than enhancing the power and influence 
of planners and planning authorities, to a considerable degree enhanced the importance of 
solicitors in the planning and development control process. The increased role of 
solicitors, in turn, helped to keep the negotiation of contributions within moderate and 
acceptable bounds. Not surprisingly, district solicitors adhered to a highly legalistic view 
of agreements, and made sure that contributions obtained in agreements were within 
guidelines of established government policy.
The bargaining position of local authorities in seeking to negotiate contributions 
was undermined by various strategies and tactics used by developers. Through the practice
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of “twin-tracking” — i.e. submitting parallel applications for the same development— 
applicants could file an appeal on one application after 60 days, while keeping a duplicate 
application on file with the LPA. This practice allowed developers to put pressure on LPAs 
to grant permissions subject to modest contributions, lest they run the risk of having 
planning permission granted on appeal with no contributions whatsoever. Developers also 
frequently followed a practice I call “ratcheting.” They would file an application for a 
relatively small-scale development, and once permission for that was locked in they would 
submit a new application seeking permission for larger scale of development Developers 
frequently repeated this process over and over. (See Unex case in Appendix Two- 
Selected Agreements.) In this way, a developer could limit his potential exposure for 
contributions to the marginal difference in project sizes, and avoid being required to offer 
contributions based on the full size and impact of the proposed development. It should be 
noted that the practice of “ratcheting” would offer no advantage to developers in the U.S. 
The size of the impact fee paid by a U.S. developer is determined by the amount of 
development that is undertaken, and each successive addition of development is subject to 
the same fee schedule.
One question which attracted considerable attention during the 1980’s was whether 
LPAs forced developers into offering contributions by delaying action on pending planning 
applications. In fact, over the course of the 1980’s the percentage of all planning decisions 
issued by LPAs in Cambridgeshire within eight weeks fell steadily and dramatically. One 
factor which undoubtedly contributed to increased delay was the fact that local planning 
authorities were overwhelmed by a large volume of planning applications. However, at 
least some of the increased delay was also probably due to the increased use of agreements. 
When developers in Cambridgeshire received planning permission for their projects 
without agreements, planning decisions were issued in an average of 127 days for 
residential projects and 147 days for commercial projects. It took developers who signed 
agreements with contributions an average of 318 days to obtain planning permission — and 
337 days for commercial projects. Thus, the signing of agreements with contributions 
added approximately 190 days to the time required to obtain planning permission.
Nevertheless, the data in Cambridgeshire contradicts the hypothesis that local 
authorities used delay to compel developers to offer contributions. For developers who 
signed agreements without contributions, the average time to obtain planning permission 
was 291 days for residential projects, and 320 days for commercial projects. Thus, 
agreements with contributions took an average of only 17-27 days longer to negotiate than 
agreements without contributions. Given the fact that developers were already having to 
wait approximately 300 days or more to sign agreements, it is doubtful that this small 
additional delay played a role in forcing developers to offer contributions. The evidence 
suggests that delays associated with the signing of agreements were not tactically related to
-282-
attempts at obtaining contributions, but were solely the result of the administrative process 
of preparing agreements.
Delays due to agreements were most burdensome when they affected applications 
for very small developments — such as additions of accessory housing units, etc. It took 
an average of 289 days (for residential projects) and 345 days (for commercial projects) to 
sign agreements for minor developments which did not involve contributions. In most 
cases, the purposes accomplished by such non-contributory agreements for small projects 
could just as easily have been accomplished through the use of conditions. These delays 
could have been significantly reduced had the government allowed local authorities greater 
freedom in using conditions to achieve non-contributory development control objectives.
Although it is clearly desirable to reduce delays in processing applications for small 
projects, it does not appear that delays in processing agreements for large projects posed a 
serious an obstacle to development From an American perspective, eight weeks is a very 
short time for local planning authorities to review and issue decisions on large and complex 
projects. In the U.S., when all is said and done, it often takes developers at least six 
months to a year to obtain all necessary planning approvals— and in many cases much 
longer, due to the need to obtain different approvals and permits. If a proposed 
development does not conform to current zoning, a zoning change is required, and 
rezoning land can take six months to a year. Even in cases where a proposed development 
is allowed under zoning, “sub-division approval” is normally required for a developer to 
lay out a new road and to create new frontage lots. Such sub-division approval can take six 
months to a year. In the State of Massachusetts, for example, planning boards are required 
by law to hold a public hearing on any subdivision application, and must advertise the 
hearing, notifying owners of all abutting properties. A period of two months between the 
time an application is received and the time of the public hearing is not unusual. After the 
public hearing, the planning board has 90 days in which to render its decision. However 
extensions to the 90 day deadline are frequently mutually agreed to by the applicant and the 
LPA to allow for additional information to be submitted. Once the planning board issues its 
decision, there is another 20-day delay before the decision can be recorded, called the 
“appeal period,” during which time third parties can lodge appeals. (In the U.S., third 
parties and abutters are able to appeal the granting of planning permission and/or 
subdivision approval.) If an appeal is lodged, the decision of the local planning authority 
can be delayed for another year or more. Thus, in the United States, where the 
development control system presumably confers a comparatively high level of certainty, it 
frequently takes a year or more for developers to obtain all necessary approvals. For large 
scale projects, and projects in environmentally sensitive areas, additional environmental 
permit requirements may be imposed, further increasing the time required to obtain 
permission to build. In some states, the time required to obtain approval may be longer
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still. Lowry and Kim (1991,3) report that in Hawaii, “It often takes six to seven years to 
acquire necessary planning, zoning, and site development approvals necessary to convert 
developable agricultural land into suburban housing/’
When interviewed in connection with this research, planners working for 
Boroughs in Greater London expressed the view that delay in processing planning 
applications could be used as a means of forcing^evelopers to agree to terms sought by the 
local authority. However, as noted in ChaptenEive, cbnditions in London are very 
different from those which prevail outside London. Within London, land values tend to be 
extremely high, and it can cost developers a great deal to hold choice sites while applying 
for planning permission. Under such circumstances, there may be considerable financial 
pressure on a developer to try to terminate protracted negotiations by offering a 
contribution. However, it costs developers much less to purchase options on sites in rural 
areas outside Greater London, and the cost of holding rural land is insignificant compared 
to total project cost (P. Evans, 1991, int.). Indeed, at the end of the day, delays of the 
magnitude identified in this research (318-337 days) probably made very little difference to 
large developers undertaking large developments in rural districts. Moreover, the fact that a 
large proportion of planning agreements in Cambridgeshire were signed at the outline 
permission stage (often by long-time landowners whose main interest was apparently in 
selling the property to someone else), suggests that delay in issuing permissions with 
agreements did not constitute a serious burden for major development projects. A large 
proportion of planning applications are simply “valuation exercises” (Studdert, 1992,int.).
In such cases, development is likely to take a long time to materialise, even if planning 
permission is granted without delay.
One last comment needs to be made regarding the issue of delay. It has sometimes 
been erroneously assumed that developers are always in a huny to obtain planning 
permissions. When land values rise, as they did in the mid-1980’s, developers will be 
eager to obtain planning permission, and will bemoan any delays which they regard as 
unnecessary. However, when land values are falling, developers are usually very happy 
when decisions on their applications are delayed— because purchase agreements typically 
require that purchases be completed once decision notices are issued. Market values of 
sites in Cambridgeshire and East Anglia in 1991 were one-third to one-half below what 
they were in 1988 (Blincoe,1991,int.; Brown,1990,int.). As a result, many developers in 
1991 found themselves holding options to purchase properties at prices which could no 
longer be justified in the property market. Under such circumstances, developers were in 
no hurry to receive decision letters from planning authorities.
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Outcomes
Only 2% of permissions granted in Cambridgeshire between 1 January, 1985 and 
31 March, 1990 were accompanied by Section 52 or related agreements. Moreover, less 
than half of all agreements involved any kind of contribution, so that only 1% of all 
permissions involved agreements with contributions. In approximately half of all 
agreements the local authority even paid the cost of preparing the agreement
The most frequently cited reasons for signing non-contributory agreements were, in 
order of importance: to specify use; to restrict occupancy; and to control the phasing of 
development Restrictions on occupancy were most frequently imposed in rural districts to 
maintain and encourage rural agriculture, requiring that occupants of farm dwellings be 
principally employed in local agriculture.
The number of agreements which were signed in Cambridgeshire increased every 
year from 1985 through 1990. Only 23 agreements were signed in Cambridgeshire in 
1985; 101 agreements were signed in 1989. However, this steady annual increase in the 
number of signed agreements concealed a significant shift in the proportion of contributory 
and non-contributory agreements. After the end of 1988, as the property market 
weakened, and as planning applications fell, there was a sharp drop in the number of 
agreements with contributions. Meanwhile, the number of agreements signed without 
contributions continued to increase.
Only 17% of all contributions negotiated from developers during the study period 
involved payments of money. Seventy-five per cent of all developer contributions in 
agreements involved offers to construct public facilities and improvements, or to donate 
land or easements for such facilities and improvements, rather than offers of cash 
payments. Even when contributions were large, they tended to represent only a small 
proportion of total development cost
It was not possible to obtain data on the value of improvements constructed by 
developers, or of the land and easements donated to local authorities. However data 
presented in Chapter Eight suggests that developers probably paid less in negotiated 
contributions to Anglian Water Authority than they would have paid in infrastructure 
charges, had the mandatory water infrastructure charge been imposed earlier. Over time, 
developers will probably pay more under a system of mandatory, fixed fees than under a 
system of negotiated contributions. This conclusion seems to mirror U.S. findings, 
presented in Chapter Four, that developers tend to benefit when allowed to negotiate with 
planners and public authorities.
Contributions tended to be negotiated mostly from developers of relatively large 
projects. The average size of residential projects with agreements with contributions was 
121 units. The average added floor area of commercial projects with agreements with
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contributions was 9,165 square metres. When agreements were signed without 
contributions, projects sizes tended to be much smallen The average size of residential 
projects for which agreements were signed without contributions was only 8 units. The 
average added floor area of commercial projects with agreements without contributions was 
1,453 square metres. Because agreements were negotiated for projects of above average 
size, the percentage of all newly permitted development subject to agreements was 
substantially greater than the percentage of planning permissions subject to agreements. 
Twenty-seven percent of new housing units granted permission during the study period 
were subject to agreements; ten percent of all newly permitted commercial floor area was 
subject to agreements.
As the data above suggests, LPAs in Cambridgeshire were more likely to negotiate 
agreements for residential developments than for commercial developments. They were 
also more likely to negotiate contributions from residential developments than from 
commercial developments. Seventy-eight percent of all contributions were negotiated from 
residential developers, and only 22% from commercial developers. Residential agreements 
contained an average of 1.42 contributions, while commercial agreements contained an 
average of only .92 contributions. On the other hand, there was a somewhat greater 
tendency to impose non-contributory provisions on commercial developers (1.97 per 
agreement) than on residential developers (1.36 per agreement). The primary reason for 
signing agreements with commercial developers was to limit the scale and negative effects 
of development, and not to obtain contributions.
The most commonly offered contributions in Cambridgeshire were for sewer and 
highway improvements. These infrastructure contributions were almost always directly 
related to, and beneficial to developers. Sewer and drainage improvements paid for by 
developers were invariably necessary for development to proceed. Highway improvements 
paid for by developers were almost always either within, or immediately adjacent to 
proposed developments.
As noted earlier in the discussion of “Attitudes,” contributions were often offered 
by developers without being asked for by LPAs. Some of the largest contributions 
obtained by local authorities (See Appendix Two— Selected Agreements: Tesco case in 
South Cambridgeshire and Elean Business Park case in East Cambridgeshire) were made 
voluntarily after planning permission for major developments had already been granted. 
Nevertheless, offers of contributions, over and above what was required for development 
to proceed, did not assure approval of planning applications. A significant number of cases 
were identified where applicants made unsolicited offers of contributions, and nevertheless 
their applications for planning permission were turned down.
Detailed examination of the content of agreements signed in Cambridgeshire 
between 1985 and 1990 revealed that the negotiation of agreements on a case by case basis
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had a number of advantages for developers. It was a way to overcome infrastructure 
objections which otherwise might have forced local planning authorities to turn down 
applications for development Agreements gave developers assurance that needed 
infrastructure and facility improvements would be completed in time, often by a specified 
date, or else money paid by the developer would be returned with interest. Agreements 
allowed developers to avoid cash contributions by offering to do the construction of needed 
improvements themselves, a solution which usually cost the developer much less, and 
again meant that improvements would be done on time. Finally, offers of contributions 
created local goodwill for projects- a definite commercial advantage to developers.
One final point needs to be emphasised about the offers of contributions which 
were contained in agreements. Contributions were rarely paid at the time agreements were 
signed. Rather, contributions offered in agreements were usually payable only if  and 
when construction of the project commenced. Some contributions were payable only after 
the project was completed. (In the U.S. a similar practice was followed; impact fees were 
generally not paid until a permit was applied for and obtained either for construction or 
occupancy.) Thus, developers in Britain took litde risk in signing agreements, and incurred 
little cost in advance of development. If they chose not to implement the planning 
permission within the specified time period (usually three to five years), then the 
contributions were not made at all. Once the permissions which occasioned the signing of 
agreements lapsed, so too did the agreements themselves, and the process of negotiation 
could start all over again, on a clean slate.
In the U.S., local governments have had a strong incentive to impose charges on 
developers. Impact fees and exactions, and other forms of developer finance, have been 
exclusively administered by units of local government which have collected and retained the 
payments for their own use. In Cambridgeshire, the situation was very different. The 
division of planning responsibilities between district councils and the county council in 
Cambridgeshire, and the extent to which infrastructure responsibilities were assumed by 
regional authorities, served to moderate LPA requests for contributions. Most of the 
contributions negotiated by LPAs went to the County Council or Anglian Water Authority. 
Such contributions to regional authorities did not necessarily result in beneficial local 
improvements, and in any case were not of direct benefit to the district authority.
Therefore, LPAs were probably not as motivated to maximise those contributions. The 
only contributions which were directly collected and retained by district authorities were for 
roads, schools, sewers and drainage facilities, sewage treatment plants and pumping 
stations— and those represented only a very small share of all contributions. In parts of the 
country with unitary authorities (such as in Greater London), where infrastructure 
responsibilities are not split between different tiers of local government, LPAs might 
possibly feel a greater incentive to negotiate the best contributions possible. Following a
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similar line of thinking, if central government were to reorganise the structure of local 
government, eliminating the second tier of local government (such as counties) and creating 
a system composed entirely of unitary local authorities, that could give the remaining local 
authorities a somewhat greater incentive to negotiate contributions.
The presence of strong development pressure did not assure that local authorities 
would seek or obtain large numbers of contributions. Nor did success in negotiating 
contributions depend on the exercise of severe planning constraint District authorities 
which exerted the greatest constraint on development tended to negotiate the fewest 
contributions. Fenland extracted a high number of contributions despite the fact that it 
exerted a low level of constraint on planning applications, and had a 22 year supply of land 
with planning permission.
Local authorities which expected to grow the most in the coming decade, and which 
were being called upon to absorb an increased share of the county’s growth between 1990 
and 2000, tended to be more favourably disposed toward negotiating agreements involving 
contributions than districts which expected to absorb little new growth. On the other hand, 
local authorities which had the benefit of a high degree of protection from development 
under the County Structure Plan, and which did not expect much growth in the coming 
decade, were much more reluctant to negotiate beneficial contributions from developers.
Based on previous research, it was expected that the negotiation of contributions 
might cause developers to increase the density of their developments. Some support for this 
hypothesis was provided in interviews with Cambridge planning officials, who reported 
that it was only possible to obtain contributions for social housing by allowing developers 
to increase the density of their developments. However, data compiled for the county as a 
whole pointed in a different direction. Rural authorities, such as East Cambridgeshire and 
Fenland, made greater use of agreements to secure contributions than the more highly 
urbanised districts of Cambridge and Peterborough. The data suggests that conditions for 
negotiating contributions may be strongest, not in urban areas where land values are the 
highest, but in non-urban areas, where property values and rents are lower, but where the 
prospects for significant gains in property value as a result of development may be 
proportionately greater. Reinforcing this conclusion is the fact that major developments 
which were subject to agreements with contributions occupied larger sites and were/era 
dense than those approved without agreements. These findings appear consistent with 
American experience. Local governments in the U.S. which have made the most 
aggressive use of impact fees have been primarily suburban and rural communities on the 
fringes of developing urban areas. In such areas, the density of development would tend, 
by its very nature, to be lower than in more centrally located urban areas. Severe impact 
fees and exactions have rarely been imposed in central cities. Linkage payments required in 
the cities of San Francisco and Boston were exceptional cases, made possible by an
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extraordinary explosion of property values and development pressure for downtown office 
buildings in those cities during a compressed period of the 1980’s .
Consistency of Agreements With Countv and Local Plans
Economists who have written about planning gain have theorised that the negotiation 
of contributions should make local authorities more willing to approve developments. A 
potential danger inherent in planning gain negotiation, they argue, is that local authorities, 
lured by offers of major contributions, might approve too much development However, 
findings in Cambridgeshire appear to contradict this theory. LPAs increased their rate of 
refusal of planning applications during the period 1985-1988, even as they negotiated more 
agreements with contributions. In the words of the Chief Planning Officer for Cambridge, 
“Politically there is a lot of support in principle for negotiating planning gain ffom 
developers... But members are often so opposed to development that they are unwilling to 
negotiate gains in relation to them.'* (Studdert,1992,int.) The negotiation of planning gain 
contributions might conceivably have induced local authorities to grant planning permission, 
but only if the gains secured through agreements were significant enough to overcome the 
perceived disadvantages and costs of accepting development. As has been emphasised 
previously, local authorities felt constrained in negotiating contributions. Thus, there was 
little reason to soften local planning objections to unwanted developments.
It was expected, based on claims made in the literature on planning gain, that field 
research would reveal numerous instances where developers obtained exceptions to 
established planning policies by offering sizable contributions. Additionally, it was expected 
that the greatest contributions would be obtained for permissions most at variance with 
established plans and policies. However, research in Cambridgeshire produced little 
evidence that LPAs negotiated contributions in exchange for granting permissions for 
developments at variance with local plans and policies. Offers of contributions in 
Cambridgeshire did not cause local planning authorities to abandon policies of tight 
constraint, and there was a pattern of seeking to negotiate agreements which were consistent 
with established plans and policies. In a handful of cases, which were confined to the City 
of Cambridge, developers were permitted to build projects larger and more dense than they 
would otherwise have been permitted to build. However these permissions represented only 
minor departures ffom established policy.
LPAs went to considerable lengths to justify their use of agreements in terms of 
established plans and policies. Confirmation of this finding can be found in the fact that 
LPAs in Cambridgeshire were reluctant to use agreements to achieve specified new purposes 
until official policy statements on agreements were formalised and adopted as part of the 
local plan preparation process. It was only after local authorities had adopted revised policies
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in their draft local plans, that they appeared to be prepared to seek a wider range of 
contributions. For example, East Cambridgeshire and South Cambridgeshire did not obtain 
developer contributions for affordable housing until after they had adopted official policy 
statements authorising such contributions. East Cambridgeshire adopted its policy on 
affordable housing contributions in 1989; South Cambridgeshire’s policy was adopted in 
1991.
Local planning authorities in Cambridgeshire were more concerned about managing 
and controlling growth, and about achieving local and county planning objectives, than they 
were about obtaining contributions. The fact that contributions were negotiated by non- 
unitary local authorities on behalf of regional authorities meant that there was little reason for 
local authorities to waive established planning policies in return for contributions. The 
Cambridgeshire Structure Plan sought to deflect development away ffom Cambridge, and to 
disperse it to secondary centres in the northern half of the county. Agreements were thus 
used by East Cambridgeshire and Fenland to enable and encourage development, while 
South Cambridgeshire and Cambridge used agreements to impose restrictions on new 
development, and to limit possibilities for future expansion. Huntingdonshire and Fenland 
District Councils used agreements to regulate the occupancy of dwellings in rural agricultural 
areas to favour persons employed in agriculture. Cambridge used agreements to assure the 
provision of housing for elderly and low income residents, and to enforce its “local user” 
requirement related to new commercial and industrial development. Thus, agreements 
provided a flexible tool for achieving development outcomes which were locally appropriate 
and compatible with the overall broad-brush outlines of the structure plan.
Planners in both Britain and the U.S. have tended to adopt a negative attitude toward 
negotiating with developers, and the literature on planning gain is full of charges that 
negotiation undermines the proper exercise of planning and development control. Most 
professional planners are currently working without having had any training to develop their 
skills in negotiation. The findings of my research indicate that the negotiation of agreements 
can be a positive and appropriate tool for local planning authorities to achieve established 
planning and development control objectives, particularly in the context of a region-wide 
strategic plan. In short, the negative connotations placed on negotiation by planners and 
proponents of strong planning appear to be without foundation. Indeed, it would seem 
altogether appropriate and desirable that greater emphasis be placed on training planners in 
the art and process of negotiation. Without such training, the effectiveness of planning and 
development control may be undermined, and the planners* role may be further encroached 
upon by lawyers, who have already assumed an increasingly important role in development 
control as a result of the increased use of legal agreements.
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Was Betterment Collected?
The question related to planning gain negotiation which provoked the greatest debate 
in Britain during the 1980’s was whether or not local authorities attempted to use agreements 
to collect betterment This question appeared particularly relevant in Cambridgeshire, where 
land values and the potential for the realisation of development gains were so substantially 
enhanced by targeted public infrastructure investment. In addition to the government 
funding made available for the development of the Peterborough New Town, substantial 
government expenditure was also invested in the county in rail and highway improvements. 
Additional government-funded highway improvements were anticipated for 1990-1993. 
These recent and planned government investments in infrastructure, and in support of 
development, played a significant role in increasing land values and development gains in 
Cambridgeshire. Another public action which created the potential for windfall development 
gain was the removal of a large tract of land in the Cambridge Northern Fringe from the 
Green Belt, and the allocation of this land for business park development.
Initial evidence obtained in Cambridgeshire showed that agreements were frequently 
negotiated early in the development process, at a time when costs of developer contributions 
were most easily be passed back to landowners. While outline permissions constituted only 
37% of all residential permissions, 69% of all residential agreements were signed at the 
outline stage. And while only 10% of all commercial permissions granted during the study 
period were outline permissions, 48% of all commercial agreements (nearly five times as 
large a percentage) were signed at the outline stage. In addition, agreements were often 
signed by long-time landowners, or by developers who had contracts with landowners to 
purchase their property. These findings seemed consistent with the view that charges 
imposed on developers in agreements were being passed back to landowners.
Nevertheless, very little evidence was found that local authorities were motivated by a 
desire to collect betterment, and not much betterment appears to have been collected. 
Hundreds of valuable planning permissions for major projects were granted without any 
contributions being obtained whatsoever. Large numbers of major projects granted 
permission without agreements were located on sites whose value and development potential 
had been greatly enhanced by publicly-funded highway improvements. Payments were 
never extracted from developers to pay back public authorities for already completed public 
works. Also, no special attempt was made to collect betterment from major developments 
granted permission on land removed from the Cambridge Green Belt
There was little apparent relationship between the value of planning permissions and 
the presence or extent of contributions. Districts in Cambridgeshire did not use valuers in 
negotiating agreements. The amount that developers contributed tended to be based on the 
cost of the required improvement rather than on \hevalue of the permission. Developers
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were usually allowed to construct the improvements themselves rather than to make cash 
contributions.
Local authorities in Cambridgeshire usually only sought contributions when there 
was an actual infrastructure need, and the improvements for which contributions were made 
were almost always specified in agreements. In the U.S., on the other hand, impact fees 
have been much less direcdy linked to the need for, and construction of specific 
improvements. U.S. developers have been assessed standard impact fees, whether or not the 
improvements on which the fees were based were needed in the particular areas where their 
developments were located.
Reade (1987) has argued that town and country planning in Britain has failed to deal 
explicitly with the problem of betterment, and the distributional effects of planning and 
development control. The same criticism could also be leveled in relation to windfall gains 
created by government investments in highway improvements. As pointed out earlier in this 
thesis, land values are enhanced not only by the act of granting planning permission, but 
also by public investments in infrastructure (such as highways). However, is it realistic to 
expect planners, and local planning authorities, whose primary orientation, by training and 
temperament, has been to achieve a prescribed pattern of development, to do so while at the 
same time recouping the betterment created in the process? Planners and planning 
authorities, in fact, face a thorny problem of policy. An appropriate objective of urban and 
regional planning is to achieve greater coordination between development and infrastructure. 
Permitting development in areas where betterment has been created by public highway 
investments may be entirely consistent with established planning policies. And yet, to 
aggressively seek contributions from developments benefiting from public highway 
investment-- to impose a special price for development in such areas-- may actually 
discourage development in areas where it makes the most sense for new development to 
occur. Findings in Cambridgeshire suggest that planners and LPAs generally ignored the 
factor of betterment when negotiating agreements and contributions. Indeed, to succeed in 
managing development in line with regional planning objectives, LPAs compromised on 
efforts to obtain major contributions through negotiation, even in cases where the collection 
of betterment was probably most justified. These findings suggests that full resolution of the 
problem of betterment, if it comes, must probably come at a much higher level, and not 
through the negotiation of agreements by district planning authorities.
Developer Finance and the Property Market
Contributions in Cambridgeshire generally rose and fell in line with changes in 
development pressure. Contributions increased significantly between 1985 and 1988, as 
planning applications rose. When planning applications fell after 1988, so too did the
-292-
number of agreements with contributions. At first glance the data seems to suggest that 
prospects for negotiating contributions were market-sensitive, and that developers were 
most willing to offer contributions during a rising property market, but were less willing to 
do so during a period of declining demand. However, the data is not conclusive on this 
point The contributions obtained by LPAs, even during the period of most intense 
development pressure, were fairly basic and minimal. Given the restraint shown by LPAs 
in seeking contributions, it would probably be a mistake to assume that the rise in 
contributions documented between 1985 and 1988 was wholly attributable to rising market 
conditions. Instead, it appears that LPAs were becoming more comfortable with the 
process, and therefore more willing to negotiate contributions. Similarly, the decline in 
contributions which occured in 1989 and the beginning of 1990 cannot be wholly ascribed 
to a deteriorating property market Even in 1989, LPAs asked for relatively little that was 
onerous to developers. The number of agreements with contributions negotiated from 
developers in 1989 and 1990 probably fell for the simple reason that developers and 
landowners were submitting significantly fewer planning applications.
Local planning authority attitudes, policies and practices were fundamentally out of 
synchrony with the property market. Interviews with chief planning officers and planning 
staff indicate that planners did not adapt quickly or easily to the challenges and 
opportunities of using agreements to obtain contributions from developers. The hiring of 
John Popper as Cambridge’s Chief Planning Officer in January, 1989 signified that the City 
Council was ready to adopt an aggressive approach in negotiating contributions from 
developers. Ironically, “John Popper arrived at Cambridge at the end of the boom-- a little 
too late to seize on the opportunity” (Studdert,1992,int.).
During the period 1985 through 1988, when the property market was most 
buoyant, and when developers were undoubtedly most willing and able to offer 
contributions, local planning authorities were operating without official county and local 
policies on contributions, and were reluctant to seek contributions in the absence of such 
official policies. It wasn’t until 1989 and 1990 that the County Council and East 
Cambridgeshire District Council put forward formal policies calling for a wider range of 
developer contributions. However, by that time the property market had weakened 
considerably, and prospects for obtaining contributions from applicants had greatly 
diminished.
If local authorities had been serious about making developers pay they should have 
made their greatest effort in negotiating offers of contributions when pressure for 
development was increasing. To realise such contributions, district authorities also had to 
be willing to grant planning permissions. However LPAs in Cambridgeshire appeared to 
shy away from such self-interested behavior. When development pressure increased, LPAs 
increased their rate of refusal of planning applications- thereby giving up on the
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opportunity to secure contributions applicants might have been willing to agree to at the 
time. It was only after the property market had peaked, and after planning applications had 
plummeted, that LPAs reversed themselves and began approving a larger percentage of 
planning permissions. However, by this time the bargaining position of LPAs to entice 
offers of contributions was extremely weak.
The imposition of the mandatory water and sewer infrastructure charge in April 
1990 could not have come at a worse time in terms of the property market cycle. The 
infrastructure charge was imposed in 1990, at a time when the property market was 
already weakening, and developers were required to pay a fee which, for most of them, 
was greater than they had paid when water-related contributions were negotiated. Once the 
mandatory infrastructure charge was imposed, developers had even less financial leeway to 
satisfy local authority requests for contributions. Imposition of the water infrastructure 
charge probably also had an effect on the property market cycle itself. Coming at a time 
when the property market was in decline, the water infrastructure charge probably added 
further discouragement to new development, and very possibly intensified the severity of 
the downturn in the property market which took place between 1990 and 1992.
The Institutional C ontex t- U.K. Versus U.S.
As noted in Chapter One, planning and development control in Britain in the 1980’s 
gradually changed in ways which made it more “American.” Government advice to LPAs 
that there should be a “presumption in favour of development” was one sign of this shift 
toward American-style development control. Another sign of the convergence of British 
and American planning was that LPAs were required, for the first time, to prepare district- 
wide plans. These plans were expected to be much more specific than in the past about the 
types of development which would, or would not, be allowed in specific areas. Thus, 
development control in Britain was becoming more predictable, and was acquiring 
characteristics previously associated with American style zoning.
Nevertheless, the political and institutional context in Britain has remained very 
different from that in the U.S. For example, in the U.S. water and sewer charges have 
traditionally been levied proportionate to the level of water use by means of metering. 
Equally significant, in recent years there has been a marked tendency for water charges in 
the U.S. to incorporate a provision for capital cost recovery. Rates charged for water use 
are now commonly set high enough to pay for needed future capital improvements. 
Nationwide in 1990, almost 75 percent of public capital spending on environmental 
infrastructure in the U.S. was raised from user fees (Apogee Research,1990,13). In 
addition to reducing the need for increased taxation, user fees have reduced the need to 
impose additional charges on developers. In Britain, on the other hand, there has been
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much stronger adherence to the notion that infrastructure should be publicly financed by 
government tax revenues, and a reluctance to adopt alternative methods of capital finance. 
There has been resistance, for example, to metering water use, and to assessing charges 
proportionate to water use. Water users in Britain have instead been charged a flat rate for 
water service, and there has been no provision for capital cost recovery in charges billed to 
water users.
In the U.S., local governments were effectively encouraged by the federal 
government, under the banner of the New Federalism, to develop new revenue sources, 
and were given remarkably wide latitude to collect payments from developers. In Britain, 
the political and institutional climate during the study period was hostile to giving local 
authorities the freedom to negotiate the best deals possible. As the development boom 
intensified, and as LPAs in Cambridgeshire became more inclined to negotiate 
contributions, developers found that they could increasingly bypass LPAs, and obtain 
planning permission on appeal from the Secretary of State. The ability of developers to 
obtain planning permissions on appeal significantly weakened the bargaining position of 
LPAs. Five hundred and forty-seven (547) residential planning applications, and 108 
commercial planning applications were approved in Cambridgeshire on appeal between 
1982 and 1990, with the peak number of permissions granted on appeal coming during the 
1985-1990 study period. It is also important to note that at least 15 agreements 
(approximately 15% of the 103 agreements signed for major developments during the study 
period) were signed after the Secretary of State had ordered that planning permission be 
granted on appeal. Once permission had been granted on appeal, the LPA had little 
leverage to force applicants to make unwanted contributions.
Differences between the systems of government finance in Britain and the U.S. 
reinforced different perspectives on the issue of betterment, and different attitudes toward 
developer finance. Seventy-five per cent of all local government tax revenue in the U.S. in 
1984 came from the property tax (Aronson and Hilley,1986). Moreover, because the 
property tax in the U.S. has been locally administered and locally collected, official 
property valuations have been kept current, and the property tax has served as an effective 
way for local governments to recoup betterment. Thus, there has been little need in the 
U.S. to look to developer finance as a means for recouping gains in property value.
Instead, developer finance has been viewed simply and straightforwardly as a way of 
supplementing the revenues available to local governments. It is interesting to note that 
when property taxes were cut in half in California by Proposition 13, local governments in 
that state became active in devising other ways to capture gains in land value-- such as by 
making use of special assessments, tax increment financing, and negotiated agreements.
In Britain, the property tax has been a relatively unimportant source of government 
tax revenue. Adoption of the “Community Charge” in 1989 made the property tax even
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less important as a source of government revenue. Furthermore, because the property tax 
has been centrally administered, and because the central government has failed to up-date 
property valuations on a regular basis, the property tax in Britain has not effectively 
captured betterment. If the property tax were a more important source of government 
revenue in Britain, and if property valuations were regularly updated so as to reflect current 
market value, there would probably be less concern and debate regarding the need to collect 
betterment
Negotiated Agreements Versus M andatory Fixed Fees
Due to perceived problems and abuses associated with negotiated agreements in the 
1980’s, British planners, researchers, lawyers and local authority officials have begun to 
look with increasing favour on the American approach of imposing mandatory, fixed fees. 
By the early 1990’s, LPAs had become more willing to seek cash payments for off-site 
infrastructure improvements, and there was a tendency to calibrate desired (or required) 
cash contributions on a per unit basis— very much as has been done in the U.S.— thereby 
making such payments more predictable.
Increased interest in American-style developer finance was also apparent at the 
national level. Based on legislation passed in 1989, regional water authorities began 
imposing and collecting a mandatory infrastructure charge which was remarkably similar to 
an American-style impact fee, as of 1 April 1990. Richard Wakeford and John Delafons 
were granted leaves from the Department of Environment to study American approaches to 
development control and development finance. Wakeford’s detailed study of American 
development control drew parallels between developer finance in Britain and the U.S.
And the report of John Delafons, issued in 1990, expressed a remarkably positive view of 
development impact fees:
Negotiated agreements... are often complex and time-consuming, and are 
practicable only in the case of relatively large-scale developments. It would hardly 
be possible to enter into negotiations over every application for new development 
Therefore a system of standard contributions is necessary if the process is to operate 
in an equitable and consistent manner (Delafons,1990,122).
Mandatory, fixed fees are certainly simpler, less costly, and less time-consuming to 
administer than the negotiation of agreements, and they provide developers with a high 
degree of certainty and predictability. Because the same fees are applied to every similar 
project, there is the appearance of equal treatment But are American-style impact fees 
preferable to the traditional British approach of negotiated agreements? In localities with 
the strongest property markets, where home prices and rents are highest, fees imposed on 
developers may be easily absorbed. However, those same fees, imposed in areas with
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weaker markets, will represent a much higher percentage of total development cost and will 
therefore be much less easily absorbed by developers. Thus, the imposition of equal fees 
over areas of uneven market strength could exacerbate problems of uneven development.
While market conditions change over time, fixed fees set by local authorities are 
likely to stay fixed, and fees which do not appear onerous at the point of adoption might 
make development economically unfeasible under poorer market conditions. This problem 
is important to emphasise, given the propensity of governments, as noted by Weiss (1991), 
to lag behind property markets when making decisions. Applying Weiss' logic to the 
problem of developer finance, it is probable that high fees will tend to be imposed on 
developers, not when the property market is strengthening, but rather after the property 
market has begun to decline. That certainly appears to have been the case with the water 
infrastructure charge, which took effect in 1990, well after the development boom had 
peaked, and at a time of falling property values.
Although fixed fees have the appearance of equal treatment, there is an inherent 
element of unfairness. Not all developments are equally profitable. Fixed fees will 
represent a higher proportion of development cost for low cost housing units than for high 
cost units, and may thus operate to discourage the provision of low cost housing. Also, 
fees imposed on developers are almost always based on the average cost of providing 
infrastructure in support of new development, whereas actual marginal costs will vary from 
site to site. Unless steps are taken to refine the system of fees, and to develop various tiers 
of fees, as was done in San Diego (See Chapter Two), some developers will pay more than 
the actual cost of infrastructure needed for their developments, while others will pay less.
What would happen if American style mandatory charges were imposed on 
developers in Britain? The first result is that developers in Britain would probably end up 
paying much more toward the cost of infrastructure and public facilities than they did under 
negotiated agreements. As shown in Chapter Eight, once the mandatory water 
infrastructure charge was imposed, developers paid more for water-related infrastructure 
than they did under negotiated agreements. Although British developers have complained 
about negotiated agreements, they may like mandatory fixed fees even less. Indeed, 
mandatory fees, if and when fully applied in the British institutional context, may prove 
much more onerous in Britain than they have in the U.S. Given central government 
opposition to allowing local governments to increase their independence, and the highly 
centralised institutional and governmental context in Britain, it seems unlikely that local 
authorities will be allowed to set their own fee levels, or to collect and spend the revenues 
raised from such mandatory fees. Fees are likely to be set at much higher levels, and may 
be unrelated to local market conditions. Also, fees paid by developers may not necessarily 
be targeted for local infrastructure improvements beneficial to their developments.
In the U.S., local governments have been responsible for setting the fees that have
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been imposed within their boundaries. They have imposed the fees, and in turn have been 
responsible for constructing improvements with the funds collected. In 1982, there were 
82,290 local government units in the U.S. (Aronson and Hilley,1986,10). Although the 
U.S. is a larger country than Britain, local government units in the U.S. tend to be 
geographically smaller than in Britain. Thus, when developers have paid fees, they have 
usually derived some direct benefit as a result of improvements being constructed. The fact 
that developer finance has been localised in the U.S. has tended to make impact fees 
beneficial to developers. Moreover, because local governments in the U.S. have been so 
dependent on local property tax revenues, and have had to compete with one another for 
tax-enhancing development, they have had to set fees which are realistic and justifiable in 
terms of the market If they impose charges which are not supported by the market, 
developers will very likely take their projects to nearby localities where charges and 
requirements are more reasonable. Thus, fees imposed on U.S. developers have tended to 
be remarkably market sensitive.
Policy makers in Britain appear not to have fully appreciated the market sensitivity 
of American impact fees, and have therefore taken too literally the argument that “impact 
fees... are supposed to vary solely with costs. (Nicholas,1992,517). American 
practitioners and proponents of impact fees, in their eagerness to gain legal acceptance of 
impact fees, have argued that impact fees have been cost-based, but in making that 
argument they have stretched a point Indeed, to argue that cost has been the sole basis of 
variation of impact fees in the U.S. is to seriously misrepresent and misinterpret American 
experience.
Evaluating Develoner Finance
Having compared British versus American approaches to development finance in 
the 1980’s, and researched how agreements were used in Cambridgeshire, it is possible to 
formulate answers to the three broad questions which were asked in Chapter One. How 
can and should local governments finance public infrastructure costs? To what extent 
should developers pay for public costs? And what method, or methods of developer 
finance make the most sense in terms of equity and efficiency, and in terms of achieving the 
objectives of planning and development control?
One way of paying for infrastructure would be to make greater use of user fees, 
with provisions for capital cost recovery. This approach, widely used in the U.S., has 
provided a convenient way of financing public improvements, and for pricing public 
services. The advantage of user fees is that those who benefit most from a proposed 
facility pay the most On the other hand, this method of finance has the disadvantage of 
being much more regressive than other methods of finance.
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Another way of paying for infrastructure would be to adopt the recent American 
practice of imposing mandatory fixed fees, or impact fees, on developers of new 
developments. These charges would assess new developments their proportionate share of 
infrastructure costs, including charges for required off-site infrastructure and facilities. 
Impact fees can potentially generate significant amounts of revenue for public authorities. 
However, a number of shortcomings and problems have been identified related to such 
fees. Impact fees can be, and often are, applied inequitably, and under certain 
circumstances may unfairly shift costs from existing residents onto new residents. They 
may also lead to unwanted distortions of development, by sending the wrong message to 
developers regarding where they should develop land. If the same fee is applied over a 
large geographic area, developers have no economic incentive to site projects efficiently in 
relation to public infrastructure, where public costs of infrastructure provision are lowest 
Another shortcoming of fixed fees is that they are usually not sustainable in declining or 
slow-growing communities. They tend to be used, not to lead development into areas 
where planning authorities hope development will occur, but to respond to private 
development pressures in areas already experiencing rapid growth. Impact fees have also 
often been imposed in response to growth pressures in an attempt to slow down and 
discourage development.
Instead of turning to user fees and impact fees, consideration could be given to 
methods of infrastructure finance which involve the recoupment of betterment. The failure 
of three previous attempts to tax betterment at the national level suggests that adoption of an 
across-the-board tax on betterment is not a likely option. However, British policy makers 
might take a closer look at the property tax as an indirect way of recouping betterment.
“The rates,” as they are called in Britain, have admittedly been politically unpopular, and 
few British politicians have been willing to endorse their increased use. Even in the U.S., 
the property tax has come under growing criticism, and has been the prime target of the 
“taxpayers revolt.” Nevertheless, the property tax has many advantages as a revenue 
source. It can be efficiently administered, and can provide a steady and reliable source of 
public revenue. Also, the property tax is much less regressive than sales taxes, VAT, and 
user fees. Greater reliance on the property tax, and more efficient administration, could 
provide a way of funding public infrastructure costs in Britain, and at the same time 
provide a convenient and indirect way of recouping publicly-created betterment. Indeed, I 
would argue that greater reliance on the property tax is necessary in Britain, if for no other 
reason than to give local authorities some financial incentive and reward to accept 
developments with major impacts and costs. With so little revenue raised from the property 
tax, and with such heavy dependence on central government funding, local governments in 
Britain have had more to gain from turning down development applications than from 
permitting new development
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The development of publicly-financed New Towns- as exemplified by 
Peterborough New Town in Cambridgeshire— provides another possible model for 
financing infrastructure through recoupment. Despite the successes of the New Town 
programme, there appears to be little current political support in Britain for the government 
to play such a dominant role over the private sector in shaping development However, as 
an alternative to government-led development the government could encourage the 
development of privately-financed New Settlements through the structure plan process, and 
shift much of the infrastructure and public facility costs related to those New Settlements 
onto private developers. As described in Chapters Five and Eight, this approach was 
attempted on an ambitious scale in Cambridgeshire, and might have succeeded, had it not 
been for the Secretary of State’s rejection of all of the proposed New Settlements in and 
around Cambridge. Betterment might also be selectively negotiated from developers of 
large scale developments, such as proposed business parks and out-of-town shopping 
centres, which have obtained windfall gains as a result of identifiable public actions— such 
as the release of Green Belt land for development, and the construction of limited access 
highways and interchanges providing preferred access to selected locations. Research in 
Cambridgeshire found that local authorities were reluctant to seek contributions for off-site 
improvements from major developments. Clearly, however, the negotiation of 
extraordinary contributions from developments which have received extraordinary benefits- 
- such as from public investments in highways, and/or from the removal of land from the 
Green Belt— could be justified in terms of policy. To do so would represent a British 
application of the American approach of “benefit recapture”-  as represented by incentive 
zoning and density bonuses— granting developments special benefits and in return 
imposing special obligations.
To what extent should developers pay for public costs? This research has not 
provided a precise answer. However, a comparison of British versus American experience 
suggests developers in Britain can and should be expected to pay more toward the public 
costs of development than they have in the past. In the U.S., in a political and economic 
context in which little thought has been given to the collection of betterment, developers 
have increasingly been expected to pay for public costs related to the impacts of their 
developments— and have been remarkably willing to do so. The imposition of costs on 
developers for improvements related to their developments has not represented the 
collection of betterment. Rather, the imposition of such charges has enhanced the value of 
proposed developments. To use Alan Evans* terminology, the payments extracted from 
developers were “beneficial,” not “onerous,” and tended to enhance the value of 
developers* projects. If impact fees increase the cost of completed developments, as has 
been suggested by American research on the incidence of impact fees, they increase the 
value of those developments as well.
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But what is the best way of having developers pay? Negotiating agreements may 
produce less total revenue than imposing impact fees and exactions. The ability to negotiate 
contributions will also probably vary considerably over time, due to the cyclical nature of 
the property market. However, the negotiation of contributions nevertheless appears to be 
a fair and defensible way of obtaining finance for public improvements. Negotiated 
agreements are certainly a potentially more accurate way to gauge benefits and apportion 
costs than U.S. style special assessments. With special assessments, property owners are 
assessed costs not only in advance of public improvements being made, but also before 
proposals are received for more intensive development It is assumed that all adjoining 
properties will benefit, and costs are allocated according to some standard formula. But not 
all properties may realise equal benefit from the proposed improvements. For example, all 
properties fronting on a road might be assessed for the cost of widening the road.
However, some businesses may generate a large volume of additional business because of 
the increased road capacity, and may expand, while others may generate much less 
additional business. Benefits which are likely to accrue as a result of proposed 
infrastructure improvements are, in fact, difficult to predict in advance. On the other hand, 
negotiating developer contributions at the point when a developer is proposing to develop 
or change the use o f land provides a more accurate basis for gauging the benefit that a given 
property is likely to derive, and for determining in turn what a fair contribution toward the 
cost of the project might be.
Perceptions regarding the negotiation of agreements in Britain and development 
impact fees in the U.S. appear to have been based on inaccurate and overly simplistic 
assumptions. In the U.S., the assumption has been that development impact fees have 
been based primarily, if not exclusively, on the cost of providing facilities and infrastructure 
in support of development However, the amounts that local governments have charged 
developers have probably been determined to a large degree by other factors, such as the 
strength of local property markets, the level of development pressure, and rates of growth. 
In Britain, it has been widely assumed that negotiated agreements have been based on the 
value of planning permission, and has been motivated by the desire of LPAs to recoup 
betterment However, that characterisation, too, appears to have been misleading. LPAs 
in Cambridgeshire systematically ignored the value of planning permission, sought 
contributions only in contexts where infrastructure improvements were necessary for 
development, and based contributions largely on the cost of required improvements. 
Agreements were not used to impose barriers to development, but rather to enable and 
encourage development in areas where it might otherwise not have occured. Claims that 
local authorities frequently used agreements to force developers into making exorbitant 
contributions were far off the mark. The major value of negotiated agreements was not so 
much as a source of revenue, but as a flexible means for managing and guiding growth,
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consistent with established planning policies.
Keogh (1985,226) has observed that “much of the existing debate [about planning 
gain] is deficient because it takes no clear position on what planning is supposed to achieve.” 
It might be equally fair to re-phrase Keogh's observation by stating that the debate about 
planning gain has been deficient because of the lack of agreement as to what the negotiation 
of agreements is supposed to achieve. Is the major reason for negotiating contributions to 
recoup betterment? Is the purpose of negotiating contributions to raise needed money for 
public infrastructure improvements? Is it to encourage development? Or is the purpose of 
negotiation to achieve a beneficial pattern of development as described in land use plans and 
policies? If the primary purpose of negotiating contributions is to manage growth and 
development, then the most important question is not whether betterment was collected, or 
how much was collected from developers, but whether and how the negotiation of 
agreements and contributions advanced and related to established planning objectives and 
policies.
Developer Finance and Growth Management
Most of what has been written to-date in Britain on planning agreements has 
judged local authority use of agreements without reference to the specific goals and 
objectives that local planning authorities in particular regions were attempting to achieve.
The research which was conducted in Cambridgeshire demonstrates the importance of 
geographically focused research, and of analysing local authority use of agreements with 
reference to operative plans and policies. The negotiation of agreements in Cambridgeshire 
took place within the context of the Cambridgeshire Structure Plan. The presence of that 
strategic plan, and the role of the County Council in monitoring local compliance with the 
plan, served to keep the negotiation of agreements focused on the fulfillment of broad 
regional planning objectives. In this planning context, the negotiation of contributions was 
not as much a revenue source as a tool for managing growth, and for achieving established 
planning objectives. The same cannot necessarily be said about locally administered impact 
fees and exactions in the U.S.
Developer finance in the U.S. has been pursued first and foremost as a source of 
revenue for local governments. Moreover, the adoption and implementation of developer 
finance in the U.S. has almost always been carried out by local government units without 
reference to regional planning objectives. In large portions of the U.S., regional strategic 
plans are either non-existent, or very weak. Even in areas where regional planning 
agencies do operate, their ability to influence local planning and development control has 
been extremely limited. Local governments in the U.S. have therefore expanded their use 
of developer finance without considering how such actions might affect regional patterns of
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growth and development Planning purposes advanced through developer finance have 
usually been so local as to be self-serving. One lesson which U.S. researchers can draw 
from the Cambridgeshire research is the importance of evaluating developer finance as a 
tool for regional rather than simply local growth management
A disproportionate share of the research conducted in the U.S. on developer 
finance has been carried out at the local level to analyse the incidence of impact fees and 
exactions. Most of the debate in Britain over the negotiation of agreements has centered on 
the question of whether developers have been forced to pay betterment. But an equally, if 
not more important question for planners and policy makers in both countries relates to 
effects of developer finance on patterns of development and on the ability of planning 
authorities to achieve desirable patterns of setdement and growth.
Planners and government officials in the U.S. have an imperfect understanding of 
the inter-relationships between developer finance, rates of growth and property markets 
cycles. How have alternative methods of developer finance affected patterns of growth and 
development in areas with different market strengths? To what extent has the level of fees 
imposed in different communities correlated with the strength of local property markets, 
and how have fees changed over time in relation to the property market cycle? Many local 
governments have adopted impact fees out of a desire to slow down the rate of growth.
But did the adoption of impact fees actually lead to slower growth? Or did the collection of 
fees support and encourage greater development? Further research is clearly needed in the 
U.S. to document the relationship between impact fees and growth patterns.
The imposition of fixed fees (infrastructure charges) may exert complex and varied 
effects on patterns and densities of development, depending on the planning context. In 
some contexts, requirements of developer finance may lead to more dense and more 
compact development. On the other hand, experience in Florida has shown that adopting 
developer finance requirements may encourage development to “sprawl.” There is a risk 
that requiring developers to pay a mandatory infrastructure charge may establish an implied 
contract between payers and public authorities-- creating an obligation on the part of 
infrastructure authorities to extend facilities into areas they otherwise might not have chosen 
to service.
Research in the U.S. on the effects of impact fees and exactions on patterns of 
development may be useful guidance to British policy makers considering wider application 
of fixed fees within the British context However, it is also important that additional 
research examining the growth effects of fixed fees (infrastructure charges) be conducted 
in Britain, because such fees, when applied in the British context may have a different 
effect on patterns of development than they have in the U.S. The localised use of impact 
fees in the U.S. has evolved into a diverse, dynamic, and constantly changing system of 
development finance. Within the much more highly centralised institutional structure of
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Britain, development impact fees could work very differently— creating a static set of 
charges incapable of responding to unequal needs and changing circumstances.
The way in which the water infrastructure charge was administered in Britain after 1 
April 1990 provides an indication of how American style impact fees are likely to be 
misapplied in Britain. When the water infrastructure charge took effect, mandatory fixed 
fees were established in each of the 10 regional water authorities. Within the vast AWA 
Service Area, a single uniform infrastructure charge was imposed, based on an overall 
calculation of the average cost of providing infrastructure to serve new development over 
the entire area— even though the marginal cost of providing water infrastructure obviously 
varied enormously in different locations of the region. Not only did this approach to 
developer finance fail to provide an incentive for developers to locate their projects 
efficiently in relation to available water infrastructure, it also failed to take account of major 
differences in the strength of the property market within the region.
A major goal of the Cambridgeshire structure plan, as noted earlier, was to achieve 
a more dispersed pattern of development than would have taken place under unrestrained 
market conditions, and to discourage development from concentrating in and around 
Cambridge. However, the uniform water infrastructure charge imposed over the whole of 
the Anglian Water Authority region will probably undermine those structure plan goals. In 
Cambridge, where property prices were highest, the water infrastructure charge will 
represent a relatively low proportion of total development cost. In Fenland and East 
Cambridgeshire-- where property prices are lower and where the Cambridgeshire Structure 
plan hopes to encourage more development to take place- the water infrastructure charge 
will represent a relatively high proportion of development cost, and will thereby discourage 
development.
Centrally-imposed high infrastructure charges in Britain may serve to further 
depress development in areas with weak property markets, and encourage development to 
concentrate in centres with stronger property markets where the charges are more easily 
absorbed by developers. At the same time, the imposition of a single fixed fee, irrespective 
of the marginal cost of providing infrastructure to different areas, may, in effect, encourage 
development in areas where the cost of infrastructure provision is highest.
In both the U.S. and Britain, there is a need for further geographically- focused 
research to evaluate the effects of alternative methods of developer finance on patterns of 
development, and on the achievement of regional planning and growth management 
objectives. The research which was conducted in Cambridgeshire has provided a starting 
point for this research, and a baseline for comparison for future investigators.
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APPENDIX ONE:
British Development Control Versus TVaditional U.S. Zoning
Definition of "Development" Requiring Permission 
U.K.: Restrictive definition
U.S.: Permissive definition (a property owner can put up fences, cut down trees,
demolish buildings, dig cellar holes, etc.— all without planning permission, and 
without a building permit as well.)
Degree of Control over Development
U.K.: No development without permission.
U.S.: A great deal of development allowed “by right” without needing to obtain specific
planning permission. Every property must be zoned for some type of 
development It is not possible to zone a property for “no development.” Court 
rulings have established the principle that overly restrictive zoning constitutes a 
“taking” of private property, and that owners of properties affected by such 
restrictive zoning must receive “just compensation.”
Specificity of Plans
U.K.: Structure and local plans set out strategic planning policies, and set targets for
development to be accommodated. However these plans are not site specific, and 
do not commit the local planning authority to approve specific developments on 
specific sites. Planning applications are reviewed on a case by case basis. There 
is no zoning ordinance to provide an advance indication of what uses might be 
allowed, or what scale or density of development might be allowed on a specific 
site. In the absence of such specific guidelines, there is ample scope for 
negotiation with applicants regarding the content of development applications.
U.S.: Traditional zoning in the U.S. is site specific. For each site and area, the zoning
ordinance will usually indicate what types of uses will be allowed, and the 
allowed physical limits of development (set-backs, height, floor area ratio,etc.). 
This prescriptive approach to development control leaves little opportunity for 
negotiation, or for modifying requirements based on a consideration of conditions 
unique to a particular site.
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Flexibility / Discretion Exercised bv Local Planning Authority
U.K.: Extreme flexibility. Planning authorities not bound to base planning decisions
solely on the local plan. Rather, planning authorities are specifically authorised by 
the Town and Country Planning Act of 1971 to consider any considerations 
which they judge to be “material” to the application.
U.S.: Zoning has tended to be prescriptive, and has afforded planners little, if any,
discretion to modify zoning requirements to fit specific cases, or to consider and 
regulate aspects of development not covered by the ordinance. The legal test for 
obtaining a “variance” is difficult to meet in most cases. Planners have been able 
to “hide behind rules.”
Predictability /  Certainty
U.K.: Past decisions regarding similar properties are not necessarily a guide to what the
decision will be in a subsequent case. Every case is judged on its own merits. 
The “Rule of Man”-- with a high degree of uncertainty.
U.S.: The “Rule of Law.” Equal justice, but not necessarily fair justice (Jowell,1977).
Exceptions to zoning requirements rarely granted. Previous decisions set an 
important precedent. As a result, the system provides applicants with a fairly high 
degree of certainty.
Bargaining and Negotiation
U.K.: The discretionary nature of planning decisions creates an opportunity for
bargaining and negotiation between developers and local authorities. Developers 
are tempted to want to negotiate with local authorities as a way of reducing 
uncertainty.
U.S.: Zoning requirements have traditionally been non-negotiable.
Predominant Development Pattern
U.K.: Containment of development; clear delineation between city and country.
(Example: City of Cambridge, surrounded by Cambridge Green Belt)
U.S.: “Sprawl”
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Degree to Which Land Values Are Determined bv Planning Decisions
U.K.: Because of the discretionary nature of the British planning system, and the
tendency to limit the supply of land for development, decisions on planning 
applications in Britain have a major and direct impact on underlying land values. 
Grants of planning permission typically produce windfall profits for certain lucky 
landowners, while preventing owners of adjacent properties from realising similar 
benefit. In sharp contrast to the American approach, it is not necessary that 
owners of properties in the same general area be treated equally, or that they 
receive the same level of benefit from land use regulation.
U.S.: Land values tend to be determined by zoning, rather than by specific grants of
planning permission. The value which a property commands assumes that the 
property can be developed in some economically rewarding way. The price of 
land therefore reflects not just the value of current uses, but also a degree of 
“hope value.”
Land Cost as a Proportion of Total Development Cost 
U.K.: Very High
U.S.: Low
(The high price of land of in the U.K. is not simply due to the fact that there is 
less land in England than in the U.S.; rather the high cost of land is in large part 
reinforced by the British system of planning and development control, which has 
restricted the supply of land with planning permission, and in turn has conferred 
very high land values on sites which manage to obtain planning permission.)
Degree to Which Planning Leads or Follows the Market
U.K.: Planning applications are frequently denied in areas where private developers
might otherwise have wanted to build; at the same time, development is often 
encouraged in areas where development might otherwise not have occurred had 
developers had a choice.
U.S.: Development patterns generally shaped by market forces.
Supply of Developable Land Relative to Market Demand
U.K: Planning authorities seek to maintain a limited supply of land with planning
permission. Additional land approved for development only as needed.
U.S. Much more land available for development than is actually needed for 
development at any one time.
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Trends- The Direction of Change
U.K.: British development control is moving in the direction of American-style
development control:
District-wide local plans now required for the first time. Plans becoming 
increasingly specific, and in turn providing greater certainty.
Government directives that there should be a “presumption in favour of 
development,’* and that local planning authorities should maintain a five-year 
supply of land for development, have had the effect of loosening somewhat the 
degree of constraint on development
Revisions to Use Classes Order, and the creation of the new B-l Class including 
office, light industrial and high technology uses in a single use class, has given 
property owners the ability to change commercial uses by right without obtaining 
specific permission.
Indications of increased interest in American-style impact fees, as an alternative to 
negotiated agreements with contributions.
U.S.: There is a clear trend toward tighter development control in the U.S. There are
also signs in parts of the country of an increased willingness to adopt more 
flexible development controls, in place of traditional, rigid zoning ordinances 
(“performance standards, point systems, etc.).
Increased environmental concerns, and the need to mitigate environmental impacts 
of development, has necessitated a more flexible site by site approach to 
development review
Less development “by right*’ -more development by “special permit’*
Increased exercise of discretion by local planning authorities 
Development is becoming more uncertain and difficult 
Increased opportunities for negotiation
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APPENDIX TWO :
SELECTED AGREEMENTS SIGNED IN CAMBRIDGESHIRE. 
1 985-1990
Cambridge Sub-Area: Cambridge Citv Council and South Cambridgeshire 
District Council
Cambridge Business Park /  Citv of Cambridge
In September 1982, the City's planning authority granted two outline planning 
permissions to Pine Developments for an industrial estate which eventually became known 
as the Cambridge Business Park. No planning agreement was signed related to these first 
two outline permissions. Two additional full planning permissions were subsequently 
issued in February 1984 permitting the erection of warehouse/industrial units and a 
computer research and development production building. Again, no agreement was 
signed. It was not until November 1984, after these two full permissions had been 
granted, that a Section 52 agreement was signed which called for contributions to take 
surface water drainage off the site. The amount of the contribution set in the agreement was 
£5000 per impermeable acre. No other contributions for development-related infrastructure 
or other public facilities were sought by the City.
During the early phases of development, Cambridge City authorities seemed content 
with the terms contained in the of the 1984 agreement. Between 29 January,1986 and 30 
November, 1988, three additional agreements were signed related to final applications for 
specific developments at the Cambridge Business Park. Each of these agreements was 
modeled exactly on the original 1984 agreement, and called for drainage contributions of 
£5000 per impermeable acre. However, as development of the site proceeded, the planning 
authority became more dissatisfied, particularly regarding the growing traffic impacts of the 
Cambridge Business Park. On 27 January, 1989, an application was filed requesting final 
planning permission to build 2605 square metres of new B-l space. At the same time, the 
applicants submitted an application seeking permission to develop the remainder of the site 
with an additional 20,000 square metres of business space. The Planning Committee did 
not to approve these additional applications because it was concerned that the proposed 
additional development would contribute to a further worsening of traffic congestion on 
Milton Road. Traffic counts, and calculations of traffic likely to be generated by 
developments which had already been approved but were yet to be built, showed that the 
intersections serving the Cambridge Business Park were "at capacity"
(Winterbottom,1990b, int.). A memorandum to the Chief Planning Officer from the City 
Engineer dated 23 October 1989 stated "I consider we have very good grounds for
-334-
refusing the application... unless a significant contribution is made to the proposed road 
network." The Chief Planning Officer sought to negotiate a new agreement containing a 
major contribution for improvements to alleviate traffic congestion on Milton Road, but the 
applicant resisted agreeing to the contributions. Almost two and a half years passed from 
the time the application was submitted, during which time no action was taken. Eventually 
an agreement was signed on 30 August 1991 in which the developer agreed to contribute 
£500,000 to the County Council for highway improvements which were specifically 
described in the Agreement
Cambridge Science Park/ South Cambridgeshire
An agreement was signed in June 1988 for Phase 5 of the Cambridge Science Park, 
covering approximately 20 acres of land along the northern fringe of Cambridge. No 
contribution was secured in connection with this agreement. Rather, the purpose of the 
agreement was to restrict occupancy of the Science Park to firms primarily in research and 
development In the agreement, the College assured that it would "not knowingly permit the 
said land or any buildings to be erected thereon to be used for any purpose other than the 
purpose appropriate to a science park... namely firms involved in ‘scientific research* or
light industrial production of a kind which is dependent on regular consultation with scientific 
staff or facilities or the university or of local scientific institutions."
Permission for the first phase of the science park (30 acres) was granted to Trinity 
College in 1972. At the time, it was one of the first dedicated science parks in Britain 
(Breheny,Hart,1989). Sixteen years later, when the College applied for permission for 
Phase 5, the Science Park had grown to cover approximately 112 acres, housing 65 firms 
which employed 2170 people (Cambridge Publications, December 1987,5). As 
development of the Science Park proceeded, traffic on roads leading to and from the park 
intensified. "Because it was one of the first, if not the first science park, the local planning 
authority, as well as the County Highway Authority, had no idea how much traffic such a 
park would generate. No one knew that it would end up generating 3 times more traffic per 
square foot than a Salisbury's store" (Barnes, 1991,int.). By February 1991, there was 
over 900,000 square feet of commercial space at the park, with 86 firms employing over 
3000 people (Chartered Surveyor Weekly, 21 March 1991), and traffic tie-ups and 
congestion at the junction and access road to the Science Park had become a constant and 
notorious occurrence. When fully developed, there could be as much as 1.4 million square 
feet of floorspace at the Cambridge Science Park, further worsening the problem of 
congestion at the Park entrance. Indeed, the failure of the local authority to ask for, and the 
failure of the developer to offer, a major contribution for highway access improvements to 
the Park, in retrospect, is now probably regretted by both the authority and Trinity College.
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Trinity College certainly was in an excellent position to have offered a contribution. 
The land on which the Science Park was developed had been owned by the College and it 
predecessors since 1443 (Breheny, Hart,1989). Moreover, the value of the land for 
development had been gready enhanced by two major public actions. First, the value of the 
site for development was enhanced as result of the construction of the A45 Cambridge 
Northern Bypass. This dual carriageway, with its four-way interchange at the A10, opened 
in December 1978, and provided the science park with excellent vehicular access. Secondly, 
the College directly benefited as a result of the release of its land from the Cambridge Green 
Belt In 1984, land which was later developed by the College as Phase 4 of the Science 
Park, was removed from the Green Belt (See Figure 7.01). Then in 1989, additional land 
owned by the College was removed from the Green Belt by the Secretary of State, and it was 
this land which became the subject of the Phase 5 application. Despite these windfall gains 
which befell the College as a result of the release of this land from the Green Belt, no 
additional contribution was negotiated in connection with the Phase 5 permission.
St. John's Innovation Park / Cambridge and South Cambridgeshire
This case highlights how two adjoining local planning authorities used legal 
agreements in different ways, reflecting different local planning policies and attitudes toward 
development The 22.5 acre site of the proposed Innovation Park, which became known as 
the “tear-drop site” because of its shape, was located in boundary between Cambridge and 
South Cambridgeshire, in the Cambridge Northern Fringe. Approximately one-third of the 
property was located in Cambridge, and two-thirds of the site in South Cambridgeshire.
Thus, in order to develop the site it was necessary for the Masters, Fellows and Scholars of 
S t John the Evangelist College, of Cambridge University, to submit planning applications to 
both the City of Cambridge and South Cambridgeshire District Council.
Cambridge City Council was positively inclined to approve the Innovation Park 
application. Prior to the application, the City had adopted the Milton Road Policy, which 
specifically allocated the land in question for research and development 
(Winterbottom,1990a, int.). The City granted planning permission for approximately 14,700 
square metres of space on the 7.5 acres of land within Cambridge, subject to a planning 
agreement signed on 3 November 1986. In the agreement, the College agreed to contribute 
£18,700 toward the cost of constructing a ditch to accommodate surface water drainage from 
the site, and to contribute a further £29,200 for additional drainage improvements- an 
amount which was calculated based on a formula of £5000 per impermeable acre.
South Cambridgeshire District Council, on the other hand, opposed the application to 
develop that portion of the site within its jurisdiction (Miles,1990,int.; Taylor, 199 lb,int.). 
According to South Cambridgeshire District Council, the land which the College wished to
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develop was in the Green Belt, and it therefore refused planning permission. The College 
appealed the refusal to the Secretary of State. Fearing that it was likely that it would lose on 
appeal, South Cambridgeshire District Council decided to make the best of what it viewed as 
a bad situation by entering into an agreement limiting development on the portion of the site 
located in South Cambridgeshire (Miles,1990,int.). South Cambridgeshire was correct in 
fearing that it would probably lose on appeal. The land the College sought to develop for its 
Innovation Park was officially removed from the Cambridge Green Belt by the Secretary of 
State in 1989.
The agreement signed on 16 December,1987 limited the amount of floorspace that 
could be built in South Cambridgeshire to 12% of the total site area. The agreement also 
included a provision restricting occupancy to firms in research and development, or 
otherwise related to the university. No contribution was obtained by South Cambridgeshire 
for drainage improvements or road improvements. South Cambridgeshire did not use its 
opposition to the development as leverage to secure offers of additional developer 
contributions.
Barwell Machine and Rubber Company / South Cambridgeshire
In March 1989, South Cambridgeshire granted permission for a local company to 
relocate it's machine and rubber factory to a new site within the District, and a complicated 
agreement in conjunction with the permission was signed. Only relatively minor 
contributions were extracted from the firm, despite the fact that "no other firm could have 
gotten the planning permission that they got" (Miles, 1991,int.). In the view of the planning 
authority, the existing location of the firm was undesirable, because the firm's massive 
lorries ran through the village of Swavesley. The LPA therefore wished to facilitate and 
encourage the relocation of the factory to a more remote site where it would have less of an 
impact. "It was considered to be a planning gain simply to get the factory out of the center of 
the village"(Ibid.). Provisions were included in the agreement requiring Barwells to move 
within a specified time, and extinguishing the right to use the original factory site for 
industrial use after that date. As further inducement to complete the relocation of the factory, 
the permission and accompanying agreement granted the firm permission to develop its 
original factory site, which it planned to vacate, for housing. There was no requirement in 
the agreement that any social housing units be included on the site. It was envisioned that all 
of the new housing would be private.
The most significant contribution obtained by the South Cambridgeshire in this 
agreement was the donation of four acres of land so that an existing adjoining public 
recreation area could be expanded. According to the District Council, the amount of land 
which Barwell was asked to donate was greater than it would otherwise have been asked to 
set aside for recreation as part of its development. On the other hand, to balance off this
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burden, the firm "received permission to develop more housing [approximately 20 - 30 more 
units] on its site than it otherwise would have been able to.. (Ibid.).
Marshall Engineering Ltd./ Cambridge and South Cambridgeshire
Marshall's Engineering proposed to build a new hanger to service jumbo and Tri-Star 
jets on a site at Cambridge Airport, on the boundary between South Cambridgeshire and 
Cambridge. Because of the scale of the proposed structure (800 feet long, 300 feet wide, 
and 90 feet high), the planning application generated considerable publicity as well as local 
opposition. Although the proposed site for the hanger was entirely in South Cambridgeshire, 
planners in the City of Cambridge were concerned that the proposed new hanger would have 
a negative effect on an adjoining Council Estate in Cambridge (Lane,1990,int.). The City 
hoped to press for a major package of contributions from the firm, such as for social 
housing. Additional planning concern arose from the fact that aircraft would have to be 
moved between the new hanger and the airfield, across a heavily used road. Before the 
application could be dealt with at the local level, the application was called in by the Secretary 
of State. The Inspector who heard the case ruled that permission should be granted, subject 
to an agreement dealing with certain limited concerns, such as traffic control. An agreement 
was signed between Marshall's and South Cambridgeshire District Council requiring the 
applicant to install a traffic signal at the point where aircraft would need to cross the existing 
road, and to maintain the traffic signal thereafter. The agreement further specified that the 
duration of aircraft crossing phases "shall not exceed two minutes" and that, "save for prior 
written consent of the Highway Authority, aircraft crossings would not occur between from 
0730 to 0900, from 1200 to 1400, and from 1630 to 1830.”
Tesco Stores / South Cambridgeshire
In November 1987, Tesco Stores applied to South Cambridgeshire District Council 
for planning permission to build a 50,000 square foot supermarket, 3 unit shops, a petrol 
filling station and associated car parking on Cambridge Road in Milton. The planning 
authority was opposed to the application, because the land had been allocated for housing 
development in a local plan, and because of the proximity of the proposed development site 
to nearby housing. During the application process, Tesco's offered to sign an agreement 
including a variety of contributions: for the construction of a new roundabout; for the 
realignment of Cambridge Road in the vicinity of the roundabout; for the construction of a 
new footpath between a bus stop and the development; for mounding and landscaping to 
mitigate the impacts of the development on nearby housing; and for construction of a new 
surface water drainage systems to divert a public drain running through the property (as well 
as a commuted sum payment for the future repair and maintenance of the drain). The
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estimated total value of all these contributions was approximately £300,000 
(Johnson, 1991 ,int.)
In addition to these contributions, Tesco offered to contribute £200,000 to the 
District for the cost of developing playing fields and soccer pitches serving the adjoining 
residential area. Nevertheless, the planning authority remained opposed to the application, 
and refused planning permission. In the opinion of the developer, "the people on the parish 
council were simply against the project, and no amount of planning gain would have changed 
their point of view..."(Johnson,1991,int.).
Tesco appealed to the Secretary of State, who instructed that permission should be 
granted, subject to an agreement Having lost on appeal, the District was in no position to 
require the developer to make the £200,000 contribution for playing fields promised earlier. 
Moreover, District planners were reluctant to specify such a contribution in a planning 
agreement because they felt it was inconsistent with the guidelines of Circular 22/83. “There 
was no logical connection between shopping and the need for recreation 
facilities"(Miles,19914nt). As a result, the planning agreement was signed without 
specifying the contribution of £200,000. Nevertheless, Tesco made the contribution anyway. 
No mention of it was made in the Section 52 agreement, however. The contribution was 
made to the Parish Council, rather than to the District Council. "Tesco was aware that the 
village was against them" and decided to contribute the £200,000 to create goodwill in the 
community— it was commercial decision" (Miles, 1991, int.). "The Secretary of State 
granted planning permission on appeal, and there was no requirement that we pay the 
£200,000. The payment was after the fact — we didn't have to do it"( John son, 1991 ,int.).
The total contribution offered by Tesco in relation to this project, amounting to 
approximately £500,000, was among the highest offered by any developer in 
Cambridgeshire during the study period. However, the total value of contributions still only 
represented less than 5% of the total development cost of the project (Johnson,1991,int.).
Marks and Spencer Expansion / Cambridge
The application of Marks and Spencer seeking permission to build 4000 square 
metres of retail space at 6-11 Market Street in the center of Cambridge resulted in the 
signing of an agreement, but not one involving major contributions. The planning 
authority opposed the application because the proposal called for the demolition of the 
Victoria Cinema, a listed building. The developer appealed the refusal of permission to the 
Secretary of State, who approved the requested application on 24 June 1987. Having 
received permission for 4000 square metres, Marks and Spencer then submitted a new 
planning application seeking permission to bring the total development to 4472 square 
metres. Given that permission had already been granted permitting 4000 square metres of
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retail space, and that the new application in effect sought to add only 472 square metres of 
additional floor space, the Gty Council did not have much leverage to negotiate significant 
contributions. An agreement was negotiated restricting truck loading and deliveries to 
specified locations, and to specified, limited hours.
Unex Investment Co. Office Development / Cambridge
The application of Unex Investment Company to build a large office complex in 
Cambridge was a major test of the ability of the local planning authority in Cambridge to 
enforce County Structure Plan and local planning policies discouraging new office 
development in Cambridge. The case also revealed the limited ability of a local planning 
authority to obtain significant developer contributions even when established planning 
policy was on its side.
Over the course a number of years, Unex submitted successive planning 
applications, seeking permission for a successively larger and larger office complex on the 
site. The first application which was submitted requested permission to build an office 
building containing 39,750 square feet of space. This application was approved by the 
Gty. A subsequent application for a 43,300 square foot office building was also 
approved. No planning agreements were signed in connection with these permissions. 
However these permissions were not implemented. Between 1985 and 1986 Unex 
submitted 6 additional applications for the site-- two for 72,800 square feet, and four for 
84,500 square feet. The City Council turned down all of these applications. "Local 
residents of the area... were extremely opposed to the development, and argued that the 
development would have an adverse impact on a nearby Victorian estate, a listed building" 
(McElroy, 1991 ,int.).
Unex appealed the refusals of its planning applications to the Secretary of State.
The Secretary of State dismissed all of the appeals on 10 April 1987, but Unex appealed the 
dismissals to the High Court. The High Court quashed the four applications for 84,500 
square feet, but ordered that the applications for 72,800 square feet be reheard. In the 
meantime, Unex submitted yet another application seeking permission for a 72,800 square 
foot building, plus 231 car parking spaces. The Inspector for the Secretary of State who 
held the inquiry into the 3 new planning applications at the Guildhall in July 1988 ruled on 
11 August, 1988 that outline permission should be granted for all three applications.
It was only at this late point in the process that the City of Cambridge began to try 
to negotiate a planning agreement with Unex. The fact that Unex was assured the right to 
develop a 72,800 square foot building on the site, meant that the Council had relatively 
little leverage to negotiate contributions from Unex. However, the City felt that the scale of 
the development, and the additional traffic it was likely to generate, required that the road
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and intersection adjoining the development be widened. The only apparent leverage which 
the City had to negotiate contributions for these road improvements was to possibly allow 
the development to become larger than 72,800 square feet
An agreement was signed in October,1988 granting permission for an office 
development of 84,500 square feet, but in turn requiring the applicant to dedicate a 3 metre 
wide strip of the property fronting on Hills Road to enable the Highway Authority to widen 
and improve the Hills Road/Brooklands Avenue junction. The total area of land donated was 
approximately 270 square metres.
A second agreement was signed in September,1989, granting Unex permission to 
add an additional 8051 square feet of space to the development- raising the total amount of 
floor area to 92,551 square feet, but also requiring that the new space be devoted to 
conference and training space, a creche, a restaurant/canteen, squash courts, and a gym.
The Chief Planning Officer, who had just arrived on the scene... felt that the 
building with the car park should be topped off with an additional floor, to make it 
visually more appropriate and attractive at the gateway to the city. Most of what was 
asked for was asked for aesthetic reasons (McElroy, 1991, int.).
Although the September 1989 agreement restricted the use of 8051 square feet of 
space, the City failed in its attempt to negotiate public access and use of the added space.
The City asked that the conference space added in the building be open to the public in the 
evening, but Unex refused (Ibid.). The City also wanted the car parking to be able to be 
used as public parking at night, but Unex refused (Ibid.)
Quayside Development. Thompson’s Lane / Cambridge
In this case, a developer was agreed to provide and improve public amenities, in 
return for receiving planning permission for a larger scale development than would 
otherwise have been permitted.
The Masters and Fellows of Magdalene College proposed to redevelop a highly 
visible site adjoining the River Cam, which included a number of derelict buildings. The 
Chief Planning Officer’s response to the proposal was positive, and the Planning Department 
sought to cooperate with the developer so as to improve the townscape 
(Winterbottom,1990a, int.). The City was in a strong position to negotiate an agreement 
with the developer, because of planning policies restricting the scale of development in core 
areas of the city. The City also owned land needed for the redevelopment to proceed. In the 
end, however, the City made only limited requests for contributions. In the agreement that 
was signed in February 1986, the College agreed to construct and maintain a walkway along 
the river which was open and accessible to the public, and to construct specified "public 
conveniences" (public rest rooms, accessible to handicapped persons) in the complex
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fronting on the walkway. The City, in turn, granted Magdalene College permission to build a 
total of 8750 square metres of office and retail space and car parking -- which was "more 
development than was specifically provided for under planning policies" (Turner, 1991,int.).
Milton Road Housing Development / Cambridge
A number of major agreements were signed related to proposed developments on a 
16 hectare site on Milton Road in Cambridge. An application for oudine planning 
permission was submitted by Cambridge University seeking permission to develop 
biotechnology science units on 10 acres of the site, and housing on another 28 acres. An 
agreement was signed for this permission in July 1987, specifying that the University 
would contribute £193,356 (65% of the total estimated cost) toward a joint-funded scheme 
to construct off-site surface and foul water sewers. This promised contribution by the 
University allowed the City and Anglian Water to bring forward the construction of a sewer 
interceptor, whose construction would otherwise have been delayed for a number of years. 
"Without that joint-funded scheme, there would have been an embargo on new 
development in the northern part of the city" (Winterbottom,1990a, int.). The agreement 
also required that 1.5 acres of the site be set aside as open space, and that a 20 metre-wide 
green belt at the rear of Birch Close be maintained. Lastly, there was a unique non- 
contributory provision in the agreement. The property had been the site of scientific 
research into anthrax disease between 1941-45, and a number of animal carcasses infected 
with the disease were buried on the land. Areas where animals were buried were identified 
in the legal agreement, and the agreement stipulated that these areas had to be capped with 
concrete slabs and permanently restricted against future development and/or disturbance.
The University subsequently dropped its plans for developing the biotechnology 
science units, and submitted revised applications seeking permission to develop the entire 
site for housing. Five planning agreements were subsequently signed, which revised and 
superseded the terms of the original agreement of July 1987. The first of these agreements 
was signed in December 1987, and granted permission for the development of 69 units of 
social housing on .9 Ha. by a housing association. Although social housing was not 
mentioned in the original planning agreement, the provision of social housing was an 
important planning objective of the City, and the developer's willingness to allocate land to 
this desired use appears to have been a major reason why the City was so cooperative with 
the developers. In a subsequent agreement, the Council released the applicant from the 
covenant contained in the original agreement regarding the transfer of 1.5 acres of open 
space. The amount of open space the developer was required to improve and transfer to the 
Council was reduced from 1.5 acres to .5 acres, and in return the developer agreed to pay a 
commuted sum of £4513 for maintenance of the landscaped open space.
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Havster Drive Housing Development /  Cambridge
In this case, the applicant sought permission to develop a 10.2 acre site on the edge of 
the Green Belt The agreement which was signed in December 1987 granted permission for 
the development of 40 houses on 3.5 acres, but in exchange called for the balance of the site 
to be donated to the City Council and County Council. Two acres were to be donated for a 
school, 3.22 acres were to be donated for public open space, and an additional 1.5 acres 
were to be donated as a playing field available for dual use by the school and community 
residents. In addition to these substantial donations, the applicant pledged to make best 
efforts to construct a highway giving access to the development, which would also provide 
access to the school site. Finally, the applicant pledged to make best efforts to construct a 
foul and surface water system to serve the development, which would also serve the school.
Clav Farm. Trumpington / Cambridge
An 11.8 acre site at Clay Farm in Trumpington, believed by Cambridge County 
Council to be located in the Green Belt, received planning permission for 112 housing units, 
subject to an agreement requiring a major contribution for social housing. The agreement 
specified that one-third of the housing units should be low cost housing units. Other units in 
the development were required to be set aside for “shared ownership”-- with homebuyers 
buying 60% of their homes, and with the remaining 40% held over as an interest-free 
mortgage (payable at the time of sale). Sale and occupancy of the shared-ownership units 
was restricted to persons who were legal residents of Cambridge, who worked in 
Cambridge, or who had an offer of permanent employment in Cambridge. Also, the 
agreement required the applicant to set aside land for open space, to landscape and improve 
the open space and transfer the land to the Council, and to pay a commuted sum for its 
maintenance. Finally, the applicant agreed to pay for the construction of foul sewers and 
surface water drainage improvements, and to pay for the expansion of sewage treatment 
works in the area.
However the agreement which was negotiated for land at Clay Farm came to no 
effect Although the planning agreement was signed on 5 December,1988 specifying the 
above described contributions, the application was called in by the Secretary of State and the 
agreement was overturned (Winterbottom,1990b,int.). The Secretary of State was unwilling 
to allow an agreement to stand which required that one-third of the units be reserved for 
social housing. The ruling of the Secretary of State in this case is ironic in light of later 
policy advice issued by the Government (Circular 7/91), which in effect encouraged local 
authorities to do the very thing that Cambridge was seeking to do at Clay Farm. (For
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additional discussion of the provisions of Circular 7/91, see Chapter Eight.)
Land north and south of Fulboum Old Drift. Cherry Hinton/ South Cambridgeshire
When Pembroke College of the University of Cambridge received permission for 
large-scale residential development in the Fulboum Old Drift area, an agreement was signed 
imposing certain obligations on the applicant The contributions obtained in this and 
subsequent agreements signed for various phases of residential development in this area, 
were the most significant and far-reaching that South Cambridgeshire extracted from 
residential developers during the study period. The agreement required the developer to set 
aside and donate land as for a school (3 acres), to lay out and landscape sizeable areas of 
open space, including 13 acres of playing fields, and to construct a network of cycleways 
and footpaths. The agreement also stated that the applicant was responsible for constructing 
all necessary on-site and off-site sewers and sewer-related works. Finally the agreement 
required the developer to build a perimeter road in a specified alignment, spanning tracks 
owned by British Rail, and linking residential areas to the north and south of the railroad 
tracks. The road specified in the agreement was essential to the development of the site, but 
was also viewed by the planning authority as offering some benefit in terms of over-all 
District traffic circulation.
Barnwell Road Commercial Development / Cambridge
The planning agreement signed for a major commercial development on Barnwell 
Drive in Cambridge appears to contain the most significant package of contributions of any 
agreement signed in Cambridgeshire during the study period. As part of the agreement, the 
City agreed to grant permission for a total of 92,550 square feet of space— a 24,750 square 
foot automobile showroom, workshops and ancillary space, plus 67,800 square feet of B-l 
space. In return the applicant agreed to pay a commuted sum of £175,000 toward the cost of 
providing a play area, neighborhood sports/community facility, and a creche in nearby 
wards. In addition, the developer agreed to sell a separate parcel of land to the City for 
£350,000 so that social housing could be built on i t  In initial negotiations, the Council had 
sought to get the applicant to donate the land at no cost; in response, the applicant offered to 
sell the land for £450,000. The £350,000 sum specified in the agreement was thus a 
compromise sum arrived at through negotiation.
Upon closer analysis, however, questions must be raised as to whether the 
,,contributions,, specified in this agreement were "contributions" at all. The planning 
agreement was negotiated, and the planning permission was issued, in connection with the 
sale of City Council-owned land for commercial development. Indeed, negotiations were
-344-
initiated not by the submission of a planning application, but when the City Council issued a 
brief inviting purchase offers and development proposals for the property with the goal of 
trying to achieve the greatest receipt of capital (Winterbottom,1990a, int.).
Rather than receiving a cash payment for the land it was selling, the City preferred -- 
for financial reasons— to receive payment in the form of "contributions." If the City had 
received the purchase price of the property in the form of cash, it would have been counted 
by the central government, and would have reduced the amount of government funding the 
City Council received. However, receiving payment in the form of contributions avoided 
this problem. The so-called "contributions" received in connection with Barnwell Avenue 
were simply a different way of receiving proceeds from the sale of land.
Even in agreeing to buy land for housing for £350,000, as specified in the agreement, 
the City Council stood to reap a healthy profit from the overall land deal. "[T]he capital 
allocation [of £350,000] can be met out of the premiums received on the Barnwell frontage 
site which is still about £1.5 million above the originally envisioned sum"(Cambridge City 
Council Property Panel memo, 7 November,1989).
Nuffield Road Housing Development / Cambridge
An agreement signed for a major housing development on Nuffield Road also 
contained promises of a number of significant contributions, but once again these 
"contributions" must be understood in context. As in the preceding case of Barnwell Drive, 
the site in question was owned by the City Council. The City Council issued a brief inviting 
development proposals for the land, and negotiated terms for the sale of the land in 
conjunction with drafting a planning agreement A major goal of the City was to encourage 
the building of social housing on the site, and it was therefore willing to subsidise its 
development. It also wished to have the developer pay for public facilities and amenities 
related to the development, rather than receiving money from the sale of the land, and then 
having to spend that money on public improvements. "The City used the agreement to write 
down the value of the land. The District in effect paid for the social housing with its own 
resources, but without having to make a cash expenditure. It represented a novel use of an 
agreement for social housing" (Winterbottom,1990a, int.).
In addition to specifying that development on the site was limited to social housing, 
the agreement specified that the applicant would: construct an off-site all-weather multi­
purpose sports facility, in a location chosen by the Council, at a cost of £45,000, set aside 3 
acres of the 12 acre site as open space; construct landscaping and other improvements on the 
land at a cost of not more than £37,355, and then transfer the land and improvements to the 
Council; construct a toddlers play area; pay commuted sums of £12,235 and £29,460 
respectively for the cost of maintaining the toddlers play area and all-weather multi-purpose
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sports pitch; construct a land drainage scheme, extending approximately 1/2 mile, and pay a 
commuted sum of £7,530 for inspecting, maintaining and repairing the drainage system; 
construct a sewage pumping station and transfer it upon completion to Anglian Water 
Authority; and construct various junction improvements.
These "contributions” obtained from Granta Housing Society for the Nuffield Road 
site were greater and more far-ranging than were typically obtained in relation to conventional 
planning applications submitted by private developers. But when viewed in context, it can be 
seen that they were really not "contributions" at all, but were rather a way of receiving value 
from land which was being sold by the Council.
East Cambridgeshire District Council 
Hare Park New Settlement
The agreement signed for Hare Park, on February 13,1990, with Charles Church 
Developments Pic. was the only Section 52 agreement signed for a New Settlement during 
the study period. The New Settlement covered an area of 776 acres, and was to be 
comprised of 3000 housing units on 270 acres of land, a 50 acre business park, hotel, local 
centre, and associated facilities. In exchange for obtaining planning permission, the 
developer agreed: to construct all necessary water-related infrastructure and roads; to 
contribute £4 million for road improvements to the A45 and other specified off-site highway 
improvements; to set aside 223 acres of the site as a “country park”; to donate 11 acres of 
land for schools, and pay £4,800,000 to the County Council towards the expansion and/or 
improvement of secondary school facilities; to donate land for a police station and fire station 
if required, and multi-use community facilities (indoor sports facilities,day centre, library, 
health centre, ecumenical centre, and associated car parking); to pay £1,150,000 to the 
Council for its future expenses with regard to maintaining facilities serving the New 
Settlement; to contribute £1.5 million to the County for public transport improvements; and 
to provide 225 units of low cost housing by disposing of the freehold at below market cost
Multiple Permissions for Petrol Filling Stations
Six commercial agreements were signed in Hast Cambridgeshire during the study 
period, four of which were for applications to develop petrol filling stations, and associated 
motels and restaurants, along rural County roads and bypass highways. Two of the 
agreements related to sites on the Soham bypass; the others were for sites on the Witchford 
bypass and in Stretham. Three agreements required the applicants to construct turning lanes 
and related road improvements providing safe vehicular access to the proposed
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developments. Two of the agreements required the applicant to construct surface water 
drainage improvements. No other contributions were extracted.
Elv Town Centre Redevelopment
An agreement was signed in December 1989 in connection with a grant of permission 
for a major retail development with associated car parking on a 10 acre site in the center of 
Ely. The developer, Burton Property Trust, agreed to contribute £100,000 toward 
refurbishment of market buildings, and to pay £449,000 toward the cost of repaving roads 
and constructing pedestrian improvements in the Market Square. The developer also agreed 
to contribute £20,000 toward provision of a community centre and citizen advice bureau.
This particular agreement was not implemented. A new planning application was submitted 
by a new applicant (Waitrose), and a new agreement was signed on 12 April, 1990, just after 
the end of the study period, which basically contained the same offers of contributions 
previously negotiated from the prior applicant
Business Park/ Mepal Airfield. Sutton
Planning permission was given on 28 June 1988 for a 52 acre industrial estate, called 
Elean Business Park, at Mepal Airfield in Sutton. This planning permission was granted 
without an agreement. However, after receiving planning permission the developers came to 
the conclusion that changes and improvements to the County road on which it was located 
would improve prospects for marketing and developing the site. The developers therefore 
approached the District Council and County Highway Authority proposing to pay 100% of 
the cost of constructing improvements to the adjacent County Road (B1381), including a new 
roundabout. An agreement was signed on 30 March,1990, calling for the developer to 
construct the various highway improvements called for in the agreement, which were valued 
at £350,000.
-347-
Fenland District Council
The roost significant contributions obtained from a commercial developer in Fenland 
during the study period were obtained in an agreement signed in March 1990 for a large-scale 
commercial development (hotel, restaurant, petrol station, B1 office space, B2 general 
industry, and B8 storage and distribution space) on a 12.8 hectare site on Cromwell Road in 
Wisbech. In the agreement, the applicant agreed to construct an off-site surface water 
drainage scheme, and to contribute financially to the upgrading of off-site sewage treatment 
works, and a sewage pumping station. The developer also agreed to design and construct 
road improvements- to widen adjacent roads, to construct a new right turning lane, and to 
provide lighting the full site frontage along Cromwell Road- and to enter into a Section 278 
agreement with the Secretary of State for Transport for all works affecting roads under his 
jurisdiction. Finally, the applicant agreed to sell 3 acres of the site to the District Council “at 
historic land cost” for the purposes of an Innovation Centre.
March Concrete Products received outline planning permission in 1988 for an 18 acre 
residential development, subject to an agreement requiring the applicant to reconstruct and 
improve two access roads leading to the site which were in poor condition. A resident of the 
area, commenting on the proposed agreement, expressed the view that the developers 
improvement of this road would add an average of £5000 to the value of the properties being 
developed.
An agreement was signed in April 1989 in Fenland which required the developer of a 
10 acre site in Leverington to construct improvements to the public road, and to pay £12,000 
to the District for the installation of traffic lights at a nearby junction. This payment was 
index-linked, and was payable within 14 days of completion of the development
The developer of a 2.2 hectare residential development in Manea, Fenland signed an 
agreement in January 1990 agreeing to convey land free of charge to the District Council for 
public open space, and to pay £10,000 to enable the Council to provide children’s play 
equipment on the site. The agreement committed the district to complete the installation of 
the play equipment before not more than 25% of the units were completed and occupied.
An agreement was signed in February 1990 granting permission for 49 sheltered 
housing units in Fenland, but also requiring that occupancy of the units be restricted to 
persons 55 years of age or more, that the units be leased at affordable rents (which were 
defined in the agreement), and that mini bus service be provided to and from March town 
centre four times weekly for residents of the development on a non-profit making basis.
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Huntingdonshire District Council
Five agreements were signed in Huntingdonshire with commercial developers who 
agreed to make commuted sum payments for parking. Huntingdonshire was in fact the only 
District in the County to obtain commuted sum parking payments. The District did not use a 
uniform fee in assessing parking costs to developers in different areas. Rather, the amounts 
assessed varied considerably, depending presumably on the amount of parking required by 
particular commercial uses, and the variable cost of providing additional parking in different 
locations. For example, a developer adding 325 square metres of office space to an existing 
building in Huntingdon agreed to pay £26,250. A developer adding 626 square metres to a 
commercial property in S t Ives agreed to pay £18,750. An applicant who received 
permission to add 151 square metres of space to an existing residence, to accommodate a 
catering business, agreed to pay £16,800. And an applicant who obtained permission to 
convert an 1057 square metre building and add 287 square metres of floor area for retail and 
office use agreed to pay £31,875.
An agreement was signed in November 1989 granting permission for a fireworks 
factory to relocate from a site in a developed area to a site along the A45 in Kimbolton. The 
agreement did not extract any contribution. Rather, the agreement specified that use of the 
site where the fireworks factory was located at the time of the agreement had to be 
discontinued permanently once the new factory was completed on the new site.
An agreement was signed in December 1989 in response to an application for 
approval of Reserved Matters related to the development of a 13 hectare business park. The 
agreement limited the amount of floor space on the site to no more than 26,250 square 
metres, and set a limit on the height of buildings. The agreement also required that 
implementation of the permission was conditional on the applicant completing construction of 
a lorry parking area in accordance with previous outline permission.
The most significant contributions obtained from a residential developer in 
Huntingdonshire during the study period was obtained after the District had refused the 
developer’s planning application. A developer applied for permission to build 31 units of 
housing on 4.6 acres in the village of Grafham, and made unsolicited offers of contributions. 
The developer offered to relocate the village playing field, to build a pavilion with changing 
rooms, and to devote 6 of the units in the development for occupancy by elderly persons. 
Despite these offers of contributions, the planning authority refused to grant permission.
The applicant appealed the refusal and was upheld on appeal by a DoE Inspector, who took 
account of the offer of contributions, and cited them as a reason for approval 
(Potter, 1991,int.). An agreement was signed following the appeal decision, in July, 1989, 
incorporating the developer’s initial offers of contributions.
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Peterborough Citv Council
East of England Showground. Peterborough
The most extensive contributions obtained by Peterborough during the study period 
were contained in an agreement signed in July 1989 for a proposed major development at the 
East of England Showground. Two planning applications were submitted simultaneously by 
the East of England Agricultural Society, the long-time owner of the land. One application 
proposed to build up to 350 units of housing on 27 acres of land, and the other proposed to 
build a business park on 16.2 acres of adjoining land. In granting permission for these major 
developments, the City Council signed an agreement in which the applicant agreed: to build a 
new two lane carriageway; to pay £500,000 to the County Highway Authority for other 
roadway improvements; and to construct footpaths and cycleways, including a footbridge 
over Orton Parkway. Further the Society agreed that, prior to implementing the 
development, it would to pay the Council £235,000 as a contribution toward the provision by 
the Council of an all-weather sports pitch. However, soon after the agreement was signed it 
became clear that the deal would probably have to be renegotiated. It was learned that the site 
could not be developed as proposed without a ransom strip being included, which was 
owned by the Commission of New Towns. Under British Law, the owner of the ransom 
strip could claim to be compensated for up to half of the added value of the site. As a result 
of this ransom situation, the Agricultural Society had to revise plans for the proposed 
development, showing a different means of access to the site. In the meantime, another 
complication arose as well. The £500,000 contribution toward roadway improvements was 
expected to be matched by a roughly equal transport supplementary grant from the 
Department of Transport However, that supplementary transport grant was turned down, 
and by 1991 the ability to complete the roadway improvements as laid out in the agreement 
was in doubt. Under the terms of the agreement, if the developer's funds were not used 
within 6 months for the highway improvements specified in the agreement, then the funds 
had to be returned to the applicant, with interest
Two years after the agreement had been signed, development of the Showgrounds 
site still had not gone forward, and the gains negotiated in the agreement had not been 
realised. The passage of time added a further complication relative to the 1989 agreement 
The funding which the City Council negotiated for the all-weather sports pitch was not index- 
linked, so that by 1991 the amount promised by the developer for the construction of the 
facility was no longer adequate. Planners at the City Council considered the option of trying 
to renegotiate the agreement to obtain the extra margin of funds needed for the sports facility, 
but felt that success in renegotiating the agreement was unlikely, given the fact that land 
values had significantly declined in the intervening two years.
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The agreement signed for the East of England Showground site highlights the 
difficulty of negotiating agreements for complex projects. It also serves to underscore the 
fact that contributions promised in agreements often do not materialise.
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APPENDIX THREE:
DATA ON CONTRIBUTIONS, BY DISTRICT-
Number of agreements with contributions for specific 
purposes
Number of contributions (forms of contributions) for 
specific purposes
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APPENDIX 3.1:
FORMS OF CONTRIBUTIONS- CAMBRIDGE
Agreements Construct With
WithContrib. Pay Construct Joint-Funding
Residential Projects
Foul Sewer 6 1 5  2
Sewage Treatment 1 1 0  0
Sewage Pumping Sta. 2 1 2  0
Surface Drainage 6 1 6  2
Roads 2 0 2 0
Footpaths/Cycleways 0 0 0 0
Rec./O.S./Amenity 5 0 4 0
School 1 0  0 0
Other Public Bldgs. 0 0 0 0
Housing 4 0 4 0
Parking 1 0  1 0
Public Transport 0 0 0 0
Miscellaneous 0 0 0 0
Sub-total 28 4 24 4
Commercial Projects
Foul Sewer 0 0 0 0
Sewage Treatment 0 0 0 0
Sewage Pumping Sta. 0 0 0 0
Surface Drainage 4 4 0 0
Roads 3 0 2 0
Footpaths/Cycleways 1 0  1 0
Rec./O.S./Amenity 2 1 1  0
School 0 0 0 0
Other Public Bldgs. 4 1 3  0
Housing 1 0  0 0
Parking 0 0 0 0
Public Transport 0 0 0 0
Miscellaneous 0 0 0 0
Sub-total 15 6 7 0
TOTAL 43 10 31 4
Donate
Land
0
0
0
0
0
0
5 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0
6
0
0
0
0
2
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
3
9
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APPENDIX 3.1 cont: Cambridge
Donate
Easement
Sell
Land Maintain
Comm. Sum 
Maintenance
Comm. Sum 
Parking
Sell/Lease Below 
Market Cost
Tota
Contri
Residential Projects 
Foul Sewer 0 0 0 0 0 0 8
Sewage Treatment 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Sewage Pumping Sta. 2 0 0 0 0 0 5
Surface Drainage 1 0 0 0 0 0 10
Roads 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
Footpaths/Cycleways 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Rec./O.S./Amenity 0 0 2 2 0 0 13
School 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Other Public Bldgs. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Housing 0 0 0 0 0 0 4
Parking 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Public Transport 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Miscellaneous 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Sub-total 3 0 2 2 0 0 45
Commercial Projects
Foul Sewer 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Sewage Treatment 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Sewage Pumping Sta. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Surface Drainage 0 0 0 0 0 0 4
Roads 0 0 0 0 0 0 4
Footpaths/Cycleways 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
Rec./O.S./Amenity 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
School 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Other Public Bldgs. 0 0 0 0 0 0 4
Housing 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
Parking 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Public Transport 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Miscellaneous 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Sub-total 0 1 0 0 0 0 17
TOTAL 3 1 2 2 0 0 62
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APPENDIX 3J2z
FORMS OF CONTRIBUTIONS- EAST CAMBRIDGESHIRE
Agreements Construct With Dona
Residential*
WithContrib. Pay Construct Joint-Funding Lane
Fold Sewer 5 1 5 0 1
Sewage Treatment 1 0 1 0 1
Sewage Pumping Sta. 1 0 1 0 1
Surface Drainage 5 1 5 0 1
Roads 2 1 2 0 1
Footpaths/Cycleways 1 0 1 0 1
Rec./O.S./Amenity 3 0 1 0 3
School 3 1 0 0 3
Other Public Bldgs. 1 0 0 0 1
Housing 3 0 1 0 0
Parking 0 0 0 0 0
Public Transport 1 1 0 0 0
Miscellaneous 0 0 0 0 0
Sub-total* 26 
* Hare Park classified as residential
5 17 0 13
Commercial Projects
Foul Sewer 0 0 0 0 0
Sewage Treatment 0 0 0 0 0
Sewage Pumping Sta. 0 0 0 0 0
Surface Drainage 0 0 0 0 0
Roads 4 1 3 0 0
Footpaths/Cycleways 0 0 0 0 0
Rec./O.S./Amenity 0 0 0 0 0
School 0 0 0 0 0
Other Public Bldgs. 0 0 0 0 0
Housing 0 0 0 0 0
Parking 0 0 0 0 0
Public Transport 0 0 0 0 0
Miscellaneous 1 1 0 0 0
Sub-total 5 2 3 0 0
TOTAL 31 7 20 0 13
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APPENDIX 3.2 cont.: East Cambridgeshire
Donate Sell Comm. Sum Comm. Sum Sell/Lease Below Total
Residential
Easement Land Maintain Maintenance Parking Market Cost Contrib.
Foul Sewer 0 0 0 0 0 0 7
Sewage Treatment 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
Sewage Pumping Sta. 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
Surface Drainage 0 0 0 0 0 0 7
Roads 0 0 0 0 0 0 4
Footpaths/Cycleways 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
Rec./O.SVAmenity 0 2 1 1 0 0 8
School 0 2 0 0 0 0 6
Other Public Bldgs. 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
Housing 0 3 0 0 0 1 4
Parking 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Public Transport 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Miscellaneous 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Sub-total 0 7 1 1 0 1 45
Commercial Projects 
Foul Sewer 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Sewage Treatment 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Sewage Pumping Sta. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Surface Drainage 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Roads 0 0 0 0 0 0 4
Footpaths/Cycleways 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Rec./O.S./Amenity 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
School 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Other Public Bldgs. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Housing 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Parking 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Public Transport 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Miscellaneous 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Sub-total 0 0 0 0 0 0 5
TOTAL 0 7 1 1 0 1 50
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APPENDIX 3.3:
FORMS OF CONTRIBUTIONS- FENLAND
Agreements Construct With Donate
Residential Projects
WithContrib. Pay Construct Joint-Funding Land
Foul Sewer 7 3 4 0 0
Sewage Treatment 8 5 3 0 0
Sewage Pumping Sta. 0 0 0 0 0
Surface Drainage 17 0 17 0 0
Roads 24 1 24 0 0
Footpaths/Cycleways 18 0 18 0 18
Rec^0.S7Amenity 6 1 5 0 2
School 0 0 0 0 0
Other Public Bldgs. 0 0 0 0 0
Housing 1 0 0 0 0
Parking 1 0 1 0 1
Public Transport 1 0 0 0 0
Miscellaneous 0 0 0 0 0
Sub-total 83 10 72 0 21
Commercial Projects
Foul Sewer 3 0 3 0 0
Sewage Treatment 1 0 1 0 0
Sewage Pumping Sta. 1 1 0 0 0
Surface Drainage 3 0 3 0 0
Roads 6 0 6 0 0
Footpaths/Cycleways 4 0 4 0 4
Rec./O.S./Amenity 1 0 1 0 0
School 0 0 0 0 0
Other Public Bldgs. 0 0 0 0 0
Housing 0 0 0 0 0
Parking 0 0 0 0 0
Public Transport 0 0 0 0 0
Miscellaneous 1 0 0 0 0
Sub-total 20 1 18 0 4
TOTAL 103 11 90 0 25
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APPENDIX 3.3 conk: Fenland
Donate Sell Comm. Sum Comm. Sum Sell/Lease Below Total
Easement Land Maintain Maintenance Parking Market Cost Contrib.
Residential Projects
Foul Sewer 0 0 0 1 0 0 8
Sewage Treatment 0 0 0 1 0 0 9
Sewage Pumping Sta. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Surface Drainage 0 0 0 1 0 0 18
Roads 0 0 0 0 0 0 25
Footpaths/Cycleways 0 0 0 0 0 0 36
Rec./O.S./Amenity 0 0 1 0 0 0 9
School 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Other Public Bldgs. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Housing 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
Parking 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
Public Transport 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
Miscellaneous 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Sub-total 0 0 1 3 0 2 109
Commercial Projects
Foul Sewer 0 0 0 0 0 0 3
Sewage Treatment 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Sewage Pumping Sta. 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Surface Drainage 0 0 0 0 0 0 3
Roads 0 0 0 0 0 0 6
Footpaths/Cycleways 0 0 0 0 0 0 8
Rec./O.S./Amenity 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
School 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Other Public Bldgs. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Housing 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Parking 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Public Transport 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Miscellaneous 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
Sub-total 0 1 0 0 0 0 24
TOTAL 0 1 1 3 0 2 133
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APPENDIX 3.4:
FORMS OF CONTRIBUTIONS- HUNTINGDONSHIRE
Agreements Construct With Donate
WithContrib. Pay Construct Joint-Funding Lam
Residential
Foul Sewer 10 3 7 1 0
Sewage Treatment 8 8 0 0 0
Sewage Pumping Sta. 4 4 0 0 0
Surface Drainage 6 0 6 0 0
Roads 0 0 0 0 0
Footpaths/Cycleways 0 0 0 0 0
Rec.AD.SVAmenity 5 0 5 0 1
School 0 0 0 0 0
Other Public Bldgs. 1 0 1 0 1
Housing 1 0 1 0 0
Parking 0 0 0 0 0
Public Transport 0 0 0 0 0
Miscellaneous 1 0 1 0 0
Sub-total 36 15 21 1 2
Commercial
Foul Sewer 0 0 0 0 0
Sewage Treatment 1 1 0 0 0
Sewage Pumping Sta. 0 0 0 0 0
Surface Drainage 0 0 0 0 0
Roads 0 0 0 0 0
Footpaths/Cycleways 0 0 0 0 0
Rec./O.S./Amenity 1 0 1 0 1
School 0 0 0 0 0
Other Public Bldgs. 0 0 0 0 0
Housing 0 0 0 0 0
Parking 5 0 0 0 0
Public Transport 0 0 0 0 0
Miscellaneous 0 0 0 0 0
Sub-total 7 1 1 0 1
TOTAL 43 16 22 1 3
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APPENDIX 3.4 cont.: Huntingdonshire
Donate Sell Comm. Sum Comm. Sum Sell/Lease Below Total
Residential
Easement Land Maintain Maintenance Parking Market Cost Contr
Foul Sewer 0 0 0 0 0 0 11
Sewage Treatment 0 0 0 0 0 0 8
Sewage Pumping Sta. 0 0 0 0 0 0 4
Surface Drainage 0 0 1 0 0 0 7
Roads 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Footpaths/Cycleways 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Rec./O.S ./Amenity 0 0 0 0 0 0 6
School 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Other Public Bldgs. 0 0 0 0 0 1 3
Housing 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Parking 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Public Transport 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Miscellaneous 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Sub-total 0 0 1 0 0 1 41
Commercial
Foul Sewer 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Sewage Treatment 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Sewage Pumping Sta. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Surface Drainage 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Roads 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Footpaths/Cycleways 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Rec./O.S./Amenity 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
School 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Other Public Bldgs. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Housing 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Parking 0 0 0 0 5 0 5
Public Transport 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Miscellaneous 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
TOTAL 0 0 0 0 5 0 8
TOTAL 0 0 1 0 5 1 49
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APPENDIX 3.5:
FORMS OF CONTRIBUTIONS- PETERBOROUGH
Agreements Construct With
WithContrib. Pay Construct Joint-Funding
Residential Projects
Foul Sewer 1 0  1 0
Sewage Treatment 0 0 0 0
Sewage Pumping Sta. 1 1 0  0
Surface Drainage 2 0 2 0
Roads 1 1 0  0
Footpaths/Cycleways 2 0 2 0
Rec./O.S./Amenity 3 1 2  0
School 0 0 0 0
Other Public Bldgs. 0 0 0 0
Housing 1 0  0 0
Parking 0 0 0 0
Public Transport 0 0 0 0
Miscellaneous 0 0 0 0
Sub-total 11 3 7 0
Commercial Projects
Foul Sewer 0 0 0 0
Sewage Treatment 0 0 0 0
Sewage Pumping Sta. 0 0 0 0
Surface Drainage 0 0 0 0
Roads 1 1 1  0
Footpaths/Cycleways 1 0  1 0
Rec./O.S./Amenity 2 1 0  0
School 0 0 0 0
Other Public Bldgs. 0 0 0 0
Housing 0 0 0 0
Parking 0 0 0 0
Public Transport 0 0 0 0
Miscellaneous 0 0 0 0
Sub-total 4 2 2 0
TOTAL 15 5 9 0
Donate
Land
0
0
0
0
0
2
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
2
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
3
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APPENDIX 3.5 cont.: Peterborough
Donate Sell 
Easement Land Maintain
Comm. Sum 
Maintenance
Comm. Sum 
Parking
Sell/Lease Below 
Market Cost
Tots
Contr
Residential Projects 
Foul Sewer 0 0 0 0 0 0 1-
Sewage Treatment 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Sewage Pumping Sta. 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Surface Drainage 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
Roads 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Footpaths/Cycleways 0 2 0 0 0 0 6
Rec./O.S./Amenity 0 0 0 0 0 0 3
School 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Other Public Bldgs. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Housing 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
Parking 0 0 0 0 0 0 „ 0
Public Transport 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Miscellaneous 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Sub-total 0 2 0 0 0 1 15
Commercial Projects
Foul Sewer 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Sewage Treatment 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Sewage Pumping Sta. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Surface Drainage 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Roads 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
Footpaths/Cycleways 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
Rec./O.S./Amenity 0 0 1 0 0 0 2
School 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Other Public Bldgs. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Housing 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Parking 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Public Transport 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Miscellaneous 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Sub-total 0 0 1 0 0 0 6
TOTAL 0 2 1 0 0 1 21
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APPENDIX 3.6:
FORMS OF CONTRIBUTIONS- SOUTH CAMBRIDGESHIRE
Agreements
WithContrib. Pay Construct
Construct With 
Joint-Funding
Donai
Lane
Residential Projects 
Foul Sewer 2 0 2 0 0
Sewage Treatment 1 1 0 0 0
Sewage Pumping Sta. 1 1 0 0 0
Surface Drainage 6 2 4 0 0
Roads 4 0 4 0 0
Footpaths/Cycleways 6 0 6 0 6
Rec./O.S./Amenity 5 0 5 0 4
School 3 0 0 0 3
Other Public Bldgs. 0 0 0 0 0
Housing 0 0 0 0 0
Parking 0 0 0 0 0
Public Transport 0 0 0 0 0
Miscellaneous 0 0 0 0 0
Sub-total 28 4 21 0 13
Commercial Projects
Foul Sewer 1 0 1 0 0
Sewage Treatment 0 0 0 0 0
Sewage Pumping Sta. 0 0 0 0 0
Surface Drainage 5 2 3 0 0
Roads 6 0 6 0 1
Footpaths/Cycleways 3 0 3 0 3
Rec./O.S./Amenity 1 0* 1 0 1
School 0 0 0 0 0
Other Public Bldgs. 0 0 0 0 0
Housing 0 0 0 0 0
Parking 0 0 0 0 0
Public Transport 0 0 0 0 0
Miscellaneous 0 0 0 0 0
Sub-total 16 2 14 0 5
TOTAL 44 6 35 0 18
* Contribution of £200,000 by Tesco not mentioned in agreement, not counted in table
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APPENDIX 3.6.: South Cambs. cont.
Donate Sell Comm. Sum Comm. Sum Sell/Lease Below Total
Residential Projects
Easement Land Maintain Maintenance Parking Market Cost Contri
Foul Sewer 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
Sewage Treatment 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Sewage Pumping Sta. 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Surface Drainage 1 0 1 1 0 0 9
Roads 0 0 0 0 0 0 4
Footpaths/Cycleways 0 0 0 0 0 0 12
Rec.A3.S./Amenity 1 0 1 2 0 0 13
School 0 0 0 0 0 0 3
Other Public Bldgs. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Housing 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Parking 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Public Transport 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Miscellaneous 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Sub-total 2 0 2 3 0 0 45
Commercial Projects
Foul Sewer 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Sewage Treatment 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Sewage Pumping Sta. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Surface Drainage 0 0 0 1 0 0 6
Roads 0 0 1 0 0 0 8
Footpaths/Cycleways 0 0 0 0 0 0 6
Rec./O.S./Amenity 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
School 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Other Public Bldgs. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Housing 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Parking 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Public Transport 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Miscellaneous 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Sub-total 0 0 1 1 0 0 23
TOTAL 2 0 3 4 0 0 68
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